

## **October 1980**

### **A. Ross Johnson, with the assistance of Alexander R. Alexiev, 'The Yugoslav Military Elite: An Update' [Approved for Release, February 6, 2019]**

#### **Citation:**

"A. Ross Johnson, with the assistance of Alexander R. Alexiev, 'The Yugoslav Military Elite: An Update' [Approved for Release, February 6, 2019]", October 1980, Wilson Center Digital Archive, RAND Note N-1596 (Control No. 503-520), October 1980. Mandatory Declassification Review #C01035515. Approved for release, February 6, 2019. <https://wilson-center-digital-archive.dvincitest.com/document/208962>

#### **Summary:**

This 1980 RAND Report, prepared for the Office of Political Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency, updates the 1977 RAND Report on the Yugoslav military elite.

#### **Credits:**

This document was made possible with support from MacArthur Foundation

#### **Original Language:**

English

#### **Contents:**

Original Scan

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# A RAND NOTE

Redacted, declassified and released by  
the CIA in February 2019  
Reference C01035515

THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY ELITE: AN UPDATE (U)

A. Ross Johnson, with the assistance of  
Alexander R. Alexiev

October 1980

N-1596

Prepared For

Office of Political Analysis  
Central Intelligence Agency

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Intelligence Sources and  
Methods Involved (WNINTEL)



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Review on October 31, 2010



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PREFACE (U)

In February 1977, Rand issued the final report of a study of the Yugoslav military elite (Rand R-2131, *The Yugoslav Military Elite* (U), by A. Ross Johnson, with the assistance of Jeanette A. Koch, Secret/ [redacted] undertaken for the Office of Regional and Political Analysis, CIA. In view of the future Tito succession and the key role that the military might then play, the Report analyzed the Yugoslav military by focusing on its leadership group--its elite. The Report combined dynamic statistical analysis of the transformation of the Yugoslav military elite with traditional analysis of its historical development. Focusing on the key individuals in the Yugoslav military, the Rand Report complemented in-house studies of the political role of the Yugoslav military as an institution (*The Political Role of the Yugoslav Military* (S), OPR-109, March 1975, by Robert Dean, Secret)

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This Note reports the results of a small study initiated in 1979 for the Office of Political Analysis to update the findings of the Rand Report since its cutoff date of October 1975. The first task was to determine the extent of changes in the composition of the military elite--defined in terms of 104 individuals for 1975. Some 60 new individuals were identified as prospects for inclusion in a similarly-defined 1979 elite--a number so large as to preclude, within the scope of the study, systematic expansion, updating, and correction of the Rand computer data base.\* The data collection effort carried out with respect to these new individuals does suggest three important conclusions:

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1) they do not differ significantly in terms of background and career profile from their predecessors. The newly-advanced individuals seem still to be members of the Partisan generation, who had served in important positions just below those postulated to constitute the basis of the military elite in 1975;

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2) the recent careers of these individuals can be tracked. But their backgrounds and early careers are often (apart from an indication of having fought with the Partisans) blanks.

[Redacted]

3) they are the end of the line of the Partisan generation. Already a few post-Partisans have appeared in third-level positions, and the next wave of personnel changes can be expected to bring the post-Partisan generation to the fore.

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Given the limited scope of the update study,

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[Redacted]

Non-quantitative data on these and other individuals, and other information, have been utilized to update the remaining sections of the original Rand Report. The cutoff date is May 1980.

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[Redacted]


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SUMMARY (U)

It is the basic finding of this update analysis that the Yugoslav military leadership has been characterized by continuity, rather than any major changes over the past five years. The detailed conclusions formulated in the earlier Rand Report (R-2131/53-61)\* therefore remain, in general, still valid. More specific findings of this update study follow: (U)

1) There has not yet been a generational change in the Yugoslav military leadership. The median age of the top 35 officers increased four years in the past five years. The apex of the military establishment, and evidently the broader military elite as well, is still dominated by the "late Partisan generation": peasant youth at the outbreak of World War II who joined the Partisans as their first adult activity; then joined the Party, mobilized on a platform of national independence and unity, not support for the USSR or Communist revolution; and (usually as professional commanders) have had military responsibilities for their entire adult lives. Thus an experienced and consolidated military leadership, under the firm control of Nikola Ljubicić, was in place for the immediate post-Tito transition. But this generation of military leaders can only perpetuate itself another five years or so. Some 90 percent of the officer corps as a whole is now comprised of postwar officers, and some of these will soon rise to the top. The change of generations, when it does occur, is likely to happen quickly, and this may raise questions about the cohesiveness and strength of the military institution should the longer-term post-Tito succession be a troubled one. (U)

2) Professional commanders dominate the apex of the military establishment even more so than five years ago. They--not political officers--continue to dominate the military representation on the LCY Central Committee. The important exception is the position of defense undersecretary, occupied by Džemail Šarac--a potential source of

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\*References are to pages in the original Rand Report. (U)

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leadership weakness in the future. Tito's hand was still visible in appointments prior to his death, but whether this favored or detracted from professional competence is an open question. Mamula's appointment as Chief of the General Staff does raise questions in this regard--not in terms of his professional competence, but in terms of his effectiveness as Chief of the General Staff in a military institution in which ground forces are the dominant component.

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3) The Yugoslav military is a multinational, quasi-federal institution. At the very top, the proportion of Serbs appears to have increased slightly (to 50 percent from the 40 percent that existed in 1975 and that is the proportion of Serbs in the Yugoslav population). More significant than this change is the continued gross overrepresentation of pricani Serbs, i.e., Serbs from regions other than Serbia proper; they account for 14 of the 18 Serbs occupying the 35 top key positions. This testifies to the continued crucial role of this group in the Yugoslav military leadership and indicates that the removal of Djoko Jovanić as defense undersecretary in late 1976 did not lead to a reduction of the role of Serbs from Croatia in the military leadership. (U)

Whether or not any significant change has occurred in the national composition of the broader military elite--the top 100-150 officers--could not be determined; the odds are against it. But "territorialization" has progressed at the military region level. Consolidation of republican territorial defense commands has reinforced this trend toward the federalization of the military institution. The military leadership, like the republican political authorities, continues to seek more proportional national representation in the officer corps as a whole and has expanded the opportunities for national affirmation within the military. The military institution has continued to adapt to the multinational federal political system of which it is a part, and this has strengthened the Yugoslav system. But limited dissatisfactions on this score continue in Croatia and Kosovo and among Bosnian Muslims, and this is a potential source of dissension in the post-Tito period. (U)

4) In the second half of the 1970s, the military consolidated (but did not significantly expand) its political role in Yugoslavia. The military representation on the Central Committee selected in 1978 increased slightly over that selected in 1974. The military Party

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organization has become the ninth full-fledged constituent suborganization of the LCY, and the few military representatives on the republican Party Central Committees signify more the result of republican efforts to integrate the territorial defense establishments into the republican political structures rather than channels of influence on republican politics by the military leadership. The "political generals" who assumed civilian functions in the early 1970s have been largely replaced. The military leadership has become an important factor in the Yugoslav political system, but its influence is exerted through the defense and internal security posts occupied by military men and through the role of the military Party organization in the federal LCY--not outside these institutionalized channels. (U)

5) The Yugoslav military elite has remained fundamentally cohesive. The only intra-elite cleavage known to have occurred since the mid-1970s was the Jovanic' affair and that, however important, was easily contained. In contrast to the earlier Miskovic' affair, none of Jovanic's close associates seem to have rallied to his cause.  3.5(c)

6) During the late 1970s, the Yugoslav military elite exhibited a greater degree of concern with the Soviet threat to Yugoslavia. The explicit criticism of the USSR to Western officials, while suspect as tactically motivated, is reminiscent of language about the USSR utilized by Yugoslav officers in the early 1950s and does, evidently, reflect deep-seated concerns about the USSR that pervaded the Yugoslav system in the late 1970s. In a situation of enhanced Soviet threat and an uncertain Western military connection, differing views on tactics toward the USSR could arise, and this was apparently one element of the Jovanic' case. But there is no evidence of "pro-Sovietism" (in the sense of wanting to realign Yugoslavia with the USSR, or the kind of qualified loyalty toward the USSR that characterized the Yugoslav Communists prior to 1948) among the Yugoslav military elite, even as a marginal phenomenon. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, senior Yugoslav military officers have indicated a greater interest in military ties

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with the West. In terms of the domestic system, the Yugoslav military leadership remains thoroughly "Titoist," i.e., committed to the policies of self-management that were the hallmark of the Tito era.

