

## **February 1977**

### **A. Ross Johnson with the assistance of Jeanette A. Koch, 'The Yugoslav Military Elite' [Approved for Release, February 6, 2019]**

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#### **Summary:**

This 1977 RAND Report, prepared for the Office of Political Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency, analyses the evolution of the leadership of the Yugoslav People's Army between 1945 and 1976. It combines statistical biographic analysis of the transformation of the Yugoslav military elite with qualitative historical analysis. It includes appendices on data sources, the ethnic and regional composition of Yugoslavia, career characteristics of the military elite, and opinion polls of the Yugoslav military.

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R-2131

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A. Ross Johnson, with the assistance of Jeanette A. Koch

A report prepared for

**OFFICE OF REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION**  
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PREFACE

Yugoslavia faces the Tito succession. Future developments in that country will affect importantly the interests of the United States. A crisis situation in post-Tito Yugoslavia could develop into a European and international crisis of grave proportions. The Yugoslav military is certain to play a key role in post-Tito Yugoslavia. This Report analyzes the Yugoslav military by focusing on its leadership group -- its elite. The Report combines dynamic statistical analysis of the transformation of the Yugoslav military elite with traditional analysis of its historical development. It was prepared for the Office of Political Research and the Office of Regional and Political Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency, to fill the gap that had resulted from the absence of any USG or academic analysis of the Yugoslav military elite. It aims to provide such an analysis helpful to USG policymakers who deal with Yugoslavia and USG analysts responsible for ongoing assessments of developments in that country.

The present Report, focused on the key individuals in the Yugoslav military, is intended to complement an in-house study by the Office of Political Research that deals with the political role of the Yugoslav military as an institution. (*The Political Role of the Yugoslav Military* [S], OPR-109, March 1975, by Robert Dean, Secret.) An in-house study by the Office of Strategic Research, CIA, examines the current organization and capabilities of the Yugoslav armed forces. Together, these three studies provide the policymaker and analyst with a comprehensive overview of the Yugoslav military on the eve of the Tito succession.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The current Yugoslav military elite, although aging, is sufficiently young and unchallenged to be in place when Tito passes from the Yugoslav political scene. It is comprised of the Partisan military generation; the postwar military generation will not rise to the top for another five to ~~ten~~ years. The present elite is relatively well prepared to defend Yugoslavia against external and internal threats. It is dominated by professional commanders of the Partisan generation. Peasant youth at the outbreak of World War II, they joined Tito's Partisan movement at its outset as their first adult activity. They then joined the Party, mobilized on a platform of national independence and unity, not support for the USSR or Communist revolution. Since World War II, they have been professionally concerned with Yugoslavia's defense, principally against the Soviet threat. + 5

Assimilating the changing values of the Communist Party, the military elite has developed strong loyalty to the Yugoslav Communist political system, and it stands ready to defend that system, as well as the Yugoslav state, against domestic as well as foreign challengers. The military elite is more active in Party politics and government affairs than a decade ago. It desires more discipline in Yugoslav life within the present Party-dominated "self-management" system, but not a return to Soviet-style rule.

In contrast to other Yugoslav elites, the military elite has remained fundamentally cohesive, notwithstanding internal disputes involving defense policy, the national question, and organizational conflict. There is no evidence of intra-military cleavage on foreign policy issues; in particular, there is no evidence of pro-Soviet sentiment (meaning a desire to realign Yugoslavia with the USSR). *Exception*

The military elite constitutes one of the strongest "all-Yugoslav" centripetal forces. It has successfully adapted itself to the looser federal political system and greater self-affirmation of the constituent national groups while protecting the military institution against

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nationalist inroads and excessive decentralization. The military elite has become multinational; all major national groups (except Albanians) are proportionally represented in its ranks. Key regional command posts are again staffed by "native sons" from the respective regions, just as they were during the Partisan War. Establishment of regional territorial defense commands influenced by regional political authorities, part of the post-1968 system of "total national defense," has further "territorialized" the military elite. Consequently, the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia evidently are perceived as a "joint armed force" by most of Yugoslavia's national groups (Croats and Albanians being significant exceptions).

Whatever the shape of post-Tito Yugoslavia, the military elite will play a key role. If no succession crisis occurs, the elite will continue to participate in the political process but concentrate on the external, principally Soviet threat. Should the post-Tito period be more troubled, the elite could be expected to be much more active in domestic political affairs, acting as a unifying factor. In the more extreme eventuality of internal disintegration, the role of the military elite would become paramount. In case of localized conflict, the elite could be expected to respond effectively to orders from Belgrade and a regional capital to restore order. But in case of contagious conflict leading to civil war and national breakdown, the unity and effectiveness of the military elite would be suspect. Resilient in situations short of major crises precisely because it is a reflection of the political and social system, it would probably lack the unity and purposefulness necessary to reconstitute political authority in a disintegrating Yugoslavia.

Should the Soviet Union intervene militarily in post-Tito Yugoslavia in circumstances other than this "worst case" domestic scenario, the military elite can be expected to conduct a determined resistance effort. In that event, as in the case of immediate Soviet military threat, the elite can be expected to look to the West for armaments and other forms of military assistance.

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Much of the burdensome and at times frustrating task of data collection fell to Jeanette Koch of Rand's Washington Office; her major contribution to the project is acknowledged on the title page. Robert Roll, a staff member of Rand's Economics Department, most generously assisted with computer data processing. Rand colleagues William R. Harris, Thomas W. Wolfe, Arnold Horelick, Guy Pauker, Horst Mendershausen, and Lilita Dziricals provided helpful comments on earlier drafts.

The author is grateful to all of the above individuals and offices for assistance and interest; he alone is responsible for statements of fact and judgment in this Report.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFY	Armed Forces of Yugoslavia
CG	Colonel General
CPY	Communist Party of Yugoslavia
FSND	Federal Secretariat of National Defense
HMA	Higher Military Academy
KOS	<i>Kontraobaveštajna služba</i> (Counterintelligence Service)
LCG	Lieutenant Colonel General
LCY	League of Communists of Yugoslavia (official name of the Communist Party since 1953)
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MG	Major General
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLW	People's Liberation War
SAWPY	Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia (mass political organization)
TDF	Territorial Defense Forces
YPA	Yugoslav People's Army

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Tito succession will be Yugoslavia's most serious challenge since the conflict with Stalin in 1948. It will have important international ramifications. The country occupies a crucial strategic position in Europe on the boundary between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Reincorporation of Yugoslavia into the Soviet sphere following Tito's departure would constitute a significant shift in the European political balance in favor of the USSR. Soviet military action against Yugoslavia would create a major international crisis, since Yugoslav resistance would be likely; Yugoslavia would probably request external assistance of some kind; and a conflict might spill over into other areas of Europe. The likelihood of Soviet military intervention in Yugoslavia and the prospects for success of more indirect instrumentalities of Soviet policy are related directly to the degree of internal cohesion in post-Tito Yugoslavia. These policy premises<sup>1</sup> suggest the importance of understanding the evolving Yugoslav system and its likely future development in both non-crisis and crisis situations.

This Report analyzes the Yugoslav military elite, a relatively neglected element of the Yugoslav system. The study assumes that the Yugoslav military will be a politically significant factor in post-Tito Yugoslavia; indeed, today the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) plays an important political role. The army is the strongest all-Yugoslav institution in a country rife with regional and ethnic divisions.<sup>2</sup> Its domestic political weight has increased in the past five years. It will play an important role in the post-Tito political constellation in the absence

<sup>1</sup>Developed in Johnson and Horelick (1972). (Full citations of publications referenced in footnotes are given in the Bibliography.)

<sup>2</sup>Appendix B describes Yugoslavia's complex multinational condition. Throughout this Report, common Yugoslav issues and institutions centered in Belgrade are referred to as "all-Yugoslav," while "national" refers to characteristics of the constituent ethnic groups (Serbs, Croats, etc.) of Yugoslavia, and "republican" refers to the constituent republics (Serbia, Croatia, etc.) of the Yugoslav state.

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of internal turmoil. In the event (unlikely, perhaps, but certainly thinkable) of severe internal strife, no less than in the contingency of a sharply increased Soviet threat, the cohesion of the Yugoslav military may well be decisive for the continued integrity and independence of the Yugoslav state.

The study reported here analyzes the Yugoslav military by focusing on its most influential individuals, that is, its leadership group or elite (the term which will be utilized hereafter). The study was undertaken as a pioneering effort to fill the gap created by the absence of any governmental or academic analysis of the Yugoslav military elite. Study objectives included formulating a profile of the Yugoslav military elite that could complement available biographies of individual officers; projecting the outlook, or set of attitudes on issues, of that elite; analyzing tensions within the Yugoslav military establishment; and considering the resulting implications for the role of the Yugoslav military elite in the post-Tito period. This study examines secondarily the military as an institution with particular organizational and political characteristics conditioning the actions of the individuals operating within it. It does not assay the military capabilities of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia (AFY).<sup>1</sup>

Section II contains a summary review of the evolving role of the YPA in postwar Yugoslavia. It provides background for the elite analysis in the subsequent sections.

Section III presents a profile of the Yugoslav military elite, namely, an analysis of collective attributes including age, nationality and regional origin, education, Party experience, and military career data. This profile is based on systematic analysis of all available data concerning the background of 104 key officers judged to comprise the military elite (as of September 1975).<sup>2</sup> To provide a benchmark against which to judge recent changes in this profile, an "historical" profile is drawn

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<sup>1</sup>The method, definitions, and data utilized in this study are discussed in Appendix A. Recent U.S. Government studies dealing with other aspects of the Yugoslav military are listed in the Preface and Bibliography.

<sup>2</sup>Important personnel changes since this cut-off date are noted, but not incorporated in the statistical analysis.

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of the characteristics of a counterpart elite of 1966, comprised of 112 key officers. (The choice of 1966, as opposed to other years, for the purposes of comparison is explained in Appendix A.) Knowledge of group characteristics does not suffice to permit predictions of the actions of the members of the respective group in various future situations. It does improve our understanding of predispositional factors that will condition the behavior of individual actors in specific future circumstances. Gaps in data blur somewhat this profile of the current Yugoslav military elite; it is a suggestive profile, not the conclusive portrait that study of a more accessible military group can provide.<sup>1</sup> In this regard as in others, it is not the sufficiency of the data for rigorous empirical analysis, but rather the need for more knowledge about the military as a critical element of the Yugoslav political system that motivated this study. Further analysis, qualification, and documentation of the data utilized in Section III are contained in Appendix C.

Section IV provides an estimate of the "outlook" or attitudes about issues of the Yugoslav military elite. Since systematic attitudinal data on the Yugoslav military is inaccessible, the Report reviews the fragmentary evidence available<sup>2</sup> and formulates a judgment (in which the subjective component is necessarily high) about the attitude of the Yugoslav military elite.

Section V analyzes cleavages and affinity groups within the Yugoslav military. This study assumed at the outset that the Yugoslav military is not a monolith and that knowledge of the existence, extent, and nature of internal divisions and affinity groups would improve our ability to anticipate the future cohesion and behavior of the Yugoslav military. The Report reviews evidence of intra-military conflict on military and nonmilitary issues for the past ten years, in order to draw conclusions about the nature of disputed issues and the identity,

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<sup>1</sup>An example of the latter is Goodman (1970), which analyzed statistical surveys of South Vietnamese armed forces personnel records.

<sup>2</sup>Key internal military opinion polls are partially reconstructed in Appendix D.

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motivations, and allies of major protagonists. Personal associations are assessed on the basis of career and particularly organizational proximity, with emphasis (suspected at the outset and confirmed in some cases by the analysis) on the continued importance of personal associations forged during the Partisan War.

Section VI summarizes the preceding analysis and discusses implications for the behavior of the Yugoslav military in a variety of future circumstances.

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II. THE ROLE OF THE YPA IN COMMUNIST YUGOSLAVIA:  
A CONTEXTUAL SKETCH<sup>1</sup>THE PARTISAN ARMY: 1941-1945

The YPA was the founding instrument of Communist Yugoslavia. Originally known as the People's Liberation Army, it was created by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia after 1941 to fight what Tito and his subordinates in the CPY leadership conceived as a dual war for both national liberation from Axis occupation and for social revolution. Tito fully recognized the overwhelming attractiveness to Yugoslavs of the cause of liberation (as opposed to revolution) and skillfully exploited that appeal in developing the Partisan movement; the Party downplayed both its control of the Partisans and its revolutionary social objectives.<sup>2</sup> The PLA developed initially from "proletarian brigades" organized after December 1941 and staffed in good measure by Yugoslavs who had fled the cities in the face of German occupation. While the proletarian brigades had relatively high inter-regional mobility, they were not the model for the PLA; in 1942 Tito decided against attempting to establish such units on a wide scale and subsequently emphasized regionally-based units. By 1945, the PLA had grown into a force of some 800,000 soldiers organized in 48 divisions and four armies.

Rapid growth and internal stratification of the PLA conditioned the evolution of its officer corps. The military organizers of the Partisan movement were the "Spaniards"--the prewar Communists who had served in the International Brigades of the Spanish Civil War<sup>3</sup>--who dominated the major PLA commands, including all four Army commands

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<sup>1</sup>This Section is provided as background for the elite-focused analysis in subsequent Sections of the Report; it skims the surface of a still largely unstudied 30-year history of the Yugoslav military. It draws in part on Johnson (1971); Johnson (1974); *The Political Role of the Yugoslav Military* (1975).

<sup>2</sup>At the end of 1941 Tito briefly embraced (but then abandoned) the notion of emphasizing revolutionary "class" aims and Party control of the Partisan movement.

<sup>3</sup>Aleš Bebler has described how he implemented in Slovenia guerrilla warfare experience gained in Spain (*Vjesnik*, October 5-6, 1975).

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in 1945.<sup>1</sup> Twenty-nine "Spaniards" became Partisan generals. Prewar military officers played a significant role only in the Partisan Navy (245 former naval officers occupied all leading naval posts in October 1944) and the Partisan Air Force.<sup>2</sup> Most wartime officers lacked previous military experience and were elevated from the ranks of the Partisans. Like other revolutionary armies, the PLA initially lacked hierarchical differentiation; ranks were introduced only in 1943.

National equality was emphasized in the development of the Partisan army; the Party's slogan of "brotherhood and unity," signifying opposition both to Serb hegemony of interwar Yugoslavia and the national fratricide of World War II, was another key to the Partisans' success.<sup>3</sup> Apart from the proletarian brigades, whose special status has been noted, the PLA was until late 1944 comprised of regional units commanded principally by officers of the respective region and national group, subordinated to regional commands, and utilizing the respective regional language or dialect for command.<sup>4</sup> The only demographic anomaly occurred in Croatia; there the Partisans' major initial support came from the Serb minority concentrated in Lika and Slavonia that was the object of a policy of physical extermination by the Axis satellite "Independent State of Croatia."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Staničić (1973), p. 387.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 397.

<sup>3</sup>Serb domination of interwar Yugoslavia was particularly evident in the armed forces. Of the 165 active generals on the eve of World War II, 161 were Serbs, while two were Croats and two were Slovenes. Thirteen hundred of the 1500 military cadets were Serbs (Rothschild [1974], p. 278).

<sup>4</sup>See Appendix B for a note on the relationship between region and national group.

<sup>5</sup>Of roughly 5000 Partisan organizers--the "First Fighters" who received the "Partisan Medallion of 1941" and constituted the postwar Yugoslav elite--still alive in Croatia in 1971, only 25 percent were Croats and 49 percent were Serbs (with 3 percent miscellaneous other nationalities and 18 percent refusing to declare a national affiliation), whereas the respective proportions of these nationalities in the postwar population of Croatia were 78 percent and 15 percent respectively. (*NIN*, September 19, 1971.)

