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**J. duPreez, 'Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT):
South African Position and Preparations for the NPT
Review and Extension Conference'**

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Summary:

The memo contains strategies both for before and during the NPT, arguing for fixed extension without publicly announcing it prior to NPT and support supermajority as criteria in decision.

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 THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, DIRG
 MR TF WHEELER, HDSO
 MR FH LAND, HDPA
 FROM : MR JP DU PREEZ, MA80
 DATE : 27 FEBRUARY 1995
 STATUS : FOR APPROVAL
 SUBJECT : NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) :
 SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION AND PREPARATIONS FOR
 THE NPT REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE

1. SUMMARY

- 1.1 South Africa has to date not given any indication of its position on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) extension issue. This matter is due to be considered at a Conference of States Parties to the NPT in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995, and the questions which are to be addressed are whether, in terms of Article X(2) of the Treaty, the States Parties are willing to extend the life of the NPT, and if so how. The extension options which the Treaty provides for is whether it should continue in force indefinitely, or should be extended for an additional fixed period or periods.
- 1.2 The debate surrounding the extension of the NPT has become very divisive with widely differing positions being adopted along the North/South divide. The arguments put forward by both sides are valid. The developed countries argue that the NPT is the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime; and that the security and economic interests of all states will be best served if the NPT is extended indefinitely in 1995. The developing countries argue that the NPT is discriminatory in that it favours the nuclear weapon states and in that these countries have not met their disarmament obligations under the Treaty.
- 1.3 Although it is in South Africa's national interest that the NPT should be extended, there is no overriding reason which determines that South Africa should support any specific option provided for in the Treaty. Up until now it has been the Department's position that we should not bind South Africa to a final option, and that we should rather maintain a flexible position so that we could act as the broker between the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the developed countries. This flexibility would allow South Africa to explore all possible solutions to address the concerns of the various sides in the debate and to achieve the broadest possible support.
- 1.4 This policy has proven to be successful as is evident by the widespread recognition which has been given to our privately argued position. As outlined in South Africa's Statement at the 4th Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting in New York, (23-27 January 1995), an extension option which has the

of drawing support is a rolling extension of successive fixed periods which would extend the Treaty in perpetuity, but where a positive vote would be required between each of the succeeding periods to initiate the start of the following period.

- 1.6 The success of the South African proposal which has now been identified as the middle ground, is evident in articles which appeared in the Disarmament Times and ACRONYM publications. These are the only two mainstream disarmament related publications which have been published since the Fourth PrepCom meeting in New York when South Africa unveiled the so-called "Third Option".
- 1.7 It is therefore strongly recommended that South Africa should maintain its current flexible position until the start of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference so as to allow South Africa to play a mediating role between the supporters of indefinite extension and the non-aligned countries.
- 1.8 So as to allow South Africa to act as broker in the debate concerning the extension of the NPT, it is recommended that the Minister approve that South Africa should support the rolling extension of successive fixed periods which would extend the Treaty in perpetuity, but where a positive vote would be required between each of the succeeding periods to initiate the start of the following period.
- 1.9 In order to obtain support for South Africa's position, it is recommended that the Minister approve the strategy as outlined in this memorandum. To gain maximum political mileage from its "Third Option" position care should, however, be taken so as not to expose South Africa's tactics and position at a too early stage.
- 1.10 It is also recommended that the Minister approve the composition of the South African delegation to the Conference as outlined in the memorandum. It is recommended that the delegation essentially comprise of the Minister (if it is decided that he should attend), the Permanent Representative, New York, Mr Abdul Minty, who is the advisor to the Minister on these issues, representatives from the Missions in Vienna and Geneva, an official from the Department's Sub-Directorate Non-Proliferation Affairs (Route MA80) and an official from the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC).