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I. CHANGES IN KEY MILITARY POSITIONS 

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Senior Officials of the Defense Secretariat and General Staff  3.5(c)

General of the Army Nikola Ljubicić (born 1916, a Serb; R-2131/94)\* continues to dominate the Yugoslav military establishment as Federal Secretary of National Defense. A measure of Ljubicić's important role, and Tito's continued confidence in him, was the public attention devoted to his 60th birthday in March 1976. In the mid-1970s, there were reports that Ljubicić would leave his military position and become the senior Serbian political leader. Ljubicić has become a national political figure. He is a member of the LCY Presidium (and one of the inner circle of political leaders who has played a key role in decision-making during Tito's protracted illness and since his death). But Ljubicić achieved this status on the basis of his position as head of the military establishment, and he has dealt effectively with several efforts from within and without the military to limit his powers as defense secretary. It was evidently the challenge to his authority from CG Ivan Mišković, Tito's former security affairs advisor, that led to Mišković's removal from office in 1972. Similarly, the removal of CG Djoko Jovanić from his position as FSND Undersecretary in 1977 was reportedly the consequence of efforts by Jovanić to challenge Ljubicić's authority and, in concert with Jovanka Broz, to "kick him upstairs." Ljubicić has impressed Western officials who have dealt with him as unquestionably in control of the Yugoslav military establishment, capable, tough, committed to the policy of expanded military ties with Western countries, but more cynical than some of his subordinates about Western intentions.  3.5(c)

The position of Deputy Federal Secretary of National Defense was established in 1969 for CG Miloš Šumonja (born 1918, a Serb from Croatia; R-2131/95) in view of his poor health, as a job less demanding than Chief of the General Staff, the slot he had occupied for two years.

\*References are to page numbers in the original Rand Report. (U)

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Sumonja left this post in 1977, evidently at his own request and without political overtones, and became Yugoslav Ambassador to the Netherlands. He officially retired in 1978; his former post has not been filled. [redacted] 3.5(c)

With the disappearance of the position of deputy secretary, the incumbents of the position of FSND Undersecretary have served as Ljubicić's principal deputies. There has been a lack of continuity in the occupancy of this position in the late 1970s. The initial incumbent, CG Djoko Jovanić (born 1917, a Serb from Croatia; R-2131/95), was, as noted, removed from his job in 1977. Following the Misković affair, Jovanić had concentrated in his hands responsibility for security, intelligence, and personnel matters. Subsequent reports, while contradictory on some details, are extensive and consistent enough in outline to support the thesis advanced previously [redacted] that 3.5(c) Jovanić was removed for concentrating power in his hands to such an extent that he constituted a threat to Ljubicić. In a letter of January 1977 to senior military officials, Ljubicić reportedly accused Jovanić of "usurpation of power"; Jovanić's specific transgressions evidently included scheming together with Jovanka Broz to influence military personnel policy--especially to promote the careers of fellow Serbs from Croatia--in directions challenging Ljubicić's authority. He was accused of overstepping his authority during Ljubicić's absence from Belgrade in late 1976 and of interfering in the affairs of the Croatian LCY organization. [redacted] 3.5(c)

More fragmentary reports suggest a foreign policy component of the Jovanić affair. Jovanić reportedly differed with Ljubicić (and Tito) on the tactics of dealing with the Soviets on military affairs. According to one report, Jovanić advocated a more accommodating posture vis a vis the Soviets on use of Yugoslav military facilities and continued reliance on the USSR for that portion of its military equipment that Yugoslavia continued to seek abroad. The implication is that Jovanić opposed cultivating the Western military connection. There is no hard evidence of the latter (apart from Jovanić's coldness toward Western officials, not necessarily a reliable indicator). It should be noted, however, that 1976 was a year of freeze in U.S.-

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Yugoslav military relations, and in that context Yugoslav military officers could have argued that the military relationship with the U.S. (which both parties had pledged to develop during Assistant Secretary of Defense Ellsworth's discussions in Belgrade in late 1974) had no future and that Yugoslavia would have to rethink its tactics vis a vis the USSR.\* Such a stance on Jovanić's part would explain Tito's reported criticism of him (and CG Milorad Janković) in early 1977 for insufficient attention to safeguarding Yugoslav "sovereignty." (S)

Whatever his transgressions, they were real but not treasonous: Jovanić was not summarily "purged" but was eased out of office. He continued to hold the title of defense undersecretary through mid-1977; his 60th birthday was commemorated in the FSND, and he retired honorably at the end of 1977.\*\* (U)

Following Jovanić's retirement in late 1977, CG Petar Matic (born 1920, a Serb from Vojvodina; R-2131/97), the former Assistant Federal Secretary of National Defense for Rear Services, was appointed Undersecretary. Matic was a professional commander who had earlier served as Assistant Chief of the General Staff for Operations and had been prominent in the Vojvodina Party organization. Absent from the 1974 LCY Central Committee, he was included as a military representative in the 1978 Central Committee. But at the end of 1978, Matic left the position of Undersecretary to become full-time head of the LCY Presidium's Commission on National Defense (one of the slots formerly occupied by CG Ivan Kukoč, see below). This transfer, and Matic's short tour as Undersecretary, suggest that his performance in that job was not found to be satisfactory; there is no evidence, however, as to the specific reasons for the shift.

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\* This interpretation is necessarily speculative. From a Yugoslav perspective of 1976, however, the record of U.S. military policy toward Yugoslavia since 1968 was not encouraging, and otherwise loyal officers could have begun to entertain the possibility of greater, if still limited, concessions to the USSR as the price of obtaining sophisticated modern heavy weaponry.

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\*\* The last known media reference to Jovanić was in May 1978, in conjunction with his activities as a veteran leader (*Narodna armija*, May 18, 1978). (U)

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Prior to Matic's transfer, but perhaps in preparation for it, CG Ivan Dolničar (born 1921, a Slovene; [redacted]) was elevated from Assistant Federal Secretary of National Defense for Civil Defense to Undersecretary. Dolničar's appointment as Undersecretary was unusual, for it signified the assumption of the second-ranking FSND position by a general with a political rather than a professional career profile. Moreover, Dolničar's political influence had declined in the early 1970s as a result of conflict with CG Ivan Mišković, Tito's former security advisor. While Dolničar's position improved somewhat following Mišković's ouster [redacted], he did not regain his former political stature; he was not included in the 1974 or 1978 LCY Central Committees. The only explanation that can be cited for Dolničar's appointment (apart from Ljubičić's possible desire to have a weak deputy who could not challenge him) is his widely-reported personal tie with Party leader Stane Dolanc. [redacted]

Dolničar may have been intended to serve as a more "political" counterweight to Matic, but in fact he had been in office only a few months when Matic was transferred to his Party post. Dolničar himself served as Undersecretary for only nine months, after which he was appointed Secretary General of the state Presidency in June 1979 (see below). By one account, the cause of this somewhat precipitous transfer was Dolničar's responsibility for the "war scare" of early 1979, the result of a purported (in fact non-existent) Soviet military buildup in Bulgaria. (S)

Matic was succeeded by CG Džemail Šarac (born 1919, a Slav Muslim from Bosnia-Hercegovina; [redacted]), and Dolničar's transfer to the state Presidency staff in mid-1979 has left Šarac as the sole FSND Undersecretary and Ljubičić's principal lieutenant. Šarac's position is at odds with the previous tendency toward greater weight of professional commanders in the FSND, for Šarac has never held a line command position. He had previously served first as assistant defense secretary for political affairs and then as the secretary of the military Party organization. His prominence is puzzling in another sense as well.\* He

\* A further puzzle was the misidentification of LCG Asim Hodžić as Undersecretary in the December 21, 1978 issue of *Narodna armija*. (U)

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had earlier been described in some reports as a close friend of Jovanka Broz, yet he reportedly acted for Tito as one of the principal reviewers of the "Jovanić affair" (Jovanka's ties with Jovanić notwithstanding), clearly improving his own position in the process. Until this appointment as Undersecretary, he was inaccessible to Westerners.