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The CPY organized the PLA; it maintained its influence over the expanding PLA through multiple channels. The PLA's Supreme Command, organized by Tito in 1941, was coterminous with the Party Politburo. Regional commands were organized on a similar basis. Party activists were appointed to the posts of political commissars at all levels of the PLA and shared responsibility with unit commanders -- the familiar "dual command" principle characteristic of (and modeled after) the Soviet army in the immediate prewar period. Utilizing political commissars to maintain political control over the expanding PLA, the Party feared "militarization" of the Party itself--a fear understandable in view of the fact that the Party grew in size from 12,000 members in 1941 to 140,000 members in 1945 (with only 3000 of the 1941 contingent surviving the war). To protect the autonomy of Party cells in military units, Party secretaries were secretly appointed; nominally they occupied the function of deputy commissar. The commissar and the Party secretary were in turn subordinated to yet another channel of Party control. Party Central Committee emissaries were dispatched first to brigades (usually three emissaries) and in mid-1943 to divisions (4-5 emissaries) to organize a "Political Section" that was considered an integral part of the Central Committee. It was this Political Section, working with the commissar, the Party secretary, and the youth organization secretary, that served as the linkage for transmittal of political directives to military units. The Political Sections were maintained until the end of 1944.

POSTWAR CONSOLIDATION AND SOVIET THREAT: 1946-1955

After 1945 and the consolidation of the Communist regime in Yugoslavia, the PLA (now called first the "Yugoslav Army" and then the "Yugoslav People's Army") was transformed from a revolutionary Partisan army into a more conventional professional fighting force. Strict Party control of the Army was maintained through political channels: unified Party-political organs in the YPA were subordinated to its Political Administration that was (as in other Communist countries today) a section

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of the Party Central Committee. The Political Administration was initially headed by Party Secretary Vukmanović-Tempo (who was also military prosecutor and head of *KOS*, the counterintelligence service). Commissars continued to exist in all military units; the commissar was generally more powerful than the commander. The command hierarchy itself was dominated by Tito, who was both Supreme Commander and (until 1953) Secretary of Defense.

Once the YPA had suppressed the remaining domestic opposition to Communist rule, it became preoccupied with external security. Concern with a Western threat was soon matched by apprehension about Soviet intentions. Tito had successfully insisted to Stalin in 1944 that none of the Soviet forces that had helped to liberate parts of Eastern Yugoslavia remain after the war. But Yugoslavia quickly became dependent on the USSR for military training and equipment; Soviet military advisors were posted to Yugoslavia in large numbers; most Yugoslav senior officers went to the USSR for training; and Yugoslavia looked to the USSR for assistance in modernizing the YPA. Friction developed between Soviet and Yugoslav military personnel, however, and by 1947 Tito had come to view these incidents as part of a Soviet effort to gain control of the YPA. In December 1947 Tito publicly adopted a defiant stand on the issue of the independence of the YPA -- the first issue so confronted in the developing general conflict with Stalin.<sup>1</sup>

Following the outbreak of open conflict with Stalin in 1948, Yugoslavia faced a real and present danger of external intervention. With Soviet renunciation in 1949 of the Soviet-Yugoslav friendship treaty, the staging of troop maneuvers in neighboring satellite countries, and a series of border incidents, Yugoslavia lived in the shadow of Soviet military invasion. The YPA was redeployed and enlarged to meet the Soviet threat. A domestic arms industry was established in the interior of the country. By 1952, Yugoslavia was devoting nearly a quarter of national income to defense, and the YPA had been expanded to a half-million men. A U.S. military assistance program was formally begun in 1953 and provided grant aid worth three-fourths of a billion

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<sup>1</sup>Johnson (1972), pp. 34-35.

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dollars by 1958. Defense preparations were solely in the hands of the YPA. Doctrinally and organizationally, it emphasized conventional defense more than the Partisan operations of World War II.

As the YPA expanded in the early 1950s, the prerogatives and authority of its commanders were strengthened. Surfacing of the Stalin-Tito conflict led to several high-level pro-Soviet defections within the military (to be discussed later), and these touched off an intensive political search for possible "Cominformists" (i.e., pro-Soviet elements) within the YPA that strengthened the hand of political officers. But as early as February 1949 the formal authority of the commander vis-a-vis the commissar was elevated somewhat. The major change in this regard occurred in early 1953, as a consequence of the Sixth Party Congress directives to remove the Party from a direct command role in Yugoslav society. This general political imperative to redefine the Party's role in the military was doubtless reinforced by the military imperative of more authority for the command hierarchy, given the extent and nature of the YPA buildup that was underway. In February 1953, the Main Political Administration (a Party Central Committee section) was abolished, as was the position of commissar at all levels. The political organs of the YPA were now subordinated to commanders up and down the military hierarchy; the military Party organization, too, was strongly influenced by the commanders, for their deputies for political affairs also assumed the post of Party secretary.<sup>1</sup> As a consequence, then, of the intersection of political and military developments--the Sixth Party Congress that redefined the role of the Party in Yugoslav life and the massive conventional military buildup in the face of the Soviet threat--professionalism and institutional autonomy were emphasized in the YPA, more so than in many other Yugoslav institutions.

DEMOBILIZATION AND MODERNIZATION: 1956-1967

Following Stalin's death in 1953 and Khrushchev's conciliatory visit to Belgrade in 1955, Soviet-Yugoslav relations improved and in

<sup>1</sup>Kovačević (1968), pp. 16-19.

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the mid-1960s again became warm. In Yugoslav eyes, the Soviet threat receded; defense spending was therefore reduced, and the YPA greatly limited in size, so that by 1968 Yugoslavia devoted less than 6 percent of national income to defense and the YPA had been reduced to nearly 200,000 men.<sup>1</sup> Early retirement of YPA officers was encouraged after 1956; by 1968 26,000 officers had retired including 2500 officers and 38 generals in 1967-1968 alone.<sup>2</sup> (Social tensions inevitably resulted and some of the retired officers, lamenting the loss of their former material and social position, actively opposed Party policies of the time). In the 1960s, Yugoslavia again became dependent on the USSR for advanced weaponry (although it accepted these armaments on terms compatible with its independence), and resumed exchange of official military delegations with the Soviet bloc. During this period, military ties with Western countries lapsed. At times, particularly in connection with the 1967 Middle East war, the Yugoslav military seemed to be more concerned with a potential military threat from the West than from the East.

The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 reawakened Yugoslavia to the reality of the Soviet threat. While the resulting crisis atmosphere (that included widespread mobilization) relaxed within a few weeks, the shock of Czechoslovakia caused Yugoslavia to take its defense more seriously. A renewed massive conventional military buildup was out of the question for several reasons: pressing economic difficulties; the more decentralized political system of the late 1960s; and the military inadequacy of whatever conventional force Yugoslavia might organize to meet the threat presented by the massive and highly mobile Soviet military establishment. Reembracing the concept of a "nation in arms" and reemphasizing the Partisan heritage, Yugoslavia developed its present system of *opštenarodna odbrana* or "total national defense."

#### DEVELOPMENT OF TOTAL NATIONAL DEFENSE: 1969-1976<sup>3</sup>

The primary organizational consequence of the adoption of "total national defense" was the establishment on republican lines of territorial

<sup>1</sup>Johnson (1974), p. 43.

<sup>2</sup>*Prva konferencija* (1969), p. 17.

<sup>3</sup>For detailed analysis see Johnson (1971, 1974); *The Political Role of the Yugoslav Military* (1975).

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defense forces as units of citizen-soldiers. The TDF has since developed into a force of over one million men (with auxiliaries) that is financed on a sub-federal, i.e., republican and local basis. The TDF is comprised of small factory-defense units, company-size local units, and larger, well-equipped mobile units intended for use throughout a republic. TDF units are subordinated to local and republican defense commands; at each level TDF commanders are responsible both to local political authorities and to the superior TDF command. TDF units fall under YPA command only when engaged in joint tactical operations. On the other hand, should an entire republic be overrun by the enemy, the republican defense command would assume control of all military units on its territory.

Implementation of total national defense has thus entailed a profound change in the role of the YPA, which has lost its monopoly of responsibility for defense and is now nominally (although not de facto) one of two co-equal components of the newly-named Armed Forces of Yugoslavia. The YPA is no longer *the* Yugoslav military institution, but is now complemented by the larger TDF. On the other hand, Yugoslavia has not accepted for the YPA the Swiss model of a professional training corps for a single militia of citizen-soldiers; the active YPA must be able on its own both to resist limited incursion and to delay massive attack long enough for the country to carry out total mobilization; in the latter case it would still play a key role. Specific changes in YPA organization have resulted, including further manpower reductions, a sharp lowering of YPA reserve levels (and virtual abolishment of the YPA's inactive reserve), and transfer of many support and logistic functions to the TDF or civilian sector.

The relationship of the YPA to the TDF has been a dynamic one. Established at the height of republican self-assertiveness in Yugoslavia, the regional character of the TDF was originally emphasized at the expense of YPA influence, even though TDF commands were from the outset staffed exclusively by YPA reserve or (in some cases) active officers. Most importantly, the TDF chain of command originally extended directly from the Supreme Commander to the republican commands, bypassing the

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Federal Defense Secretariat and the YPA General Staff. After 1972, as some republican rights were curtailed at the expense of greater federal authority in the political system generally, more emphasis was placed on the role of the TDF as part of a "unified defense system"; now the General Staff was inserted into the TDF chain of command, and this was symptomatic of greater influence of the YPA over the development of the TDF at all levels. This influence notwithstanding, the TDF remains politically responsive to local and republican political authorities, who continue to nominate candidates for TDF command posts<sup>1</sup> and whose right to organize and direct national defense in their respective territories has been legitimized in the new Yugoslav constitution of 1974. Their involvement in defense matters represents a significant return to the Partisan heritage and dilution of the exclusive responsibility for defense that the YPA bore between 1945 and 1968.

Total national defense is officially described in Yugoslavia as a system of defense against any and all enemies. In fact, since 1968 the principal threat preoccupation of the YPA and TDF has been the Soviet Union--notwithstanding the continuation of military relations with the USSR and its allies<sup>2</sup> and concern with other, particularly subversive and terrorist, threats from the West. Yugoslav military doctrine is preoccupied with the threat of a sudden massive armored and airborne invasion that corresponds only to Soviet doctrine and capabilities. The territorial disposition of YPA units mirrors a preoccupation with the Soviet threat.<sup>3</sup> More fundamentally, the entire system of total national defense was developed in its present form in response to Soviet military action--the invasion of Czechoslovakia--just as the only previous post-war expansion of Yugoslav military capabilities was undertaken in response to Stalin's threats.

<sup>1</sup>The National Defense Law (1974, Article 20) stipulates that the Commander-in-Chief appoints republican defense commanders upon nomination by the republics.

<sup>2</sup>Since 1968 exchange of military delegations with Western countries has complemented exchange with Soviet bloc countries resumed after 1971. Yugoslavia continues to depend on the Soviet Union for advanced heavy weaponry; its efforts to diversify its arms purchases have not met with a ready response from Western governments.

<sup>3</sup>*Yugoslavia: Perception of the Threat and Nationwide Deterrent* (1976).

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THE YPA'S INTERNAL ROLE: 1945-1976

The YPA's preoccupation with external security over the past thirty years conditioned its role in the Yugoslav political system. Following the Communist consolidation of power after 1945, the YPA became a more conventional military establishment; "professionalization" transformed the revolutionary multinational army into an exclusivist, supranational "Yugoslav" institution that was almost hermetically sealed off from the rest of Yugoslav society. To be sure, the YPA remained a key instrument by which conscript youths were socialized into the values of the Yugoslav Communist system. The YPA continued to cultivate its heritage as the founding instrument of that system. Yet for two decades it remained outside the mainstream of Yugoslav Party-political life.

In the mid-1960s, Party reformers feared that the isolation of the military could mean a future "militaristic" threat to the wide-ranging economic and political reforms introduced in Yugoslavia in the mid-1960s. They sought with considerable success to dilute the exclusiveness of the military establishment. The Party forced on the YPA an "opening to society" (as the process was termed in Yugoslavia) after 1966. Military matters, once a public taboo, began to be discussed in the media. The Federal Assembly began to debate, not just rubber stamp, the defense budget. The Party organization in the YPA was reorganized to limit the authority over it of the command echelon that had dominated the Party bodies in the military since the abolishment of commissars in 1953; to encourage horizontal contacts with nonmilitary, territorial Party organizations; and to permit greater participation by the military rank-and-file. The purpose of these measures was (in the words of a political officer) to effect "the real and not formal acceptance in the army [of the] democratic and self-management achievements of our society."<sup>1</sup>

The lowering of barriers between the military and other elements of Yugoslav society was reinforced by the upsurge of forces of national and regional self-affirmation that spawned the set of reforms that increased decentralization and pluralism in Yugoslavia in the second

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<sup>1</sup>Kovačević (1968), p. 33.

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half of the 1960s. Under pressure from republican Party organizations, the YPA adopted the goal of fully proportional national representation in its officer corps (in which, for historical reasons, Serbs and Montenegrins had played a disproportionately large role). Republican political authorities outside Serbia and Montenegro sought to enroll more of their youth in military academies (and encouraged the establishment of new officers' training schools in their respective republics for this purpose). The YPA accepted the principle of stationing a percentage of conscripts on the territory of their native republic; formerly it had followed a policy of almost exclusively cross-regional postings. Earlier, Serbian (more precisely, the Belgrade dialect of Serbian written in the Latin, i.e., Croatian alphabet) had been used almost exclusively in the YPA, as in other federal institutions; now opportunities for linguistic and cultural national expression within the YPA were enhanced. The necessity of a unitary language for command and training (i.e., the Belgrade dialect of Serbian) was brought into question.<sup>1</sup> Most significant of all, the YPA was complemented after 1968 by the republican-based territorial defense forces; the latter greatly increased contact between YPA officers and other Yugoslavs and contributed to the breakdown of the former isolation of the YPA.

This significant dilution of the YPA's exclusivist and supranational character in the late 1960s notwithstanding, the military establishment remained the strongest and most reliable all-Yugoslav political institution. In the protracted confrontation with Croatian nationalism (and the republican Party leadership in Zagreb that sought to harness it) in mid-1971, Tito turned to the military for support. He organized an unusual series of consultations with senior military figures to buttress his antinationalist remarks of the time. And in December 1971,

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<sup>1</sup>These national issues were prominently discussed in the military Party organization in early 1969 (*Prva konferencija* [1969]). They were systematically analyzed in a 1970 document of the military Party organization, published as a supplement to *Narodna armija*, May 15, 1970.

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Tito restated what was never in question but which had not been made explicit for years--that the YPA played an internal political, as well as external security role in Yugoslavia and would be utilized, if events so dictated, to suppress a nationalist or other domestic challenge to the integrity of the Yugoslav state and the maintenance of LCY rule.

In the atmosphere of domestic semi-crisis generated by the Party center's confrontation with Croatian nationalism in 1971 and the crackdown on the Serbian Party leadership (accused of being too "liberal") the following year, the civil-military relationship postulated as desirable by the Party was modified and in a sense reversed. In the late 1960s, Party reformers hoped the "opening to society" would reintegrate an isolated and more conservative military establishment into the mainstream of a "liberalizing" Yugoslav political system. Military involvement in politics indeed further increased. But in the early 1970s, the Party leadership reemphasized the internal political as well as external security role of the YPA as a loyalist, orthodox institution providing an antidote to permissive nationalism and "liberalism" and, at a more fundamental level, as the custodian and ultimate guarantor of the Yugoslav state and Communist system. In Tito's words of late 1971, "our army is also called upon to defend the achievements of our revolution within the country, should that become necessary."<sup>1</sup> He subsequently implored: "It is no longer sufficient for our army to be familiar with military affairs. It must also be familiar with political affairs and developments. It must participate in [them]."<sup>2</sup> Many other high-level calls for military participation in politics ensued. For example, addressing an army Party conference, Party Executive Bureau Secretary Mirko Popović called on YPA officers to be politically active in the communities in which they were stationed.<sup>3</sup> As such appeals indicate, the military

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<sup>1</sup>*Borba*, December 24, 1971.

<sup>2</sup>Speech of January 8, 1974, broadcast by Radio Belgrade.

<sup>3</sup>Tanjug, February 20, 1975.

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was called on by Tito and the Party to play a more active political role; it did not inject itself into the political process.

