

**April 18, 1995**

**1995 Review and Extension Conference of the  
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of  
Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Summary and  
Verbal Records (excerpts)**

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**Summary:**

Opening statements in the General Debate by Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, United Kingdom, United States, Russia, South Africa, The Netherlands.

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1995 Review and Extension Conference  
of the Parties to the  
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation  
of Nuclear Weapons

Final Document

Part III

Summary and Verbatim Records

New York, 1996

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## SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 2nd MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,  
on Tuesday, 18 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

## GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 15)

1. Mr. JUPPE (France), speaking on behalf of the European Union and Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic, said that, although the countries of Europe differed in their level of economic development, recent political history and choices with regard to the use of nuclear energy, they all held in common the values of democracy and freedom. They were also united by their common commitment to the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). That commitment was based on the conviction that the proliferation of nuclear weapons was a threat to peace and international security, and that the NPT served the fundamental interests of the international community.
2. Concerning non-proliferation, the predictions made 20 years earlier that there would be 20 to 30 nuclear-weapon States by the end of the century had not materialized; in fact, South Africa's decision to renounce its weapons signalled an opposite trend. The draft treaty on the denuclearization of Africa had the support of all the European countries, who welcomed it as an undertaking for the peace and stability of that continent. Brazil, Argentina and Chile had given up their intention to acquire nuclear weapons, and Cuba's recent signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco should allow the conclusion of a legal instrument to prevent the emergence of nuclear weapons in the Latin American region. The discovery during the Gulf War of a secret nuclear programme in Iraq had led to a rethinking of the spirit in which International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards were carried out. They were currently based not only on trust among signatory countries, but also on improved capability to detect possible clandestine activities, which was indispensable for maintaining their credibility. As in the case of North Korea, the Agency must be able to verify effectively that States were complying with their obligations.
3. As the review would confirm, the Treaty made it possible for many countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, because of the confidence generated by compliance with its obligations. Export controls, far from being an obstacle to the development of trade in nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, were an essential component of the international system of non-proliferation.
4. During the 1990s, détente and peace had led to unprecedented disarmament accords between the two main adversaries of the cold war, and a return to the situation that had prevailed just ten years earlier was almost inconceivable. The arms race had ended: the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia would be reduced by nearly two thirds, and the two European nuclear powers had begun unilateral arms reduction efforts.
5. For the first time in history, the international community had decided to begin negotiations on a complete nuclear test ban treaty that would be universal and verifiable. The European Union welcomed the forthcoming opening of negotiations at the Disarmament Conference to draft a convention banning

the production of fissile materials for explosive purposes. It also welcomed the efforts by the five nuclear-weapon States to respond to the expectations of the non-nuclear signatories of the NPT regarding security assurances. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) provided a collective, global and concrete response to that problem.

6. The European Union solemnly reaffirmed its commitment, in accordance with article VI of NPT, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. The world was still going through a phase of change and instability, and the nature of the balances on which the next century would be founded was still unknown. Although there were an ever-growing number of accessions to the NPT, stronger international safeguards, more diversified means of verification and greater international solidarity, new regional ambitions were surfacing where the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction could be particularly dangerous. In order to reduce the risks of uncertainty and instability, increase confidence among States and strengthen the international legal status of the NPT, the Treaty must be made permanent. What united the parties to the NPT was more important than what divided them. The international community expected from the participants in the Conference the consolidation of the system of non-proliferation and confirmation of the disarmament process, and the indefinite extension of the Treaty was the only solution compatible with those objectives.



34. Mr. KINKEL (Germany) said that the Conference was not a routine diplomatic event; the decision to be taken was of crucial importance for peace and security in the twenty-first century. At stake was the future of mankind. The threat arising from the most dangerous of all weapons of mass destruction must be averted. Although the nuclear genie could not be forced back into the bottle, everything must be done to tame it. Many strategies to that end had failed. The non-proliferation Treaty was a realistic and successful response to the nuclear challenge, based on the recognition that a continually increasing number of nuclear-weapon States was bound to lead to incalculable risks for the survival of mankind.

35. At a time of mistrust between East and West and disagreement between North and South, the Treaty had been the first evidence of a new global thinking. Forced upon the signatory States by a common survival instinct, a historic compromise had been founded which took account of their common interests. In spite of its deficiencies, the Treaty had lived up to all expectations over the past 25 years. Dangerous developments in the direction of the proliferation of nuclear weapons had been halted or reversed. The number of signatory States had risen to 178. All the successor States of the Soviet Union had acceded. Africa had become a nuclear-weapon-free zone. If the Treaty was extended indefinitely, it would be easier to persuade the other countries to join. The Treaty was the guarantor of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the control of IAEA; IAEA was making a valuable contribution through its technical assistance programmes. Now that the confrontation between East and West was over, the Treaty was needed more than ever. In a multipolar world full of nuclear players, there could no longer be a balance of terror, only an omnipresent threat. Nuclear proliferation was no longer a danger for States alone: nuclear civil wars and atomic weapons in the hands of terrorists had become conceivable.

36. Germany had long ago renounced all types of weapons of mass destruction, and had proved that renunciation of nuclear weapons was in no way a disadvantage. That decision was wholeheartedly supported by all democratic parties in the German Bundestag. Germany was fully committed to all the obligations arising from the Treaty. It appreciated the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States and would continue to urge further energetic steps towards disarmament. However, it rejected the idea of making the Treaty's extension conditional, since that would only play into the hands of those who sought a pretext to justify their own nuclear ambitions. For Germany, the durability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime had absolute priority over all other considerations. More States were committed to the Treaty than to any other international agreement except the Charter. There was now an unprecedented opportunity to make the ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons a universal norm of international law, provided that agreement was reached on an indefinite, unconditional extension of the Treaty. The United Nations was needed as the guardian of non-proliferation. The Security Council should play an active role in that respect.

