

January 25, 1951

**The US Consul General at Calcutta (Wilson) to the
Department of State, 'Transmitting Copies of
Reports of Indian Representative at Lhasa, Tibet, for
October, November, and December 1950'**

Citation:

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Summary:

Reports of the Indian Mission in Lhasa, Tibet, for the months of October-December 1950.

Original Language:

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Contents:

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amconsul, Calcutta
TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.
REF :
SUBJECT: Transmitting Copies of Reports of Indian Representative at Lhasa, Tibet, for October, November, and December, 1950.

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There are transmitted as enclosures to this despatch copies of three monthly reports dated, respectively, October 15, November 15, and December 15, 1950, prepared by Mr. S. Sinha, the Officer in Charge of the Indian Mission at Lhasa. It is believed that the Department and the Embassy at New Delhi will find these reports to be of considerable interest. They were just received from the Office of the Deputy High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, Calcutta.

In handing us these reports, the Office of the U.K. Deputy High Commissioner urged that extreme caution should be used in safeguarding this material, as the Government of India is presumably not aware that this information has been made available to the American Government.

Some of the information contained in the attached reports is now out of date but they still give an interesting picture of the way in which events have been viewed from Lhasa during the period in question.

Evan M. Wilson

Evan M. Wilson
American Consul General

Enclosures:

1. Monthly Report of the Indian Mission, Lhasa, for the period ending 15th October 1950.
2. Monthly Report of the Indian Mission, Lhasa, for the period ending 15th November 1950.
3. Monthly Report of the Indian Mission, Lhasa, for the period ending 15th December 1950.

Copy: New Delhi

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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 343, dated January 25, 1951, from Calcutta, India, entitled "Transmitting Copies of Reports of Indian Representative at Lhasa, Tibet, for October, November, and December 1950."

From: Officer in Charge,
Indian Mission, Lhasa

To: The Political Officer in Sikkim,
Gangtok.

Memorandum No. 3 (7)-L/50
Dated, Lhasa, the 15th October, 1950.

Monthly Report of the Indian Mission, Lhasa,
for the period ending 15th October, 1950.

1. EXTERNAL RELATIONS.

(a) Relations between Tibet and India.

(i) Since the arrival of the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi, the long deferred preliminary negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the Tibetan question has been in progress. Nothing of importance seems to have transpired so far in the Delhi talks, though it is understood that the Chinese Ambassador has successfully impressed on the Tibetans the need to transfer the venue of the talks without further delay to Peking. The Lhasa authorities who are anxious not to give any cause for offence are reported to have meekly submitted to the Chinese proposal.

(ii) It is true that the Government of India's intervention staved off the invasion of Tibet for which preparations at one time were in full swing; but the intervention according to Tibetan calculations is neither final nor conclusive. The threat of invasion still hangs ominously over them. The Chinese while condescending to negotiate are continuing to make military preparations on the frontier as if they were certain of the failure of negotiations.

Despite their blind adherence to religion and extreme backwardness, Tibetans are fully alive to the developments that threaten to engulf them. They are conscious that their religion, culture and pattern of life are being threatened by a ruthless creed which, should it arrive in the wake of an invasion, will have no vestige of the past. They refer in sentimental remembrance to the country that first initiated them into the spiritual world of Buddhism, and is now providentially imparting them the strength and skill to defend the faith. There are times when overawed by the prospect of inevitable defeat, they wonder whether the Government of India can sit back

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and coolly watch the rape of Tibet. It is not that they are unaware that the present Government of India unlike its predecessor is weakened by partition, internal political dissensions and strife with Pakistan. Thus alone can they conceive of India pouring out her sympathy and advice to two unequal parties in a conflict which involves fundamental issues and on which depends the very existence of Tibet and her culture. They doubt, even as every sane thinking person would, that a peaceful solution of the Tibetan problem is possible without vital concessions being made to China. It is this realisation that makes them feel that Tibet will have to submit whether she negotiates or resists. When the alternatives so clearly lead to the same inevitable fate, the futility of resistance becomes obvious and in a manner restrains the zeal of these pious men for unnecessary slaughter of life and destruction of property. It is not long before they cast off the gloom - and doubts - with the mystic assurance that the soul of Tibet will reassert itself even though it be clamped with the authoritarian chains of an irreligious faith. Many are the enquiries that I have received regarding the alternatives to war and defeat. In all sincerity I pointed out to them that the possibilities of a peaceful solution are not as hopeless as they make them out to be. The possibilities that occurred to me are as follows:-