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The replacement of CG Stane Potočar (born 1919, a Slovene; R-2131/96) by Admiral Branko Mamula (born 1918, a Serb from Croatia; R-2131/97) in the fall of 1979 has likewise given a different coloration to the position of Chief of the General Staff. Potočar reportedly gained the reputation among Yugoslav officers of a tough professional little involved in politics, and this is corroborated by the Western officials who dealt with him. In 1977, he figured prominently in reporting as one of the potential successors to Ljubičić as defense secretary. But his retirement occurred with an absence of political gossip and was evidently a consequence of poor health and a desire to retire to his native Slovenia.

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Mamula served in political and intelligence posts before he became chief of the navy. In 1976, as Assistant Federal Secretary of National Defense for Naval Affairs and Navy Commander, he also took command of the Split Military Region, relocating his office to Split. That move was opposed, according to some reports, by several naval officers then serving on the Split Military Region staff and with ties (in one case, family ties) to Jovanka Broz. Jovanić was reportedly involved as well, and Mamula's 1976 appointment may have been one of Jovanić's specific criticisms of Ljubičić's personnel policy. That Mamula's star rose thereafter was indicated by the 1977 reports that he was a possible successor to Ljubičić and by his inclusion on the LCY Central Committee in 1978. His military writings indicate a keen interest in and understanding of professional strategy, tactics, and organization.\* Mamula has been accessible to Western officials; in some of these contacts he spoke frankly about the Soviet threat to Yugoslavia before this had become a common theme.

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\* Most prominently, Mamula is the author of *Mornarice na velikim i malim morima* [Navies on Large and Small Oceans], Belgrade, 1975. (U)

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Mamula's appointment as Chief of the General Staff in 1979 was nonetheless surprising. Mamula is the first naval officer and the first officer with a distinctly political component of his career profile to occupy that position. Moreover, given Ljubicić's clear track record of defending his position against intra-military challengers, Mamula's appointment is all the more surprising given the reports that he clashed with Ljubicić repeatedly in 1978 over personnel and other matters. Mamula's advancement did substitute another Serb from Croatia for Jovanić. But no private account of the specific reasons for his promotion has been forthcoming, apart from an indication that his ties to Tito went back to 1965.

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At the level of Assistant Federal Secretary of National Defense, Enver Cemalović (born 1920, a Muslim from Bosnia-Herzegovina; R-2131/97) has continued to be responsible for air force and air defense matters. A graduate of Maxwell in the 1950s, Cemalović has displayed particular interest, in repeated contacts with Western officials, in military ties with the West and in utilizing Western equipment to modernize the YAF. His influence in the Yugoslav military establishment was apparently reduced in 1979 when the position of Commander of the Air Force was separated from the assistant secretaryship and assumed by the former Air Force Chief of Staff, Steven Roglić (see below). Although this bifurcation occurred without any evidence that Cemalović was in political disfavor and may have been related to health problems, it probably reduced Cemalović's influence in the military establishment.

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LCG Steven Roglić (born 1921, a Serb) had served as Air Force Chief of Staff prior to this appointment. Roglić's background and career profile are unknown; following service in Belgrade, he assumed command of the Niš Air Corps in 1973 and remained in Niš until his 1978 appointment. Promoted to Major General in 1969, he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel General in 1975. Western attachés have considered him sympathetic toward the USSR, yet this conclusion is apparently based on his comments on Afghanistan to third parties and his behavior at diplomatic receptions, and may therefore be questioned. He roundly condemned Soviet actions in Ethiopia to a Western official in 1978. Roglić was apparently not originally Cemalović's

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preferred candidate to assume the air force command; earlier reports indicated his preference for MG Slobodan Alagić, commander of the Zagreb Air Corps, instead.

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Following his appointment as Chief of the General Staff, Mamula was replaced as Assistant Federal Secretary of National Defense for Naval Affairs by his former deputy, VA Veljko Dokmanović (born 1926, a Serb from Croatia). Dokmanović was a Partisan commissar but has followed a postwar naval career embracing military school and command posts. He established an association with Tito in 1965, when he became commander of Tito's ship, *Galeb*. In 1968, he transferred to the staff of the Split Military Region command, where he served under Purisić. He then moved to Belgrade and represented Mamula in Belgrade after Mamula himself relocated his office to Split. Dokmanović became a Rear Admiral in 1973 and was promoted to Vice Admiral in 1976, after only three years in grade.

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The post of Assistant Secretary of National Defense for Rear Services was, as noted, occupied by Peter Matic until his appointment as Undersecretary in late 1977. Matic was initially replaced by CG Bruno Vuletić (born 1924, a Croat; R-2131/103), who had theretofore served as commander of the Nis Military Region and who had been promoted to the rank of Colonel General in 1976, after six years in grade as Lieutenant Colonel General. In 1976, Vuletić, as a Croat, was reportedly the favorite candidate of the Croatian Party organization to succeed Dusan Corković as commander of the Zagreb military region; Corković, a Serb from Croatia, was reportedly then in poor health. This transfer was said to have been one of the personnel moves opposed by Jovanka Broz. At the end of 1978, Vuletić took over the much more political post of Assistant Federal Secretary of National Defense for Civil Defense, following Dolnicar's promotion to Undersecretary. The consequence was to place a senior officer with extensive command (along with intelligence) experience and with a Tito connection in the FSND's chief position for liaison with the other elements of the defense system.

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Vuletić was replaced by CG Ilija Radaković (born 1922, a Serb from Croatia), formerly the Assistant Chief of the General Staff responsible for operations. Radaković, a Partisan commissar, occupied intelligence posts until 1962, when he assumed command of the 4th (Tito Guards) Division. In 1969 he transferred to the Ljubljana military region, evidently as deputy commander, and in 1972 was appointed to his General Staff position. He was promoted to Major General in 1961; to Lieutenant Colonel General in 1969; and to Colonel General in 1975. Associated with Jovanić ever since the Partisan war, Radaković was reportedly one of the three officers appointed by Ljubčić to review the Jovanić affair.\* He has displayed interest in military ties with the West in his contacts with Western officials.