37. In recent years, the nuclear disarmament obligation in article VI had been fulfilled to an extent no one could have imagined. That process must be vigorously continued; the five nuclear Powers must fulfil that obligation since it had been the very reason for the accession to the Treaty of the great majority of the community of nations.

38. In order to make the nuclear disarmament process irreversible, no more fissionable material must be produced for weapons purposes, and weapons-grade fissionable material from dismantled weaponry must not be used to build new weapons and must not fall into the hands of nuclear smugglers. Hundreds of tonnes of spare plutonium must be reliably monitored. Germany reiterated its proposal for an international plutonium regime.

39. There was an urgent need for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. If the 1995 deadline could not be met, it must be signed in 1996.

40. The expansion of the Conference on Disarmament was long overdue. The article VI obligation applied to all signatory States, whether they were nuclear-weapon States or not. Therefore, the sole multilateral negotiating forum for global disarmament and arms control should be open to all those who wished to participate.

41. In the light of events in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the instruments available to IAEA must be further strengthened. The right to conduct special inspections in non-declared sites must be exercised and enforced.

42. Germany welcomed the merging and harmonization of the declarations by the nuclear-weapon States on security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon

States. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was an important step in that direction.

43. Everyone knew that the real problems facing mankind on the threshold of the twenty-first century, including mass migration and terrorism, environmental disasters, poverty and overpopulation, could not be solved through the possession of nuclear weapons. However, stopping proliferation for all time and a permanent disarmament pledge by the nuclear-weapon States were major preconditions for solving those problems.

44. Germany therefore called for the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty.





16. Mr. van MIERLO (Netherlands) expressed satisfaction that, since 1990, some 30 States, including two nuclear-weapon States, had acceded to the Treaty, which, with 175 States parties, had become nearly universal. There was no doubt that the Treaty had turned out to be the most successful global security treaty since the world had entered the nuclear age. The question facing the Conference was therefore whether the Treaty, which had served well in the relatively stable world of the cold war, would continue to serve well in a less predictable future. His country's answer to that question was yes, for it saw the Treaty as providing the necessary framework for nuclear disarmament, durable disarmament and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Netherlands therefore favoured the unconditional extension of the Treaty for an indefinite period, since that course of action would best serve those purposes.

17. The non-proliferation Treaty was unique in many respects. First, its duration had not been unlimited from the outset. Second, it intentionally created inequality between the nuclear haves and have-nots. And lastly, it provided for a linkage between nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful cooperation.

18. The only global legal instrument aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Treaty had been highly successful in preventing additional States beyond the five declared nuclear Powers at the time of its conclusion from acquiring nuclear weapons. The fears that existed when the Treaty had been concluded had not come to pass and, at least, the number of nuclear States was the same as in 1968.

19. The very welcome increase in the number of parties to the Treaty should not give rise to complacency; the ultimate goal was universal adherence to the Treaty. The Conference could contribute to the achievement of that goal by sending a strong signal to States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty or even accepted its norms. Making the Treaty permanent would be just such a signal.

20. Out of their overriding concern to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, the signatories to the Treaty had accepted a temporary inequality between the nuclear haves and have-nots. That unusual provision had been agreed to because all the parties had realized that, whatever their status, it was in their common interest and that their determination to reduce nuclear weapons and proceed to disarmament would ultimately do away with that inequality.

21. After reviewing the considerable progress made in recent years in the area of disarmament, he pointed out that, under the START I and START II Treaties, the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation would soon be reduced by two thirds.

22. In the current favourable climate, the five nuclear-weapon States should actively engage in further arms control and disarmament negotiations. Security Council resolution 984 (1995), adopted on 11 April 1995, provided the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty with security assurances and solemnly reaffirmed the obligation of the nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith leading to nuclear disarmament. The progressive implementation of article VI of the Treaty, dealing with nuclear disarmament, had become more feasible than ever and the



world could look forward to a day when a complete nuclear disarmament would be a reality.

23. The Netherlands fully supported the negotiations under way in Geneva on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and noted with satisfaction that the talks begun in January 1994 had made significant progress. However, there were still intricate political and technical issues to be solved. The current negotiations should be concluded quickly so that the world would finally see an end to all nuclear testing. The start of negotiations on a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive purposes was another positive development. Progress on those two fronts would further strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

24. Turning to the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, he said that efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons should not keep the non-nuclear-weapon States from benefiting from civilian nuclear technology, which could play an important role in improving the quality of life. The experience with civilian nuclear cooperation had perhaps been disappointing to some States. The overriding reason for that was growing scepticism about the possibility of benefiting from nuclear energy in an ecologically and economically sound and sustainable manner. Such scepticism was felt in the industrialized and the developing world alike. His country was for its part, reappraising the role of nuclear energy in its national industry. That did not mean that the beneficial impact of nuclear technology on people's everyday lives should be forgotten, but it was important to note the limitations to the use of the atom.

25. The challenge embodied in the non-proliferation Treaty was to make sure that no nuclear technology or material, once transferred for peaceful purposes, was diverted for military applications. In that connection, he wholeheartedly supported the statement by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency the preceding day and fully supported the efforts being made in Vienna to strengthen the existing safeguards regime through "Programme 93 + 2".

26. A strengthened safeguards regime and the extension of the non-proliferation Treaty for an indefinite period would not hamper peaceful nuclear cooperation between States. On the contrary, it would create a climate of confidence in which such cooperation would be able to flourish.

27. That was precisely why his delegation urged the Conference to accept the principle of the application of full-scope safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities, in nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. That measure should become the cornerstone of the future nuclear non-proliferation regime under the non-proliferation Treaty. The discussions at the Conference would, no doubt, be intense, perhaps sometimes acrimonious, but at last it seemed that it was possible not only to establish a stable non-proliferation regime but also to further the Treaty's other objectives, especially in the sphere of disarmament. His delegation did not believe that there was a conflict of interest between North and South, or between rich and poor countries, all of which had a common destiny and the same basic security interests. Extending the Treaty for an unlimited period would not only make life difficult for potential proliferators, but would also create the necessary conditions for further nuclear disarmament. The other side of the coin was that any uncertainty over the future of the Treaty could dampen the willingness of the nuclear-weapon States to further reduce their nuclear arsenals. The parties would in fact be the ones to suffer from such a situation.

