

## **November 20, 1961**

## Central Intelligence Agency, Information Report Telegram, 'Foreign Policy Aims of Strauss, Schroeder and some FDP Leaders'

### Citation:

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## **Summary:**

In the weeks following the November 1961 West German federal elections when a new cabinet formed, CIA sources in Bonn provided information on the thinking of the group of "Young Turks" in Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's cabinet that included Defense Minister Franz-Joseph Strauss and Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder.

#### **Credits:**

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## **Original Language:**

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#### Contents:

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- J. DECISIVE POWER COULD BE HELD IN THE NEW CABINET BY AN ALLIANCE OF STRAUSS, SCHROEDER, AND THE FDP "YOUNG TURKS." THE LATTER GROUP INCLUDES A VERY STRONG FACTION WITHIN THE FDP, DOES NOT INCLUDE MENDE, BUT DOES INCLUDE ALL THE FDP CABINET MEMBERS EXCEPT FREASURY MINISTER LENZ. ALTHOUGH THIS GROUP IS PREPARED TO ENCOURAGE THE RIVALRY BETWEEN STRAUSS AND SCHROEDER IN ORDER TO ENHANCE ITS OWN IMPORTANCE, IT IS WILLING TO OFFER SOME POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR STRAUSS, SHORT OF SUPPORTING HIM FOR THE CHANCELLORSHIP, AND THE VIEWS OF THIS GROUP ARE CLOSE TO THE VIEWS BOTH OF STRAUSS AND OF SCHROEDER.
- 2. "NEW REALISM" IS THE SLOGAN CHARACTERIZING STRAUSS, SCHROEDER, AND
  THE YOUNG TURKS. ALL AGREE THAT WEST GERMANY'S POSITION IN NATO MUST BE
  FURTHER STRENGTHENED, WITH WEST GERMANY BECOMING THE KEY EUROPEAN NATION
  IN THE ALLIANCE. THIS CONDITION IS CONSIDERED THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE IN
  A POLICY BASED ON "ENLIGHTENED NATIONAL INTERESTS." TO THIS END, THE GERMAN
  CONNECTION WITH THE WEST, PARTICULARLY WITH THE U.S., SHOULD BECOME CLOSER,
  30 THAT THE WEST WILL BE WILLING TO MAKE MORE CONCESSIONS TO WEST GERMANY.
  WITH THIS IN MIND, SCHRÖEDER AND STRAUSS ARE WILLING TO MINIMIZE BERLIN'S
  IMPORTANCE, SO THAT THE SOVIETS CANNOT USE THIS LEVER TO UNHINGE NATO OR
  TO FORCE CONCESSIONS FROM THE WEST LIKELY TO LIMIT WEST GERMANY'S POWER.
  EFFORTS SHOULD NOT NOW BE MADE TO REDUCE TENSIONS, SINCE THIS WOULD DETRACT
  FROM WEST GERMANY'S IMPORTANCE IN THE MAIN BATTLE LINE. ONCE WEST GERMANY'S
  MILITARY BUILDUP HAS REACHED A SATURATION POINT, TENSIONS CAN SAFELY BE

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REDUCED WITHOUT LIMITING WEST GERMAN POWER.  2. SCHROEDER, STRAUSS AND THE YOUNG TURKS AGREE THAT WEST GERMANY
SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT ATOMIC WARHEADS BUT DISAGREE
ON THE WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS RIGHT. STRAUSS THINKS THAT UNLESS THE U.S.
AGREES TO SHARE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND THE RIGHT TO USE THEM WITH THE EUROPEANS,
THE GERMANS AND FRENCH SHOULD COOPERATE TO PRODUCE ATOMIC WEAPONS OF THEIR OWN SCHROEDER THINKS THE THREE WESTERN POWERS SHOULD BE PLAYED AGAINST
EACH OTHER AND THAT THE GERMANS SHOULD RETRACT THEIR PLEDGE NOT TO PRODUCE
ABC WEAPONS. A GERMAN ATOMIC DETERRENT COULD IMPRESS SOVIETS MORE THAN THE
U.S. DETERRENT CAN SINCE NEITHER THE SOVIETS NOR THE EUROPEANS BELIEVE THE
AMERICANS WOULD REALLY USE THEIR BOMBS. IF FACED WITH A GERMAN ATOMIC
CAPABILITY, THE SOVIETS WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE MAJOR CONCESSIONS IN
NEGOTIATIONS WITH WEST GERMANY. OTHERWISE, ANY CONCESSIONS THE SOVIETS
MADE WOULD BE MADE TO THE WESTERN POWERS WITHOUT PRIMARY ATTENTION TO THE
INTERESTS OF WEST GERMANY, SINCE WEST GERMANY COULD NOT IN ANY CASE PRODUCE
MANY ATOMIC WEAFONS, THE WESTERN POWERS WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO FEAR. ON THE
OTHER HAND, A STRONG MODERN ARMY SHOULD BE FORMED THAT COULD STOP ANY
SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ATTACK. SCHROEDER, STRAUSS AND THE YOUNG TURKS AGREE
THAT IF THE GERMANS COULD USE ATOMIC WEAPONS, THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE MORE
GENUINELY INTERESTED IN AN ATOMIC BAN.
4. FOR THE TIME BEING SCHROEDER, STRAUSS AND THE YOUNG TURKS AGREE
TO OPPOSE ALL PROPOSALS FOR REGIONAL DISARMAMENT OR ANY LIMITATIONS ON "
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CERMAN ARMAMENTS. INSTEAD, THE WEST IS TO BE OFFERED A SUBSTANTIAL GERMAN CONTRIBUTION FOR DEFENSE, INCLUDING A SHARE IN THE COSTS OF CONTINGENCY MEASURES. IN THIS WAY, STRAUSS EXPLAINED TO THE FDP, THE THREE WESTERN POWERS CAN BE PREVENTED FROM LOOKING FOR POLITICAL OR OTHER CONCESSIONS TO REDUCE THEIR COSTLY ENGAGEMENT. "INCREASED GERMAN INTEGRATION INTO THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE," ACCORDING TO STRAUSS, MEANS THERE WILL BE BUNDESWEHR OFFICERS IN HIGHER JOBS IN ACCORDANCE WITH BONN'S DEFENSE CONTRIBUTION, E.G., COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CENTRAL EUROPE, WHO, IN STRAUSS' OPINION, SHOULD SHARE IN DECISIONS ABOUT ATOMIC WEAPONS.