2. RECOMMENDATIONS

2.1 South Africa's position on the extension of the NPT

- 2.1.1 South Africa should maintain its current flexible position until the start of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference so as to allow South Africa to play a mediating role between the supporters of indefinite extension and the Non-Aligned countries. The "Third Option" is widely recognised as a South African proposal. As is being noted by commentators "this option is drawing support" and "the debate concerning the third option may well be at

- "While most Northern speakers favoured the indefinite and unconditional extension, as they had at previous PrepComs, there were growing concerns among the Northern allies that they may not have enough votes for indefinite extension. There are signs that some form of extension by additional fixed periods will ultimately gain majority support. For the first time a growing number of non-aligned states called for a series of renewable fixed periods linked to progress in nuclear disarmament ... One possibility, as detailed in a legal opinion submitted by South Africa to the PrepCom, is to devise "a decision making mechanism... to trigger the succession of the fixed periods" in order to make it different from indefinite extension. This mechanism-essentially a "yes" or "no" vote on continuation-could be invoked "at the time of a review conference held near the end of a fixed period, (where) parties should be able to decide on the future of the NPT." The South African paper says, "This interpretation is in fact consistent with the idea of periodic review of the NPT... The principle of effectiveness also dictates that this interpretation is the only reasonable one." ... The debate concerning the third option may well be at the heart of the Conference this spring." (The Disarmament Times (Vol XVIII, No 1, February 1995));

- "... South Africa seemed to favour a form of 'rolling extension' - the third option of successive periods. Much of South Africa's speech was devoted to the extension question, also submitting a separate legal analysis. This argued that a rolling extension in which a positive vote is taken to move to each succeeding period, is the interpretation most consistent with the negotiators' assumed intention to provide three distinct options. By the South African analysis, a specified number of fixed periods presupposes eventual termination, and would therefore add up to the second option of a single fixed period, while a rolling extension in which successive periods follow automatically unless there is a specific vote to terminate (as in the Bunn Van Doren option) would be tantamount to indefinite extension. In conclusion, South Africa appeared to support a rolling extension as most "consistent with the idea of constant review of the NPT and with the idea contained in article X.2 that the parties can 'decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force'..." Though only a small proportion of States Parties put their views formally in the exchange of views, it is clear from informal discussions that many states are giving serious consideration to the third option, as a way of providing both durability and pressure ... Spearheaded by South Africa's well argued legal analysis, there is a discernible shift of interest among non-aligned states towards the third extension option of successive fixed periods. While indefinite extension is the clear first choice of the great majority of declared

preferences-some 70 states parties-and should by its means be ruled out, the tide appears to be turning. A growing acceptance of the legal and practical validity of the rolling extension option may win over many states which the Northern allies had counted on not wanting to jeopardise the NPT." (ACRONYM article entitled "Extending the Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Endgame" (No 5, February 1995))

2.1.2 The reason which can be ascribed to the support and favourable comment which the South African proposal has received is that while it does not give the proponents of the various arguments everything which they have demanded, it is the only alternative which addresses the core arguments of all sides:

- In the case of the proponents of indefinite extension it provides for extension in perpetuity (indefinite) by rolling/successive fixed periods.
- In the case of the countries arguing for "some mechanism for continuing pressure ..., leverage that would be lost if the NPT is extended indefinitely" our proposal provides for the positive vote which will be required to initiate each successive period.

2.1.3 It is recommended that South Africa's should support the rolling extension of successive fixed periods which would extend the Treaty in perpetuity, but where a positive vote would be required between each of the succeeding periods to initiate the start of the following period.

2.1.4 A "positive" mechanism is one where the parties will have a say in the continuation of the NPT at the end of each of the fixed periods. The NPT will only continue to the next fixed period if the majority of the parties so decided. If at the Review Conference near the end of each fixed period the majority of the parties bring out an affirmative vote in this regard, the duration of the NPT will extend automatically to the next fixed period. The "positive" mechanism is also consistent with the idea of constant review of the NPT and with the idea contained in Article X(2) that the parties can "...decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force...", in other words a positive decision. A decision making process similar to the one now suggested, is therefore already part of the NPT. If all the parties accept and agree on this interpretation, this interpretation will also be acceptable under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as a case of change through subsequent practice in the application of the treaty.