28. The nuclear disarmament process that had started in the past decade must, obviously, go on. The inequality between nuclear haves and nuclear have-nots that was inherent in the Treaty was a source of tension and could not last in the long run. In that connection, the Treaty placed a heavy moral responsibility on the nuclear-weapon States.

29. Mr. HURD (United Kingdom) said that, although the cold war was now over, the risks posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction had not faded. The non-proliferation Treaty lay at the heart of efforts to deal with those risks, and it should be placed on solid, permanent foundations. Needless to say, the Treaty had its imperfections, but none of them was a fatal flaw. The best way to rid the world of the fear of nuclear war was to extend the Treaty unconditionally and indefinitely. Although the circumstances in which the Treaty had been devised had changed, the Treaty had preserved its relevance. Mere exhortation of the States parties was no use; there was a need to look at the Treaty's imperfections, whether real or perceived. His delegation did not believe that they were major obstacles.

30. The Treaty recognized the existence of only five nuclear-weapon States. That might seem discriminatory, but it had to be borne in mind that, 25 years earlier, the Treaty had had to recognize the real position if it was to prevent further nuclear proliferation. At that time proliferation had appeared unstoppable. Well over 20 States had been thought eager to acquire nuclear weapons and it was largely because the Treaty had drawn a firm distinction between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States that nuclear proliferation had been contained.

31. As for the criticisms of nuclear disarmament, the continued existence of nuclear weapons should not obscure the fact that considerable progress had been achieved. The Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and the two START Treaties had consigned thousands of nuclear warheads to elimination. Unilateral decisions had also been taken to reduce stockpiles. The United Kingdom was not lagging behind, but had steadily proceeded with its own reductions. Its nuclear forces would soon be limited to a single system deployed on submarines. At the end of the current decade, the total number of British warheads would be 21 per cent less than in the 1970s and their explosive power 59 per cent lower, which represented a reduction of three fifths. If the world had seen cuts of that order in other types of weapons, it would be a safer and more stable place.

32. The United Kingdom nevertheless understood the fears of some countries. In order to allay them, it had, together with other nuclear-weapon States, offered strengthened security assurances. It was committed to negotiating measures which would impose severe constraints on nuclear weapons and hoped that an effective and verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty would soon be concluded. To that end, it had accepted that there should be no exemption for tests in exceptional circumstances or safety tests. It also hoped that there would be an early start to the negotiations on an agreement to cut off the production of fissile materials for military purposes. In order to remove any doubts that there might be, he announced that the United Kingdom had ceased the production of fissile material for explosive purposes.

33. The United Kingdom programme for the reduction of nuclear forces which he had outlined meant that, when the START II Treaty was implemented, British nuclear forces would be considerably less than 10 per cent of the total United States and Russian nuclear forces. There was, however, no doubt that, in a world in which those forces were counted in hundreds rather than the current thousands, the United Kingdom would respond to the challenge of multilateral talks on the global reduction of nuclear arms.

34. The nuclear disarmament he had described could only have taken place in the framework of stability and predictability which the Treaty had helped to establish. In order to build further on the momentum created by recent successes and by the negotiations in progress or in prospect, it was important to ensure that the framework provided by the Treaty was made permanent.

35. Turning to the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, he noted that some deplored the fact that those uses had not developed as rapidly as they had expected. Nuclear power had, however, spread widely around the world and nuclear energy had found various applications in fields of particular interest to developing countries, such as medicine and agriculture. All that would not have been possible without the non-proliferation Treaty and the IAEA

safeguards. It would take several decades to secure a return on investment in major civilian nuclear projects. A predictable and certain non-proliferation Treaty was therefore essential if international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was to be increased.

36. Some were concerned about export controls. However, the fact that certain items were subject to controls did not mean that their export was prohibited. The controls in question affected only countries such as Iran, about whose ultimate intentions there were widespread doubts. Suppliers must be careful; they would be rightly criticized if they were not.

37. The United Kingdom constantly urged all States which were not parties to the Treaty to allay suspicions about their nuclear activities and accede to the Treaty at the earliest opportunity. Progress had been made. He welcomed the fact that Algeria, Argentina, South Africa and all the successor States to the Soviet Union had become parties to the Treaty.

38. It was not impossible that Israel, India and Pakistan might one day accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. Some States which had once condemned the Treaty were, indeed, now parties to it. Unrelenting pressure and persuasion could perhaps achieve the same result with others. Such efforts would not succeed, however, if the decisions taken at the Conference displayed a lack of commitment to the Treaty.

39. It was also important to ensure that States which had acceded to the Treaty complied with its provisions. In that connection, the scale of Iraq's clandestine nuclear-weapons programme had been a salutary shock for all. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had presented a problem and many were anxious about Iran. Those dangers were all the more reason to strengthen, rather than despair of, the control system established under the Treaty. The United Nations Special Commission and IAEA were dealing with the Iraqi problem and the Agreed Framework signed in October 1994 offered a way of resolving the problem of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea within the framework of the Treaty.

40. The international community had also recognized the need to strengthen the safeguards system of IAEA and to provide the latter with all the support it needed through the Security Council. His delegation welcomed the Agency's latest proposals for strengthening safeguards and looked forward to early agreement on their implementation. The statement made by the President of the Security Council at the summit meeting of the Council held in January 1992, to the effect that the members of the Security Council would take appropriate measures in the case of any violations of safeguards agreements, also considerably reinforced confidence in the Treaty.

