

**April 7, 1967**

**US Embassy Paris Telegram 15735 to State  
Department, 'Vice President's Visit: Meeting with  
General de Gaulle on April 7 - Nonproliferation  
Treaty'**

**Citation:**

"US Embassy Paris Telegram 15735 to State Department, 'Vice President's Visit: Meeting with General de Gaulle on April 7 - Nonproliferation Treaty'", April 7, 1967, Wilson Center Digital Archive, NARA, RG 59, Conference Files, box 438, CF 142 Vice President's Visit to Europe; March 1967 Vol. III Memoranda of Conversation. Contributed to NPIHP by Bill Burr. <https://wilson-center-digital-archive.dvincitest.com/document/177800>

**Summary:**

During his meeting with French president de Gaulle, Vice President Humphrey said that Washington knew the "French position" of opposition to the NPT, but wanted to know what de Gaulle thought the "German attitude" should be.

**Credits:**

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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VIPTO 106

BRUSSELS FOR VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT: MEETING WITH GENERAL DE GAULLE ON  
 APRIL 7- NON PROLIFERATION TREATY

THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT WHILE WE KNEW FRENCH POSITION OF THE  
 NPT, HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT DE GAULLE THOUGHT SHOULD BE THE  
 GERMAN ATTITUDE.

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DEGAULLE REPLIED FIRST OF ALL THAT FRANCE WAS NOT TAKING ANY STAND  
 VIS-A-VIS OTHER COUNTRIES ON NPT. THEY CONSIDER THIS STRICTLY A  
 MATTER FOR EACH NATION TO DECIDE ITSELF. THERE WERE, HOWEVER, TWO  
 ASPECTS TO PROBLEM OF GERMAN ADHERENCE FROM FRENCH POINT OF VIEW,  
 1) THAT THE TREATY WOULD FURTHER LIMIT POSSIBILITY OF GERMANY AC-  
 QUIRING NUCLEAR ARMS WITH WHICH THE FRENCH WERE IN COMPLETE SUP-  
 PORT. HE ADDED PARENTHETICALLY THAT IF GERMANY EVER ACQUIRED NU-  
 CLEAR ARMS, THAT WOULD RADICALLY CHANGE FRENCH POLICY TOWARDS IT.  
 2) THE SECOND WAS PSYCHOLOGICAL IN NATURE. FOR THE GERMANS, THE  
 NPT WOULD CREATE A SPECIAL AND DISCRIMINATING POSITION. THE U.S.,  
 USSR, UK AND FRANCE HAD NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WOULD CONTINUE TO IN-  
 CREASE THEM, WHILE TREATY APPEARED TO CONDEMN GERMANY NEVER TO HAVE  
 ANY. THIS WAS A PURELY PSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTION, AND HE MERELY NOTED  
 IT AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS IN THE EQUATION. BOHLEN  
 BT

ADVANCE COPY PASSED TO S/S-O, 4/7/67, 6:55 P.M.

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, 4/7/67, 6:55 P.M.

SECRET

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