(i) To carry on negotiations until the international situation changes in favour of Tibet. This argument appeals to the Tibetans for there are some amongst them who believe that the present year is particularly unholy for them. Besides Tibetans excel in protracted negotiations and are adept in using reason, persuasion and appeals to mercy with which to confound their enemies. The Chinese unfortunately seem to be in no mood for lengthy discussions for they are inevitably the masters of the situation.

(ii) To seek a peaceful solution through a plebiscite supervised by neutral observers. It is important to bear in mind that the Government of India have impressed on the Peking authorities that Sino-Tibetan relations should be adjusted by peaceful means on the basis of enduring friendship between the three countries, China, Tibet and India. Should negotiations break down, as they must, in the present extreme divergence of rival Sino-Tibetan claims, the inevitable sequence of India's earlier appeal to China would seem to be for India to resume the initiative again at an opportune moment and emphasise their earlier stand that it is in the interests of all concerned that if the Chinese must occupy Tibet it should not be done by force but by consent of the people of Tibet. To ensure a fair plebiscite it is

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(2) That Tibet is essential to Chinese security. On the 11th October the Peking radio reaffirmed that China will not remain idle when North Korea is being invaded by hostile imperialist forces. These statements have given rise to extraordinary hopes that China will now step into the Korean war. Tibet in her hour of crisis is looking for salvation through divine intervention which would involve China in an international conflict, and divert her resources to other ends. She is convinced of the justice of her own cause and believes that the Gods will intercede in her behalf to rescue her from the promised "liberation" by the communist forces. The Dzasa Lama of the Foreign Bureau is inclined to interpret the statement "that Tibet is essential to Chinese security" as a significant departure from previous outright claims by China that Tibet is an integral part of China.

INTERNAL.

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Since my arrival in Tibet I found complete public apathy in matters of national interest. It is of little concern to the common men and women of Tibet as to who rules them; though they are known to give unwavering allegiance to the Dalai Lama. The officials in Lhasa are gradually becoming aware of the defects in their scheme of things; but none dare take decisions on matters of vital importance. In consequence all important problems are shelved for the Dalai Lama to await his coming of age. There are besides in the neighbourhood of Lhasa three important monasteries viz. Dreptung, Sera and Ganden, who exercise a baleful influence on national policy. They fear progress - and a strong national army. They are agitators for reaction and some of them are believed to have recently put up placards near Deyki Lingka accusing the Regent and Surkhang Shape of using their office for private gains.

It now appears that Ragashar Shape is stationed at Nagchuka mainly to keep an eye on the possible movements of the Panchen candidate in Sining. Information has reached the Tibetan Government that the Panchen candidate is likely to make a dash for Shigatse by the northern route this winter along with a Chinese escort to establish the Provisional Government of Tibet at Tashi-Lhunpo and to assume power. Ragashar Shape has been given full powers to deal with any such emergency and a force of about 3,000 men at Nagchhuka, Namru, Naktshang and Dam areas has been placed under his command.

Not long ago the Gardong oracle prophesied that Chinese troops would suddenly appear at Naktshang and surprise the Tibetan authorities there. The oracle enjoined on the Tibetan Government to take

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necessary precautions against such an eventuality. The Tibetan Government give full credence to this prophesy as the same oracle's earlier prediction came true.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY:

An example of what goes on in the National Assembly was cited to me by the Chikyap Khempo. Learned monks in a recent debate pointed out with irrefutable logic that the backwardness and poverty of Tibet are her chief assets for there is little in Tibet today, or its pattern of secluded life, which need attract the cupidity of foreign aggressors. In her undeveloped state should be a poor reward for an expensive military expedition and, in any event, the conquerors would not be able to surmount the problem of administering law and order in a country intersected by mountains, which has few roads and where the fastest means of locomotion is the mule and the pony.

On the 18th or 19th September the National Assembly decided on sending revised instructions to their Mission to China.

In view of the improved situation on the Chamdo frontier the National Assembly on the recommendation of Nagapho Shape agreed to allow Lhalu Shape to return to Lhasa.