2.1.4 South Africa's position on the extension of the Treaty should be focussed on the rolling extension of successive fixed periods and should maintain its flexibility on the length of each period. The criticism expressed against the fixed periods option is based on the fact that its supporters focus on the length of the fixed periods (5-25 years) and not on the mechanism which will ensure that the NPT will extend automatically to the next fixed period. This flexibility will allow South Africa to act as broker

2.2 Proposed strategy prior to the NPT Review and Extension Conference

2.2.1 In the final weeks before the start of the NPT Review and Extension Conference in New York (17 April to 12 May 1995) it must be expected that the proponents of indefinite extension, and in particular the United States and its allies, will exert maximum pressure and influence to convince other countries to support their position of indefinite and unconditional extension. South Africa will especially be focused upon because of our role in the NAM, in Africa, in Southern Africa, and because of our status as the only country to have voluntarily and unilaterally given-up the nuclear weapon option.

2.2.2 It is essential for South Africa to withstand this pressure. Any commitment to indefinite extension without consideration of the concerns which have been expressed by member countries of the NAM will weaken our position in the Movement and undermine any endeavour for South Africa to either play a leadership and/or broker role on disarmament/non-proliferation issues.

2.2.3 In order for South Africa to gain maximum political mileage from its "Third Option" position, care should be taken not to expose South Africa's tactics and position at an early stage. The premature and uncoordinated declaration of South Africa's position through multilateral missions and other South African delegations will effectively undermine any opportunity which South Africa might have to play the role of mediator between those States which support indefinite extension and the majority of the non-aligned States. It is essential that we allow ourselves enough flexibility to play an important role at the April Conference.

2.2.4 To obtain support for South Africa's views on the extension issue it is recommended that the SADC countries (both in capital and in Pretoria) should be provided with copies of the South African legal opinion which was unveiled at the 4th PrepCom. (A copy of the legal opinion is attached as Annexure I.) During the discussions with our interlocutors from the SADC countries it is recommended that we should explain our support for the in perpetuity (as opposed to indefinite) extension of the Treaty, as well as our belief that it is possible to extend the Treaty in this way while still maintaining leverage over the nuclear weapon states especially with regard to their Article VI disarmament obligations. South African representatives should take care in these discussions not to indicate that this is our fixed position, but merely to hand over the legal opinion and express our belief that it is possible to extend the Treaty in perpetuity while maintaining leverage. Our support for this position should be implied, not openly stated. It is essential that we allow ourselves enough flexibility to play a role at the April Conference. If we lock ourselves in prematurely then we will undermine

2.2.5 A similar action should also be initiated with key States in other parts of the World. Other countries which should be approached are:

- the African members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This will further strengthen our role as the leading country in Africa on nuclear issues - Designated Seat on the IAEA Board of Governors issue;
- Brazil (even though they are not yet a States Party to the NPT), Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador and Peru;
- Indonesia (as the NAM coordinator);
- Iran, India and Pakistan (even though the latter two are not States Parties to the NPT, but are strongly opposed to the indefinite extension option).

2.2.6 **NO ACTION** should be taken elsewhere (especially at multilateral missions or by any other South African delegation) because this will expose South Africa's tactics and position at too early a stage.

2.3 Proposed strategy during the NPT Review and Extension Conference

2.3.1 During the opening statement at the Conference (either at the beginning of the Conference or at the start of the Extension discussions) the South African delegation should make it clear that South Africa supports the extension of the NPT in perpetuity, and that we believe that the security of the international community will be severely damaged if the NPT is weakened. The point should also be made that South Africa took the decision to destroy its nuclear weapons and to become a State Party of the NPT because it saw its security being guaranteed by the provisions of the Treaty. It is for this reason also that South Africa became an active sponsor of an African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. The delegation should make it clear that South Africa would therefore not oppose or be unhappy at a decision of a majority of the States Parties at the Conference to extend the Treaty indefinitely. We believe, however, that the in perpetuity/indefinite extension of the Treaty can be achieved in another way - **rolling fixed periods with a positive vote** - which will also go some way in addressing the concerns of those States which (rightly or wrongly) feel that while the Treaty should be durable, it is necessary to find some mechanism for continuing pressure on the nuclear weapon states; leverage that they believe would be lost if the NPT is extended indefinitely.