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CG Dušan Vujatović (both 1920, a Serb from Bosnia-Hercegovina) continues to occupy the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Economy (which he has held since 1971). As one of the three senior officers picked by Ljubčić to review the "Jovanić affair," Vujatović's influence evidently increased after that event. As the senior FSND official in charge of military procurement and as the Yugoslav chairman of the joint U.S.-Yugoslav military commission established in 1978, Vujatović has had perhaps the most extensive exposure to Western officials of any of the Yugoslav military leadership. He has appeared committed to expanding military ties with the West.\*\*

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The two career commanders who served as deputy chiefs of the General Staff in the mid-1970s continue to serve in those positions. CG Janko Sekernik (born 1921, a Slovene; R-2131/98) has particular responsibility for territorial and civil defense, along with general matters, within the General Staff. He was a protégé of Potočar, and it remains to be seen whether he will continue to play the same role under Mamula. CG Dušan Pekić (born 1921, a Serb from Croatia; R-2131/98) is responsible for the ground forces. On professional grounds

\* Ljubčić evidently included Jovanić's associates in the review to avoid fueling suspicions that he was discriminating against the Lika Serbs as a group.

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\*\* Vujatović was reportedly replaced by his deputy, LCG Janko Šušnjar, in mid-1980. (U)

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alone, Pekić was perhaps the logical choice to succeed Potočar as Chief of the General Staff. One interpretation of the Mamula appointment reported by Western military attaches was that Pekić would play an enhanced role within the General Staff, but it is unclear whether or not this has in fact occurred. Pekić has demonstrated a strong interest in Western military ties and on the occasion of Army Chief of Staff Rogers' visit to Belgrade in May 1979 delivered himself of the sharpest criticism of the USSR that Western officials have yet heard from a senior Yugoslav officer.

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The post of Chief Inspector, FSND, is still occupied by CG Dušan Korać (born 1920, a Montenegrin from Serbia; R-2131/98). His public visibility suggests both his own influence and the important role played by the Chief Inspectorate in the Yugoslav military establishment. (U)

With regard to the more political assistant defense secretaryships, the replacement of CG Ivan Dolničar by CG Bruno Vuletić as Assistant Secretary of National Defense for Civil Defense (and other liaison functions) has been noted. CG Dane Petkovski (born 1922, a Macedonian from Macedonia; R-2131/99) continues to serve as Assistant Secretary of National Defense for Military-Political Affairs. His continued influence in his native Macedonian Party organization is indicated by his position (anomalous for one of the leading political officers) on the LCY Central Committee as a member of the Macedonian and not of the military organization contingent. Petkovski has had almost no contact with Western officials, but has been regularly involved in military exchanges with Soviet and Warsaw Pact countries.

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CG Radovan Vojvodić (born 1922, a Montenegrin from Montenegro; R-2131/101) continues to head the FSND Personnel Department, a position equivalent to an assistant secretaryship.\* Reelected to the LCY Central Committee in 1978, Vojvodić has had little contact with Western officials since his earlier posting as Assistant Chief of the General Staff responsible for intelligence.

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The Military Security Service (the counterintelligence service, originally known as KOS) was headed from 1974 to 1979 by CG Dane Cuic

\* Vojvodić is identified as Chief of the Personnel Administration in media reports and he is not included in the official lists of the assistant secretaries. (U)

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(born 1922, a Serb from Croatia; R-2131/100). Although Cuic reported to Jovanic and assumed that position in the wake of the Miskovic affair, and although his personal ties with Jovanic go back to World War II (when he served as Jovanic's commissar in the Sixth Proletarian Division), Cuic survived Jovanic's fall from favor, was elected to the Central Committee in 1978, and in 1979 replaced Sarac as head of the military Party organization. He has not dealt with Western officials.

3.5(c)

Cuic was replaced by CG Branislav Joksovic (born 1920, a Serb). Joksovic was a Partisan commissar who occupied political posts in the wartime period and then first served in and subsequently headed the General Staff personnel directorate between 1957 and 1969. In 1970 he was appointed Assistant Chief of the General Staff for Organization and Mobilization; according to some reports he also served as deputy Inspector-General after 1975. He was promoted to Major General in 1960; to Lieutenant Colonel General in 1966; and to Colonel General in 1974. His appointment signified continuity in terms of entrusting command of the Military Security Service to a professional officer who was not a career counterintelligence officer in the wake of the Miskovic affair.

3.5(c)

The position of head of the Party organization in the armed forces was, as noted above, occupied by CG Dzemail Sarac until the latter's appointment as Defense Undersecretary in 1979, when the position was assumed by CG Dane Cuic, the former head of the Military Security Service. (U)

To recapitulate, there has been continuity in the senior Yugoslav military leadership over the past five years. There are five new occupants in the 16 key positions examined (plus one change of position by a 1975 occupant), but the new occupants generally resemble their predecessors in terms of background. They are of the same age cohort; overall, the incumbents of these 16 positions have "aged" another four years (the median date of birth having increased only a year, from 1920 to 1921). The national composition of the occupants of these key positions is also substantially unchanged. In 1980,

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as in 1975, all the regions except Kosovo (and in 1980, Vojvodina) were represented in the top military leadership. But Serbs from outside Serbia continue to play a disproportionately large role at this level-- today as in 1975 constituting roughly half of the total.

3.5(c)

There has been unusually rapid turnover at the level of FSND Undersecretary; the upshot is the replacement of a seasoned line professional by a more political, professionally less competent officer. In the General Staff, a professional ground forces officer has been replaced by an admiral with a more diversified career history under somewhat puzzling circumstances involving a close Tito connection.

3.5(c)

At the FSND assistant secretary level, on the other hand, previous trends have continued. Officers with career histories of command positions and an association with Tito have moved into the assistant secretaryships for naval and civil defense affairs. The military counterintelligence service has been placed under the supervision of a senior professional officer from outside that service, while its former head has returned to political work, now as head of the military Party organization.

3.5(c)

"Commanders" with Partisan backgrounds thus continue to dominate the apex of the Yugoslav military establishment. The important exception is Sarac, a career political officer, who now serves as Ljubicić's principal deputy but probably lacks the unified responsibilities for security and personnel matters enjoyed (and abused) by Jovanić. Cuic, now head of the military Party organization, is the only other career political officer at this level. Personal ties to Tito continued to influence personnel policies, as indicated by Dokmanović's advancement and Admiral Mamula's unusual appointment as Chief of the General Staff.

3.5(c)

#### Military Region Commanders (U)

CG Dušan Ćorković (born 1921, a Serb from Croatia; R-2132/101) a professional commander, continued to serve as Commander of the Zagreb Military Region. Ćorković's appointment in 1974 was not popular with the Croatian Party leadership, who would have preferred that an ethnic Croat occupy the post, and during Ćorković's illness in 1978-1979

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the Croatian Party leadership reportedly again suggested that his successor be a Croat. Čorković reportedly clashed with MG Filip Jadrijević, Chief of Staff of the Zagreb Military Region who, as an ethnic Croat, was the preferred candidate of the Croatian Party leadership to occupy the post that Čorković assumed in 1974. As a result Jadrijević was subsequently shifted from this post (evidently under a cloud, since he appears to have disappeared from public view; he is misidentified in some reporting as Deputy Commander for Political Affairs of the Zagreb Military Region). These indicators notwithstanding, there is no evidence of serious tension between the Zagreb Military Region command and the Croatian Party leadership. In line with the policies of the Croatian Party organization and Croat sensitivities, Čorković himself fully endorsed increasing the percentage of ethnic Croats in the YPA officer corps.\*  3.5(c)

The Commander of the Belgrade Military Region since 1975 has been CG Petar Gračanin (born 1923, a Serb), who has followed a military career of exclusively command and military school posts. A Partisan commander after 1941, Gračanin's postwar career culminated in his appointment as chief of staff of the Sarajevo Military Region in 1973, a brief tour of duty as commander of the ground forces' command-staff academy in 1974-1975 (replacing the disgraced LCG Mirko Bulović), and appointment to his present position in fall 1975. Promoted to Major General in 1970, Gračanin was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel General in 1974 and to Colonel General in 1978--exceptionally, only four years in grade in each case. He was elected to the LCY Central Committee that year.  3.5(c)

CG Rahmija Kadenić (born 1920, a Muslim from Bosnia-Herzegovina; R-2131/102) served as Commander of the Sarajevo Military Region until June 1977, when he assumed command of the Higher Military School Center. Although removed from a major line command position, his continued

\* Interview in Vjesnik, December 16, 1978. Čorković died in June 1980; his successor is LCG Zorko Čanadi, a Croat of Hungarian descent. It is not known whether Croats consider Čanadi an ethnic Croat. But for the first time since 1967, the Zagreb Military Region is not commanded by a Serb from Croatia. (U)

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influential role in the Yugoslav military establishment is testified to by the nature of his new position (an important one in the Yugoslav military system), his prominent appearances at public military events, and his election to the 1978 Party Central Committee. Kadenic has impressed Western officials with his understanding of military strategy.