Military involvement in political affairs has in fact increased in the first half of the 1970s (albeit not to the extent some observers have suggested). A small group of "political generals" has reemerged for the first time since the late 1940s, although (as described in Appendix C) they occupy almost exclusively security-related posts. The appointment of generals to such posts reflected the Tito leadership's heightened concern with terrorist and subversive threats to Yugoslavia in the early 1970s. A few military figures were called upon for other services, both technical and political. MG Dragislav Radisavljević was put in charge of the civilian airline, to improve its efficiency. Army General Kosta Nadj, then semi-retired, was installed as head of the veterans' union in 1974 as part of an effort by the Party to dampen the pressure that had emanated from parts of the veterans' organization in 1971-1972 for "stronger measures" against nationalists and "liberals" and for more centralist policies.<sup>1</sup> A general increase in the political weight of the military was effected at the Tenth Party Congress in 1974, when the Central Committee (abolished as such at the Ninth Congress of 1969) was reconstituted and the military Party organization

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<sup>1</sup> Described in Johnson (1974), pp. 28-29. General Nadj's appointment was accompanied by a major reshuffle of the leadership of the veterans' organization. In isolated cases, recently retired senior officers had joined forces with the veterans in urging more conservative policies on the Party. A key case in this regard will be discussed in Section V. Such cases do *not* demonstrate (as has been suggested) that the veterans' organization is a handmaiden of the military establishment. The veterans' organization constitutes a significant political force within the Yugoslav Communist system in its own right; local and even republican-level veterans' organizations have at times advocated quite unorthodox (usually "conservative" but sometimes "liberal" and "nationalist") policies. But the political weight of the veterans' organization is to be explained by its significant numbers of prominent "first fighters" who constituted the cream of the postwar political elite but who were subsequently shunted off onto the political sidelines. It is not ties with the current military establishment that explain the role of the veterans' organization; that organization has not been a political surrogate for the YPA in recent years.

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allocated 15 seats on it (equivalent to those of a provincial Party organization, although less than the 20 allocated to the republican Party organizations). But, as will be discussed, this greater military weight in central Party councils did not translate itself into a military presence in nonmilitary Party bodies at the republican and local levels; claims to this role were voiced by some military Party officials in 1972 but soon dropped.

The YPA has reacted to the challenge of the forces of national affirmation in the same way as have other Yugoslav institutions since 1971; extreme nationalist demands have been decisively rejected, but opportunities for national self-expression within a context of respect for the integrity of Yugoslav institutions have been expanded. The calls of extreme nationalists in 1970-1971 for radical reorganization of the YPA into single-nation units with national languages of command have been silenced. But efforts continue to correct the disproportionate national representation in the officer corps -- a principle, codified in the 1974 Constitution, that the republican Party organizations continue to insist on.<sup>1</sup> Officer candidates are assured of greater opportunities to be posted to their native regions.<sup>2</sup> Opportunities for linguistic self-expression in the military have expanded. The principle of a unitary language of command and training has been successfully defended, but more scope has been granted (at least in theory) for the use of Croatian along with Serbian military terminology.<sup>3</sup>

The more prominent role of the YPA in the early 1970s has allowed the military establishment, as noted earlier, to defeat the challenges to the YPA's institutional autonomy and primary role in the Yugoslav

<sup>1</sup>*NYN*, March 14, 1976. Illustrative of the republican Party stands on the issue are statements of the head of the Kosovo provincial Party organization (Tanjug, March 29, 1975) and the Croatian Party Executive Committee (Tanjug, February 17, 1976.)

<sup>2</sup>E.g., ["Croatia in the YPA"], *Vjesnik*, May 5, 1973.

<sup>3</sup>The 1974 National Defense Law formally defines the language of command and training as "Serbocroatian or Croatoserbian."

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defense system raised by some of the stronger advocates of territorial defense forces after 1968. Calls from the republican level in 1970-1971 claiming a veto right over YPA regional postings and counterposing the TDF to the YPA have been decisively rejected. The YPA has assumed a more active role in pre-induction military training, further solidifying its monopoly over all military education.

The military establishment has also blunted an incipient challenge from within. In the wake of the political campaign of 1971-1972 against "nationalism" and "liberalism," some military Party organizations, as mentioned previously, made short-lived claims to influence outside the armed forces. Simultaneously the military Party organization took a more active stance within the YPA, in some cases opposing political to professional military concerns in a manner challenging commanders' prerogatives. By 1975 this tendency had been reversed; the proceedings of the February 1975 military Party organization conference indicate a preoccupation with military-technical tasks.<sup>1</sup> The chief Party official in the army has stressed repeatedly that the military Party organization's involvement in operational concerns is limited and supportive of the command echelon.<sup>2</sup>

In summary, after World War II the YPA quickly evolved from a revolutionary Partisan army into a professional military establishment. Created by the Communist Party, the YPA has remained effectively subordinated to overall Party control. But the nature of that control has changed; since 1953 it has been exercised "from above," through the command echelon, rather than through commissars posted to each level of the hierarchy. Throughout the postwar period, the YPA has been preoccupied with external security, primarily the real or potential Soviet threat; the intensity of Yugoslav defense preparations has varied in the postwar period proportionate to the Soviet threat. Since the 1960s, the YPA has again become involved in domestic Party-political life, not on its own initiative but at the insistence of Party leaders and Tito himself. The

<sup>1</sup> *Narodna armija*, February 27, 1975.

<sup>2</sup> CG Džemail Šarac, addressing the conference of the military Party organization, *Narodna armija*, May 20, 1976; Šarac, in *Total National Defense in Theory and Practice* (1975), p. 124.

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post-1968 system of "total national defense" has further diluted the former exclusiveness of the YPA, which has endeavored to adapt itself to the forces of political decentralization and national self-affirmation in Yugoslavia while maintaining its institutional integrity.

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### III. A PROFILE OF THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY ELITE

The institutional history of the YPA sketched in the preceding Section provides a context for analyzing the Yugoslav military elite. This Section contains a profile of the 1975 elite and the benchmark 1966 elite. The profile includes age, Party membership, national and regional affinity, origins and education, Partisan War experience, postwar military career, top level career patterns, occupancy of selected posts, and political involvement. As explained in the Introduction (and more fully in Appendix A), this profile is derived from systematic analysis of all available biographic data on officers judged to comprise the respective elites (112 in 1966; 104 in 1975, including 57 of the 1966 cohort). Analysis, qualification, and documentation of the data are contained in Appendix C.

Age. Since 1966, the military elite has aged nearly as much as the intervening number of calendar years, and more so than the Yugoslav political elite. The known median age of the 1975 elite is 55; in contrast, the median age of the 1966 elite was 47.5.

Party Membership. Communist Party membership is a prerequisite for advancement within the military establishment. The present military elite contains significantly fewer prewar "international Communists" and more "Partisan Communists" than the 1966 elite. About 85 percent of the present military elite joined the Party during World War II, and almost all of these in 1941 or 1942; the remaining 15 percent were prewar Party members. Thirty percent of the 1966 elite were prewar Party members, while about 70 percent joined the Party during World War II, principally at the outset of the war.

National and Regional Affinity. As indicated in Fig. 1, the major Yugoslav national groups are approximately proportionally represented in the current military elite. The Serbian proportion of the 1975 elite has declined to a level slightly short of Serbs' 40 percent share in the population as a whole; in 1966 Serbs were slightly overrepresented. Croats remain slightly overrepresented, and Montenegrins remain strongly

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


Fig. 1— Nationality data (percentages rounded)

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overrepresented. The Slav Muslim national representation in the military elite has increased somewhat since 1966 and now approximates Slav Muslims' proportion of the total population. There has been a striking increase in Macedonian representation in the military elite, from 2 percent in 1966 to 7 percent in 1975--a level slightly higher than Macedonians' share in the Yugoslav population. Slovenes remain represented in the military elite at a level approximating their proportion of the total population. Albanians and Hungarians remain grossly underrepresented. *Pričani* Serbs--Serbs from regions of Yugoslavia other than Serbia proper--continue to play a disproportionately large role in the military elite, although their relative numbers have declined since 1966.

All the national groups other than Serbs and Montenegrins are much less well represented in the total officer corps than in the military elite. The percentage of Croats and Slovenes in the officer corps has declined over the postwar period, while the percentage share of other national groups has risen.

Origins and Education. Most Yugoslav military elite members were sons of peasant families. In terms of military experience, a significant "Partisanization" of the military elite has occurred. Ten percent had some experience (other than as conscripts) in the prewar military; one so-called "Spaniard" fought in the International Brigades of the Spanish Civil War. A quarter of the 1966 elite had prewar military experience; 9 were "Spaniards." The trend in military education has been toward greater indigenous training. Nineteen percent of the 1975 elite had some foreign military training, while 32 percent of the counterpart elite of 1966 had such foreign training. The elite has traveled abroad extensively on official business.

Partisan War Experience. The current Yugoslav military elite, like its counterpart of 1966, is comprised primarily of "first fighters," those who entered the Partisan movement at its inception in 1941 and subsequently became the elite of postwar Yugoslavia. They hold the "Partisan Medallion," the politically prestigious sign of an early Partisan. Eighty-five percent of the current elite were recruited into the Party through the Partisan movement; the corresponding figure

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for the 1966 elite was 70 percent, reflecting the larger proportion of prewar Communists.

"Commanders" and "commissars" (as career types) were generally mutually exclusive Partisan career paths. They constituted roughly equal proportions of the 1966 elite; both remain strongly represented in the current elite (the precise relationship is indeterminant). On balance, the 1975 elite saw less senior service in the Partisan War than did the 1966 elite; nearly 30 percent of the latter group held positions above the divisional level, while the corresponding figure for the current elite is about 15 percent.

Yugoslav military elite members fought the Partisan War primarily in their respective native regions of Yugoslavia. The significant exceptions were the Montenegrins, who fought throughout the country.

Postwar Military Career. The 1966 elite was dominated by "commanders," with "mixed commanders-political officers" second, and "political officers" a poor third. The same rank ordering characterizes the 1975 elite (the relative weights are indeterminant).


For most of the postwar period, non-native regional postings were far more common than native regional postings for key members of the regular military. Since 1968, as indicated in Fig. 2, this pattern has been reversed; home regional postings again outnumber non-native regional postings, just as they did during World War II. The addition of key territorial defense officials to the military elite since 1968 (not reflected in Fig. 2) reinforces the trend toward native regional postings. This trend is salient at the military region and subregion headquarters level; 63 percent of the respective subgroup of the 1975 elite serve at home (including all but one of the military regional commanders), while the corresponding percentage for the 1966 elite was 38 percent. Data on divisional headquarters postings, while too sparse to permit definite conclusions, point in the same direction.

Top Level Career Patterns. Commanders dominate the very top of the military establishment; presently the only incumbents with career histories as exclusively political officers are the head of the security (counterintelligence) service, Dane Čuić (an appointment that introduced new blood into that service after the Mišković affair,

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Fig. 2  
NATIVE REGIONAL POSTINGS OF REGULAR MILITARY  
(percentage of regional postings in native regions)



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described in Section V), Ivan Dolničar, the assistant secretary of defense for liaison, whose influence has declined since the early 1970s; and Džemail Šarac, head of the military Party organization. The federal defense secretary, Nikola Ljubičić, and his deputy, Miloš Šumonja, had personal connections with Tito prior to their appointments. The selection of Stane Potočar as the present chief of the general staff was evidently influenced by his Slovene national identity. The third-ranking military man, Djoko Jovanić, was a Partisan commander evidently brought into the defense secretariat to control a security establishment viewed as essential by the political and military leadership but that had threatened to turn against its masters.<sup>1</sup> All other nonpolitical posts have been filled by commanders whose careers consisted of steady progress up the command ladder, with command of military schools an important rung. A latter-day commander is in charge of political affairs in the military, while the chief personnel officer is the former intelligence chief. Among this group, there were four exceptions to a standard six years minimum time in grade for promotion beyond major general; all were for political officers.

At the military region command level, four of the 1975 incumbents had exclusively command careers; one combined intelligence and command posts with a key spot on Tito's staff, and two had more political career histories. Of the latter, one was of a minority (Slav Muslim) nationality; the other has since been replaced by a professional commander. With one exception, all are native sons of the respective region. The appointment of a Croatian Serb as Zagreb military region commander flaunted Croatian national feelings; in contrast, the appointment of a Macedonian to the Skopje military region command was evidently intended to assuage Macedonian national feelings. The only exceptions at this level to a standard six years minimum time in grade were for a political officer and a member of a minority nationality.

Occupancy of Selected Posts. The position of Party Secretary at the military region level has been devalued over the past decade; when the post was last coterminous with political officer, in 1966,

<sup>1</sup>Jovanić was dismissed in early 1977, as explained in Appendix C.

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it was a lieutenant colonel general slot; subsequently it became a major general slot; today it is a colonel slot.<sup>1</sup> The position of political officer at the military region level has remained a lieutenant colonel general post.

Territorial defense posts have been upgraded since they were established in 1968-1969. Some of the republican defense secretaries are now lieutenant colonel generals, whereas formerly they were all major generals. Half of the republican defense commanders are now lieutenant colonel generals, who have strong regional ties. The posts of chief-of-staff of the republican defense staff are occupied by major generals from the respective republic with recent divisional or regimental level command experience.

Political involvement. As indicated in Section II, a group of political generals reemerged in Yugoslavia in the early 1970s; these include a Party Executive Committee Secretary, the Federal Secretary of Internal Affairs, the Public Prosecutor, and the Director of Civilian Aviation. All are concerned in their nonmilitary posts with defense and security-related matters.

The present Party Central Committee contains a larger percentage of military representatives -- ten -- than at any time in the postwar period. Fifteen of the seventeen "military" CC seats are allocated to the military Party organization; the remainder are occupied by military men included in republican Party delegations. This group of military representatives on the Central Committee is comprised primarily of professional commanders and generals occupying government positions, not political officers. At the republican Party level, however, military participation reached its peak in 1969 and has subsequently declined. Other fragmentary indicators point to an expanded but not large role for military men in contemporary political institutions: seven military men are federal assembly delegates; 54 are delegates to republican and provincial assemblies.

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<sup>1</sup>General officer ranks, in descending order, are: General of the Army; Colonel General; Lieutenant Colonel General; Major General.

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IV. OUTLOOK OF THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY ELITE

The preceding Section has drawn a profile of collective background attributes of the Yugoslav military elite. This Section provides an estimate (necessarily partial, since it is based on very limited information) about the outlook, or attitudes on issues, of that elite.

Members of the present Yugoslav military elite, like almost all of their contemporaries, were mobilized into the Partisans during World War II on a platform of patriotic "liberation." More so than its counterpart of ten years ago (which still contained a significant number of prewar Communists), the current military elite was recruited as predominantly peasant youth first to the Partisan movement and then to the Party in 1941 and 1942 on national/patriotic grounds. Chief of the General Staff Stane Potočar has testified that these were his motives in joining the Partisans in 1941.<sup>1</sup> In the subsequent 35 years, as the future military leaders advanced in their primarily command-oriented military careers, they have assimilated the changing values of the Party while developing a fierce loyalty to the Yugoslav state and its unique Communist political system. Granting the influence of more recent experiences on the military elite, appraisal of its outlook today must acknowledge the lasting impact of initial politicization as recruitment to the Party during national catastrophe in the cause of patriotism and Yugoslav integrity.

External Security Concerns

After 1945, the officers comprising the current military elite were occupied professionally with the external security of the new Communist state. Initially inoculated with the Party's perception of a hostile and threatening West, they soon experienced directly the

<sup>1</sup>"... foreigners came [and] acted as if they owned the place. They could decree what we were allowed to do and what we could not . . . national pride asserted itself. There was something else that grieved me a great deal. Our country fell apart as if it had never existed. . . . I never had a chance to fire a single shot." (Interview with CG Stane Potočar, *Večern*, November 27, 1975.)