2.3.2 South Africa should stress the fact that anything less than in perpetuity extension will weaken the Treaty. So also would the rolling/ successive fixed periods option if it is linked to progress in other areas or if the periods are too short or too long. The nuclear weapon states will never accept periods of five years because in their view it will weaken the Treaty by continuously and at short periods bringing its continued extension into question. The

2.3.3 South Africa should make it clear that we believe that any decision which is taken by a "50% plus 1" majority would weaken the Treaty. It would undermine the commitment to the NPT of those who are left on the outside. Any decision would need to be taken by a significant majority which in all likelihood will need to include key countries especially from within the NAM. To ignore and exclude a country such as Iran which has the potential of becoming a "threshold state" would be a mistake. It would also be a mistake not to include other countries such as Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, etc all of whom have been very critical of the functioning of the Treaty and who have made radical extension proposals. In disarmament circles there is an understanding for the critical position of Egypt vis-a-vis the Israeli position as an acknowledged nuclear threshold state. A "no" vote by Egypt will therefore be understood in the Middle East context and will not be seen as a vote against the Treaty. This would, however, not be so in the case of the others.

2.3.4 The South African delegation should seek support for our proposal from those States that are strongly opposed to indefinite extension. The delegation should also discuss our proposal with proponents of indefinite extension so as to gain support for a more flexible extension option. During its discussions with other delegations, South Africa should remain flexible on the length of the fixed periods. This flexibility will allow South Africa to act as broker in the likely event of a "deadlock" regarding the length of each period. In this regard it is important to note that the majority supporters of fixed periods favour 5 year periods, while the United States (according to a document provided to the us by the US Embassy in Pretoria) is at this stage not willing to consider anything less than 25 year periods. Depending on the developments for or against the fixed period extension, the South African delegation could then lobby in favour of the rolling extension of successive 15 year periods.

2.4 Preparations for South African participation in the Review Conference

2.4.1 The April Conference will not only consider the extension of the NPT. The Conference will also be reviewing the implementation of the Treaty over the last five years. Although South Africa has done much work on the extension issue, it is also essential that we should prepare positions on the Review side. The Department in cooperation with the Atomic Energy Corporation, is currently preparing South African positions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and safeguards and nuclear disarmament.

2.4.2 The April NPT Review and Extension Conference will be organised along the following lines:

- Plenary meetings of the Review Conference;

- Meetings of Main Committee II on safeguards which will be chaired by Hungary;
- Meetings of the Main Committee III on peaceful uses of nuclear energy which will be chaired by the Netherlands;
- Meetings of the Drafting Committee which will be chaired by Poland;
- Meetings of the Credentials Committee which will be chaired by a member of the NAM (most probably Venezuela); and
- Plenary meetings of the Extension Conference.

2.5 The South African delegation to the NPT Review and Extension Conference

2.5.1 The meetings of especially the 2 Plenaries, the 3 Main Committees and the Drafting Committee are likely to (and have in the past) take place in tandem with one another. For South Africa to continue playing a leading role, it will be essential for members of the delegation to be present and participate in all these meetings.

2.5.2 The proposal that the Minister could possibly attend the Conference should be carefully considered. The extension of the NPT has become an extremely divisive issue and has generated strong feelings, especially along the North/South divide. Consideration should be given as to whether it would be correct to expose the Minister's prestige and credibility to this debate.

2.5.3 It will be recalled that after the September 1994 IAEA General Conference the Minister instructed that a working group should be established to prepare South Africa's position on the NPT with a view to assisting South Africa's bid to be designated to the IAEA Board of Governors. This Group consists of Mr Abdul Minty, Ambassador Roux (Vienna) and Mr P Goosen (Geneva). As was envisaged these persons are all included in the delegation.