- INTEGRATION IN ITS ORIGINAL SENSE. "L'EUROPE DES PATRIES" IS SUPPORTED

  BY ALL THREE, INSOFAR AS THIS DOES NOT REDUCE WEST GERMANY'S SOVEREIGNTY.

  THEIR REASON IS THAT WITH COMPLETE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO PURSUE "NATIONAL AMBITIONS AND RIGHTFUL CLAIMS," SINCE THE OTHER—

  MEMBERS WOULD ALWAYS OBJECT. THEY SUPPORT THE INCLUSION OF THE UNITED

  KINGDOM IN EEC MAINLY AS THE BALANCING FACTOR AGAINST THE FRENCH.

  FURTHERMORE, THE U.K. WOULD NEVER AGREE TO ANYTHING CURTAILING NATIONAL

  SOVEREIGNTIES. WEST GERMANY WOULD ALMOST AUTOMATICALLY BECOME FIRST

  AMONG EQUALS IN EUROPE, ONCE DE GAULLE WAS GONE.
- 6. STRAUGS AND SCHROEDER AGREE THAT THERE CAN NOT AND SHOULD NOT BE REUNIFICATION BASED ON CONFEDERATION. INSTEAD, EAST GERMANY SHOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO WEST GERMANY. STRAUSS ENVISIONS LIBERATION WHEN EAST

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GERMANY IS NO LONGER A GREAT ASSET TO THE SOVIETS AND WEST GERMANY IS STRONG ENOUGH NOT TO BE OVERRUN WITHOUT SOME EFFORT. HE BELIEVES A REVOLT IN EAST GERMANY COULD BE USED AS A PRETEXT TO HELP ENSLAVED PEOPLE. SCHROEDER BELIEVES THE SOVIETS WILL EVENTUALLY BE PREPARED TO GIVE UP EAST GERMANY IF THIS WILL SPARE THEM CONTINUOUS CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S. IN EUROPE. A STRONG GERMANY WHICH WOULD BE NO REAL THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION BUT WOULD GUARANTEE THE STATUS QUO IN EASTERN EUROPE WOULD ALSO BE ADVANDED.

THE YOUNG TURKS BELIEVE REUNIFICATION SHOULD CREATE A GERMAN
REICH, NOT JUST AN ENLARGED WEST GERMANY. THEY AGREE THAT NECESSARY
STRENGTH MUST FIRST BE BUILT UP. WHEN THIS IS ACHIEVED, HOWEVER, NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITH AN OFFER TO DISSOLVE NATO
IN EXCHANGE FOR REUNIFICATION. THEY BELIEVE RELATIONS WITH THE SATELLITES
SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN ORDER TO OVERCOME THESE COUNTRIES, OPPOSITION TO
REUNIFICATION, AND THAT LARGE-SCALE ECONOMIC PROGRAMS SHOULD BE INITIATED
IN THE FORM OF AN EASTERN EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT PLAN.

- 8. THE WESTERN POWERS CANNOT BE RELIED ON TO HELP ESTABLISH A UNITED GERMANY IN ANY FORM BECAUSE THE WESTERN POWERS ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY INTERESTED UNLESS A UNITED GERMANY WOULD IMPROVE THEIR OWN POSITIONS. PROPOSALS FOR A UNITED GERMANY WHICH WOULD STRENGTHEN THE WESTERN POSITION ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION.
  - 9. DIFFERENCES EXIST CONCERNING THE TIMETABLE AND STEPS TO BE TAKEN

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1	FARE BETTER IF THEY LIBERALIZED THE EAST GERMAN REGIME. CERTA		
- 1	MIC CONCESSIONS COULD BE MADE IN EXCHANGE FOR LIBERALIZATION.	•	
ERAT	on could even be given to recognizing a liberalized east german		
MENT			
	REMOVE THE POSSIBILITIES OF REVOLT IN EAST GERMANY. HE DOES N	•	
TUO	DE FACTO RECOGNITION, IF THIS WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE MILITARY BU	TLIUP	
IN T	est germany. The young turks take a shorter view and want to in	CREASE	
CON	ACTS WITH EAST GERMANY BECAUSE THEY FEEL THAT WEST GERMANY CAN M	KORIE	- 5
EFF	CTIVELY UNDERMINE EAST GERMANY THAN VICE VERSA.		,
	10. STRAUSS, SCHROEDER AND THE YOUNG TURKS AGREE THAT WEST GE	RMANY	
SHO	LD NO LONGER PAY FOR THE RIGHT TO BE ACCEPTED IN WESTERN COUNCI	LS.	
FRO	NOW ON, THERE WILL BE NO MORE PLEADING BUT RATHER DEMANDS FOR	RIGHTS	
BAS	D ON CONTRIBUTION AND POTENTIAL. CONCESSIONS AND SACRIFICES WI	LL	
IMO	BE MADE IF THEY IMPROVE WEST GERMANY'S FOSITION AND STRENGTH.		
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