ARMED BANDITRY:

Reports of lawlessness continue to arrive in Lhasa from areas adjoining the Chinese frontier. Recently a Reting Lebrang trader returning from Sining with 30 mule-loads was waylaid by bandits, who are suspected to be Nomadic tribesmen inhabiting the area.

It has been ascertained from the Foreign Bureau that 26 men of the Nagchukha militia were involved in a clash with bandits at Lungchungkipa which is 4-5 days journey northwest of Nagchuka. The Nagchuka militia suffered heavy casualties. Of the 26 only two survivors returned to Camp and reported to Ragashar Shape, the Commandant, that they ran into a communist ambush. The Shape immediately summoned De-Tsap Shagappa to come to Nagchuka with 600 troops. However, it has now been definitely proved that the armed bandits were not communists but Nomad bandits of the area.

ECONOMIC:

Recently there has been a sharp decline in the exchange rate

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which has gone down to four Sangs three Shokangs to the rupee. The reasons for this appreciable fall in the rate are:-

1. Improved situation on the Sino-Tibetan frontier, and
2. Increase in the price of wool at Kalimpong. The rate of exchange in Lhasa is regarded by experts as a political barometer. When conditions are normal the rate is about five Sangs to the rupee, when it gets worse it increases and when it is better it decreases.

While there is now news yet of the annual visit of traders from Sining, Tibetan traders report that the communist authorities have so far relented as to allow the import of Indian cotton piece-goods from Tibet on payment of an ad-valorum duty of 3%. Goods of high utility value, and inexpensive, are separately stamped and reserved for quick disposal. It is quite likely that a good deal of Khaki drill and such other products are being purchased for official use in China. Expensive stuff it appears is not favoured by the communists and takes longer to sell.

SOCIAL AND PERSONAL.

Mr. H. E. Richardson left Lhasa on a Coracle for Lhobrak near the Bhutan border on 27th September. He is expected to return to Nagartse after a week on his way to Gangtok.

I took over as Officer in Charge, Indian Mission, Lhasa on the date of his departure.

I called amongst others on the Prime Minister, Rampa Kalon Lama (Monk shape), Surkhang shape, Chikyap Khempo, the two Foreign Secretaries of the Foreign Bureau, the 4 Trungyik Chhempos, Tsarong Daxasa, Kundeling, Dzasa, the Gyayum (Dalai Lama's mother). We attended the Lay Officials' annual party on the 3rd October and the Kashag's party on the 14th October.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Mr. Rowland the Rev. and Mrs. Winward have been permitted by the Political Officer with the Tibetan Government's consent to visit Yatung in October.

Considerable earthquake damage is reported from Tawang, Tsona, Konam Dzong, Chhap Na and Chhap Kar Gompas (near Rsepia Dzong),

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South Kangbo and Pemako. As it would take a long time to organize relief measures and transport grain from Lhasa to affected areas, the neighbouring Dzongs have been asked to despatch immediate relief to the victims.

Visas for six months stay in India have been issued to Princee Min Wang and party.

Dated, Lhasa the 15th November, 1950.

Monthly Report of the Indian Mission, Lhasa,
for the period ending 1950.

Sd/- S. SINHA
OFFICER IN CHARGE
INDIAN MISSION, LHASA

EXTERNAL RELATIONS:

(a) Relations between Tibet and China

(i) During the period under review the Tibetan Mission to China conducted preliminary negotiations with the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi for a settlement of the Tibetan issue. The parties met on neutral soil and in the preliminary sessions strove to explore as best they could the ulterior motives and designs of each on the basis of which a solution was being sought.

(ii) The Chinese had not bargained for so awkward a position, and were disconcerted at being forced to negotiate with people whom they regard a minority race within the territorial limits of China. It was worse that the talks had to be held on foreign soil with international spies prying into the course of the negotiations.

(iii) With artless vehemence they impressed on the Tibetans that nothing less than the incorporation of Tibet within New China would be acceptable to the Peking regime and behind that offer of fraternal embrace lay unconcealed the threat of a military decision should the Tibetans waver, or delay the inevitable outcome.

