# April 12, 1967

#### Memorandum of Conversation between Norwegian Ambassador Arne Gunneng and ACDA Director Foster, 'Non-Proliferation Treaty'

## Citation:

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## Summary:

In this conversation, Director Foster and Norwegian Ambassador Gunneng discussed the state of the NPT negotiations and the U.S. consultations with West Germany. Foster made comments about Italy and West Germany being inflexible, and Gunneng stated that it would cost the country "a great deal internationally" if they continued to block progress.

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## Original Language:

English

### **Contents:**

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
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| 4/17/67 Memorandum of Conversation                                |  |   |
| Approved in   | ACDA/D   | DATE: April 12, 1967  |
| SUBJECT: NO   | n-Proliferation Treaty (U)   | PR 20 1967 COPYEL 1967 APR 19   |
| PARTICIPANTS: H.<br>Kj<br>Wi<br>Ro                                | E. Arne Gunneng, Ambassado<br>eld Vibe, Counselor, Embas<br>lliam C. Foster, Director,<br>bert W. Drexler, ACDA/IR | or of Norwal R 20190' COPYE 19<br>sy of Norway ACDA = 23                                      |
| COPIES TO: ACDA (1<br>GPM<br>S /S (3)<br>INR (8)<br>IO<br>EUR/SCA | EUR/GER<br>EUR/RPM<br>White House-Mr. Keeny<br>DOD/ISA - Mr. Barber  | CIA - Dr. Drell<br>Amembassy OSLO<br>USMission GENEVA DISDEL (3)                              |

<u>Ambassador Gunneng</u> began by asking for an assessment of the present NPT negotiating situation. <u>Mr. Foster</u> replied that we were in need of assistance; he went on to say that the position of the Norwegian Government regarding the NPT had been forthright and that the statements made by the Norwegian representative at the April 4 NAC meeting had been very helpful. Mr. Foster described the developments leading to the April 12 NAC session and said he judged from a preliminary telephonic report that the meeting had advanced matters somewhat; the Germans had been rather quiet, though the Italian representatives had continued their previous activity.

Mr. Foster outlined the nature of the current NPT talks with German representatives in Washington and expressed the hope that they will be genuinely exploratory in nature and facilitate our going ahead with the tabling of the treaty at the ENDC. Mr. Foster said he trusted that the Norwegian Government would join in helping get the treaty on the road when this is considered at the April 19th NAC meeting.

Mr. Foster reviewed for Ambassador Gunneng the principal concerns expressed by the visiting German officials with regard


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to the NPT and explained our position on these issues. Referring, in this connection, to the problem of Article III, Mr. Foster emphasized the importance we attach to the principle of full, international, objective safeguards. He pointed out that if this principle is weakened through the treaty negotiations, the Soviets will thereby be able to argue more strongly against verification and inspection requirements for other arms control measures. Referring to FRG concerns that the three-year transition period stipulated in the revised Article III will give the IAEA excessive leverage in negotiations with EURATOM, Mr. Foster stressed that the West has an important presence and influence in IAEA and that it was therefore hard for us to understand why an agreement between the two organizations could not be reached within that period.

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
Mr. Foster told Ambassador Gunneng that he recognized that because of the coalition-type government in Bonn there were strains and complications in the FRG's decision-making processes on the NPT question. He observed, however, that the difficulties the FRG was encountering in this regard were in contrast to the fact that Germany is the only country to have renounced, in a treaty, its right to manufacture nuclear weapons. Mr. Foster added that the FRG, in view of its past history, would pay a high price internationally if the NPT undertaking failed because of its attitude. Emphasizing the need to carry the negotiations forward expeditiously, Mr. Foster warned that if advances are not scored at the coming ENDC session, the issue would be taken to the General Assembly where it would be impossible for the West to control the debate.

In response to questions from <u>Ambassador Gunneng</u>, <u>Mr. Foster</u> reviewed how we had addressed Italian and German concerns about the treaty's effect on the process of European unification. In this connection, Mr. Foster alluded to the fact that the NPT would not place any limitations on a European jointly-owned force of delivery vehicles provided the nuclear warheads remained under U.S. control.

<u>Ambassador Gunneng</u> asked whether the Germans appeared now to regret their earlier decision to renounce the manufacture



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of nuclear weapons. <u>Mr. Foster</u> replied that their attitude in the current negotiations raises such a question but that he wasn't certain of the answer. He said he gave them full credit for sincerity but that they were, nonetheless, difficult to convince. Mr. Foster added that the basic problem to be faced is how one limits nuclear proliferation. By definition, one is left with little flexibility in addressing this problem, and, he said, it is hard for some to face this fact.


<u>Ambassador Gunneng</u> inquired whether the Italians were easier to convince on this point. <u>Mr. Foster</u> commented that they, too, had been very inflexible so far. Nenni supported the treaty, but again there was the complication of a coalition government; Moro and Fanfani remained difficult to convince.

Returning to the German position, <u>Ambassador Gunneng</u> asked if Strauss was looming in the background. <u>Mr. Foster</u> replied that he is one of several FRG leaders who remain unconvinced about the NPT. In view of distorted and misinformed articles which have appeared in the German press, Mr. Foster added it was possible that the real issues regarding the NPT had not been made clear to the German people. He said that, therefore, one of our reasons for wanting to have the treaty tabled as quickly as possible was to make it a public document and thereby allay misapprehensions that had arisen about it.

<u>Ambassador Gunneng</u> commented that if the two former Axis partners become responsible for blocking progress toward the NPT it would cost the two a great deal internationally. The Norwegian Government, he said, would consider this a very serious development. The Ambassador asked whether other US allies had more or less agreed to the NPT. <u>Mr. Foster</u> said that the EURATOM countries feel a certain obligation not to destroy the progress which has already been made toward European unification. He stressed that the US has always supported the unification movement and has no intention to do it damage. He observed, however, that the Europeans must recognize that there must at times be adjustments in forms.







In response to <u>Ambassador Gunneng's</u> reference to other arms control undertakings, involving ABMs for example, <u>Mr</u>. <u>Foster</u> stated that progress regarding the NPT will contribute to advances in other, related arms control fields, even though we cannot guarantee what or when the next steps in this direction may be. If the NPT negotiations fail, however, prospects for additional measures would worsen and the arms race might become more intense.