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high-handed behavior of the Soviet military advisors that so infuriated the senior military and political leadership at the time. In the conflict between Tito and Stalin that broke out in 1948, the officer corps remained generally loyal to Tito, intensive Soviet efforts at subornation notwithstanding. Symptomatically, Yugoslav officers undergoing military training in the USSR in 1948 returned without exception to Yugoslavia. Yet, as noted in Section V, a few high-level defections did occur. And the post-1948 crackdown on "Cominformists" (those suspected of harboring sympathies toward Moscow) included military officers.<sup>1</sup>

After 1949, the members of the present Yugoslav military elite experienced the crisis atmosphere of imminent Soviet military threat -- typically, as division commanders with the rank of colonel or major general. Initiation of the American military assistance program in 1952 exposed a number of Yugoslav officers to the U.S. military. Wary of a repetition of their bad experience with the Soviets, the Yugoslavs insisted on arrangements that limited U.S. military influence on the YPA; the small MAAG permitted in Belgrade generally had to limit its dealings with the YPA to a Counterpart Staff. Nonetheless, in the mid-1950s, the MAAG did have somewhat broader access to the Yugoslav military; several hundred Yugoslav officers, including nine identified members of the present military elite, received advanced training in U.S. military schools,<sup>2</sup> and the YPA was modernized with Western armaments during a period when Yugoslavia felt an active threat of military intervention. On balance, the U.S. military assistance program to Yugoslavia probably had a modestly positive influence on the attitude of Yugoslav officers toward the United States.

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<sup>1</sup>In the heated atmosphere of the time, as Yugoslav leaders have subsequently admitted, many unfounded charges of "Cominformism" were leveled. Intelligence reporting included such charges, some of topical relevance. CG Jovanić, Under Secretary of National Defense, was reportedly arrested in 1948 on suspicion of "Cominformism." This seems unlikely (or else Jovanić must have been fully exonerated); in 1949 he was entrusted with the sensitive task (as first editor of the military journal *Vojno delo*) of purifying Yugoslav military doctrine of Soviet influences. See *Vojno delo*, No. 6, 1973.

<sup>2</sup>DIA IR 6 904 0067 70 (Confidential) contains a partial list.

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In the 1960s, improvement of Soviet-Yugoslav relations resulted in a much reduced perception by Yugoslavs, including presumably the military, of an active military threat to Yugoslavia from the East. Yet resumption of active contacts with the Soviet military was by and large confined to the top of the military structure -- to the "1966 elite" that has substantially been replaced.

Since 1968, as pointed out in Section II, the present military elite has been preoccupied primarily with the Soviet threat--the resumption of military contacts with Soviet bloc countries after 1971 and purchase of advanced Soviet weapons notwithstanding. The institutional indicators of this perception noted in Section II--Yugoslav military doctrine and force deployments--are supported by some intelligence reporting and other private comments of Yugoslav military figures to Westerners.<sup>1</sup> There is no evidence that this threat perception is disputed within the YPA, although differences have probably occurred on the tactics of dealing with the Soviet military (see Section V).

To be sure, Yugoslav generals, like other Yugoslav leaders, are not concerned exclusively with threats to Yugoslavia from the East. They are concerned with present emigré terrorist threats to the country from the West; with potentially more substantial future threats related to territorial disputes with their Western neighbors; and with the specter of intervention by either Great Power to deny control of Yugoslavia to the other. The outlook of Yugoslav generals is not comparable to that of defense officials in Sweden or Switzerland; they cannot be imputed with a perception that the West has purely benign intentions toward Yugoslavia and its Communist system. The fact remains that the only active military threat that the Yugoslav military elite has ever faced -- directly in 1949-1954 and indirectly in 1968 -- has been from the Soviet Union. Predominant concern with the Soviet military

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<sup>1</sup>Including Ljubičić's comments on the Soviet threat to former Assistant Secretary of Defense Ellsworth (American Embassy Belgrade Cable 6254, December 1974, Confidential/Executive Distribution); Johnson (1975).

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threat evidently characterizes the outlook of the Yugoslav military today. There is no indication of "pro-Soviet" sentiment (meaning a desire to realign Yugoslavia with the USSR) among the present Yugoslav military elite or the officer corps as a whole. None of the intra-military conflicts of the past decade (traced in Section V) involved relations with the USSR (or the West); indeed, not since the late 1940s has a "pro-Soviet" Yugoslav military officer been identified.<sup>1</sup>

#### DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONCERNS

External security concerns have preoccupied the Yugoslav military elite over the past thirty years; it has become involved in domestic political affairs only in the last decade. The isolation of the YPA from the mainstream of Yugoslav political life in the 1950s and early 1960s (noted in Section II) meant the insulation of the officer corps from internal issues. The "opening to society" forced on the military by Party reformers after 1966 dramatically increased interaction between military officers and other Yugoslav social and political groups. As noted earlier, officers began to participate in the affairs of local communities in which they were stationed. Reorganization of the Party apparatus in the military, aimed in part at contributing to reintegration of the Army with the rest of Yugoslav society, went unchallenged; one indicator of its acceptance by the officer corps was the reported results of an internal Army opinion poll of 1968, which indicated overwhelming support for a larger role for the military Party organization.<sup>2</sup>

As the military institution was reintegrated into public life, the military leadership accepted the program of socioeconomic and political reforms, including greater affirmation of national rights, adopted by the Party leadership in the latter half of the 1960s. The

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<sup>1</sup>Intelligence reports (like public analyses inside and outside of Yugoslavia) have sometimes included the appellation "pro-Soviet" (just as the term "pro-West"). Reports ascribing *both* orientations to a number of individuals in the present military elite were reviewed in the course of this study. In the absence of details of attitudes on specific issues, or other additional evidence, the analyst must disregard these appellations.

<sup>2</sup>See Appendix D.

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reforms were supported by top leaders in public statements and by the Party organization in the Army in a series of conferences. That this public support was not pro forma, but reflected broad acceptance of the reforms among the military, qualified by reservations about increased nationalism, was indicated by the reported results of an internal opinion poll of May 1971.<sup>1</sup> This poll (conducted at the height of the movement for greater national affirmation in Croatia) indicated less than five percent of the sample clearly opposed to the main lines of the reform (and its components of political decentralization to the republics and greater national affirmation in particular), but the majority concerned with the degree of prominence the "national question" was then receiving. Seventy-two percent of the "higher officers" thought the national question had been overemphasized in the public discussion of the Constitutional Amendments of 1971; 54 percent considered "nationalism and chauvinism" the greatest single present danger to Yugoslavia.<sup>2</sup> The 1971 poll thus indicated a qualifiedly "loyalist" majority within the military (whose apprehensions about the rise of nationalism were a harbinger of the shift in Party policy in late 1971) and a minority undercurrent of opinion at odds with Party policy, then and subsequently, on the basic direction of reforms. The existence of an undercurrent of dissent advocating "hard-line" and neo-centrist policies is further corroborated by critiques of such unorthodox views leveled at the time by top military leaders.<sup>3</sup> There is no indication that this latter current was signifi-

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix D.

<sup>2</sup>The poll results grouped Slovene officers with Montenegrin and Serbian officers as most concerned with nationalism; (but Slovene officers most concerned with economic issues); Croatian and Macedonian officers were least concerned.

<sup>3</sup>A document of the military Party organization (published as a supplement to *Narodna armija*, May 13, 1970) referred to "individual" misunderstandings of the reform measures and took issue with the following unorthodox views within the military: that "state capital" should not be returned to the economy (i.e., economic liberalization should not proceed further); that devolution of greater powers to the republics weakened the Yugoslav federation; that no language reform (i.e., more use of languages other than Serbian) in the Army was needed; that "we are all Yugoslavs" (i.e., that national self-affirmation of individual ethnic groups was not needed); that republican territorial defense headquarters were unnecessary.

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cantly stronger in the military than in other Yugoslav groups.<sup>1</sup>

Subsequent developments (outlined in Section V) and retrospective comments by Yugoslav military leaders critical of nationalism in the YPA indicated the existence of an opposite and even weaker undercurrent of dissident "nationalist" viewpoints.

Reemphasis on the custodial role of the military in the domestic semi-crisis of 1971-1972 encouraged the expression of the concern felt earlier within the military about the negative security implications of the rise of nationalism and, more broadly, the lack of discipline in Yugoslav society at the turn of the 1970s. Apprehension about the negative impact of these developments was indicated in numerous statements by military leaders to the effect that lack of discipline in Yugoslav society was sapping the country's defense strength.<sup>2</sup> Concern of the military elite on this score was reinforced by a threat to the institutional integrity of the YPA itself from extreme nationalist elements in the Party. The military leaders' concerns on these matters were expressed frankly in the fall of 1972 by Defense Secretary Ljubičić, who emphasized the need for "more order, personal and social responsibility, and equity" in Yugoslavia and reiterated -- after Tito had dropped the subject -- the fact of the YPA's domestic as well as external security role.<sup>3</sup> But it is important to note that in this atmosphere of domestic semi-crisis no military figure claimed a domestic role for the military independent of the Party. In his frank statement just cited, Ljubičić placed unusual emphasis on the role of the Party, affirming that the Army "was a part of the self-management system *and the Party* (emphasis added)." Under Secretary of Defense Jovanić made a similar retrospective claim about his own efforts in the Croatian crisis of 1971, which, he said,

<sup>1</sup>For example, an opinion poll of the Croatian population at large in 1969 indicated five percent believed that "socialism was possible without self-management" (an unorthodox view implying acceptance of a centralized Communist system). See Denitch (1976), p. 88.

<sup>2</sup>For example, the statement of military Party Secretary Šarac, *Borba*, January 22, 1972.

<sup>3</sup>Speech of November 15, 1972, to the Army Party organization, *Vojno delo*, No. 1, 1973 (key points omitted in general media coverage).

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were directed toward strengthening the role of the Croatian Party organization.<sup>1</sup>

Since 1971-1972, as noted in Section II, the military elite has continued to adapt itself to the greater self-assertion of Yugoslavia's constituent national groups. In terms of outlook, the apex of the military leadership may still think of itself as an all-Yugoslav grouping that can function without regard to its national composition.<sup>2</sup> But even if supranational impulses survive, the Yugoslav military elite is clearly aware of the sensitivity of the national issue. It is constrained on such military matters as regional posting policies by the multinational federalized political system of which it is a part. Today it acts as if greater scope for national affirmation within the YPA were essential to the functioning of the military institution. Moreover, it recognizes the crucial symbolic importance for the functioning of the Yugoslav political system of respect for national affirmation within the YPA.

The "hardline" dissident political undercurrents within the YPA at the turn of the 1970s were related to and in many cases doubtless derived from reservations held by minority elements of the officer corps about the post-1968 system of total national defense, with its major emphasis on the role of territorial defense forces. What evidence there is, including the reported results of internal YPA opinion polls, indicates overwhelming acceptance of the system of "total national defense"; the polls and the critical comments of senior military figures suggest again the existence of "technocratic" (i.e., status quo 1965) and "nationalist" (i.e., favoring--at the extreme--republican armies) undercurrents within the officer corps.<sup>3</sup> But the available evidence indicates full backing for the system of total national defense by the military elite once a top-level intramilitary dispute over the desirability and efficacy of relying heavily on territorial defense forces (outlined in Section V) had been resolved by Tito in 1967-1968.

<sup>1</sup> *Narodna armija*, July 1, 1976.

<sup>2</sup> As argued in Denitch (1976), p. 116.

<sup>3</sup> General Lončarević, addressing the Serbian Party Central Committee, Tanjug, June 30, 1972; poll results in *Narodna armija*, December 7, 1972; May 20, 1976.

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It is testimony to the continued influence of the Partisan past, the flexibility of outlook of the YPA senior officer corps, and the YPA's responsiveness to Party policy and Tito personally that the Yugoslav military evidently adapted to the system of total national defense without much friction.

In sum, the outlook of the Yugoslav military elite remains strongly influenced by elite members' first adult experiences in the cause of maintaining an integral Yugoslav state. Assimilating the changing values of the Party, they have developed a strong loyalty to the Yugoslav state and the Yugoslav Communist political system. The military elite remains principally concerned with the external, primarily Soviet, threat to Yugoslavia. Following the domestic political turmoil of 1971-1972, it has reemphasized its mission to protect, as servant of the Party, the integrity of the Yugoslav Communist system and Yugoslav state against domestic as well as external challenges. The military elite recognizes the crucial importance of respecting national rights within the YPA for the functioning of both the military institution and the political system of which it is a part. It is committed to a broadly-based system of "total national defense" that has created a symbiotic relationship between the military institution and Yugoslav society as a whole. It is in these terms, insofar as one can judge, that the Yugoslav military elite contemplates the future.

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V. INTRA-ELITE TENSIONS

Throughout its postwar history, the Yugoslav military establishment has appeared to be a remarkably cohesive institution adapting to Yugoslavia's rapidly changing internal and external environment without trauma. But since the military has remained a closed institution, it is possible that stability has been a surface phenomenon masking internal cleavages. It may be recalled that a few top-level military men, most prominently the wartime chief-of-staff, General Arso Jovanović, and a deputy head of the political administration, General Branko Petričević, did oppose Tito in the 1948 confrontation with Stalin; Jovanović was shot attempting to flee the country along with Petričević and one of the latter's subordinates, Colonel Vlado Dapčević. While no other instances of such dramatic opposition within the military have come to light, there is enough evidence, albeit fragmentary, to indicate the presence beneath the surface of repeated controversies on matters of issue and personality -- the norm, it is assumed, of any institution.

This Section draws on the evidence available in public and intelligence reports to review the major controversies within the Yugoslav military elite that have come to light in the last decade. Reported personal associations have been checked against career background information for any indication of common wartime service or postwar posting patterns. The aim is not to reconstruct complete histories of the disputes, but rather to highlight salient personalities, organizations, and issues that have influenced the development of the military elite. Six such controversies will be reviewed.

The Milojević Affair

In 1966, CG Miloje Milojević was removed from his post as commander of the Belgrade military region, retired from active service, and expelled from the Party. The cause of his disgrace was plausibly reported to have been a "Serbian nationalist" attitude that, inter alia, led him to accuse Defense Secretary Gošnjak of discriminating against Serbs in appointments to senior military posts and allocating defense-related

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economic resources among the various Yugoslav republics.<sup>1</sup> Milojević was linked in reports of the time with General Kreačić (long-time senior Party official in the Army) and Party Secretary Ranković himself; no further confirmation of these associations has been found. What is clear is that Milojević fell from grace; he disappeared from public view, was inaccessible to foreign military figures who had known him during World War II, and was later included in some of the lists of putative dissident "conservatives" within the military.

#### The Gošnjak and Hamović Controversies

In the fall of 1967, Army General Ivan Gošnjak gave up the post of State Secretary of Defense he had held since 1953. His replacement was a normal function of his age (then 58) and his long tenure; "rotation of positions" became a watchword of Yugoslav political life in the late 1960s. Nonetheless, Gošnjak was evidently on the losing side in a debate within the military establishment in 1966 on the proper defense strategy and organization appropriate to Yugoslavia's circumstances in the mid-1960s. Gošnjak evidently opposed abandonment of a large standing army and stricter separation of Party from military positions within the YPA advocated by his opponents.<sup>2</sup> Yet he evidently avoided letting the debate be turned into a confrontation, and in 1967 he shifted to inactive status without disgrace. Gošnjak was reportedly in disfavor in the fall of 1968; as if to deny such allegations, Tito made a point of being seen with him in late 1968.<sup>3</sup> Retained thereafter on inactive status, Gošnjak formally retired with full honors in 1974 at age 65.

The withdrawal from active service of CG Rade Hamović, Chief of the General Staff under Gošnjak from 1961 to 1967, proceeded less auspiciously. Having sided with the proponents of a smaller standing army and stricter separation of Party and military posts, Hamović was nevertheless replaced

<sup>1</sup>Embassy Belgrade A-872, April 29, 1966, Confidential; DIA IR 2904021366, Confidential, NOFORN.

<sup>2</sup>Embassy Belgrade A-864, June 19, 1967,

<sup>3</sup>Embassy Belgrade A-1131, December 12, 1968, Secret.

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as Chief of the General Staff by Miloš Šumonja in the fall of 1967. He was appointed Inspector General, a transfer that may be viewed as a normal consequence of completing his six-year term in the context of the day, when rotation of leading personnel was strictly observed. It is possible, however, that Hamovič's position was weakened in 1966 as a consequence of the "Milojevič affair." It is also possible, in view of his reported views of 1968, that Hamovič's transfer in 1967 was related to opposition to territorial defense forces, the organization of which had been suggested in the context of a low-key public discussion in 1966-1967 on a new national defense law.