2.5.4 In view of the above, it is recommended that the South African delegation should comprise:

- The Minister (if it is decided that he should attend);
- The Permanent Representative, New York and an official from the Mission;
- Mr Abdul Minty, who is the advisor to the Minister on these issues and whose participation has been dealt with under cover of separate Memorandums;
- The Ambassador and an official from the Mission in Vienna. The Mission is accredited to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which is responsible for the implementation of the NPT safeguards. The issues dealt with at the Conference and South Africa's positions will have a direct bearing on South Africa's bid to be designated to the IAEA Board of Governors in June 1995;
- The Minister (Disarmament), Geneva who has been responsible for preparing and developing the South African position on the extension issue and who

participates in the work of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Mr Goosen has also done the preparations for and participated in the Preparatory Committee meetings which have been preparing for the April Conference. Most of the representatives from other countries will, as in the case of the previous PrepComs, be drawn from the delegations to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. It is recommended that this official should focus on the Plenary meetings of the Extension Conference and the meetings of the First Main Committee on Disarmament;

- An official from the Department's Sub-Directorate Non-Proliferation Affairs (Route MA80); and
- An official from the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC), Dr Nic von Wielligh, who has extensive knowledge on safeguards and who would be able to focus on the work of the Third Main Committee dealing with peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

3. BACKGROUND

- 3.1 South African representatives abroad and in Pretoria have to date taken care not to publicly commit South Africa to any one of the extension options which are provided for in Article X.2 of the NPT. Article X.2 provides that:

"Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty."

- 3.2 The debate surrounding the extension of the NPT has become very divisive with widely differing positions being adopted along the North/South divide. The Western nuclear weapon states, Russia and their allies are arguing for the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. They argue that the NPT is the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime; and that the security and economic interests of all states will be best served if the NPT is extended indefinitely in 1995. The proponents of indefinite extension believe that a strong and dependable NPT would encourage further progress in bilateral and multilateral efforts to eliminate the threat posed by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, while ensuring that parties' access to the fullest range of nuclear-related commodities and technologies be protected.
- 3.3 The countries of the South/Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) have generally avoided committing themselves publicly to any one of the Article X.2 extension options. There is, however, widespread dissatisfaction within the Movement as to the failure of the nuclear weapon states to meet their Article VI disarmament obligations, and with the difficulties which have been experienced with the flow of nuclear technology to the developing world (Article IV). According to a recent edition of the Disarmament Times the key point of agreement within the NAM, is that "the viability of the Treaty depends on the nuclear weapon states fulfilling their nuclear disarmament obligations ... Therefore the

...for these states is to find a formula that would be long enough to make the Treaty durable, but with some mechanism for continuing pressure on the nuclear weapon state; leverage that would be lost, they feel if the NPT is extended indefinitely."

3.4 South Africa initially did not adopt a clear position on the extension issue based on the facts that:

- The Government of National Unity should be provided with enough time to study the issue in detail, and that there was sufficient time before the April 1995 Conference for a decision to be taken; and
- We would require sufficient time to consult with members of the regional groups to which we which we belong - Africa Group and the Non-Aligned Movement - before making a final decision.

3.5 While it is obviously in South Africa's national interest that the NPT should be extended, there is no overriding reason which determines that South Africa should support any specific option provided for in the Treaty. Up until now it has been the Department's position that we should not bind South Africa to a final option, and that we should rather maintain a flexible position so that we could act as the broker between the NAM and the developed countries. This flexibility would allow South Africa to explore possible solutions to address the concerns of the various sides in the debate and which could achieve consensus support.

3.6 This policy has proven to be successful as is evident by the widespread recognition which has been given to our privately argued position. The South African Permanent Representative at the United Nations outlined South Africa's position in the Statement delivered at the 4th Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting (New York, 23-27 January 1995), by stating that an extension option which has the potential of drawing support is a rolling extension of successive fixed periods which would extend the Treaty in perpetuity, but where a positive vote would be required between each of the succeeding periods to initiate the start of the following period.

3.7 The statement which the South African Permanent Representative delivered stated that:

"A "positive" mechanism ... is one where the parties will have a say in the continuation of the NPT at the end of each of the fixed periods. The NPT will only continue to the next fixed period if the majority of the parties so decided. If at the review conference near the end of each fixed period the majority of the parties bring out an affirmative vote in this regard, the duration of the NPT will extend automatically to the next fixed period. The "positive" mechanism is in our view also consistent with the idea of constant review of the NPT and with the idea contained in Article X(2) that the parties can "...decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force...", in other words

...positive decision. A decision making process similar to the one now suggested, is therefore already part of the NPT. If all the parties accept and agree on this interpretation, this interpretation will also be acceptable under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as a case of change through subsequent practice in the application of the treaty."