41. To sum up, it was important to look beyond the technicalities and recognize the benefits of the non-proliferation Treaty. Despite the threats to peace and stability in the world, the Treaty had made it possible to avert the threat of a nuclear war and the risk of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation. It was important to preserve what had been achieved and make the Treaty a permanent feature of international life.

42. The indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty was the right decision because it would reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation with its destabilizing consequences, reinforce the momentum towards nuclear disarmament, provide the continuing framework essential to international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and send a clear signal to those few countries which had not yet acceded to the Treaty that the international community expected them to do so. Lastly, a decision to that effect would demonstrate to all - including those tempted to follow the route of proliferation - that the world community remained determined to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and the horrors inherent therein. The non-proliferation Treaty deserved the biggest vote of confidence, which it would well repay.

53. Mr. OUELLET (Canada) said that the discussions at the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, one of the most successful international treaties ever, would take place against the backdrop of a growing world consensus in favour of halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the one hand, and denuclearization on the other hand. By signing the Treaty, 176 countries had already affirmed their commitment to the universal norms and principles on which it was based. There was no doubt that the international community must work to achieve the ultimate goal of universalization. Canada, for its part, hoped that the commitment would become a permanent reality and that the non-proliferation Treaty would be indefinitely and unconditionally extended.

54. The attitude of the Canadian Government to the Conference was shaped by a number of realities: first, Canada had taken a political decision, very early on, not to use either its skills or its technical capacities to produce nuclear weapons. Secondly, Canada was one of the leading proponents of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Finally, true to its long-standing commitment to multilateralism, Canada wished to strengthen the United Nations and international norms and principles in order to build a comprehensive and universal security framework for the twenty-first century. That presupposed



universal adherence to the key instruments on non-proliferation, namely, the Treaty under consideration and also the chemical weapons Convention, the biological and toxin weapons Convention and the Convention on certain conventional weapons, which regulated the use of land mines. In addition, it would be necessary to strengthen respect for legality by establishing a framework of international treaties on non-proliferation and disarmament. Any allegations based erroneously on possible limitations of sovereignty must be refuted by noting the tangible progress accomplished in the area of security.

55. Canada appreciated the opportunity that presented itself every five years to review the operation of the Treaty and considered that that opportunity should be further enhanced. The aim should be not only to facilitate consideration of the implementation of provisions of the Treaty but also to strengthen the achievement of its objectives.

56. Reviewing what had been achieved in the 25 years since the Treaty came into force, he recalled that one of the first objectives was, and remained, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries other than the five nuclear Powers of the post-war era. It could be said that the Treaty had achieved that goal. Indeed, at the time the Treaty came into effect, it had been feared that there might be some 25 countries with a nuclear arsenal by the time the Treaty came up for review in 1995. In fact that had not happened. Of course, the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons had not disappeared: it was just as real as it had been in 1970.

57. Non-proliferation was not the Treaty's sole objective; it also established fundamental, lasting norms and principles governing the conduct of those in possession of nuclear material and authorized the utilization of nuclear energy for purposes of economic development. Under article III signatories were required to conclude safeguard agreements for the purpose of verifying that nuclear material was not diverted from peaceful uses to other purposes. In that connection, Canada strongly encouraged the States parties to the Treaty to support the International Atomic Energy Agency's Programme "93+2", which helped to improve the transparency and to strengthen the assurance of the peaceful use of nuclear energy by providing for mechanisms to detect clandestine weapons activities. Article III also provided for the establishment of supplementary mechanisms such as export controls. The safeguards and export controls were mutually reinforcing and together provided assurance that nations were not secretly preparing nuclear-weapons programmes. Thus all States, even the non-signatories, benefited from the resulting security.

58. Under article IV all parties were entitled to benefit from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and nuclear technology. On that score, the results were conclusive, for a growing number of States parties to NPT were using nuclear energy to strengthen their economies.

59. Article VII dealt with the legal right to establish nuclear-free zones. Those agreements did much to strengthen the security of signatory States and Canada saw that as another positive element of regional and international security.

60. The Treaty provided for a dynamic process of negotiations to halt the nuclear-arms race and to undertake nuclear disarmament. More than that, it established a radical agenda which would result in a treaty on "general and complete disarmament under strict and effective control". In assessing the Treaty's effectiveness with regard to article VI, it was first necessary to recognize and to welcome the fact that among the States which were parties to the Treaty, the nuclear arms race had virtually ended. Russia and the United States continued to make bold steps to reduce their nuclear arsenals. The arms race had given way to a joint bilateral undertaking for nuclear disarmament. Other nuclear-weapon States had made unilateral cuts in their nuclear arsenals.

61. That had all been done against the backdrop of security calculations which had begun with the Treaty. Canada was convinced that it was the

framework of stability, security and predictability provided by the Treaty that had made progress on nuclear-arms control and disarmament possible. For that reason those in favour of radical disarmament should be the strongest proponents of the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

62. Under the broad security guarantees provided for in the Treaty, certain initiatives of vital importance had been taken. First, negotiations were under way for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Canada was encouraged by the work to date and believed that such a treaty would in time become a reality. It hoped that the nuclear-weapon States would refrain from testing during the negotiations.

63. Second, building on the momentum of those negotiations and reflecting States' political will to make progress in disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament had on 23 March 1995 adopted the important decision to begin negotiations on a convention to prohibit the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons.

64. Third, the nuclear-weapon States had taken significant steps with their recent declarations on security assurances. Such assurances, like the further extension of nuclear-weapon-free zones, were important confidence-building measures which were in every State's security interest.

65. Further, the leading nuclear-weapon States had recommitted themselves to their obligations under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty, an initiative that sent a powerful message in behalf of future disarmament.

66. Canada believed that the non-proliferation Treaty offered security guarantees that were essential for nuclear disarmament, and it was important to perpetuate the Treaty indefinitely. Future review conferences would provide States parties with the opportunity every five years to strengthen compliance with article VI and the other provisions of the Treaty. There was simply no substitute for the non-proliferation Treaty, whose benefits for non-nuclear-weapon States were invaluable.