Impetus for the establishment of territorial defense forces appears to have come primarily from the Croatian Party leadership and Croatian generals; at the end of 1967 the Croatian Premier hinted at the desirability of a territorial militia; a year earlier Army General Ivan Rukavina, then commander of the Zagreb military region, made a public proposal to this effect.<sup>1</sup> By one informed account, the Rukavina proposal set off a subterranean debate within the defense and political establishments on the proper organization of the defense system. In the fall of 1967, CG Ante Banina, a veteran commander who was then the Secretary of the military Party organization, advocated a more conventional doctrine of "dynamic defense" as a counterproposal to the Rukavina initiative. The debate continued into 1968 and was apparently resolved only by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which led to top-level acceptance of territorial forces, as part of the "total national defense" system.<sup>2</sup>

Whatever the motivation for Hamovič's 1967 transfer, in the fall of 1968 he was unceremoniously removed from his post as Inspector General and retired; he was plausibly reported to have opposed the adoption of the system of "total national defense" at a meeting of the

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<sup>1</sup>Savka Dabčević-Kučar, interviewed in *Narodna armija*, December 29, 1967; interview of General Rukavina in *Vjesnik*, December 21, 1966.

<sup>2</sup>See Johnson (1971).

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National Defense Council.<sup>1</sup> Assuming this was indeed the issue, Hamović's opposition must have been strong; unlike Gošnjak, he subsequently disappeared completely from public view.

#### The Military in Croatia; Target of Nationalists

In 1970-1971, as noted earlier, the republican Party leadership in Croatia first led and then increasingly became captives of a Croatian nationalist movement, one section of which took on a chauvinist, anti-Serb tone. The swelling Croatian nationalist movement demanded, inter alia, greater prerogatives for Croats in defense matters. Croatian leaders were concerned about the influence of the still Serb-dominated regular military in Croatia; this situation had worsened, in their view, with the replacement of General Ivan Rukavina by General Djoko Jovanić as head of the Zagreb military region in 1967; Jovanić was a Serb from Croatia, whereas Rukavina was a Croat who had occupied the Zagreb command since 1961. Extreme nationalists raised demands for a Croatian national army.<sup>2</sup>

Croat leaders were also concerned with the negative influence on Party politics in Croatia of "conservative" retired generals; on this latter score they received support from Tito himself. In May 1971 Tito publicly condemned (unnamed) "retired generals" for adopting "conservative" positions;<sup>3</sup> at a meeting with senior military leaders later in the month, he reportedly singled out Generals Milojević and Hamović, along with several others, for censure. Tito's criticism notwithstanding, "conservative" retired officers, including Generals Nikola Vidović, Josip Antolković, and Rade Bulat (retired 1970), continued their political opposition to the Croatian Party leadership; they were joined by CG Radojica Nenezić (not yet

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<sup>1</sup>Embassy Belgrade A-1131, December 12, 1968, Secret.

<sup>2</sup>Accounts of these developments are contained in Rusinow (1972); Lendvai (1972); *The Political Role of the Yugoslav Military* (1975).

<sup>3</sup>Tito speech of May 8, 1971, as broadcast by Radio Belgrade.

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officially retired). These former military figures acted through or received support from some local veterans organizations and were opposed by other local veterans groups, as the Croatian republican veterans organization split between supporters and opponents of the more liberal and nationalist policies of the Croatian Party leadership. The split was primarily (although not exclusively) along national, Serb-Croat lines; it was personified in conflict between the president of the republican veterans organization, Ivan Šibl (a Croat) and its vice president, Pero Car (a Serb from Croatia).<sup>1</sup>

Djoko Jovanić, the commander of the Zagreb military region, became centrally involved in the Croatian political events of 1970-1971. Jovanić was, as noted, a Serb from Croatia who had maintained strong ties with his native Lika region, in which he had been a principal organizer of the Partisan movement in 1941. Publicly endorsing the cause of republican self-affirmation, Jovanić nonetheless took a strong public stand in defense of the Serbian minority in Croatia, thus entering the political lists on behalf of the Croatian Serbs who saw the Croatian national movement as a direct threat to the Serbs of that republic.<sup>2</sup> One of his recently retired subordinates, Rade Bulat, took a much stronger stand (and as a result was expelled from the Croatian Party Central Committee by its post-1971 leadership for Serbian nationalism).

It was in this context that the Party leadership in Zagreb sought to have Jovanić replaced by his chief-of-staff, Janko Bobetko, a Croat. Bobetko enlisted himself sufficiently in the Croatian cause to be immediately suspended from active duty by Tito when he cracked down on the Croatian Party leadership in December 1971; subsequently he was separated from the military, expelled from the Party, and disappeared from public view. Only one other general, Vlado Mutak (then in the Split military region headquarters) is known to have incurred similarly severe

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<sup>1</sup>Details on the activities of the retired generals and the conflict within the Croatian veterans organization are given in ["New Battles of the Old Fighters,"] *NIN*, September 20, 1971.

<sup>2</sup>Speech to the Zagreb garrison, April 27, 1971; speech in Lika of July 27, 1971.

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penalties, but a number of other officers were expelled from the Party for Croat nationalist attitudes.<sup>1</sup> The Croatian republican defense command, thoroughly politicized in 1971, was likewise purged.<sup>2</sup>

### The Mišković Affair<sup>3</sup>

CG Ivan Mišković was appointed Tito's special advisor for security affairs in the fall of 1971, in evident response to top-level concern with external and internal threats to the Yugoslav political system, particularly from emigré groups. Mišković was the logical candidate for this position; a career military counterintelligence officer, he had headed the military counterintelligence service (KOS) since 1963 (he had been deputy head since 1955). He had served Tito well in 1966 in monitoring the activities of Party Secretary Ranković, who was purged that year for opposition to the reforms of the mid-1960s. As Tito's security advisor, Mišković amassed great power. Although he vacated his position as head of KOS, his continued influence over that service was assured; Mišković's successor, Stijepan Domankušić, had long been his protege. Like Mišković, Domankušić was a Croat from Slavonia (Eastern Croatia) who served with him in the political section of the Sixth Corps in 1944 and who subsequently followed a career in KOS, culminating in his appointment by 1968 (perhaps earlier) as Mišković's deputy. Mišković in fact supervised the entire security establishment, filtered information reaching Tito, and increasingly controlled access to Tito by the latter's trusted associates. He utilized his position as a platform from which to lobby for influence in his native Slavonia

<sup>1</sup>The ranks of the extreme nationalists included one retired general officer, Franjo Tujman, who was subsequently imprisoned. Mutak was reported by emigre sources to have been imprisoned (*Hrvatski glas*, Winnepeg, July 9, 1975). In the Split military region, six officers were expelled from the Party and 66 reprimanded for nationalist sentiments (*Borba*, March 18, 1972); no comparable figures for the Zagreb military region are available.

<sup>2</sup>Mate Bilobrk replaced Srećko Manola as territorial defense commander in Zagreb; his subordinate in Zadar, Major General Livas, was likewise ousted (Radio Zagreb, March 21, 1972); the republican Defense Council was reshuffled.

<sup>3</sup>A reconstruction and interpretation is contained in *The Political Role of the Yugoslav Military* (1975), pp. 29-33.

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among veterans, including retired officers, Party officials, and active officers.<sup>1</sup>

Mišković's roots in Slavonia were deep; a Croat born in Pula (on the Croatian coast), he had been a Communist youth leader in Slavonia on the eve of World War II and an organizer of the Partisan movement in the region. He spent most of the war in that region as a commissar, occupying political posts with the Sixth Corps and the Third Army at the end of the war. Mišković's continued ties with the Slavonian region in the 1960s were indicated by his representation of the region as a delegate to the Federal Assembly and his publication in Slavonski Brod (the regional center) of several studies of the Partisan movement in Slavonia.

Mišković's political "platform" is obscure; judging by his career, his public statements, and his associates, he advocated greater vigilance against external, particularly emigre threats<sup>2</sup> and a "firmer hand" internally to protect the existing system against its many real or imagined enemies.

Mišković's political demise in mid-1973 was sudden. Tito removed him from his position, and the catalyst was evidently intervention with Tito not by the senior Party leaders whose access to Tito Mišković was restricting, but from the senior military leadership. Mišković's "out of channels" lobbying among regular military personnel was probably the final straw for Ljubičić and other senior military leaders, who saw in Mišković the specter of a reversion to the pre-1953 situation, when KOS assisted the commissars in dominating the command structure of the military establishment.<sup>3</sup> Mišković left his post unannounced, has not been publicly mentioned since, and was last reported in a "study group" in the Defense Secretariat -- a device, presumably, for keeping him out of the way yet under control.

<sup>1</sup>Details are cited in *The Political Role of the Yugoslav Military* (1975).

<sup>2</sup>His public statements after 1971 were sometimes sharply anti-Western, yet prior to that year he had made equally "anti-Soviet" statements, and no sympathies toward Moscow can be assumed.

<sup>3</sup>One source claims the top military leadership appealed in a letter to Tito for Mišković's removal (Embassy Belgrade 2917, June 1973, Confidential).

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Following Mišković's dismissal, the military and the Croatian Party leadership attempted to repair the damage he had done in Slavonia. Defense Secretary Ljubičić and Chief of the General Staff Potočar made a special trip to the Osijek garrison in the summer of 1973; subsequently, as described in Appendix C, counterintelligence responsibilities were concentrated in the hands of a veteran commander and his protege within the Defense Secretariat itself, an arrangement presumably designed to provide an institutional barrier against another top official with security responsibilities getting out of control -- as had happened with Mišković and, earlier, with Party Secretary Aleksandar Ranković. The Croatian Party leadership issued a strong public attack against dissident conservative elements at the end of June; privately, it intensified its efforts to neutralize the group of retired military officers in Croatia that had opposed the Croatian national upsurge in 1971 from positions that were conservative in the Yugoslav political environment of 1973 as well as 1971. As indicated in the following subsection, this group, joined by a few active general officers, had evidently sympathized with and perhaps actively aligned themselves with Mišković.

#### Opposition of the Slavonian Generals: Postscript to the Mišković Affair

In 1974, three senior general officers, LCG Mirko Bulović, CG Radojica Nenezić, and CG Otmar Kreačić, were, according to a number of reports, removed from their military positions and expelled from the LCY for oppositional activities. Bulović, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence prior to 1970, was at the time Commander of the Ground Forces Command and Staff School in Belgrade. Nenezić's last major line post had been command of the Skopje military region prior to 1967; that year he had transferred to the Defense Secretariat where he was a member of the Officer Promotion Board in 1969 and reported in the Studies Department, i.e., semi-retired, in 1973. Kreačić, the most prominent of the three, had been Under Secretary of Defense with responsibility for political affairs and security (hence, Mišković's superior) and chief Party official in the Army in the early 1960s. In 1965 he reportedly clashed with Defense Secretary Gošnjak and transferred to the Party

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Secretariat, where he had responsibilities for personnel policy under Ranković. By 1968 he had returned to the Defense Secretariat and in 1973 was still there, semi-retired but in good standing.<sup>1</sup>

It is established that the three generals incurred severe sanctions; none has been mentioned publicly (or privately to Westerners) by official Yugoslav sources since early 1974. The precise reason for their disgrace is, however, less clear. They were alleged in various reports to have taken a "pro-Soviet" line, to have criticized Tito's wife for her role in officer promotions, and to have criticized Defense Secretary Ljubičić and Army Party Secretary Šarac for mishandling the Mišković affair. There is no further evidence corroborating the first two accounts; the third is most plausible, for the three generals had ties with Mišković derived from their common past in Slavonia. Bulović, a Serb and native of Slavonia, was a Partisan commissar (probably in Slavonia).<sup>2</sup> Nenezić came from a Montenegrin family that had moved to Slavonia; he fought in the area during World War II as a Partisan commander, was promoted to chief-of-staff of the Sixth Corps in 1944 and commander of the 28th Division (forerunner of the Osijek garrison) at the end of the war. In the late 1960s Nenezić was active in Slavonian politics; in 1971, as recounted earlier in this Section, he joined forces with several retired general officers in opposing the Croatian national revival from "conservative" positions. This activity resulted in his being publicly criticized in Croatia in July 1971 for his "political behavior" in Osijek.<sup>3</sup> Kreačić, a Croat, had lived in Osijek prior to World War II and had spent the last part of the war in Slavonia, serving as Political Commissar of the 12th Division and the Sixth Corps.

<sup>1</sup>He received a military decoration in December 1973.

<sup>2</sup>His Partisan career could not be traced in detail.

<sup>3</sup>*NIN*, September 20, 1971.

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In mid-1944, then, Kreačić was Commissar of the Sixth Corps, Mišković and Domankušić were among his subordinates, and Nenezić was chief-of-staff. Mišković, Nenezić, and Kreačić are all known to have been politically active in Slavonia in the late 1960s. The career paths of Bulović and Mišković had converged repeatedly; Bulović evidently began his postwar career in KOS, was at the High Military Academy with Mišković in 1953, and from 1960 to 1970 was in the intelligence section of the General Staff, heading that section as Assistant Chief-of-Staff after 1965 (a post in which he would have had constant contact with Mišković). Sharing a common past and common reservations about the political reforms of the late 1960s, Bulović, Kreačić, and Nenezić evidently rallied, belatedly, to Mišković's defense. However, the timing and objective of their action remain unexplained.

#### The Military in Croatia: Target of Conservatives

The disgrace of the Slavonian generals was apparently part and parcel of a campaign mounted from both Belgrade and Zagreb in 1974 to stop the meddling with the regular military in Croatia by "conservative" politicians and retired military officers, who utilized the republican veterans organization as their institutional base. The reports about this campaign point to Pero Car as the most prominent politician involved.<sup>1</sup> As noted earlier in this section, following Tito's crackdown on the Croatian Party leadership in the fall of 1971 Car assumed leadership of the republican veterans organization. He was reportedly an associate of General Nenezić, a linkage traceable, again, to Slavonia; Car also served under Kreačić as assistant commissar of the 12th Division at the end of the war. Several of the retired officers politically prominent in 1971 were linked with Car in reports of attempts to influence the regular military in 1972-1973.

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<sup>1</sup>Car made the strongest public attack on nationalist penetration of the military in Croatia, *Vjesnik*, March 29, 1972.

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Protection of the regular military stationed in Croatia against such "conservative" outside influences was in the interest of the post-1971 Croatian Party leadership, which was engaged in a series of political skirmishes with this dissident element. As noted in Section II and earlier in this Section, a "conservative" political current surfaced in the political turmoil of 1971-1972; its principal exponents were officials (including retired generals) deprived of their positions prior to 1969 acting through local organizations of the veterans organization, in particular in the Slavonian region of Croatia (especially the local organization in Osijek), and in Vojvodina.

The post-1971 Party leadership in Zagreb sought to contain this political current that was deviant both because it was more "conservative" than the orthodox policies of consolidation of the day and because it developed autonomously, outside Party channels. The Osijek veterans organization was criticized by the Croatian Party Central Committee in March 1973 for advocating "hardline" policies; in May its embattled president, Boško Kajganić, was expelled from the Party for "factionalism" and accused of tolerating Serb nationalism; in June the Croatian Party mobilized the Croatian reserve officers organization, and its president, Reserve CG Milan Kuprešćanin, criticized the "hardliners." Enjoying continued support from the republican veterans organization headed by Car, the Osijek veteran organization leadership held out until December 1973; although Mišković had been removed in the spring, the Osijek veterans may have received support from the "Slavonian generals." One member of the Osijek veterans leadership was reserve MG Rade Knežević, himself a "Slavonian general."<sup>1</sup> Then in December 1973 the Croatian Party succeeded in forcing the removal of the entire Osijek veterans organization leadership.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Knežević fought the Partisan War in Slavonia and was for a time acting commander of the 12th Division.

<sup>2</sup>Reconstructed from numerous Yugoslav press accounts.

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In early 1974, as noted in Section II, Croatia's senior political figure, Vladimir Bakarić, was instrumental in launching a general political counteroffensive against the "conservative" political element in Yugoslavia; Croatian Party leader Jure Bilić explicitly accused the "faction" of exerting pressure through parts of the veterans organization to recreate a "centralist state" pursuing a "firm hand" policy.<sup>1</sup> The "conservative" political current was successfully contained; and there have been no further reports of "conservative" activism in Croatia targeted against the military. On the other hand (many reported predictions to the contrary notwithstanding) Car has managed to retain his post as head of the Croatian veterans organization.