3.8 The success of the South African proposal which has now been identified as the middle ground, is evidenced in articles which appeared in the Disarmament Times and ACRONYM publications. These are the only two mainstream disarmament related publications which have been published since the Fourth PrepCom meeting in New York when South Africa unveiled the so-called "Third Option":

- "While most Northern speakers favoured the indefinite and unconditional extension, as they had at previous PrepComs, there were growing concerns among the Northern allies that they may not have enough votes for indefinite extension. There are signs that some form of extension by additional fixed periods will ultimately gain majority support. For the first time a growing number of non-aligned states called for a series of renewable fixed periods linked to progress in nuclear disarmament ...The third option of successive fixed periods which may be a compromise solution, rather than choosing between a single fixed period or indefinite extension, raises questions of its own. If continuation is not automatic, how would the Treaty be terminated or prolonged? How many fixed periods should there be and what would be the length of each period? A five year review process is already in the Treaty, but how would that affect extension decision-making? One possibility, as detailed in a legal opinion submitted by South Africa to the PrepCom, is to devise "a decision making mechanism... to trigger the succession of the fixed periods" in order to make it different from indefinite extension. This mechanism-essentially a "yes" or "no" vote on continuation-could be invoked "at the time of a review conference held near the end of a fixed period, (where) parties should be able to decide on the future of the NPT." The South African paper says, "This interpretation is in fact consistent with the idea of periodic review of the NPT... The principle of effectiveness also dictates that this interpretation is the only reasonable one." ... The debate concerning the third option may well be at the heart of the Conference this spring." (The Disarmament Times (Vol XVIII, No 1, February 1995));
- Ecuador and South Africa seemed to favour a form of 'rolling extension' - the third option of successive periods. Much of South Africa's speech was devoted to the extension question, also submitting a separate legal analysis. This argued that a rolling extension in which a positive vote is taken to move to each succeeding period, is the interpretation most consistent with the negotiators' assumed intention to provide three distinct options. By the South African

analysis, a specified number of fixed periods presupposes eventual termination, and would therefore add up to the second option of a single fixed period, while a rolling extension in which successive periods follow automatically unless there is a specific vote to terminate (as in the Bunn Van Doren option) would be tantamount to indefinite extension. In conclusion, South Africa appeared to support a rolling extension as most "consistent with the idea of constant review of the NPT and with the idea contained in article X.2 that the parties can 'decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force'..." Though only a small proportion of States Parties put their views formally in the exchange of views, it is clear from informal discussions that many states are giving serious consideration to the third option, as a way of providing both durability and pressure ... Spearheaded by South Africa's well argued legal analysis, there is a discernible shift of interest among non-aligned states towards the third extension option of successive fixed periods. While indefinite extension is the clear first choice of the great majority of declared preferences-some 70 States Parties-and should by no means be ruled out, the tide appears to be turning. A growing acceptance of the legal and practical validity of the rolling extension option may win over many states which the Northern allies had counted on not wanting to jeopardise the NPT." (ACRONYM article entitled "Extending the Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Endgame" (No 5, February 1995))

- 3.9 Further evidence of the success of the position which South Africa has adopted is the invitation which has been extended for South Africa to join a small group of NPT non-nuclear weapon state members from across regional group boundaries which would meet to discuss possible actions which will ensure that the April NPT Conference has a successful conclusion. This invitation was extended to South Africa in Geneva during an interaction between representatives from these countries to the Conference on Disarmament. The primary focus of the discussion during this interaction was the South African proposal of a "Third Option" for the extension of the NPT. Represented at the discussions were the Ambassadors to the Conference on Disarmament from Canada, Australia, Germany, Colombia and Ethiopia; the Director General for Arms Control from the Japanese Foreign Ministry in Tokyo; and senior Embassy officials from the Conference on Disarmament Missions's of Argentina, Hungary, Peru, Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and South Africa.