67. Canada believed that the only way to ensure that the Treaty remained in force was to extend it indefinitely. That meant enshrining, permanently, the legal commitment of States to dismantle all nuclear arsenals. The Treaty was the only multilateral legal instrument to contain such an injunction. Without it, the international community would have nothing, even if some claimed that countries could not be forced into following timetables and meeting goals that they had had no role in developing.

68. In conclusion, he said that the States parties to the Treaty had the political responsibility to take a decision that responded to present realities and positioned them to meet future challenges. The Treaty, with its flexibility, was the States parties' instrument for promoting and achieving nuclear disarmament. Canada and the other States parties were committed to both elements of the Treaty - non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament - which called for a firm political decision in favour of indefinite and unconditional extension.



## SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,  
on Wednesday, 19 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 15) (continued)

1. Mr. NZO (South Africa) said that South Africa had played an active part in the work of the Preparatory Committee and, in response to General Assembly resolution 49/75 F, had provided a legal analysis of the extension options contained in article X, paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It was committed to a policy of non-proliferation and arms control covering all weapons of mass destruction and extending to conventional weapons. That policy was integral to its commitment to democracy, human rights, sustainable development, social justice and environmental protection.
  2. The dramatic changes brought about by the end of the cold war had created the global environment in which it had been possible for the number of nuclear weapons to be reduced. The international community now had a unique opportunity to achieve the basic objectives of the Treaty. It was South Africa's fundamental belief that the Treaty should not be placed in jeopardy, and that the review and extension process should strengthen, not weaken, the non-proliferation regime. South Africa firmly believed that the security of individual countries, and of the international community as a whole, would be severely damaged if the Treaty were weakened.
  3. South Africa had taken the decision to destroy its nuclear weapons and become a State party to the Treaty because it felt that its security would be guaranteed by the Treaty's provisions. Since the entry into force of the Treaty, the number of threshold States had diminished, and several countries, including South Africa, had drawn back from the nuclear-weapon option and become a part of a nuclear non-proliferation regime. Furthermore, the Treaty was the only international instrument on nuclear disarmament to which all five nuclear-weapon States were bound. Its continued existence would ensure that that commitment by nuclear-weapon States remained.
  4. South Africa believed that the inequalities inherent in the Treaty, as well as the criticism of some of its provisions, should not be dealt with in such a way that they threatened the security that the Treaty provided. South Africa therefore supported the view that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely. The termination of the Treaty, whether by placing conditions on its future existence or extending it only for a fixed period, was not an acceptable option. The linkage of the Treaty to certain conditions raised the question, inter alia, of what would happen if the conditions were not met. However, there was concern that proper checks and balances should be put in place to ensure that the objectives of the Treaty were translated into reality.
  5. The decision on extension should be taken only after every effort had been made to achieve the broadest possible support. Any decision taken by a simple majority would weaken the Treaty and undermine the commitment of those left on the outside. While a consensus decision would be ideal, the decision must be taken by a significant majority, which would need to include key countries from across group boundaries.
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6. A mechanism must be found to address the concerns expressed about the implementation of the Treaty. The review process provided for in article VIII should be strengthened. That could be done by adopting a set of principles for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament which would set out the general obligations and goals which States parties would strive for, taking into account the prevailing international environment. The principles would not constitute an amendment to the Treaty; commitment to them would be renewed at every review to ensure that they were dynamic and corresponded to changing international circumstances. They would not be conditions which could lead to the termination of the Treaty, but a yardstick by which all States parties could measure their achievement.

7. The following broad issues should be taken into account when formulating the principles: restatement of the commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; strengthening of and full adherence to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard agreements; access to nuclear material and technology for peaceful purposes; progress in the negotiations on a treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, the reduction of nuclear arsenals and negotiations for the establishment of a comprehensive test-ban treaty; commitment to the establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, and the enforcement of binding security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

8. South Africa proposed that a committee should be established - either open-ended or consisting of a representative group of countries - which would be responsible for studying the review process and making concrete recommendations on how to improve and strengthen the review conference mechanism. The report on its recommendations should be submitted for the consideration of all States parties, possibly at an additional Preparatory Committee session prior to the review conference in the year 2000. The Preparatory Committee should then be responsible for including those improvements in the agenda and programme of work of the next review conference.

9. South Africa had a number of initial suggestions which could be considered by such a committee. It believed that the basic structure of the review conferences should be retained, but that subcommittees of the three main committees should be established in order to take up specific issues falling within the ambit of the Treaty provisions which were being considered by the parent main committee. It proposed the adoption of a set of principles for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and the establishment of an open-ended committee which would meet at fixed intervals during the period between review conferences and consider specific ways of strengthening all aspects of the Treaty and the non-proliferation regime.


10. South Africa agreed that the disarmament provisions contained in article VI were essential for the effective implementation of the Treaty. It welcomed the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) and the Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) and believed that steps should be taken to accelerate the pace of nuclear disarmament and achieve the earliest possible conclusion of a START III agreement. Consideration should also be given to including the arsenals of the other nuclear-weapon States in the process. South Africa welcomed the security assurances embodied in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and in the statements made in the Security Council by the five nuclear-weapon States. However, it remained convinced that the most effective way to address the issue was the negotiation, by all the States parties, of an international agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties. South Africa believed that nuclear-weapon-free zones gave an added dimension to the security provided by the Treaty. It was an active supporter of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty and would be hosting the next meeting of the Group of Experts preparing the text for such a treaty.

11. With regard to article III, South Africa supported the principle of strengthened safeguards as well as the work that was being done by IAEA. It

had been participating in field trials and in principle supported the idea of including environmental monitoring as an integral part of the safeguards system, but needed time to obtain an opinion on the legal implications of such a system, as well as more information on the cost implications. It urged greater transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapon States; that would help allay concerns and suspicions regarding the manner in which they were meeting their responsibilities under the Treaty.