The stake of the Croatian Party leadership in stopping the "lobbying" among the regular military by "conservative" elements in Croatia was matched by the interest of the high command in terminating this "outside" meddling in military affairs. Ljubičić reportedly made a special tour through Croatia sometime after Mišković's ouster for this purpose.

Containing the "conservative" element in Croatia that had lobbied among the regular military along with other groups, the Croatian Party leadership sought to improve relations with the regional military command in Zagreb. For that leadership, demonstrably improved Party-military relations in Zagreb would have the effect of further discouraging "conservative" elements from seeking to influence the regular military in Croatia.<sup>2</sup> During 1974 a series of meetings between the top Croatian Party leadership and the Zagreb military region command (headed by Jovanić until October 1974, when he was replaced by LCG Dusan Čorković, another Serb from Croatia) were publicized. These meetings were evidently intended as a demonstration that the earlier mutual antipathy between

<sup>1</sup> *Politika*, February 10, 1974.

<sup>2</sup> It is important to note that the Osijek garrison, a principal target of this lobbying, was subordinated to the military region headquarters in Sarajevo, not Zagreb.

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the Party and the army in Zagreb had been eliminated. In fact, tensions remained; the Croatian Party leadership had reportedly not included Čorković on its list of candidates for Jovanić's replacement and was unhappy with his appointment. There is some evidence of subsequent conflict between the Party and the military in Zagreb on other issues. Nonetheless, the visible tension between the two institutions that had existed in 1971 was overcome. Moreover, joint efforts were made to reduce the hostility many Croats felt toward the regular military stationed in Croatia, which they regarded as Serb dominated. In December 1974 Croatian Party leader Dusan Dragosavac (also a Croatian Serb) and General Čorković met with a number of prominent inactive or retired Croatian generals who had been kept at arms length since 1971 for putative identification with the Croatian nationalist cause<sup>1</sup> and reportedly invited them to involve themselves again in military affairs. Among them were Army General Ivan Rukavina (one of the "fathers" of the territorial defense system) and CG Srećko Manola, former commander of the Croatian Defense Headquarters, who had been removed in early 1972 for identifying himself too closely with the Croatian nationalist cause.

#### Recapitulation of Intra-Elite Disputes

Several points emerge from this review of known cases of significant cleavages within the Yugoslav military establishment in the past decade. Opposition to prevailing policies or leaders has been on internal grounds; there is no known case in this period (indeed none since the late 1940s) where foreign policy issues, and in particular the attitude toward Moscow, have constituted a basis for contention within the Yugoslav military elite. There is no indication of pro-Soviet sentiment within the military elite, even as a fringe phenomenon.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Radio Belgrade, December 10, 1974.

<sup>2</sup>This judgment is based on consideration of all available evidence, including a spate of intelligence reports in the early 1970s imputing "pro-Soviet" sympathies to a number of senior Yugoslav officers. The appellation "pro-Soviet" is, as indicated in footnote 1 on page 30, a common bugabear in public and private Yugoslav political discourse and, taken alone, an insufficient indicator of pro-Soviet sympathies. In these

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The cases reviewed indicate differences of view on military issues related to the proper organization of defense and on political issues related to the contours of the political system as a whole. National differences have played a role, explicitly in the Milojević affair and explicitly and implicitly in the Croatian-related cases since the late 1960s. Intramilitary institutional cleavages were prominent in the Mišković and related cases, when a threat from the counterintelligence service to top military (and Party) leaders was blunted. The role of World War II ties as a basis for personal loyalties is confirmed in the latter cases. Also evident in those cases were efforts to form a "conservative" faction; this was a threat to, not a policy succored by, the apex of the military establishment. Extreme "conservatives" among politicians, veterans, and retired officers in Croatia, in particular, have been challengers to, not political surrogates of, the military establishment. Most important, the cleavages have been contained with relative ease. Beneath the surface, the Yugoslav military, like any group, has experienced internal divisions, but these have not undermined fundamental cohesion.

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reports, "pro-Soviet" is one of many terms of opprobrium describing the same set of individuals. In the cases of the "Slavonian generals" (Bulović, Kreačić, and Nenezić) and the "conservative" retired generals privately criticized by Tito in 1971, there are alternative explanations for the behavior of the individuals in question.

Differences in the tactics of dealing with the Soviets (as the United States) presumably do arise within the Yugoslav military leadership. Such differences reportedly occurred over the overflight rights extended to the USSR during the 1973 Middle East War, just as in 1967, at Egyptian request. (Canadian Embassy Belgrade, 6/012/0325/74, Confidential); i.e., some senior officers opposed the arrangements made. More fundamentally, a number of top-level military leaders were reliably reported to have opposed Tito's effort between 1971 and 1974 to suppress public discussion of contentious issues in Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

It may be speculated that similar diverging viewpoints exist over the naval repair facilities utilized by the Soviets in recent years (but offered on the same terms to other countries). Differences may also exist over the tactics of dealing with Soviet requests (reportedly renewed during Brezhnev's November 1976 visit to Yugoslavia) for permanent base and overflight rights, although there is no evidence of this. (On the other hand, reports that earlier Defense Secretary Ljubičić favored "base" rights for the Soviet Navy are incredible, given context and subsequent developments.)

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Intra-Elite Groupings

This review of past cleavages within the Yugoslav military provides some indication of the likely nature of present and future personal groupings. Such groupings may again coalesce on organizational-functional grounds, although there is no evidence of this at present. Moreover, the likelihood of intra-elite differentiation on this basis would seem to be reduced by the professional commanders' domination of the military institutions. For example, the emergence of a grouping of "political officers" or "security officers" lobbying for particular policies within the military does not seem likely.

On the other hand, association of military elite members on the basis of common nationality and common Partisan War experience (particularly both together) is certain to continue. The "Slavonians" were presumably eliminated as an active intra-elite grouping with the purge of Generals Mišković, Bulović, Kreačić, and Nenezić.<sup>1</sup> But the "Lika Serbs" from central Croatia (complemented by a few Croats from that region) remained an active grouping.<sup>2</sup> This grouping included Miloš Šumonja, Deputy Defense Secretary; Djoko Jovanić, Defense Undersecretary; Dušan Pekić, Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Ground Forces; Ilija Radaković, Assistant Chief of the General Staff for Operations; Stevan Ilić, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations; Simo Mikasinović, Assistant Chief of Staff for Organization and Mobilization; Dušan Čorković, commander of the Zagreb military region; and Veljko Miladinović, Party Secretary in the FSND. Two Croats should be added to this list of Croatian Serbs: Dane Čuić, head of the military security service; and Marko Rapo, Tito's military assistant. All fought the Partisan War in their native region of Croatia; Čuić was, as noted earlier, Jovanić's political commissar at the end of the war; Jovanić and Radaković had personal ties in 1941;<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The only remaining members of the 1975 elite having identifiable ties with Slavonia are Milan Joka, assistant commander in the Belgrade military region, and Djako Puać, commander of the Belgrade garrison.

<sup>2</sup>More precisely, Serbs from the Lika, Kordun, and Baranje areas of central and southwest Croatia.

<sup>3</sup>Jovanić interview, *Narodna armija*, July 1, 1976.

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and Šumonja and Mikasinović fought in the same units throughout the war. It is noteworthy that Pekić, Radaković, and Ilić constitute the present operational top command of the ground forces. There is clear evidence that the "Lika Serbs" are an active grouping; its members travel frequently back to Lika for ceremonial occasions and meet together in Belgrade.<sup>1</sup>

Other groupings based on common nationality and Partisan War service seem likely, although there is no evidence of current interaction among their members. The "Slovenians" and the "Macedonians" are probably active groupings. The "Slovenians" in the military elite included Stane Potočar, Chief of the General Staff; Assistant Defense Secretary Ivan Dolničar; Franc Tavcar, commander of the Ljubljana military region; Janko Sekernik, Deputy Chief of the General Staff; Rudolf Hribernik, Slovene republican defense headquarters commander; and Michael Butara, republican defense secretary. All fought the Partisan War in Slovenia; Potočar and Hribernik served together in the 31st division; while Dolničar, Sekernik, and Butara served together in the 14th division. Subsequently, Sekernik and Tavcar served under Potočar in the Ljubljana military region command prior to their elevation to their present positions.

The "Macedonians" included Dane Petkovski, Assistant Defense Secretary for political affairs; Vasko Karangelski, commander of the Skopje military region since 1969 (who died in February 1977); and Boro Čaušev, Macedonian republican defense headquarters commander. All fought in the Partisan War in Macedonia; Petkovski and Čaušev served together in the 50th division. In the postwar period both were prominent in the Macedonian republican Party organization.

The "Lika Serbs," the "Slovenians," and the "Macedonians" are the clearest cases of nationally-based subgroups of the military elite with ties based on common native regional service in the Partisan War,

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<sup>1</sup>One meeting of Lika veterans living in Belgrade that included Jovanić and Šumonja was described in *Narodna armija*, February 12, 1976. By February 1977, Jovanić, Mikasinović, and Rapo had retired or been transferred.

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service in the same units during the War, and some postwar career intersections. Although the evidence is less clear, it seems likely that other similarly nationally-based groupings exist. Typically, such groupings link members of the defense secretariat and general staff in Belgrade, members of the respective military regional command, and members of the respective republican defense (TDF) establishment.

Other groupings probably exist within the Yugoslav military elite on a "patronage" basis, not necessarily involving common nationality. Analysis of postwar posting patterns of the current military elite for evidence of positional associations suggested the existence of two such groups. Defense Secretary Ljubičić and Deputy Defense Secretary Šumonja owe their present positions to wartime and postwar personal ties with Tito, as explained in Appendix C, and can be considered members of a "Tito grouping." Branko Mamula, Assistant Defense Secretary and Navy commander, served under Šumonja in the Split military region in the 1960s and followed Šumonja to Belgrade.

There was indication of a "Jovanić patronage grouping" quite apart from Jovanić's role among the "Lika Serbs." The grouping included Jovanić as "patron"; Dane Čuić, head of the military security service; Džemal Šarac, chief Party Secretary in the YPA; and Asim Hodžić, the Assistant Chief of the General Staff for Intelligence. As pointed out earlier, Čuić, albeit a Croat, had ties with Jovanić extending back to common region of birth and Partisan War service in the 6th Division. Hodžić, a Slav Muslim from Bosnia, served as Jovanić's political assistant in the Zagreb military region in 1969-1971, where he was actively involved with Jovanić in the political turmoil in Croatia at the time. Šarac served as Jovanić's political assistant in Zagreb prior to Hodžić; he had been a subordinate of Jovanić in the Zagreb military region in the early 1950s as well. Čuić and Hodžić assumed their present positions following Jovanić's transfer to Belgrade in 1974. Given Jovanić's responsibilities for security and intelligence matters in the FSND, it is clear that Čuić and Hodžić reported directly to him; there was also some indication that Jovanić was a superior of Šarac for some purpose as well. Moreover, Jovanić had at various times

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in the postwar period been commanding officer of a number of other members of the current senior military leadership. These personal ties, taken together with the indications of Jovanić's influence among the "Lika Serbs" grouping, suggested Jovanić's importance within the military elite. His evident ouster as Undersecretary of Defense in early 1977 and pending retirement is therefore of great significance; while the circumstances remain unexplained, it may be speculated that Jovanić's rapidly accumulated powers constituted a threat to members of other intra-elite groupings and to Defense Secretary Ljubičić himself.

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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The present Yugoslav military elite is dominated by the "late Partisan" generation: the prewar Communists who learned guerrilla tactics in the Spanish Civil War and who constituted the nucleus and leadership of the Partisan movement have passed from the scene, while the postwar Yugoslav military generation has yet to rise to the top. Partisan divisional commanders play a key role in the "late Partisan" generation. They are a subset of a broader Yugoslav elite the members of which, primarily of peasant background, joined the Partisan movement at its inception in 1941 or 1942 as their first adult activity and survived the war. As a group they are older than their counterparts of ten years ago; they have continued their careers beyond the former mandatory retirement age of 55. Natural rejuvenation of the military elite has thus not yet been achieved, and a major discontinuity lies ahead -- but only five to ten years hence -- when the postwar military generation will move into the key military positions.<sup>1</sup>

The "late Partisan" generation in military terms is simultaneously the "Partisan Communist" generation politically. Prewar Communists now number 15 percent of the elite; no postwar Communist has been identified. Most of the present elite entered first the Partisan movement and then the Communist Party; they were mobilized not on the platform of solidarity with the Soviet Union or Communist revolution but under the banner of national independence and unity.

The military elite is thoroughly indigenous in terms of military education. The elite of ten years ago still had a significant proportion of Soviet-trained (and Western-trained) officers, although Yugoslavia had moved quickly after 1948 to counter the influence of Soviet training by establishing its own Higher Military Academy and requiring even general officers to undergo retraining. Today around 80 percent of the military elite have had exclusively domestic military training.

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<sup>1</sup>Biographic data on members of the "postwar generation" are poor or nonexistent.

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"Commanders" and "commissars" have tended to be mutually exclusive career types in Yugoslavia, as elsewhere. Both are in evidence in the military elite, but professional "commanders" are clearly dominant. This represents the culmination of a trend the origins of which can be traced back to 1953, when supremacy of commanders was institutionalized through replacement of the position of commissar (who had been coequal to the commander) with the position of assistant commander for political affairs, subordinate to the commander. Among two key substrata of positions, senior officials and military region commanders, the role of the professional commanders has further increased in the past ten years. Since 1973 the military security establishment (KOS) has been placed under stricter command authority.

At the same time there has been a striking relative decline in the status of Party secretaries in the military vis-a-vis commanders. Prior to 1966 the assistant commanders for political affairs were simultaneously Party secretaries. In 1966 the functions were separated; the Party organization in the Army was reorganized with the avowed purpose of increasing the influence of Party organizations in the Army on the command structure, which had theretofore dominated Party bodies in the military. From the point of view of the proponents of the reforms, this would have created a counterweight to the professional military responsive to reformist currents in the Party as a whole. In fact, the opposite occurred; the Party organization in the Army (with only 105 full-time officials) is more responsive than ever to the professional command stratum. This relationship explains the unfolding of the "campaigns" in Party work in the Army; after a brief period following 1972 in which Party organizations in the Army attempted to expand their authority, their focus has subsequently narrowed to professional concerns, where dominant influence of commanders is unchallenged.

The Yugoslav military elite is multinational -- and more so than in the past. Yugoslav national groups other than Serbs and Montenegrins continue to be underrepresented in the officer corps as a whole. In the case of Croats and Slovenes, representation has worsened since the immediate postwar period, and this remains a source of articulated concern to the respective republican Party officials. At the apex of the military structure; however, a change has occurred: among the military

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elite all the principal non-Serb groups except the Albanians are in fact now proportionally represented or overrepresented. The number of pričani Serbs (from outside Serbia proper) has been reduced, but this group still plays a disproportionate role, particularly in Croatia.

Posting patterns, too, reflect the impact of the national question on the Yugoslav armed forces. Since the late 1960s, there has been a swing back toward the World War II pattern of predominantly native regional postings. The demands for more native regional service put forward by national forces since the mid-1960s have in part been quietly fulfilled. This altered posting pattern is striking at the military regional level. ✓

Another key development in the adaptation of the defense system to the less centralized Yugoslav political system of the late 1960s was the organization of territorial defense forces and establishment of republican defense headquarters after 1968. The first commanders of the republican defense headquarters were generally senior but inactive or retired generals with strong regional ties. That pattern has not changed; although the regular military's influence over the territorial defense forces increased after 1971, the republican political authorities continue to influence defense headquarters personnel selection.

The YPA remains the strongest all-Yugoslav institution. It explicitly retains the mission of fostering a sense of "Yugoslavism" on the part of the conscript youth passing through its ranks.<sup>1</sup> Yet, the YPA has not remained isolated from the forces of national affirmation so evident in Yugoslavia since the late 1960s. The Yugoslav military elite is more truly an all-Yugoslav force, in the sense that it is more multinational, than in the past. It is simultaneously more

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<sup>1</sup>*Vojno delo*, No. 1, 1974, p. 118.