(iv) The Tibetans on their part humoured the impatient Goliath and spun the usual yarns of the slow witted theocracy at home which had to obtain the prior consent of the National Assembly, the Kashag, the Regent and His Holiness before it rose with dignity to prostrate itself before so mighty a host.

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Memorandum No. 2 to Despatch No. 343, dated January 25, 1951, from Calcutta, India, entitled "Transmitting Copies of Reports of Indian Representative at Lhasa, Tibet, for October, November, and December 1950."

From: The Officer in Charge
Indian Mission, Lhasa

To: The Political Officer in Sikkim
Gangtok

Memorandum No. 3 (7)-L/50

Dated, Lhasa the 15th November, 1950.

Monthly Report of the Indian Mission, Lhasa,
for the period ending 15th November, 1950.

EXTERNAL RELATIONS:

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(v) The decision they were asked to take was of momentous consequence to Tibet as it would radically alter their age long pattern of existence and drag them out of their mystic seclusion. With due humility they pleaded for a few days grace to contemplate the new prospect offered to them - sans prayer-wheels, flags of devotion, monasteries and mystic chants, Buddha and Bodhisvattas. They lacked the courage to invite the wrath of the enshrined dieties by clean-sweeping them with a communist broom. They had to take leave of them with prayers and supplication ere the new Gods took their place in the deserted shrines. To begin the process of 'deliverance' they had asked their delegation to accept the first of the Chinese demands, viz. Tibet should be an integral part of China, but on condition that the Chinese did not precipitate matters by despatching an army to Lhasa. The delegation had also received instructions to proceed to China forthwith for talks with the great leaders of the Peoples Republic of China.

(vi) At no time had the Tibetan Government desired a rupture in their negotiations with China, particularly when they had no illusions whatsoever about their capacity to resist a Chinese invasion.

(vii) The Chinese detested the idea of protracted negotiations, and gave the Tibetan Government a brief hour to chose between immediate surrender or invasion. Tibetans did not outright reject the preliminary Chinese demands, but accepted one in the hope that the Chinese may eventually relent and allow the preservation of Tibetan autonomy. They conceded what was no more than of prestige value to China, and the Chinese hastened to show their displeasure by ordering their armies to march into Tibet.

(viii) The attack came without any warning or provocation, and fell heavily on Tibet just when her officialdom were engaged in their annual festivities. Chinese troops stole across the Drechu river and struck hard at small and isolated Tibetan garrisons on the frontier.

(b) Relations with India:

The Government of India continued to play the role of a referee between the two unequal parties in these negotiations, despite my warning that left to themselves there could be no solution to the Sino-Tibetan tangle unless the weaker of the two accepted without reservations the will of the stronger. Government of India nevertheless perservered in their self-assumed role of neutral observers and not infrequently gave expression to the forlorn hope that all would

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eventually turn out well through friendly discussions. They gave the impression that they were only remotely concerned as a fellow Asiatic nation and had no inherent right by Treaty or otherwise to intervene in the purely domestic affairs of China and Tibet.

(ii) Had China not been encouraged by India's unconcern it is doubtful if the Chinese would have ventured to resort to military measures. When the invasion began Tibet appealed to India against foul methods employed by China, and India echoed official Chinese sentiments that Tibetans were employing dilatory tactics and it had become necessary to order certain military manoeuvres in 'Sikang' to bring them to their senses. They warned the Tibetans that if their delegation did not depart for Peking at once there would be lamentable consequences.

(iii) The Chinese naively persuaded the Government of India to believe that Anglo-American intrigues in Tibet were obstructing a settlement.

(iv) When in despair Tibet beseeched India to allow them the use of their channels to transmit an appeal to the United Nations, the latter expressed their inability to sponsor or advise the Tibetan appeal to U.N. Neither was the proposal to have a plebiscite in Tibet considered feasible.

(v) Chamdo fell. There was news of deep infiltration inside Tibet by communist forces, spreading disaffection in their train. The situation was critical. There was panic and consternation everywhere.

(vi) The Government of India at last had to express surprise and regret at the step taken by the Chinese against solemn assurances to the contrary. Nor had the Chinese considered it necessary to inform the Government of India of their proposed military action against Tibet. It was recognition of the fact that the friendly efforts made by India to bring China and Tibet together in peace and harmony had failed. The Chinese in their reply told the Government of India to leave off interfering in the internal affairs of China. There is hardly any doubt now that Chinese professions of her desire to seek a peaceful settlement with Tibet were no more than a pretence to cover up her military preparations for the conquest of Tibet.

