

March 27, 1967

Memorandum of Conversation between Vice President Hubert Humphrey and ACDA Director Foster, 'Ambassador Foster's Briefing of Vice President on NPT,' with enclosure, 'Questions Most Likely to be Asked on NPT'

Citation:

"Memorandum of Conversation between Vice President Hubert Humphrey and ACDA Director Foster, 'Ambassador Foster's Briefing of Vice President on NPT,' with enclosure, 'Questions Most Likely to be Asked on NPT'", March 27, 1967, Wilson Center Digital Archive, NARA, RG 383, Director's Office NPT Files, box 4, United States Non-Proliferation January 3, 1967-March 29, 1967 Book # 3. Contributed to NPIHP by Bill Burr. https://wilson-center-digital-archive.dvincitest.com/document/177798

Summary:

During this conversation, Director Foster briefed Vice President Humphrey about the progress of the NPT. Foster said that he was willing to meet Germany's concerns about such issues as protecting its civil nuclear industry and a future European federation. Moreover, noting that Washington had to discuss the NPT with other countries that could "otherwise go nuclear," Foster worried that a long delay caused by consultations could "jeopardize the chance of the rest of the world getting signed up."

Credits:

This document was made possible with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY)

Original Language:

English

Contents:

Original Scan

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 7222

SECRET LIMDIS

SECRET - LDGTED DISTRIBUTION

This document consists of 9 pages. Copy No. 6 of 9 copies. A

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE COMPRESCE OF THE KIGHTERN-MATION CONSTITUTE ON DISARMANCET

MEMORAHIAN OF CONVERSITION

Date: March 27, 1967 Place: Geneva

Subject: Ambassador Foster's Briefing of Vice President on MPT

Participants

The Vice President Mr. Ted Van Dyk

Dr. Edward Menk, Jr.

Mr. William Welsh

Mr. Robert Anderson

Col. Merbert Beckington

Copies to: ACDA (5)

U.S. Delegation

Ambassador Foster Entre George Bana X

Cel. T. St. John Armold

NT AGEN

- 1. Opening the briefing, Ambanuador Foster unds the following points:
- (1) We cannot negotiate a "bilateral treaty" between the U.S. and the FRS. If we do, it won't be signed by the rest of the world.
- (2) In his discussion with Foster, Chanceller Kiesinger had expressed concern about protecting Germany's growing penceful madear industry, about the need for an adequate supply of nuclear fuel, and about his desire that MPT not hinder growth toward a U.S. of Europe. German concerns such as these should be taken care of in the MPT pressble, in interpretations or in bilateral discussions, but not in body of the MPT itself. The MPT draft is based on a fundamental Rush-Groupko agreement that MPT should deal with


SECRET - LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

SECRET LIMIDIS

Group 3

Domgraded at 12-yr intervals; not automatically domgraded.

MR



SECRET - LINITED DISTRIBUTION

-2-

what is prohibited not with what is permitted. This is the foundation for interpretations the Germans want (e.g., that MPT does not deal with allied nucleur consultations or nucleur deployment arrangements). If "allowables" are put in trenty articles rather than in interpretations, presable and bilateral discussions, this foundation will be destroyed. Moreover, there will be no end of things which will have to go into the text of the treaty.

- (5) The NFT must be negotiated with the Indians, Japanese, Israelis, Swedes, etc. who may otherwise go nuclear in the years immediately shead. Hegotiations with these countries must begin very soon. Further long delays for allied consultations may jeopardize the chance of getting the rest of the world signed up. And some of the points must be left to be made by them; our allies are not the only ones who must participate in these negotiations.
- (4) We do not propose to put a finally-agreed draft on the table at the Geneva Dismission Conference. Further changes will be insvitable as the result of negotiations at Geneva, and allied consultations can continue during this period.
- 2. The Vice President asked Ambassador Foster whether he thought Washington had different views. Ambassador Foster replied that many second to think there was plenty of time. The Vice President said the President had instructed him to tell the Germans that we did not intend to "do them in" on snything, but that MFT had very high priority with us. We should assure the Germans on their peaceful nuclear industry, on MATO, and on an EDC without nuclear warheads. A U.S. of Europe could inherit UK and French nuclear weapons. While giving assurances on these points, the bilateral discussions should not go on ad infinitus. The Germans should tell MAC what they had in mind. Soon after that, the MFT should be tabled at Geneva. We can't stell and stall and satisfy every concern. But MFT should not appear as just a U.S.-USER negotiation without input from our allies. The Germans were suspicious of U.S. motives and the President wanted to respond to the legitimate concerns of our allies. But this process should not go on for weeks and weeks.
- 3. Ambassador Poster said he agreed fully with this approach. But the Germans wanted more. They had leaked the President's letter to Chancellor Kiesinger saying it meant that there was no harry. Kiesinger had said he might see the President on HPT in the Fall, implying the FRG could wait until them. This had prompted press stories such as that in the London Sunday Times of 26 March by Antony Terry which states:

SHERRY - LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

Authority NND 72393


-3-

SECRET - LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

"In the next precision-made coalition package neither Kiesinger nor Brandt are prepared to quarrel over Born's conditional 'no' to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, now shelved by President Johnson in an effort to take the heat out of the argument. Popular feeling is now strongly on the side of Herr Strauen's pro-French policy and hopes of a united Europe with its own nuclear force. Herr Kiesinger known he is on the right lines in putting up a tough front to Vice President Humphrey."

- 4. The Vice President indicated we were not happy with the leak of the President's letter; and that Berry had written anti-U.S. stories before. He said the U.S. position was simple: We are prepared to consult further with our allies, but HPT had high priority; we falt a sense of urgency and a special responsibility in this area as a nuclear power.
- 5. Ambassador Foster set forth the time schedule for MAC consultations, for further U.S.-Soviet negotiations, and for tabling an MFT draft then the Geneva Disarmannat Conference remand on May 9. He reported that Chancellor Kissinger had told him after their meeting that the Chancellor had to look tough to avoid giving the MFD any emanition, but that Germany would eventually sign. Brandt was supporting MFT, but Strauss, Schroeder and Schmippenkoetter were not helpful. The Vice President said he thought the Germann did not wish to kill MFT, but the coalition had produced a nervous government. The main argument against MFT was that it would parelt all the muclear powers to have muclear weapons but deprive others of this right. An objector should be asked whether his country really wanted nuclear weapons; if it did it could obviously not sign anyway. A sain selling point for MFT was that it would provide further incentive, not hindrence, to European federation.
- Ambassafor Foster said we had so convinced the Soviets on the virtues of such safeguards that now they were insisting that they be in the trenty. Envetom was the problem because it did not went anyone else looking over its shoulder. The Vice President suggested that the IARA do on-the-spot verification of Envetom inspections at any time. Ambassafor Foster added that this would keep Envetom in the inspection business just as our national checks would be kept on IARA-safeguarded U.S. plants. But it would also give the Soviets more assurance than a system of allies inspecting allies a system upon which we would not wish to rely if it were Poles inspecting the Soviet Union. To alleviate the concerns about industrial espionage and discrimination, we were prepared to support the FRG if it rejected IARA inspectors from muclear powers. We were also considering putting more U.S. peaceful activities under safeguards. The Vice President added that Germany also needed assurance about U.S. supply of nuclear fuels in the future.

SECRET - LIBITED DISTRIBUTION



SECRET - LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

4-

- 7. A paper entitled "Questions Host Likely to be Asked on HPT" was discussed by Ambaesador Poster. A copy is attached.
- 8. In conclusion, the Vice President said that HPT was going to happen, but we should be some of the problems of a coalition putting Brandt in the same cabinet with Strauss et al.

Attachment:

"Questions Most Likely to be Asked on NPT"

DISCOS!: CELEN

SECRET - LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

Authority NND 72393

March 25, 1967

SECRET

Questions Most Likely to be Asked on NPT

- 1.Q. How can we be sure Soviets will not interpret NPT in manner contrary to US interpretations?
 - A. We can never be sure, but NATO members have all withstood Soviet propaganda charges before with equanimity. US interpretations are based directly on treaty text and negotiating history. The Soviets understand them, although we can not expect them to say publicly that, for example, existing NATO nuclear arrangements are OK. Firm in our agreement within the Alliance on these interpretations, we should have no difficulty with Soviet propaganda.
- 2.Q. Won't NPT hinder unification of Europe?
 - A. No. NPT does not deal with European unification and would not prevent creation of a new federated European state (U.S. of Europe) which succeeded to the nuclear weapons of UK or France. It does not give France any new status or bargaining leverage which France did not already have as result of its geographic and economic position, as well as its possession of nuclear weapons.
- 3.Q. Why did US work out basis for new approach to NPT without first consulting its allies?
 - There have been repeated consultations with allies on NPT since late 1962. In discussions in North Atlantic Council over last two years, it became clear that not more than two of our allies wished to keep open an option for a multilateral force with nuclear weapons which could be fired by majority vote (Germany and possibly Italy wanted to keep this open; Italians told us last year they wished to give it up to get NPT). It also became clear after extensive allied consultations that there was insufficient support to form an MLF for the foreseeable future. When Soviets indicated they would no longer seek through NPT to disrupt existing NATO arrangements for nuclear consultations and nuclear deployments, US concluded that US and its allies would all be better off with NPT and no MLF than with neither NPT nor MLF. Allies were briefed on negotiations with Soviets beginning in October; no one then objected and we therefore went ahead.
- 4.Q. Why can't nuclear powers undertake specific disarmament steps in connection NPT if they expect others permanently to renounce nuclear weapons?