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"territorialized," in terms of regional posting patterns, than it has been since World War II. In the Yugoslav context, these developments are a strength, not a weakness; they are an indication of adaptive behavior that increases, rather than reduces, the long-term cohesive potential of the Yugoslav military establishment. ✓

Participation of the military elite in political affairs has increased since the 1960s (but not approached the level of the immediate postwar period). In the early 1970s a group of "political generals" reemerged, at Party urging and not as an autonomous military initiative, all of whom are concerned in their civilian posts with defense and security matters. Greater military involvement in political affairs is indicated by the 10 percent share of Party Central Committee seats held by military men -- the highest percentage of any postwar Central Committee. At the federal level, the "opening to society" that Party reformers urged on the military has been implemented in the period of political consolidation after 1971 and has had the contrary effect (from the reformers' point of view) of increasing military influence over other sectors of the political system. On the other hand, at the republican Party level, military participation reached its peak in 1969 and has subsequently declined. The intermingling of nonmilitary and military Party organizations at republican and lower levels that was initiated in the late 1960s has ended, and this focuses the political involvement of the military on the federal level. (Military region commands have influenced regional Party policies on security-related matters.) At the federal level, the military Party organization has now formally attained a status equivalent to that of a province.

The outlook or mental set of the Yugoslav military elite remains strongly influenced by elite members' first adult experiences as peasant youth mobilized to the Partisan movement and the Party in 1941 or 1942 in the cause of national survival. Assimilating the changing values of the Party, they have developed strong loyalty to the Yugoslav state and unique Communist political system. Since World War II members of the military elite have been professionally concerned with Yugoslavia's defense. The military elite is suspicious of hostile

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designs on Yugoslavia from East and West but remains principally concerned with the Soviet threat.

The military elite's self-perception of its mission to protect, as servant of the Party, the integrity of the political system and state against internal as well as external challenges was reinforced by the domestic political turmoil of 1970-1972. Its attitude is summed up in oft-stated concern that lack of discipline in society was sapping the country's defense strength and in the appeal, articulated by the Defense Secretary, for "more order, personal and social responsibility, and equity." Its "conservative" outlook falls well within the limits of Yugoslav Communist political orthodoxy; it has advocated greater discipline within the present Party-directed "self-management" system, not a return to Soviet-style rule. (Extreme "conservatives" on the fringe of the military have constituted a challenge to, not a political surrogate of, the top military leadership.) It has been more critical of nationalist outbursts than many other Yugoslav groups, but it has granted the crucial importance of greater respect for national rights within the military for effective functioning of both the military institutions and the political system. The military elite is committed to the broadly-based system of "total national defense" that precludes sharp separation between the regular military and the rest of Yugoslav society.

The Yugoslav military elite has remained fundamentally cohesive, in contrast to other influential Yugoslav elites. There is evidence of differences of views among the elite in the past decade on military issues related to the proper defense system and on political issues. National differences have played a role. Intra-military institutional cleavages developed as a result of a bid for greater power involving the counterintelligence service. These internal cleavages have been contained with relative ease. There is no known case of intra-military cleavages on foreign policy issues; in particular there is no indication of pro-Soviet sentiment, even as a marginal phenomenon. Personal intra-elite groupings of present and future relevance include national-based groupings -- "Lika Serbs," "Slovenians," and "Macedonians" most clearly -- and patronage groupings.

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Implications for the Future

The current Yugoslav military elite, although aging, is sufficiently young and unchallenged to be in place when Tito passes from the Yugoslav political scene. It is relatively well prepared to indeed defend Yugoslavia against external and internal threats. The military elite has been dominated by commanders, not political officers, since the early 1950s. Its members are committed to maintaining the integrity of the Yugoslav state. They have been professionally concerned for thirty years with the defense of Yugoslavia against external threats. They have experienced the Soviet threat at first hand, directly in the early 1950s and indirectly in 1968. They are concerned with the Soviet threat today.

The military elite constitutes one of the strongest "all-Yugoslav" centripetal forces in the political system, supporting the unique Communist Party-influenced "self-management" political system. This is true not because the elite has defended stubbornly the status quo but because it has managed a carefully-controlled series of adjustments to Yugoslav political realities, especially the looser federal system and greater self-affirmation of the constituent national groups, while protecting the military institution against excessive decentralization and nationalism. Consequently, the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia evidently are today perceived as a "joint armed force" by most of Yugoslavia's national groups. The exceptions are the Croats and probably the Albanians. Continued domination of the YPA in Croatia by Croatian Serbs (and the disproportionately large role of these Croatian Serbs among the Serb cohort in the military elite) is the element of truth underlying the otherwise falsely-held view of many Croats that Serbs still dominate the Yugoslav military elite. Although less evidence is available, it appears that continued Serb domination of the YPA in Kosovo is also worrisome to the Yugoslav Albanians; the issue is less acute, however, since no major command is located in Kosovo and fewer YPA units are stationed there. These exceptions are disturbing, however, for Croatia and Kosovo are the two regions of the country in which instability or civil strife is most likely in the post-Tito period.

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The shape of post-Tito Yugoslavia cannot be predicted, but possible (if not necessarily likely) developments in post-Tito Yugoslavia can be explored through a typology of "alternative future Yugoslavias." Four such "futures," developed elsewhere,<sup>1</sup> will be indicated; in each of these possible future situations, the military elite will play an important and perhaps crucial role:

1. Cohesive Yugoslavia. In the case of an internally cohesive Yugoslavia, in which no successionist crisis is created by Tito's demise and the successionist political institutions function, the military elite will continue to be a participant in the political process but will concentrate on external security concerns. It will respond to likely calls from a collective post-Tito political leadership to participate in the political process, while respecting the primacy of the political leadership. It will continue the present development of a more federalized military establishment. Assuming no major change in the international situation, the military elite will remain primarily concerned with the Soviet threat.

2. Discohesive Yugoslavia. Should the successionist political institutions fail, rampant decentralization occur, nationalist passions revive, and political stalemates occur, the military elite will be called upon by elements of the political elite to actively participate as a unifying force in the political process. In the absence of such calls from the Party center, the military elite would inject itself into the political process, in an autonomous manner heretofore eschewed, in the name of the Party in order to encourage greater unity. The military elite will again find itself subjected to the same pressures from national forces that it encountered in 1970-1971 in Croatia, and a replay of some of the events of that time is likely: differentiation of TDF and YPA elites and some limited division within the YPA on national grounds. But the military elite would probably remain cohesive enough to be able to function as a major centripetal force, dividing its attention between this task and the external threat.

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<sup>1</sup>Developed in Johnson and Horelick (1972).

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3. Disintegrating Yugoslavia. In this more extreme eventuality, sparked by nationalist violence, the role of the military elite would become paramount; acting in the name of the Party to preserve the integrity of the Yugoslav state and the Communist political system, it would in fact become the dominant element of the Party. In a localized civil conflict, in which regional authorities, unable to contain the violence easily, appealed to Belgrade, the military elite could be expected to respond effectively to orders from the top political leadership to restore order and contain the inevitable disaffection on national grounds within its own ranks. In the case of contagious conflict, with domestic strife turning into civil war and leading to secessionist attempts by one or more of the republics, the military leadership would, left without central political direction, act on its own to attempt to restore order and reconstitute Yugoslavia on a more centralized basis. But in these dire circumstances its effectiveness and integrity would be suspect. In such circumstances, YPA intervention could itself initiate a messy civil war, involving clashes between TDF and YPA units and desertions from the latter. It is doubtful whether the Yugoslav military elite could withstand that extreme challenge. Resilient in situations short of major crisis precisely because it is more a reflection of the Yugoslav political and social system than in the past, it would probably lack the unity and purposefulness necessary to employ the degree of repression that would be necessary to restore order and reconstitute some semblance of political authority in a Yugoslavia that was disintegrating. In the only circumstance in which a military seizure of power in Yugoslavia is likely (and would doubtless be desired as stabilizing by the United States), the Yugoslav military elite is unlikely to be able to act as a unit. It is in such circumstances, involving a breakdown of the "all-Yugoslav institutions including the military, that multiple appeals from various groups to East and West for outside assistance should be anticipated.

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4. Invaded or Garrison Yugoslavia. The Soviet threat to Yugoslavia after Tito will be inversely proportional to the degree of internal cohesion. Nonetheless, Soviet military intervention in a cohesive Yugoslavia is not unthinkable. In an Invaded Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav military elite can be expected to implement and direct the determined resistance effort embodied in the doctrine of "total national defense." In that event, as in the event of a Garrison Yugoslavia subjected to protracted high-level Soviet military threat, the military elite can be expected to look again to the West for armaments and other forms of military assistance.

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## Appendix A

## ISSUES OF METHOD, DEFINITION, AND DATA

METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

This study has had three principal objectives:

1. to formulate a profile of the Yugoslav military elite that could complement available biographies of key individual officers;
2. to project the outlook, or set of attitudes on issues, of the Yugoslav military elite;
3. to describe and analyze internal divisions within the Yugoslav military.

Brief comments follow on the approach utilized in this study in pursuit of each of these objectives.

1. As noted in the Introduction, the profile of the Yugoslav military elite formulated in this study is proffered, not as a predictor of the behavior of the Yugoslav military in specific present or future circumstances, but as an illuminator of some of the predispositional factors that will condition that behavior. Construction of such a profile permits an answer to key questions including: the particular military "generation" comprising the present military elite; the degree of implementation of the national "key" (proportional national representation) at the upper levels of the military; the degree to which "regionalization" of the military (meaning more postings to native regions) has progressed; career differences, if any, between commanders of the republican territorial defense forces and top officers of the YPA; the relationship between professional commanders and political officers (in terms of career types) within the upper levels of the Yugoslav military; the role and relative power of Party Secretaries in the Army.

While an analytical snapshot of the current Yugoslav military elite is helpful, more valuable still is a dynamic analysis indicating the extent of changes in respective group characteristics over time. Ideally, the analyst would like to compare the current elite profile

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with the comparable profile of any earlier time. In practice, since the study could not compile information on a comparable military leadership group by year for a number of years, only one such point of reference was established: the Yugoslav military elite of 1966. That year was chosen for comparison since it was the final year of the "neo-centralist" period in Yugoslavia. In 1966 Party Secretary Aleksandar Ranković was ousted from the Party leadership for blocking implementation of far-reaching economic and political reform; substantial decentralization and some pluralization of the Yugoslav political system followed. After 1966, as noted in Section II, the military, too, was affected by the forces of reform and national affirmation. The YPA's earlier isolation from other sectors of Yugoslav society was reduced. In 1967, major personnel changes occurred in the Secretariat of National Defense.

2. The most successful "elite studies" have correlated attitudinal information with key background attributes, primarily education and career; Edinger and Searing's work on West European elites is a classic in this regard.<sup>1</sup> This study is constrained severely by the unavailability of systematic attitudinal data for the Yugoslav military. Elite surveys are regularly conducted in Yugoslavia (some have involved Western participation) and results published, but these have not embraced the military.<sup>2</sup> Since 1967, the FSND Political Department has conducted extensive and evidently technically sophisticated opinion polling of both the officer corps and conscripts; some fragmentary results of these classified or internal-use studies have been published.<sup>3</sup> While this Report utilizes these poll results in making an estimate of the outlook of the Yugoslav military elite, it perforce draws more heavily on other, indirect and therefore less satisfactory indicators: the known experience of the Yugoslav military as an institution and as the collection of individuals that have comprised the officer corps; published psychohistorical and political statements of individual generals; the few reported impressions of Western

<sup>1</sup>See the section on elite analysis, [redacted]

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<sup>2</sup>See Barton, et al. (1973).

<sup>3</sup>For details, see Bebler (1976) and Appendix D.

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interlocutors of Yugoslav officers;<sup>1</sup> and occasional intelligence reports on the attitudes of particular individuals.

3. This study explores the existence of tensions within the Yugoslav military and their linkages to particular individuals or groups. It is assumed that better understanding of the nature of disputes and tensions and the existence of affinity groups within the military establishment in recent years will permit more accurate appraisal of the present and future cohesion and behavior of the Yugoslav military elite.

In the absence of empirical analysis, the "military" cannot be assumed to be a unitary entity. It must be subjected to "the same search for internal factions, ethnic splits, generational gaps, functionally-based divisions, and hierarchically-based conflicts" as have political parties and bureaucracies.<sup>2</sup> In a closed society, analysis of possible internal groupings within the military can permit more accurate inferences about attitudes and policy positions and disputes on matters of issue and personality than ad hoc analysis of an individual leader's statements or behavior.

This study emulates prior examinations of cleavages in other military elites. Studies of the Chinese Communist military, for example, have usefully examined intramilitary conflict in terms of tension between revolutionary and professional military values; lasting patterns of personal and organizational affiliation; affiliation by service sector; and other hierarchical or functional sources of conflict.<sup>3</sup> Affinity groups are not easily identified; even in open societies personal associations are difficult to map; as an analyst of a relatively accessible elite has noted, "constellations of intra-elite linkages remain among the most inaccessible of social facts and the most difficult to assess once verified."<sup>4</sup> This study has, perforce, searched

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<sup>1</sup>Including first-hand impressions, reported in *Yugoslav Military and Political Issues in 1975: A Trip Report* (1975).

<sup>2</sup>Kelleher, ed. (1974), p. 4.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid, p. 254.

<sup>4</sup>Bonilla (1970), p. 149.

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for affinity groups on the basis of proximity of career postings and of personal associations forged during the Partisan War. The assumption of continuing relevance of such wartime ties in a post-revolutionary army receives some confirmation from the Communist Chinese and other experiences.<sup>1</sup>

#### DEFINITION OF TERMS

"Elite" has a multiplicity of meanings in the literature on elite analysis. This study defines as the "Yugoslav military elite" the occupants of what are judged to be the key positions in the Yugoslav military establishment, as well as the few military occupants of high-level Party and government positions. The positions selected are listed in Table 1; they include key officials in the Federal Secretariat of National Defense, the YPA General Staff, the service commands, military region (*oblast*) and subregion (*područje*) commands, divisional commands, republican defense commands, the secretaries of the military Party organizations at the military district level and above; and military members of the Party Executive Committee and the (government) Federal Executive Council.

The "1975 elite" analyzed in this study is comprised of the identifiable occupants of the specified set of positions on September 1, 1975; the benchmark "1966 elite" is comprised of analogous occupants as of December 31, 1966. The "1975 elite" is comprised of 104 officers; their breakdown by service affiliation: Ground Forces, 91; Air Force, 10; Navy, 3. Two are Army Generals, 26 are Colonel Generals, 35 are Lieutenant Colonel Generals, 31 are Major Generals, and 10 are Colonels. The "1966 elite" is comprised of 95 Ground Force officers, 10 Air Force officers, and 7 Naval officers--a total of 112. In 1966, 2 were Army Generals, 21 Colonel Generals, 33 Lieutenant Colonel Generals, 45 Major Generals, 4 retired or inactive, and 7 Colonels. The two "elites" are only roughly comparable; some key positions changed from 1966 to 1975--most importantly, republican defense commands were added--while several

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<sup>1</sup>For example, Whitson (1973), p. xix.

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occupants of comparable positions could not be identified for one of the respective years. The military elite defined in this study on positional grounds constitutes approximately 40 percent of the general officer corps.<sup>1</sup> The "1975 elite" contains 57 holdovers from the "1966 elite" and 47 additions; this relationship suggests an average annual circulation of about 5 through the "elite."

Additionally, biographic files were compiled on 27 other individuals prominent prior to 1966 who figured in controversies or personal associations involving members of the later elite groups. These individuals can be considered a segment of an earlier, "1955 elite." For some analytical purposes of the study, the total of 186 individuals on whom data were collected is used; they are termed the total "postwar elite sample."

The assumption of a positional definition of the Yugoslav military elite is supported (or at least not contradicted) by the absence of indications of informal, i.e., nonpositional sources of power and influence within the military. The "elite" defined here thus excludes Army Generals, Colonel Generals, and Lieutenant Colonel Generals presently inactive, even if not formally retired; it is common practice for many of these senior officers to occupy advisory and "research" positions in the Federal Secretariat of National Defense at the end of their careers. In no case, however, is there indication that such individuals who have been "kicked upstairs" remain prominent within the military; on the contrary, there are a number of accounts of how such senior generals have been "put out to pasture."