3.5(c)

Kadenic was succeeded by LCG Milan Acic (born 1924, a Serb from Bosnia-Hercegovina). A Partisan (the details of his wartime career are not known), Acic held command positions in the 1950s and 1960s; in 1972 he assumed command of the Infantry Officer's School. He then shifted to political work, serving as the secretary of the military Party organization in the Sarajevo Military Region--an example of the recent tendency to fill such positions, not with political officers, but with "commanders." Acic was a YPA representative on the 1974 LCY Central Committee. Promoted to Major General in 1972, he served only four years in grade prior to his promotion to Lieutenant Colonel General in 1976. A professional commander, his career was clearly boosted by his political posts in the mid-1970s. More significant was his nationality; in the eyes of Bosnian Muslims, his appointment to succeed Kadenic represented a step backwards in terms of national equality within the military establishment--especially since it occurred at a time when prominent ethnic Muslims were replaced by Bosnian Serbs in several important political posts.

3.5(c)

Command of the Skopje Military Region was assumed by LCG Lambe Mihajlovski (born 1925, a Macedonian), following the death of CG Vasko Karaangelski in February 1977. Mihajlovski was presumably a Partisan; details are lacking. A professional armored officer in the post-war period, he commanded an armored brigade in the Zagreb Military Region in the late 1960s. In 1973, he was appointed Karaangelski's Chief of Staff. He was promoted to Major General in 1967 and elevated to Lieutenant Colonel General in 1976. Following his appointment to replace Karaangelski, he was elected to the LCY Central Committee in 1978.

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Following the death of Admiral Ivo Purisic in September 1976, Admiral Mamula himself assumed command of the Split Military Region (thus combining the functions of Military Region Commander, Commander of the Navy, and Assistant Defense Secretary for Naval Affairs). With Mamula's appointment as Chief of the General Staff in 1979, the Split Military Region Command was taken over by VA Tihomir Vilovic (date of birth unknown, a Croat). Vilovic's pre-1970 career history is not known. After 1970 he served in the Split military district (accompanying Ivan Dolnicar to the United States in 1972) and was appointed an assistant to Mamula in 1975. He served from 1976 to 1979 as personal aide to Tito. Promoted to Rear Admiral in 1975, he was elevated to Vice Admiral in 1978 after only three years of service. His appointment bypassed several other naval officers with greater experience and seniority and signified the advancement of a Mamula protégé who had been associated with Tito. His appointment returned the Split Military Region Command to an ethnic Croat. [ ]

3.5(c)

CG Franc Tavcar (born 1920, a Slovene; R-2131/103) still commands the Ljubljana Military Region. A professional commander, he was re-elected to the LCY Central Committee in 1978. (U)

In late 1977, following CG Bruno Vuletic's appointment as assistant Defense Secretary, command of the Nis Military Region was assumed by LCG Aleksandar Janic. Nothing is known of Janic's background prior to his promotion to Major General in 1972; he is probably a Serb. Observed in command positions in the Belgrade and Nis Military Regions in the early 1970s, he became Chief of Staff of the Nis Military Region in 1976. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel General the same year, after only four years in grade. If he is indeed a Serb from Serbia, his appointment transfers command of the Nis Military Region to a "native son." [ ]

3.5(c)

To recapitulate, at the level of the military region command, the balance sheet for the past five years is one of continuity. Four of the seven full military regions received new commanders in the past five years, but the new incumbents had career profiles similar to those of their predecessors, as line commanders born about 1921. With the

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exception of Vilović, all were seasoned professionals; Vilović was a protégé of Mamula and Tito. All seven commanders were evidently now "native sons,"--an extension of the tendency toward "federalization" of the YPA at the military region level that was evident in the early 1970s. At the same time, the commanders of the Zagreb and Sarajevo Military Regions were ethnic Serbs from the respective republic--both a source of discontent to the dominant national groups within those republics and at the same time an indication of the refusal of the military leadership and Tito to allow a strict ethnic quota to overshadow professional qualifications within the military elite.\* The naming of a Croat (of Hungarian background) to head the Zagreb Military Region in mid-1980 presumably defuses this discontent in Croatia.  3.5(c)

#### Republican Territorial Defense Commands (U)

There has been substantial continuity in occupancy of the position of Territorial Defense Commander\*\* in the six republics and two provinces. In Serbia, this post is still held by CG Rajko Tanasković (born 1917, a Serb), a leading theoretician and former head of the Higher Military Academy. Tanasković's retirement had been announced for late 1977, but he has continued in his position. He was reelected to the Serbian Party Central Committee in 1978. (U)

\* In terms of percentage shares of the population, this issue is much clearer-cut in Croatia, where ethnic Croats constitute some 80 percent of the population, than in Bosnia-Herzegovina (where the relative proportions are 40 percent Muslims, 38 percent Serbs, and 20 percent Croats). But the timing of the changes is important. CG Djoko Jovanić (an ethnic Serb) became such a target of Croat national grievances after he assumed command of the Zagreb military region in 1967 because his predecessors had been ethnic Croats. Kadenić, the first ethnic Muslim to command the Sarajevo military region, assumed his post just when Muslim national consciousness was developing, making his replacement by a Bosnian Serb all the more vexing to Bosnian Muslims. (U)

\*\* Reporting and file maintenance are still bedeviled by terminological confusion between the position of Commander (*komandant*) and Chief of Staff (*nacelnik*) of the respective territorial defense commands. This section indicates who the commanders are; discrepancies as to the identities of the Chiefs of Staff have not been resolved.  3.5(c)

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CG Mirko Vranic (born 1920, a Croat from Bosnia-Hercegovina) remains in the post of Territorial Defense Commander in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Formerly Commander of the Sarajevo Military Region, he was elected to the Bosnian Party Central Committee in 1974 and--a measure of his political importance in Bosnia-Hercegovina--was included in the Bosnian representation (not the military representation) on the 1978 LCY Central Committee. (U)

LCG Boro Causev (born 1920, a Macedonian) continues to serve as head of territorial defense in Macedonia. The first and to date only head of territorial defense in Macedonia, Causev was appointed to this position after a career of internal security and Party jobs in Macedonia. He is a member of the Macedonian Party Central Committee Presidium. (U)

LCG Ethem Recica (date of birth unknown, an Albanian from Kosovo) continues to serve as Commander of Kosovo Territorial Defense. The first general officer of Albanian nationality, Recica was included in the 1974 and 1978 Kosovo Party Central Committees and promoted to his present rank of Lieutenant Colonel General in 1979. (U)

The Territorial Defense Command in Montenegro is still occupied by LCG Djuro Vojvodic (date of birth unknown, a Montenegrin). Promoted to Major General in 1969, Vojvodic was an instructor at the National Defense School prior to his appointment in 1975. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel General in 1976 and elected to the Montenegrin Party organization Central Committee in 1978.  3.5(c)

In the fall of 1977, LCG Branko Jerkic (date of birth unknown, a Slovene) replaced CG Rudolf Hribernik as Commander of Territorial Defense Forces in Slovenia. Hribernik had a distinguished military career culminating in command of the Skopje Military Region in 1965-1966; he was thereafter semi-retired in Slovenia before assuming the territorial defense command in 1973. Jerkic, in contrast, was commander of the First Division in the Ljubljana Military Region in 1972-1973.\* In

\* Jerkic served in the 1950s on the YPA Counterpart Staff that dealt with U.S. military assistance officers.  3.5(c)

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1974 he became Chief of Staff of the Slovenian Territorial Defense Organization. He was promoted to Major General in 1972 and to Lieutenant Colonel General in 1977, after only five years in grade. A member of the 1978 Slovene Party Central Committee, Jerkić's appointment represents something of a departure from past practice in staffing the territorial defense commands on two scores. He has recent YPA division-level command experience and he became involved in Slovene political life by virtue of his territorial defense position, not vice versa.