12. With regard to article IV, South Africa was participating in the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme and was strongly in favour of the exchange of technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy between the developed and developing world, based on the concept of sustainable development. South Africa was currently a host country for the training of scientists and technicians from Africa. It had supported the establishment by IAEA of a Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation (SAGTAC), and believed that SAGTAC should convene a meeting of all interested parties, particularly the developing countries, to discuss specific problem areas in the field of nuclear technology transfer. South Africa, with its extensive nuclear infrastructure and competencies, was also participating actively in many projects in Africa under the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology; it would strongly support greater levels of involvement on the part of the developed world in the transfer of peaceful nuclear technologies to the developing world, and especially to Africa.

13. Democratic South Africa saw international and regional security being achieved by complete nuclear disarmament. The South African experience - that security was provided by nuclear disarmament rather than by nuclear proliferation - was significant, not only for the threshold States, but also for the acknowledged nuclear-weapon States. South Africa believed that, with the necessary political will, it was possible to create a world free of nuclear weapons.



19. Mr. GORE (United States of America) said that, like those who had gathered 50 years earlier to create the United Nations, the international community was assembled at a moment of unusual opportunity and great risk. The confrontation between the United States and the former Soviet Union had ended, and their Governments had put behind them a relationship based on a nuclear balance of terror, profoundly diminishing but not eliminating the risk of nuclear war.

20. The struggle to block the proliferation of nuclear weapons had entered a critical phase. The knowledge and capacity to build nuclear weapons was increasingly available, and although most countries had recognized that the acquisition of nuclear weapons would bring greater insecurity and danger, the few seeking them had an increasing possibility of succeeding. The diminishing risk that nuclear war would be caused by one rivalry was offset by an increasing risk that it would be caused by others.

21. At the time of its creation, the Treaty had represented a delicate balance between competing and seemingly irreconcilable interests. After a quarter century of experience, it must be determined whether the cause of peace was best served by continuing the Treaty under temporary arrangements, or by using the one-time option to give it a permanent basis by supporting its indefinite extension without conditions.

22. The case for indefinite extension could be stated succinctly. The Treaty created a more secure world for all its members, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. By providing an internationally recognized, verifiable means for States to forswear nuclear weapons forever, the Treaty helped to prevent regional rivalries from evolving into arms races. By making it possible for the vast majority of the world's nations to remain non-nuclear without jeopardizing their security, the Treaty reinforced the global stability that was a necessary foundation for progress in arms control and disarmament.

23. The principal arguments directed against indefinite extension were that the Treaty was inherently discriminatory, that the nuclear-weapon States had failed to live up to their commitments under article VI, that indefinite extension would free the nuclear-weapon States from further pressure to disarm, that the Treaty exposed non-nuclear States to intimidation by nuclear-weapon States and States not party to the Treaty, and that it would destroy the capacity of the agreement to be adapted to future circumstances.

24. The Treaty had recognized an initial division of States between those possessing nuclear weapons and those pledged not to acquire them, but it did not create a permanent class of nuclear-weapon States. Rather, those States had a binding legal obligation under article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on arms control and disarmament. Indefinite extension would ensure the permanence of that obligation and create the conditions for its ultimate achievement. Some also argued that the nuclear-weapon States had failed to live up to their commitments under article VI, but the evidence strongly supported the case that they were moving in the direction prescribed by their obligations under the Treaty. The United States and Russia, under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) had eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. The combined results of the START I and START II Treaties would be a two-thirds reduction in the nuclear arsenals of those two countries. They had also agreed not to target their remaining nuclear missiles. In addition, the United States had stopped producing fissile materials for nuclear explosives, and had launched a new global effort to halt their production anywhere in the world. In 1994, the United States had for the first time submitted weapons material from its stockpile to IAEA safeguards. To propel further the effort to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty, the United States had extended its moratorium on nuclear tests, and a previous proposal for a ten-year withdrawal provision had been withdrawn. If the Conference on Disarmament was successful, it was possible that the United States had already conducted its last nuclear test. He paid tribute to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which had become parties to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, as had South Africa, which had rid itself of its nuclear weapons in order to join the Treaty.

25. Rather than indefinite extension, some argued that the best way to ensure that the nuclear-weapon States moved towards disarmament was to subject it to periodic live-or-die votes, or by extending it with conditions. Yet there were serious flaws in that argument. It was worth noting that even a review period of 25 years was well within the service lifetime of a major nuclear weapons system. In practical effect, rolling periods of review could have the same consequences as an immediate decision to terminate the Treaty. Making the Treaty subject to periodic risk would encourage States which aspired to nuclear weapons to hold their options in reserve, rather than to accept the permanence of their obligations under the Treaty.

26. Nuclear-weapon States clearly understood that damaging the NPT also damaged their own security, and thus had strong motives to refrain from nuclear threats and instead to provide credible assurances designed to allay the concerns of others. In fact, the United States and the other four nuclear-weapon States had just provided positive and negative security assurances to the international community. In addition, the success of the NPT built a barrier against nuclear threats by establishing a global norm of non-proliferation. In response to the argument that indefinite extension would destroy its ability to meet changing circumstances, radical changes had taken place in the world in recent years which the Treaty had handled without difficulty. Furthermore, reserves of flexibility were built into the procedures for review and amendment, and would not be altered by a decision to extend it indefinitely and without conditions.

27. In an era in which super-Power confrontation had been replaced by cooperation to eliminate nuclear arms, but in which the dangers of nuclear proliferation were increasingly apparent, the Treaty remained central to the cause of peace. He called for support of the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty, because it was deeply in the security interests of all.


28. Legislative bodies throughout the world, in ratifying the Treaty, had accepted that they would be bound by a decision made by the majority of the parties. Any suggestion that the decision might be made through a secret ballot undermined the confidence placed in those legislative bodies. Nations which called for accountability must accept its burdens. The United States strongly rejected any notion that the decisions of the Conference could not

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stand the light of day, and called on all countries to take responsibility for their actions.