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(c) Relations with Nepal:

From time to time there have been floating rumours that Tibet had approached Nepal for help and that Nepal had offered to come to her aid, if necessary. Nepal Maharaja's communication to the Tibetan Government, however, dispelled such rumours. He was sorry and concerned over the news of the invasion and promised to use his good offices with the great powers for a just and peaceful settlement of the Tibetan issue.

Events in Nepal are being followed with interest by the Tibetan Government. High officials in Lhasa have expressed the hope that Government of India would not allow communism to grow in Tibet's back yard.

The Officer in Charge of the Nepalese Legation is greatly perturbed by developments in Tibet and Nepal. He is convinced that if the Chinese overrun Tibet, Nepal would re-enter the Chinese orbit in less than a week.

(d) Tibet and United Nations:

(i) These are extraordinary times in Tibet and it is hardly surprising that the Tibetans under pressure of circumstances have decided to cast off their seclusion and place their case before the United Nations. The decision was taken when their frontier defences had succumbed, the province of Khan detached, and the road to Lhasa lay open almost undefended.

(ii) The appeal was sent from Lhasa on the 8th November. The reactions of the United Nations are being anxiously awaited by the Tibetan Government. Meanwhile the Government of Tibet have decided to send a 3-man delegation to U.N. to plead their case. They are Dzasa Surkhang, Dzasa Ngawang Cyaltzen and Trungyik Chhempo Chhombay Thupten. They have already received orders to leave for Lake Success.

ECONOMIC.

Prices have gone up considerably in Lhasa, and there is an acute shortage of consumer goods. The exchange rate, however, has remained in the neighbourhood of 5 Sangs to the rupee.

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SOCIAL AND PERSONAL.

We attended the Tse Yigtshang's party on 17th October.

The Kashag, the Chikyap Khempo, Taktra Dzasa, the Foreign Bureau Dzasa, the Nepalese Officer and his Subba attended our Devali Party. This was our first break after days of strenuous labour and all present relaxed and enjoyed what may easily be the last of these occasions.

MISCELLANEOUS

Government of India have authorised Mission to grant entry visa for India to the following persons:

1. Herr Petter Aufschnaiter - for 4 months stay in India.
2. Herr Heinrich Harrer - for 6 months stay in India.

As Herr Harrer left Lhasa before Government of India's orders reached this Mission, Political Sikkim has been requested to grant the necessary visa to him if there is no objection.

Members of the Mission have been given the option to evacuate their families from Lhasa at Government expense. So far, only one member has availed of this opportunity.

sd/-S. Sinha,
OFFICER IN CHARGE

to Despatch No. 343, dated January 25, 1951 from
New Delhi, India, entitled "Transmitting Copies of Reports of Indian
Representative at Lhasa, Tibet, for October, November, and December
1950."

From: The Officer in Charge
Indian Mission, Lhasa

To: The Political Officer in Sikkim
Gangtok

Memorandum No. 3 (7)-L/50
Dated Lhasa, Tibet, the 15th December, 1950.

Monthly Report of the Indian Mission, Lhasa,
for the period ending 15th December, 1950.

EXTERNAL RELATIONS:

Relations between Tibet and China

(i) During the period under review events in Tibet have significantly paled in importance before momentous developments in Korea, Nepal and to a lesser extent Indo-China. These developments would not have been of much significance by themselves had it not been for the sudden revelation of Chinese military potentials, which has created new fears, and grave possibilities, all along the land frontiers of China with the sole exception of areas adjacent to the USSR. It is, however, the formidable alliance between these two great powers which has upset all calculations, and have raised the spectre of war and lengthened the shadow of communist domination over the free nations of Asia.

(ii) With this as background, it is easier to appreciate why interest in Tibet suddenly flagged, while all eyes were on Korea; and how Tibet today happens to be engulfed again in isolation. Forlorn, and weak, she views the magnitude of her misfortune with bleak solicitude.