3.5(c)

Following the death of CG Marko Perićin-Kamenjar in 1976, MG Milenko Radovanov (born 1924, apparently a Serb from Vojvodina) took over the command of the Vojvodina Territorial Defense Forces. Like Causev in Macedonia, Radovanov assumed his position after service in the Vojvodina political bureaucracy; he had transferred from active to reserve status in 1967 following a military career in intelligence and propaganda positions. He was elected to the Vojvodina Party organization Central Committee in 1978.

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In Croatia, following the death of CG Mate Bilobrk in 1976, the Territorial Defense Command was assumed by CG Augustin Jukić (date of birth unknown, a Croat evidently born in Bosnia-Herzegovina but raised in Croatia), a professional officer with a career history of both political and command positions. Jukić had served as Chief of Staff of the Ljubljana Military Region prior to assuming his territorial defense post. He was promoted to Colonel General in 1978 and elected to the Croatian Party organization Central Committee that same year. His appointment meant that an ethnic Croat continued to command the Croatian territorial defense forces, as has been the case since their establishment, while the Zagreb Military Region was commanded by an ethnic Serb from Croatia from 1967 to mid-1980.

3.5(c)

In summary, three of the eight territorial defense commands have changed hands since 1975, but the collective profile of the commanders does not seem to have altered substantially. All continue to be "native sons" of the dominant ethnic group (except in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the occupant is an ethnic Croat). There are three Colonel Generals,

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four Lieutenant Colonel Generals, and one Major General. Two of the new commanders assumed their present positions after holding major YPA commands; one was a provincial government figure. It is a measure of their role in political affairs at the republican level that seven are members of the respective republican Central Committee; the exception is a member of his republic's LCY Central Committee delegation. As active officers, they constitute a channel of influence for the regular military on republican political affairs. Yet this does not invalidate their responsibility to republican political authorities on territorial defense matters. Their membership on the republican Central Committees should probably be viewed more in terms of institutionalizing the territorial defense commands in the republican political structures and "coopting" the commanders rather than as a channel for the military leadership to affect republican politics.

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II. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS (U)

Involvement of the military in Yugoslav political affairs increased in the first half of the 1970s. A small group of "political generals"--i.e., generals occupying what had come to be considered "civilian" posts--reemerged for the first time since the late 1940s. Most occupied security-related posts, reflecting the Tito leadership's heightened concern with terrorist and subversive threats. A few military officers were called upon for other services, both political and technical. A general increase in the political weight of the military was codified at the 10th LCY Congress in 1974, which formalized the status of the military Party organization as the ninth constituent suborganization of the federal LCY and allocated it 15 seats on the Central Committee. Total military membership on the LCY CC increased to 10 percent--the largest proportion of military members in the postwar period. But this greater military weight in central Party councils did not translate itself into a military presence in nonmilitary bodies at the republican or local levels. At the republican level, military representation on Party central committees reached its peak in 1969 and by 1974 had declined substantially (R-2131/106-110). (U)

This greater influence of the military in Yugoslav political life was on balance consolidated, but not greatly expanded, in the latter half of the 1970s. This consolidation was on an institutional, not a personal basis. Military representation on the republican LCY Central Committees increased only slightly. (See Table 1) The few additional military representatives are all connected with territorial defense; today *all* the military representatives on the republican Central Committees are (with one exception) key officers in the republican territorial defense apparatus, not the YPA. The constriction of military representation on the republican Central Committees since the early 1970s is consistent with the role of the military Party organization since 1974 as a full-fledged constituent suborganization of the federal LCY. It emphasizes the unique, extraterritorial nature of the military Party organization, which (the presence of territorial defense officials on republican Central Committees notwithstanding) lacks formal lateral ties with the republican Party organizations. (U)

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At the federal LCY level, military representation on the 1978 Central Committee was 11 percent, constituting only a slight increase over the 1974 status.\* (See Table 2) (U)

Military officers continue to occupy important civilian posts, but several of the officers who first assumed these posts in 1974 were replaced in 1978, in part because they reached retirement age and in part because of the principle of personnel rotation. Of the "political generals," only Defense Secretary Ljubicić is a major Yugoslav political figure in his own right. Formally the "military" representative on the LCY Presidium, his role in Yugoslav decisionmaking is by no means limited to defense matters. (U)

CG Ivan Kukoc (born 1918, a Croat), was replaced as military "representative" in the LCY Presidium Secretariat following the 11th Congress by LCG Milan Daljevic (born 1925, a Serb, region of birth unknown). Kukoc, a senior military professional, had served as Assistant Federal Secretary for National Defense (first for military economy and then for personnel matters) after 1966 and was promoted to the rank of Colonel General in 1967. Notwithstanding reports in 1977 that he would assume a major position in his native Croatian Party organization, he retired quietly at the end of 1978; his tour of duty in the Party Secretariat did not lead to a prominent civilian Party position. Daljevic, in contrast, has less seniority. His only known posts are political; he served as Deputy Commander for Political Affairs, first in the Sarajevo Military Region and then in the Ljubljana Military Region, between 1971 and 1976. In 1977 he assumed the position of Secretary of the military Party organization in the Federal Secretariat of National Defense. He was promoted to Major General only in 1969, and to Lieutenant Colonel General in 1977.

\* RFE analyst Slobodan Stankovic calculates this military representation at 14 percent (Radio Free Europe Research No. 149/79), but his calculation includes retired military officers who were excluded in arriving at the totals in Table 2. (U)

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Kukoč had also served as Chairman of the LCY CC Commission on National Defense. Following the 11th Congress, this post was occupied, not by Daljević, but by CG Petar Matic, who prior to that had served as FSND Undersecretary. Evidently a demotion for Matic, this transfer did place another professional military officer in the federal Party apparatus with influence over, if not administrative authority for, defense matters. (U)

In 1979, the chief editorship of the LCY weekly, Komunist, was assumed by LCG Veljko Miladinović; formerly, that position was occupied by civilians. Miladinović (born 1920, a Serb from Croatia) is a career political officer who served from 1970 to 1977 as the FSND Party organization secretary (the position later occupied by Daljević) and in 1977 became head of the military Party organization's Commission for Ideological-Political Work. Earlier service as chief editor of the military weekly, Narodna armija, prepared him for the Komunist editorship. (U)

In the federal government, CG Franjo Herljević (born 1915, a Croat from Bosnia-Hercegovina) continues to serve as Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs. Herljević lacks Ljubčić's stature, and his responsibilities and influence are apparently limited to internal security. He reportedly continued to serve as Interior Secretary at Tito's personal insistence, yet his reported personal ties with such figures as Mikulić and Dolanc (themselves reportedly political enemies) suggest that he will continue to play this role in the post-Tito period.  3.5(c)