SECRET

Authority NND 72393


- 2 -

- A. We have already achieved the Limited Test Ban Treaty and Outer Space Treaty which have considerable impact on nuclear powers but little as yet on anyone else. If we insist on further such steps by nuclear powers, we will probably hold up NPT so long that proliferation will be unstoppable. The NPT preamble will, however, call on nuclear powers to halt the nuclear arms race at the earliest possible date. We believe NPT will also improve the atmosphere for discussions on AEM's and offensive missiles now beginning in Moscow.
- 5.Q. Why should non-nuclear states be made to accept safeguards when nuclear powers have no such obligation? Why not leave Euratom free to apply its own safeguards without seeking to impose TAEA controls on them?
 - A. The purpose of safeguards is to/manufacture of nuclear weapons. Safeguards make little sense on the peaceful reactors of a country already making nuclear weapons elsewhere. However, to reduce the element of discrimination as far as possible, US is prepared to support the right of non-nuclear countries to reject inspectors from nuclear countries. We are also considering putting more US peaceful nuclear activities under safeguards. We would appreciate knowing from our allies if they believe this would help them to accept safeguards.

Euratom will be free to continue its own safeguards system. But we cannot expect other countries to accept IAEA safeguards if Euratom members insist that only they can inspect themselves. Many non-aligned countries have made it clear that they are prepared to accept IAEA safeguards but only if everyone else does too. And, we would not be prepared to rely on Czechs inspecting Russians. We cannot therefore expect Czechs or Russians to rely on West Europeans inspecting each other.

- 6.Q. How can we be sure NPT will not be used to hamper development of peaceful nuclear programs in non-nuclear weapon states? Won't they lose all the "spin-off" benefits enjoyed by those who produce nuclear weapons?
 - A. Except for the requirement for IAEA safeguards, and the problem of nuclear explosions which may some day be developed for peaceful purposes, there is nothing in NPT which would in any way affect peaceful nuclear programs. Twenty-five countries including US have IAEA safeguards on some peaceful nuclear facilities without any "hampering" of such programs.

SECRET



US is modifying the safeguards article, and we have added preambular paragraphs to NPT, to make clear that peaceful activities are to be encouraged, not hampered. With assurance to other countries which will follow safeguards, wider international cooperation on peaceful programs should be possible.

The "spin-off" from nuclear-weapon programs came long ago and has now been widely dispersed to many countries in the form of peaceful nuclear assistance and information. Other spin-off, and there is very little, will also be made available to others; an NPT preambular paragraph to this effect has been added. In addition, the US has made clear its intention to share the benefits of any nuclear explosives which may one day be developed for peaceful purposes.


- 7.Q. What assurance will non-nuclear weapon states be given of protection against nuclear blackmail or attack?
 - A. Allies have the Alliance. It is much better protection than will be available to other non-nuclear countries. We are, however, prepared to negotiate an assurance of protection in the form of a UN resolution.
- 8.Q. Why can't review and withdrawal provisions be revised to make it possible for non-nuclear weapon states to hold the nuclear powers more strictly to account for implementing declarations of intention regarding nuclear disarmament? If these intentions are not implemented why should not the non-nuclear weapon states be able to withdraw without having to justify the rigid requirements of the present withdrawal clause?
 - A. The present review clause permits review by all Parties after five years of whether the "purposes" of NPT have been achieved "Purposes" means what appears in the preamble--which includes declarations of intention on nuclear disarmament. Review clause is therefore adequate.

If the security of a non-nuclear-weapon state is jeopardized by failure of the nuclear powers to disarm, then of course it can withdraw. Thus, if USSR fails to come to agreement with US to cut back nuclear weapons and seriously threatens Western Europeans with those weapons, then of course they can withdraw.

9.Q. Why pursue this treaty, with all the serious problems it raises, when all it does is to institutionalize present practices?

SECRET LUNDIS

not automatically domagnated.



A. NPT does far more than institutionalize the present practice of the nuclear powers to retain their nuclear weapons. If "near nuclear" countries sign up, NPT will be an effective brake to proliferation in the way it is most likely to occurby indigenous manufacture of nuclear weapons in India, Israel, Sweden, Japan, etc.

SECRET

SECRET LIMDIS

not automatically domaraded.