(iii) Chinese diplomacy which has been consistently unorthodox has scored a signal victory over her adversaries in Tibet during the past month. The bold and challenging assertion of her rights which are only hypothetical in law have sobered down opposition, and made Chinese claims over Tibet sound authentic and true. Tibet's desperate bid to break through the ring of isolation and apathy on the part of the self-proclaimed saviour of peace, through the channels of the United Nations proved abortive.

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(iv) With uncanny prescience and shrewd calculation, the Chinese withheld the stroke that would have delivered Tibet prostrate at her feet last month allowing hysteric outbursts of international interest 'full of sound and fury signifying nothing' to die down, while she consolidated her gains in Tibet and sent out armed bands to attack weakly defended outposts in Eastern and Western Tibet. The latter were constant reminders to Lhasa that Chinese troops in over-whelming force were poised to deliver the coup de grace that would once for all end the antics of the Dalai's regime.

(v) While wearing down the morale of the Tibetan Government, the Chinese in cool defiance of all decency began negotiations with Ngapho Shape, who was captured at Druko Gomba with the largest body of Tibetan troops.

(vi) Chinese inaction in the past few weeks, or stealth in action, seems to have confused international opinion, and revived pathetic hopes that China is pining to solve the Tibetan question by peaceful means - that is, without the formality of war.

(vii) Either in mock seriousness, or for practical considerations, China now proposes to do precisely what India had earlier urged and pleaded with her to do. It appears opportune now that China should gracefully end this act of libicide in a manner which would appease international opinion and yet achieve her ends in Tibet.

Relations with Nepal

Tibetan Government informed the Government of Nepal on or about the 25th November of Chinese incursions into Western Tibet. High officials in Tibet told me that they would invoke Article II of the 1856 Treaty with Nepal, and if they found the Nepal Government not responding, they would denounce the Treaty.

Tibet and the United Nations

On the 4th December Tibetan Government sent a further appeal to the United Nations expressing grave concern and dismay over the U.N. decision to set aside discussion on their appeal regarding the unwarranted violation of their national territory by the armed forces of China. They reaffirmed their decision to abide by any settlement advocated by the U.N.

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PEACE TALKS:

(i) First news of peace talks between the Chinese and the Tibetans came from Peking. The talks were apparently being held without the knowledge or consent of the Tibetan Government who were frankly incredulous when they were first informed about these talks, but nevertheless they consider it possible that Chinese diplomacy would now rule out forcing Tibetan prisoners at Chamdo from accepting certain terms on behalf of their Government.

(ii) The Tibetan Government were, however, in no mood for compromise with a creed that is lethal to the values long cherished by them. They were distrustful of Chinese intentions and were convinced that it would be the height of cowardice to bow to superior forces; they would rather be over-powered by its blind rage than accept it with show of reverence. And as for the consequences they say they are prepared for the worst.

(iii) Later, in confirmation of earlier rumours, news reached the Tibetan Government from Lharigue that Ngapho Shape had sent to emissaries with a report on his talks with the Chinese. The report reached Lhasa on the 7th December and is now being considered by the Tibetan Government.

(iv) In his report Ngapho Shape pays a glowing tribute to Chinese military preparations and points out the futility of Tibetan efforts to stem the Chinese tide. He advocates that peace negotiations should begin forthwith on the following basis:

- (a) Union of the five races of China in a manner not prejudicial to the interests of the minority races.
- (b) Tibet to remain under the rule of the Dalai Lama.
- (c) Tibetan religion to receive protection.
- (d) China to help Tibet in reforming her army into a powerful defence force against external aggression.
- (e) China to provide Tibet with expert guidance in matters relating to Agriculture, Animal husbandry, Commerce and Industry.
- (f) Administrative reforms in Tibet to be undertaken only after mutual consultations between China and Tibet.
- (g) Collaborationists with American, British and Kuomintang interests not to be persecuted.

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- (h) Tibet to be assured that liberation movement is not in support of anti-Tibetan elements like Tashilhumpo and Reting factions.

According to the report, the Chinese have advised the Tibetan Government not to believe in malicious propoganda regarding ruthless communist methods which derive the rich and the monasteries of their landed properties, and equate the rich with the poor.

(v) Tibetan Government have been advised to send their reply to these terms by the 16th December. They have been told that Peking is prepared to consider their objections as far as possible without impairing communist ideals.