Vuko Gozze-Gučetić (born 1917, a Croat) continues to serve as public prosecutor, but he retired from active service following his appointment. Military influence over civilian aviation has evidently declined, for LCG Ljubisa Curgus (born 1917, in Bosnia-Hercegovina, nationality uncertain) left the post of head of the Directorate of Civilian Aviation in 1977 and retired from active service. His responsibilities are now apparently shared by the head of the Federal Air Inspectorate, a civilian, and the head of the Federal Aviation Control Administration (air traffic control), MG Jordan Faganel, the former head of the

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Zadar Air Academy who assumed his present rank in 1976. LCG Dragoslav Radisavljević (born 1924, a Serb) had been director of JAT, the civilian airline, since 1975, and was promoted from Major General to Lieutenant Colonel General in 1977. But in mid-1979, he was forced out of the directorate by JAT pilots and replaced by a civilian--an action Radisavljević has sought (so far unsuccessfully) to have reversed in the courts.\*

3.5(c)

The only new appointment to a civilian post of a high-ranking military officer in the late 1970s was the mid-1979 appointment of CG Ivan Dolnicar to the position of General-Secretary (i.e., executive officer) of the collective state Presidency, replacing Slavko Kuhar, a civilian. This appointment has been interpreted as signifying an expansion of military influence in Yugoslavia.\*\* It indeed places a senior military officer in a key administrative position. But it is not a policy position, and Dolnicar was apparently appointed to the job in order to ease him out of the post of Defense Undersecretary that he assumed only in late 1978. As noted previously, the cause of this somewhat precipitous transfer was Dolnicar's reported responsibility for the "war scare" of early 1979. Dolnicar has a clear track record of interest in closer relations with Western countries, but he is not a political heavyweight and his role as Presidency Secretary-General should not be overestimated.

3.5(c)

In brief, the only continuity in terms of occupancy of "civilian" posts by military officers has been Herljević's responsibility for internal security. In his job, he has both projected a "military" presence and clashed with his counterparts in the FSND on operational matters. The replacement of Kukoc by Daljević as the military representative (by now evidently an institutionalized position) on the federal LCY Secretariat

\*The affair is frankly reported in NIN, June 5, 1979 and January 13, 1980. (U)

\*\* See Slobodan Stankovic, in Radio Free Europe Research, June 13, 1979. (U)

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means placing a less senior political officer in that job--one presumably, with less influence who is more rather than less responsive to the Party Presidium. (A parallel may be drawn with Sarac's position in the FSND in this regard). A senior professional officer still heads the LCY's defense commission. Civilian aviation has been "demilitarized." A political general, the former editor of the military daily, is now editor-in-chief of the Party weekly (not a particularly important post, given the decline in the importance of Komunist). A leading political general with demonstrated sympathy toward the West has assumed a key administrative job in the State Presidency, but neither the political importance of the job nor of Dolnicar himself should be overestimated.



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III. INTRA-ELITE TENSIONS (U)

An examination of controversies within the Yugoslav military elite in the decade prior to 1975 [ ] concluded that the Yugoslav military, like any group, had experienced internal divisions, but that cleavages had been contained with relative ease and had not undermined the fundamental cohesion of the military establishment. Opposition to prevailing policies or leaders was on internal grounds; none of the cases involved foreign policy issues, especially attitudes toward Moscow. The cases reviewed involved national differences (the Milojević affair and Croatian-related cases) and intra-military institutional cleavages (the Mišković affair and related cases); the latter also involved efforts to form a "conservative" faction that threatened the military leadership.

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There has subsequently been only one known case of significant intra-elite cleavage--the Jovanić affair, involving Jovanka Broz, that attracted world-wide attention. The details of the case were reviewed above, in connection with Jovanić's replacement as FSND Undersecretary. At fundamental issue was apparently a personal challenge to Ljubičić by Jovanić, a senior professional commander who was widely respected within the military and who, as an ethnic Serb, was a political factor in his own right in his native Croatia. Jovanić had been installed as Undersecretary in 1974 in response to an "external" threat to the institutional integrity of the professional officer corps on the part of the counter-intelligence service and political conservatives, led by Mišković. In 1976, in collusion with Jovanka Broz, Jovanić evidently mounted a similar challenge "from within." Ljubičić handled the Jovanić affair--like previous cases of infighting--with relative ease. In consolidating his power over the military establishment, he appointed a political general as his principal deputy--an appointment that could portend weakened FSND leadership in certain future circumstances. [ ]

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The Jovanic affair apparently also involved a foreign policy element--the first such case within the Yugoslav military since 1948. One possible interpretation of the affair (based in part on the circumstantial evidence of the state of Soviet-Yugoslav and U.S.--Yugoslav military relations at the time), as noted above, is that Jovanic, while in no sense "pro-Soviet," may have drawn a different balance than did Ljubicic and, ultimately, Tito, of the dangers of military ties with the Soviets vs. the prospects for a military relationship with the U.S. that could boost Yugoslav defense preparedness.

3.5(c)

Two other names have figured in reports in connection with the Jovanic affair. CG Milorad Jankovic (born 1920, a Serb), a former chief of staff of the Belgrade military region and at the time commander of the National Defense School, was reportedly criticized by Tito in March 1977 for sharing Jovanic's outlook on foreign military ties. If this was indeed the case, Jankovic was treated even more benevolently than Jovanic; he remained in his post until April 1978 and retired honorably at the end of that year.

3.5(c)

Another name indirectly linked to the Jovanic affair is that of VA Josip Zuzulj (born 1920, a probable Serb from Croatia), whose wife is Jovanka Broz's niece. Serving since 1975 as Deputy Commander of the Split Military Region, Zuzulj reportedly clashed with Admiral Mamula, and this personnel issue was one of Jovanic's (and Jovanka Broz's) grievances vis a vis Ljubicic. Yet if Zuzulj indeed enjoyed their protection, he did not suffer from their disgrace. Although Zuzulj's present position remains to be clarified, he is still prominently involved in naval affairs. For example, he attended the Naval Day reception in Belgrade in September 1979.

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During this period, one former disgraced general resumed public activity: CG Ivan Miskovic, disgraced in 1973  reappeared in mid-1979 as chairman of the Civil Defense Council. Although the post is unimportant in institutional military terms, the appointment did indicate that Miskovic had at least partially redeemed himself in the

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eyes of Ljubicić and Tito. On the other hand, the "Slavonian Generals"-- LCG Mirko Bulović, CG Radojica Nenezic, and CG Otmar Kreačić--who were purged in conjunction with the Misković affair (R-2131/42-44) remain "nonpersons"--further confirmation of the seriousness of their transgressions (which have never been explained) in 1974.

3.5(c)

In summary, in the past five years there has been one major case of intra-elite controversy with important multiple dimensions, apparently involving a bid for personal power, an effort to promote the national interests of ethnic Serbs from Croatia, and the relative emphasis to be placed on military ties with the USSR vs. those with the West. The first dimension is a familiar one. In Yugoslav circumstances, so is the second; what is surprising is the apparent absence of other, nationally-related intra-elite conflicts within the military in the past five years. The third dimension, involving relations with the USSR, is new and of crucial importance. In context, intra-military differences over the tactics of dealing with the USSR and the United States on military matters were to be expected (R-2131/47-48); there is no evidence that Jovanic (or any other officer) was "pro-Soviet" in a treasonous sense or even in terms of fundamental sympathy toward the USSR.\* There is no evidence of controversy within the military in the late 1970s related to a questioning of the strategy of total national defense. Nor has there been a resurgence of the institutional and organizational conflicts within the military evident at the beginning of the 1970s.