29. The international community had learned what those who were present at the creation of the atomic age could only hope: that proliferation could be halted, and that nations could work together to protect their mutual security. There could be no rest until those goals, and the Treaty, became enduring realities.





9. Mr. MOUSSA (Egypt) said that Egypt, which had supported the non-proliferation regime and had become a signatory to the Treaty believed that it must become not only truly universal and credible but that it must maintain a balance through the commitment of all countries to honour their obligations thereunder. Unless that was achieved, the non-proliferation regime would merely benefit some countries at the expense of others and might exclude a third group of countries. Such a situation was unacceptable.

10. Egypt shared the view that, on the whole, progress in the implementation of the Treaty had not lived up to the expectations of its original architects. The much bigger stockpiles of nuclear weapons contradicted the objective of the Treaty. A comprehensive test-ban treaty and an agreement on prohibiting the production or stockpiling of fissionable materials for military purposes were yet to be concluded.

11. However, the most serious criticism levelled at the Treaty was the continuing disparity between the commitments of its parties. Such disparity was inconsistent with the new concept in international relations which called for justice, equality and collective security in a climate devoid of nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon States should establish a framework in which they would reduce and ultimately eliminate their nuclear arsenals within a specific time-frame. On the other hand, the continuing absence of legal and effective security assurances to protect the States which had voluntarily renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons 25 years previously was a great disappointment since it defeated the very purpose of non-proliferation and could never lead to world security and universal peace.

12. Turning to the unilateral declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States contained in Security Council resolution 984 (1995), he said that, with the exception of the one issued by China, they were fraught with conditions and reservations. Unfortunately, the resolution still fell short of providing the required security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States from the threat of nuclear weapons as it focused on assistance in the case of nuclear aggression

to the detriment of other crucial elements such as deterrence, protection and effectiveness.

13. Noting that there was a serious imbalance in international cooperation with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and the transfer of such technology to non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty and the discriminatory treatment and double standards applied by export control groups, he called for a thorough review of the work of such groups which, he suggested, could be transformed into an international regime which included all parties to the Treaty and would subject all the nuclear activities of specific States to the IAEA full-scope safeguards regime as a prior condition for the supply of nuclear technology or nuclear materials to the States in question. That international norm should apply to all States including non-States parties.

14. Egypt believed that the universality of the Treaty was a sine qua non for the achievement of its purposes. Its extension would merely reaffirm the legal norm upon which the non-proliferation regime had been established. Even States that were not parties should abide by that norm; otherwise, efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime would be undermined by according a special status to those States which had chosen to remain outside. In his delegation's opinion, such a situation would be both unfair and illogical.

15. For decades, Egypt had maintained consistent and clear-cut positions at both the regional and international levels with respect to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In that connection, it had worked tirelessly to spare Africa and the Middle East from the nuclear peril, including the efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and the Middle East and the multilateral track on Arms Control and Regional Security.

16. Turning to the situation in the Middle East he noted that the issue of nuclear armament continued to be a source of concern and a threat to the security of the whole region. His country considered as extremely dangerous the existence on its eastern borders of a nuclear programme outside the scope of the IAEA full-scope safeguards. It had conducted extensive consultations with all its regional partners as well as with influential national parties with a view to reaching specific international or regional arrangements that would protect the region from the dangers of nuclear weapons and affirm the determination of all parties, including Israel, to adhere to the international covenants and the non-proliferation Treaty, in particular, and to place Israel's nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. Egypt had proposed that an official process of negotiations should be initiated on the provisions related to the establishment of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction; all States in the region should undertake to accede to international legal instruments relating to all weapons of mass destruction; such accession should coincide with the conclusion of peace agreements between Israel and the parties involved in the Middle East peace process; and discussions should be held on the possibility of conducting mutual verification of nuclear facilities.


17. Those proposals had been aimed at enhancing security for all in the Middle East and further reinforcing the credibility and stability of the Treaty. In that context, Israel's continued failure to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty was not conducive to progress; indeed, it would be irresponsible to urge States of the region to agree to an indefinite extension of the Treaty even as one State within the region was benefiting from an exemption that allowed it to maintain a nuclear programme outside the boundaries of international legitimacy. Stability in the region could not prevail in the face of security imbalances or military supremacy that would benefit no one; nor would it serve regional peace or international peace and security. Despite all Egypt's efforts, Israel had rejected all the proposals, even though it had always joined in the consensus on the General Assembly's resolutions calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and for all the States of that region to join the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. Egypt was therefore calling upon Israel to reconsider its position and to enter into the same commitments as its neighbours in the



region. His delegation also urged all States parties to consistently endeavour to ensure the strict adherence of all States in the region to policies consistent with the principles and provisions of the Treaty.

18. He recalled that Egypt had signed and ratified the Treaty on the assumption that it would encourage Israel to take similar steps. Israel had failed to do so despite assurances from several countries to that effect. The entrenchment of the de facto status quo by the indefinite application of the Treaty to all the Middle East countries, with the exception of Israel, constituted a serious imbalance threatening not only the region's security but its stability as well. The League of Arab States had recently declared that such a situation was unacceptable. The Middle East was going through a period of extreme sensitivity and significance where the foundations of future peaceful relations in the region were being laid. That could not be accomplished if there were double standards or privileged status was granted to one party at the expense of the other.

19. Although Egypt supported the Treaty despite its imperfections, it could not endorse the indefinite extension thereof, because the regional situation remained volatile and unsatisfactory. That notwithstanding, Egypt would participate actively in the work of the Conference. The extension decision should be linked to specific steps aimed at achieving the objectives of non-proliferation and the universality of the Treaty; enhancing its effectiveness towards striking a balance between the responsibilities of all its parties; concluding two conventions on a comprehensive nuclear test ban and on the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of fissionable materials for military purposes respectively; providing legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and ensuring the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to all States parties.