(vi) These terms which have been communicated to the Tibetan Government by Ngapho Shape with the approval of the Chinese Government have opened out possibilities of a negotiation peace with China. The Chinese are expecting the Tibetan Government to send a fresh delegation without delay to China via Kham to discuss terms for a final settlement. Should the Tibetans waver in their desire for such a settlement, the Chinese have threatened to proceed with their plans for the conquest of Tibet.

(vii) Ngapho Shape, however, sent another message privately to the Tibetan Government in which he states that he is no longer a free agent and has to order his behaviour in a manner pleasing to his captors. Obviously the terms proposed by him to his Government were inspired by the Chinese.

(viii) The Tibetan National Assembly which met on 11th December to discuss these terms regard them as tempting but no member of the Assembly trusts the Chinese to abide by their offer. The Chinese they say are trying to lure a fly with honey spread on a sharp knife. But in view of their present state of utter helplessness they have been advised to make a sincere effort for a negotiated peace.

INTERNAL

Tibet underwent a mild revolution on 17th November when the Dalai Lama was formally invested with full powers. We attended the investiture ceremony in the Potala at 5 a.m. in the freezing cold

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of the early hours of the morning. Messages of felicitations from the President of India, the Political Officer in Sikkim and the Maharaja of Sikkim were later handed over to His Holiness. His Holiness has sent replies to these messages.

To mark the auspicious occasion, there were jail deliveries throughout Tibet. All prisoners including Kharto Rimpoche and Reting Dzasa arrested in connection with Reting conspiracy case in 1947, and Sera monks gaoled during the Sera disturbances of 1947 were released. Kapshopa Shape who was sent in exile to Nedong in August 1949, has also been released.

Tibetans have generally acclaimed the assumption of power by the Dalai Lama.

Prayers are being offered and ceremonies held in Lhasa to exercise Chinese daemons. On the 5th December Tibetans performed the Torgyap ceremony when 50 effigies of leading Chinese Communists were burnt amidst public rejoicing.

With the Dalai Lama's blessings, a party of 60 monks from three large monasteries left Lhasa last week of November to join Lhalu Shape as advisory body. It is hoped that these monks will be able to stiffen morale of the troops and create spirit of resistance among the local population. Lhasa authorities are heartened by the news that the local people are now showing signs of opposition to the invaders.

On the 8th December the Taktser Rimpoche arrived in Lhasa. He and the Amdowas in his party are believed to have denounced the communists after having reached Nagchuka. The story goes that the Rimpoche was persuaded by the communists to return to Lhasa in order that he might influence his brother, the Laiai Lama, to accede to China. In view of the treatment beted out to his monastery near Sining he is not an ardent supporter of the communists, nor would he like to see Tibet drawn into the Chinese orbit. The Chinese retinue of the Rimpoche sent by the Sining authorities to see that he does not deviate have been detailed in Lhundhup Dzong, two stages from Lhasa. As a precautionary measure bolts from guns brought by the Chinese were removed.

In a rather chastened mood high Tibetan officials consider it opportune to initiate popular reforms in Tibet. They appear to be in some anxiety to relieve the burden of the poor before events

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overtake them, and they are driven into exile. These reforms they feel will create public enthusiasm if they came direct from the grace of His Holiness, who it is popularly believed will terminate the sufferings of the poor and lead Tibet into a new era of prosperity.

Meanwhile, the high officials are scared by evil portents which they believe will bring Tibet great misfortune in the coming weeks.

Lhasa continues to be quiet, and almost normal.

ECONOMIC:

Prices in Lhasa are still soaring. The exchange rate has gone down to the neighbourhood of 4 Sangs to the rupee, as Lhasa merchants have stopped buying goods from India.

SOCIAL AND PERSONAL:

On the 1st December, the Maharani of Sikkim came to lunch and tea at the Mission with her daughter and son-in-law.

The three Tsipons of the Tibetan Government called on me on the 3rd December.

MISCELLANEOUS:

A party of 23 white Russians including two women from Sinkiang is reported to have reached Nagchuka. Their original plan was to enter India by way of Leh, but as their escape routes were cut off by the Chinese, they turned back and entered Tibet. I understand the party is anxious to enter India. Further information regarding them is being awaited from the Tibetan Government.

sd/- S. SINHA
OFFICER IN CHARGE

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