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\* It should be recalled that Blagoje Nešković, a member of the Party Politburo in the immediate postwar period, honorably resigned in 1953 because of his opposition to the policy of accepting American military aid. (U)

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IV. OUTLOOK OF THE MILITARY ELITE (U)

The Yugoslav military leadership, and evidently the military elite as a whole, is still comprised of the "late Partisan generation." The judgments made about its outlook in the mid-1970s [redacted] appear to remain valid. The military elite is strongly influenced by its members' first adult experiences in the cause of patriotic "liberation" of their country and reestablishment of an integral Yugoslavia. Assimilating the changing values of the Party, the military leadership has developed a strong loyalty to the Yugoslav state and the Yugoslav Communist political system. The Yugoslav military elite is thoroughly Titoist, i.e., it is committed to the policies of self-management and non-alignment that were the hallmark of the Tito era. [redacted]

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Throughout the postwar period, the military elite has been preoccupied with external security, primarily the real or potential Soviet threat. The present military elite has been concerned with the Soviet threat--the continuation of military contacts with Soviet bloc countries (resumed after 1971) and the purchase of some advanced Soviet weapons (initially, at least, in the absence of alternative Western suppliers) notwithstanding. There is no evidence that this threat perception has been disputed within the YPA, although the Jovanic affair would seem to confirm the existence of differences on the proper approach to dealing with the USSR in military affairs. [redacted]

3.5(c)

This conclusion is supported by institutional indicators--Yugoslav military doctrine and force deployments. It is buttressed by the record of bilateral Yugoslav-U.S. military relations since 1977, including the implementation of an extensive program of mutual military visits and establishment of a secret bilateral military commission. In their contacts with American (and other Western) officials after 1977, Yugoslav military leaders began to articulate, with theretofore unaccustomed explicitness, their concern with the Soviet threat as the *sole* threat to Yugoslavia under present circumstances. Prior to

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the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and in conjunction with heightened international tensions in 1978, Generals Ljubicić, Vujatović, Čemalović, Pekić, and Stevo Ilić all spoke privately to American officials in this vein. The expanding Yugoslav military ties with the PRC also reflect a concern with the Soviet threat. [redacted]

3.5(c)

At the same time, the "anti-Sovietism" of the Yugoslav military leadership has its limits, which relate less to perceptions of the USSR than to perceptions of the United States and other Western countries. Yugoslav military leaders are concerned with other threats, specifically with threats from emigre terrorists in the West and with the specter of intervention by either superpower to deny control of Yugoslavia to the other. The outlook of Yugoslav senior officers thus differs from that of defense officials in Sweden, Switzerland and Finland; developments since 1975 notwithstanding, they cannot be imputed with a perception that the West has purely benign intentions toward Yugoslavia or its political system. Limited progress in armaments sales to Yugoslavia by the United States and other Western countries can only have fueled Yugoslav doubts on this score (however one judges the approach of the Yugoslav side to those negotiations).\*

[redacted] 3.5(c)

Nonetheless, the Yugoslav military leadership has become more concerned with the Soviet threat than it was in 1975. Since Afghanistan, senior Yugoslav military officials have been somewhat more candid with American officials in discussing their defense problems. Their evidently serious interest in acquiring "samples" of American weapons systems for training implies reliance on U.S. delivery of such weapons in quantity in crisis or wartime conditions. The Yugoslavs never accepted Soviet weapons on these terms. Their interest in obtaining U.S. weapons on this basis--if sustained and if such transfers occur--would signify more explicit reliance on Western military assistance at an earlier point in a crisis involving Yugoslavia. That would constitute an important modification both in Yugoslav military doctrine and in the outlook of the military elite [redacted]

3.5(c)

\* The sensitivity of the Yugoslavs on this point, and their tendency to read nefarious motives into the absence of significant arms transfers, should not be underestimated. The sensitivity has deep historic roots. Yugoslavs believe that Stalin denied them weapons during World War II

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On the domestic front, following the political turmoil of 1970-1972, the military leadership echoed and endorsed the injunction of Tito and other Party leaders that the military also had an internal mission: to protect--as servant of the Party--the Yugoslav state and political system against domestic as well as external challenges.\* It evidently sees one of its functions as promoting social stability.\*\* The military continues to recognize the importance of respecting national rights within the YPA for the functioning of both the military institution and the political system of which it is a part. Military leaders and institutions regularly endorse the principle of proportional national representation within the officer corps.† The military elite remains committed to the system of

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in order to control the Partisan movement; one of the most poignant episodes of incipient Soviet-Yugoslav friction at the time was Politburo member Moša Pijade's fruitless wait on Mount Durmitor for 37 days in 1943 for Soviet weapons that never arrived. In 1948, Stalin cut off weapon deliveries; in 1955-57 the U.S. linked deliveries of MAP weapons to the state of Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement; after 1968 the USSR evidently halted or delayed weapons transfers as a form of political pressure. In 1975, in public remarks probably addressed primarily to the USSR, but also the United States, Ljubicić said:

One often hears statements made abroad that a strong and stable Yugoslavia is desirable but that there are fears for its future.... If what they say were true they would show it with deeds and not words. They would not exercise pressure or engage in sabre rattling in the vicinity of our borders, they would not impose limitations on the sale of military equipment to our country, and they would not make various economic and other difficulties for us." (Speech on Serbian Uprising Day, FBIS/II/July 8, 1975/II.)

Ljubicić's accusation in 1979, following the breakdown of the prospective Dragon sale, that the U.S. sought to "play games" with Yugoslavia on the prices of weapons, is quite consistent with this outlook. 3.5(c)

\*Tito forcefully reminded the military on Army Day in 1977 that it must "also be present inside the country" and "insure that we will continue to move in the direction we have chosen...." (U)

\*\* See the statement of then-LCY Executive Secretariat member CG Ivan Kukoć on this point, in NIN, March 20, 1977. (U)

† Restated, for example, in the "action program" of the military Party organization, published in Narodna armija, January 11, 1979. (U)

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"total national defense" that (since it embraces civil defense and popular internal security [društvena samozaštita] elements) is today even more broadly based than was the case in the mid-1970s and has reinforced the symbiotic relationship between the military institution and Yugoslav society. (U)

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Appendices (U)

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Table 1 (U)  
 MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN POSTWAR  
 REPUBLICAN PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEES (U)

Republic/Province	Percentage of Total CC Membership						
	1949	1954	1959-1960	1965-1966	1968 <sup>a</sup>	1974	1978
Bosnia-Hercegovina	4	c	0	0	4	1	0
Croatia	5	0	1	2	4 <sup>b</sup>	1	2
Kosovo	(First separate congress held in 1968)				0	2	2
Macedonia	2	0	0	0	6	1	1
Montenegro	5	0	c	0	3	0	1
Serbia	3	1	0	0	2	2	1
Slovenia	0	6	c	0	4	1	1
Vojvodina	(First separate congress held in 1968)				0	1	2

Notes:

- a) As of early 1970.
- b) Reduced to 0 in 1972, when all three military representatives were expelled from the Croatian CC.
- c) Data not available.

SOURCE: Official accounts of the respective Congresses, published as books or in the regional press.

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Table 2 (U)

MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN POSTWAR LCY CENTRAL COMMITTEES (U)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage of Total CC Membership</u>
1978 (Eleventh Congress)	18	11
1974 (Tenth Congress)	17	10
1969 (Ninth Congress Presidium)	3	6
1964 (Eighth Congress)	9	6
1958 (Seventh Congress)	4	3
1952 (Sixth Congress)	6	6
1948 (Fifth Congress)	2	3

SOURCE: Official proceedings of each Party Congress.

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GLOSSARY

CG	Colonel General
FSND	Federal Secretariat of National Defense
LCG	Lieutenant Colonel General
LCY	League of Communists of Yugoslavia
MG	Major General
VA	Vice Admiral
YAF	Yugoslav Air Force

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
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