11. Mr. KOZYREV (Russian Federation) said that the outcome of the Conference would determine whether the future was stable and predictable or fraught with the danger of a new nuclear confrontation. The non-proliferation Treaty was a document which, on the basis of compromise, had brought together the most varied States - large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear. It served the common interest of ensuring stability, averting the nuclear threat and promoting disarmament and, for a disarmament agreement, had attracted a record number of States parties, which needed the Treaty as a guarantee of both national and universal interests.

12. It was said that the Treaty was ineffective. However, it had unquestionably limited the spread of nuclear weapons; there were still only five nuclear Powers and the provisions of the Treaty had become inalienable norms of international law and civilized behaviour. It was significant that South Africa had voluntarily dismantled its nuclear weapons and had acceded as a non-nuclear-weapon State. It was largely because of the existence of the Treaty that, in the turmoil of the breakup of the USSR, an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States had been avoided and Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan had acceded to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. The Russian Federation applauded the wisdom of its friends and partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States; their accession had strengthened the Treaty and the reliability of non-proliferation.

13. The Treaty had become an appreciable factor in the strengthening of regional stability; one could imagine what might have happened in the areas of local conflicts in the absence of the Treaty. The non-proliferation norm underlying the Treaty had also become a starting point for establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. The recent adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the harmonized statements of the nuclear Powers on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty constituted a further contribution to the strengthening of international stability and security and had become possible because of the Treaty.

14. To the doubts and questions raised about the obligations in the Treaty to halt the nuclear-arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament, the Russian Federation, along with other States, had an unequivocal answer: the nuclear-arms race had been halted and reversed. That was indisputable. By mid-1991, an entire class of nuclear weapons of the Russian Federation and the United States had been eliminated. Under the START I Treaty, the two largest nuclear arsenals had been reduced almost by half; with the ratification of the START II Treaty, the Russian Federation and the United States would reduce their strategic offensive arms to one third, and they had also agreed to start deactivating all the strategic carriers that were subject to reduction.

15. The leaders of both countries recognized the need for further reductions and limitations in the remaining nuclear forces and had instructed their experts to accelerate work on possible reductions after the ratification of START II. The Russian Federation's agreements with the United States, China and the United Kingdom on the detargeting of their strategic nuclear forces were an important means of strengthening strategic stability and trust. The Russian Federation's strategic nuclear forces were no longer targeted against anyone.

16. The Russian Federation was committed to the final goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. It proposed that all the nuclear-weapon States should proceed towards that goal, taking into account the specific nature of their nuclear potential, and possibly with a certain asymmetry of commitments. That objective could be achieved under the treaty on nuclear security and strategic stability proposed by the President of the Russian Federation at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly (A/49/PV.5). The Russian Federation was gratified that, just before the Conference, the United States, the United Kingdom and France had joined it in making a statement solemnly reaffirming their commitment to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament (NPT/CONF.1995/20).

17. Among the major landmarks on the road to nuclear disarmament were the prohibition of nuclear tests for all time. An indefinite, universal treaty, subject to effective international control, was within reach. The Russian Federation was in favour of signing it in 1995. It was continuing to adhere to its moratorium on nuclear tests, which had been repeatedly extended. A comprehensive test-ban treaty and subsequent renunciation of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons would further strengthen the non-proliferation regime but would be possible only if the non-proliferation Treaty was in effect.

18. Another pressing issue was the ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. In the Russian Federation a programme was under way to shut down the remaining facilities which had previously produced plutonium for weapons purposes; moreover, the plutonium already produced was not being used for those purposes. The production of weapon-grade uranium had been stopped several years previously. The Russian Federation would strive to ensure that the ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament began work as soon as possible on that issue.

19. The Russian Federation favoured a progressive and irreversible process of nuclear disarmament. Yet it remained realistic. The implementation of disarmament programmes showed that it was impossible to get rid of nuclear weapons overnight. The elimination of inherited nuclear arsenals was a costly process which involved solving major technical and financial problems.

20. The Russian Federation had consistently supported the IAEA safeguards as an effective verification instrument fostering confidence that all States parties were abiding by the Treaty and that unauthorized activity would be detected and terminated. The IAEA safeguards constituted a verification mechanism for non-proliferation and at the same time a powerful confidence-building measure. The Russian Federation was participating in upgrading the safeguards system.

21. The non-proliferation Treaty had created a favourable climate for continuously broadening international cooperation in the peaceful uses of the atom for decades to come; the Russian Federation was prepared to develop such cooperation further, including cooperation with developing countries, whether through IAEA or on a bilateral basis. However, there must be an assurance that the Treaty would continue in effect.

22. The Russian Federation firmly favoured the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty; it would be inexcusable to miss the historic opportunity to achieve such an extension, thereby demolishing the foundations of international stability; in a world where the "logic" of the nuclear-arms race had only recently been defeated, that would be an inadmissible retreat. The indefinite extension of the Treaty would ensure that all its positive achievements were preserved and enhanced; it would not be a mandate for the nuclear Powers to retain their nuclear arsenals indefinitely, but would offer the prospect of progressive movement towards a world free from nuclear weapons.

23. The Russian Federation believed that the decision on the Treaty should be an open and clear expression of the will of the States parties. If it was not possible to take the decision on the basis of consensus, an open vote must be held. The States parties had the right to know each other's position with regard to the future of the Treaty; it was only on that basis that broad mutual trust, which had become one of the most important gains of the Treaty, could continue. It was the duty of each Government to state openly and unequivocally its position in its vote.

24. The Russian Federation welcomed all the new parties to the Treaty and expressed satisfaction that, with the accession of China and France, all the nuclear-weapon States had become parties. It hoped that the few countries which still remained outside the Treaty would soon find it possible to join. It called upon all States parties to make every effort to ensure that the Conference helped strengthen the Treaty through its indefinite and unconditional extension. The Treaty must remain one of the key pillars of the security system in the modern world.

