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**Cable, 8th Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces
General Staff to Cdes. Shtykov and Vasil'yev**

Citation:

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Summary:

Instructions for Kim Il Sung in light of the fact that the Chinese troops destined for Korea are not ready to act.

Original Language:

Russian

Contents:

Translation - English

Top Secret

8th Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff

Cable № 75511

To Cdes. Shtykov and Vasil'yev

Read the following to Kim Il Sung:

"Yesterday a meeting of representatives of the VKP(b) CC Politburo and representatives of the Chinese Communist Party CC Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao was held in the USSR on the issue of action by Chinese troops to help Korea.

From the report of Zhou Enlai it became clear that the Chinese troops destined for Korea are not ready to act, have no tanks and very little artillery, protection from the air cannot be provided in less than two months, and that more than six months will be required to supply [them] with tanks and artillery considering the training of the troops in armor and artillery matters.

In view of such a report by Zhou Enlai the meeting unanimously recognized that China can only provide aid with troops after six months.

Since such aid is belated and it can only arrive after the occupation of Korea by American troops the meeting came to the conclusion that given their technical weakness and unpreparedness the Chinese forces cannot have success in Korea at the present time but, on the contrary, will find themselves in a critical position.

In view of all the above the meeting of the representatives of the Chinese and Soviet CC's recommend:

1. To immediately begin the evacuation of Pyongyang and other very important locations without any sort of panic;
2. The Korean people's forces are to make a fighting retreat to the north, delaying the enemy, and not letting him quickly branch out to the north;
3. Concentrate part of the troops in the mountainous regions north of Wonsan and Pyongyang, forming a strong defense there, and send the other part into the rear of the enemy in small detachments for partisan warfare [delo];
4. Send the mobilized Koreans to form new reserve divisions across the Chinese border to Manchuria in small groups and form divisions from them there (the Chinese comrades have agreed to this);
5. Send the transports that arrived with the Soviet weapons which have still not been used by the Korean comrades into the service of the Korean divisions being formed in Manchuria;
6. Put all Koreans studying in the USSR into aeronautics and organize air units from them which will get aircraft from the USSR;
7. Either send all Soviet advisers to the USSR or use them to form new Korean

divisions in Manchuria, as Kim Il Sung sees fit.

You are informed that Cde. Mao Zedong agrees with the opinion of the meeting and approves it.

Nº 4/8737 Fyn Si

12 October 1950

Copy Nº 1 - to Cde. Vasilevsky; Copy Nº 2 - to Cde. Stalin; Copy Nº 3 - to the file of the 8th Directorate