The "military elite" defined on positional grounds for 1975 and 1966 as inclusive and not as a sample nonetheless contains some distortions; some key occupants could not be identified; while the selection of positions is a matter of judgment. Specifically, the "elite" defined here may overvalue the role of the republican defense secretaries--whose precise role vis-a-vis republican defense commanders

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<sup>1</sup>Accepting as accurate and characteristic for recent years the count of the British Military Attaché in 1967 (DIA IR-2-904-021067, Confidential).

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remains unclear--while undervaluing the role of generals occupying "junior" (and thus often not identifiable) General Staff slots. In addition, as noted in Appendix C, the posts of Party Secretary at the military region level had been so devalued by 1975 that their continued inclusion in the "military elite" can be questioned.

#### DATA COLLECTION

This study required compilation of a comprehensive data base on key Yugoslav military individuals. The first task was to identify the occupants of the specified set of positions--a laborious task that pointed up the inadequate attention to personalities in existing order-of-battle intelligence files and publications. Once the individuals comprising the military elite had been identified, compilation of data on them involved integration of fragmentary and sometimes conflicting items of information from U.S. Government biographic intelligence files and published Yugoslav sources. USG biographic resources consulted include the biographic files of [redacted]

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3.3(b)(1)

[redacted] the East European Ground Forces Order of Battle Office, DIA; the Defense Attaché Office, American Embassy, Belgrade; the Office of East European Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; and the Office of NATO and European Affairs, Office of International Security Affairs, DoD. Yugoslav sources include *Ko je Ko (Who's Who)*, 1957 and 1970 editions; *Vojna encyclopedia (Military Encyclopedia)*, first and second editions; and miscellaneous books and articles. Published DIA biographies and older NIS biographies of Yugoslav generals were of assistance; however they exist for only a small number of individuals of interest and are based on incomplete (and in some respects inaccurate) information. Many gaps and doubtless some errors remain in the biographic files created for the purposes of this study. Nonetheless, the resulting data base on 186 individuals constitutes a significant improvement over the information available in any of the existing partial collections and indicates what is presently known about the Yugoslav military elite to the U.S. Government. The data base corrects a number of systematic errors and omissions in existing U.S. Government biographic

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and order of battle files.<sup>1</sup> Compilation of this data base is a major derivative product of the study.

The quantitative portion of these biographic files was computerized so as to permit both aggregate analysis and full retrieval of all individual data. A list of the attributes, collected and computed, in the individual files is given in Table 2. Postings were coded according to a format developed in the course of this study from analysis of postwar order of battle information that expresses the hierarchical interrelationships of each division, military subregion (*područje*), and region (*oblast*). This format permits examination of the hierarchical relationship of individuals over time. A computerized positional association file of individuals was developed to assist in exploring these relationships.

The data base created in the course of this study has been transferred to the

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<sup>1</sup>These problems are described and some recommendations made for improvements in biographic intelligence collection, storage, and analysis in a separate Rand publication, *Suggested Improvements in Biographic Intelligence Resources* (U), by A. Ross Johnson, January 1977, Secret.

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Table 1

POSITIONS INCLUDED IN THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY ELITE1975 (as of September 1)1966 (as of December 31)Top Political PositionsParty

Secretary, Executive Committee and  
President of Defense Commission

Government

Federal Secretary of Internal Affairs  
Chief Prosecutor  
Director, Civilian Aviation Directorate

Government

Member, Federal Executive Council

Top Military Positions

Chief, Military Cabinet of Supreme Commander  
Personal Assistant to Supreme Commander  
Federal Secretary of National Defense  
Personal Assistant, Federal Secretary of  
National Defense  
Federal Under Secretary of National Defense  
Deputy Federal Secretary of National Defense  
Assistant Federal Secretaries of National Defense  
Chief, General Staff  
Inspector General  
Deputy Inspector General  
Chief of Procurement  
Director, Scientific Council  
Chief, Military Security Service

Chief, Military Cabinet of Supreme  
Commander  
Personal Assistant to Supreme Commander  
State Secretary of National Defense  
Personal Assistant, State Secretary  
of National Defense

Assistant State Secretaries of  
National Defense  
Chief, General Staff  
Chief of Procurement  
Chief, Military Security Service

General Staff

Deputy Chief of Staff, Protocol  
Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations  
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
Assistant Chief of Staff, Mobilization  
and Organization  
Assistant Chief of Staff, Training  
Deputy Chief of Staff, Ground Forces  
Assistant Chief of Staff, Supplies  
Assistant Chief of Staff, Finance  
Chief, Materials Office  
Chief, Territorial Defense and Civil  
Defense Office  
Chief, Personnel Office  
Deputy Assistant Chiefs of Staff  
Deputy Commander, YAF  
Chief of Staff, YAF  
Commander, Zagreb Air Corps  
Commander, Air Defense  
Assistant Commander, Political, YAF  
Deputy Commander, Navy  
Assistant Commander, Political, Navy  
Commander, Frontier Guards  
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, Frontier  
Guards  
Assistant Commander, Political, Frontier  
Guards

General Staff

Chief of Protocol  
Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations  
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
Assistant Chief of Staff, Mobilization  
and Organization  
Assistant Chief of Staff, Training  
Chief, Materials Office  
Chief, Ground Forces Office  
Chief, Supplies Office  
Chief, Finance Office  
Chief, Personnel Office  
Deputy Assistant Chiefs of Staff  
Deputy Commander, YAF  
Chief of Staff, YAF  
Assistant Commander, Political, YAF  
Commander, Air Defense  
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff,  
Frontier Guards  
Deputy Commander, Navy  
Assistant Commander, Political, Navy

Regional Military Positions

Commander, Belgrade Military Region  
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff  
Assistant Commander, Political  
Commander, 4th Tito Guards Division, Belgrade  
Commander, Belgrade Garrison  
Commander, 8th Infantry Division, Novi Sad  
Commander, Nis Military Region  
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff  
Assistant Commander, Political

Commander, Belgrade Military Region  
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff  
Assistant Commander, Political  
Commander, 4th Tito Guards Division, Belgrade  
Commander, 17th Armored Division, Kragujevac  
Commander, Belgrade *Područje*  
Commander, Novi Sad *Područje*  
Commander, Kragujevac *Područje*  
Commander, Niš *Područje*

Commander, 2d Proletarian Infantry Division  
 Commander, Skopje Military Region  
     Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff,  
     Assistant Commander, Political  
 Commander, 16th Infantry Division, Kumanovo  
 Commander, 10th Infantry Division, Bitola  
 Commander, Split Military Region  
     Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff  
     Assistant Commander, Political  
 Commander, Zagreb Military Region  
     Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff  
     Assistant Commander, Political  
 Commander, 6th Infantry Division  
 Commander, 8th/14th Infantry Division, Varaždin  
 Commander, Ljubljana Military Region  
     Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff  
     Assistant Commander, Political  
 Commander, 1st Infantry Division, Postojna  
 Commander, Sarajevo Military Region  
     Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff  
     Assistant Commander, Political  
 Commander, 11th Infantry Division, Tuzla  
 Commander, Titograd *Područje*  
     Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff  
     Assistant Commander, Political

Commander, 2d Proletarian Infantry Division  
 Commander, Priština *Područje*  
 Commander, 10th Infantry Division, Priština  
 Commander, Skopje Military Region  
     Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff  
     Assistant Commander, Political  
 Commander, 26th Armored Division, Skopje  
 Commander, Skopje *Područje*  
 Commander, 16th Infantry Division, Kumanovo  
 Commander, Bitola *Područje*  
 Commander, Split Military Region  
     Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff  
     Assistant Commander, Political  
 Commander, Šibenik *Područje*  
 Commander, 19th Infantry Division, Knin  
 Commander, Zagreb Military Region  
     Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff  
     Assistant Commander, Political  
 Commander, 1st/20th Armored Division, Sisak  
 Commander, Zagreb *područje*  
 Commander, 6th Infantry Division, Karlovac  
 Commander, 8th/14th Infantry Division, Varaždin  
 Commander, Rijeka *Područje*  
 Commander, Osijek *Područje*  
 Commander, 58th Infantry Division, Slav Požega  
 Commander, Ljubljana *Područje*  
 Commander, 1st Infantry Division, Postojna  
 Commander, Sarajevo Military Region  
     Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff  
     Assistant Commander, Political  
 Commander, Sarajevo *Područje*  
 Commander, Banja Luka *Područje*  
 Commander, 11th Infantry Division, Tuzla  
 Commander, Mostar *Područje*  
 Commander, Titograd *Područje*



Republican/Provincial Positions

1975

For each republic and province:

- Commander, Defense Headquarters
- Chief of Staff, Defense Headquarters
- Defense Secretary

1966

For each republic:

- Defense Secretary

Party Positions in the Military

- Secretary of Committee, Conference of LYC/YPA
- Secretary of Secretariat
- Secretary, FSND
- Secretary, Air and Air Defense Forces
- Secretary, Frontier Guards
- Secretary, Belgrade Military Region
- Secretary, Niš Military Region
- Secretary, Skopje Military Region
- Secretary, Split Military Region
- Secretary, Ljubljana Military Region
- Secretary, Sarajevo Military Region
- Secretary, Zagreb Military Region
- Secretary, Titograd Military *Područje*

- Secretary of Committee, Conference of LCY/YPA
- Secretary, FSND
- Secretary, Air and Air Defense Forces
- Secretary, Frontier Guards
- Secretary, Belgrade Military Region
- Secretary, Skopje Military Region
- Secretary, Split Military Region
- Secretary, Sarajevo Military Region
- Secretary, Zagreb Military Region

Miscellaneous

- President, Federal Committee, Veterans Organization
- President, Federal Committee, Reserve Officers Organization
- Chairman, Standing Commission for Defense, SAWPY
- President, Coordination Committee for Total National Defense and Self-Protection, SAWPY
- Commander, Higher Military Academy
- Commander, National Defense School
- Commander, Command and Staff School
- Commander, High Military-Political School

- President, Federal Committee, Veterans Organization
- President, Federal Committee, Reserve Officers Organization
- Commander, Higher Military Academy
- Commander, National Defense School
- Commander, Command and Staff School
- Commander, High Military-Political School

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Table 2

ATTRIBUTES INCLUDED IN COMPUTERIZED BIOGRAPHIC FILESCollected Attributes

Date of birth  
 Nationality  
 Region of birth  
 Occupation of father  
 Final prewar occupation  
 Civilian education  
 Military education  
 Foreign travel  
 Military service  
 Branch of service  
 Prewar military experience  
 Holder of Partisan Medallion of 1941  
 Year of entry into Communist Party  
 Type of publications  
 Partisan war career type  
 Postwar career type  
 Position )  
 Post ) by year 1941-1975  
 Rank )  
 Collateral activities )

Computed Attributes

Age in 1975  
 Age in 1966  
 Count of wartime command positions  
 Count of wartime political positions  
 Count of postwar command positions  
 Count of postwar political positions  
     Count of 1946-1952 political positions  
     Count of 1953-1975 political positions  
 Count of postwar military school positions  
 Regional location of postings, by year, 1942-1975  
 Count of wartime regional postings  
 Count of postwar regional postings  
 Level of postings, by year, 1945-1975  
 Count of postwar level of postings

Other Data in Non-Computerized Files

Reports and rumors about career  
 Reports and rumors of personal associations  
 Reports and rumors of attitudes

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## Appendix B

THE ETHNIC AND REGIONAL COMPOSITION OF YUGOSLAVIA


Yugoslavia is a mosaic of national-ethnic groups, which fall into two categories: (1) "peoples" (*narod*o**), South Slav national groups located predominantly within Yugoslavia; and (2) "nationalities" (*narodnosti*, formerly called national minorities), whose co-nationals are predominantly located outside Yugoslavia. The first category is comprised of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians, and -- lately -- Slav Muslims. The second category includes Hungarians, Albanians, Turks, Slovaks, Romanians, and other smaller groups. Formerly quite distinct, the two categories have blurred in recent years. The percentage breakdown of the Yugoslav population into "peoples" and "nationalities" is indicated in Fig. 2.

This multinational condition is not expressed in compact regional settlement of the various national groups but involves their intermingling without assimilation, like oil and water, throughout most of the constituent units of the Yugoslav federation, the six republics, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia, and the two provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, into which part of the Serbian republic is subdivided. Slovenia is the only republic that is virtually homogeneous nationally; 94 percent of its population is Slovene. The population of Croatia is 79 percent Croat and 14 percent Serb. The Serbs are neither dispersed evenly throughout Croatia nor concentrated in one section of the republic; most are located in Slavonia (eastern Croatia) and Lika (central Croatia), where they are the majority element in 11 localities (communes). Serbs are disproportionately represented in the Croatian Party, constituting almost 30 percent of the membership.

Bosnia-Hercegovina was resurrected as a republic in 1945 to put an end to Serb-Croat conflict over the allegiance of its inhabitants. Its population is 40 percent Muslim, 37 percent Serb, and 21 percent Croat. The Muslims, a product of the Ottoman Empire with few national traits in 1945, were originally the Party's best candidate for developing a

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SOURCE: 1971 census data

Fig. 2 -- The national composition of Yugoslavia (in percentages)

new "Yugoslav" national consciousness. Today, the Slav Muslims have constituted themselves as the sixth "people" of Yugoslavia. The three national elements are intermingled throughout Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Serbia proper (minus the provinces) is nearly as homogeneous nationally as Slovenia -- 90 percent Serb. Vojvodina province, the traditional seat of Serbian culture, is thoroughly multinational, with a bare majority of 56 percent Serbs, along with 7 percent Croats, 22 percent Hungarians, and 15 percent smaller nationalities. These groups are intermingled throughout the province. Kosovo province, containing the legendary last battlefield of the medieval Serbian state, has a majority Albanian population of 74 percent (constituting nearly half of all Albanians). Serbs account for 18 percent and are dispersed throughout most of the province.

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The population of Macedonia is 69 percent Macedonian -- a people who first constituted themselves as a national group in postwar Yugoslavia -- and 17 percent Albanian, concentrated in the northwest. Montenegro is 67 percent Montenegrin. While Montenegrins have traditionally considered themselves to be Serbs, many now regard themselves as a distinct national group. Montenegro has a 13 percent Muslim and 7 percent Albanian minority population.

Tables 3 and 4 present the national composition of each republic and province and the distribution of national groups by republic and province. In 1971, the total Yugoslav population was 20.5 million.

Table 3

NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE REPUBLICS AND PROVINCES OF YUGOSLAVIA  
(In percentages)

Bosnia-Hercegovina	Croatia	Macedonia	Montenegro
39.6 Slav Muslims 37.2 Serbs 20.6 Croats 2.6 Other	79.4 Croats 14.2 Serbs 6.4 Other	69.3 Macedonians 17.0 Albanians 6.6 Turks 7.1 Other	67.2 Montenegrins 13.3 Slav Muslims 7.5 Serbs 6.7 Albanians 5.3 Other
Serbia Proper	Slovenia	Kosovo	Vojvodina
89.5 Serbs 10.5 Other	94.0 Slovenes 6.0 Other	73.7 Albanians 18.4 Serbs 7.9 Other	55.8 Serbs 21.7 Hungarians 7.1 Croats 15.4 Other

SOURCE: 1971 census data.

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Table 4

DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR NATIONAL GROUPS AMONG THE REPUBLICS  
AND PROVINCES OF YUGOSLAVIA  
(In percentages, rounded)

Republic/ Province	Serbs	Croats	Slo- venes	Mace- donians	Monte- negrins	Slav Muslims	Alban- ians	Hungar- ians
Serbia proper	58	1	1	2	11	7	5	1
Croatia	8	76	2	--	1	1	--	7
Slovenia	--	1	95	--	--	--	--	2
Macedonia	--	--	--	94	1	--	21	--
Montenegro	--	--	--	--	70	4	3	--
Bosnia- Hercegovina	17	17	--	--	2	85	--	--
Kosovo	3	--	--	--	6	2	70	--
Vojvodina	13	3	--	1	7	--	--	88

SOURCE: 1971 census data.

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## Appendix C

CAREER CHARACTERISTICS OF THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY ELITE

This appendix analyzes and documents the findings, summarized in Section III, of aggregate analysis of key biographic attributes of the Yugoslav military elite. The principal subject of the analysis is the "1975 elite" (as explained in the Introduction, the occupants of 104 key military positions as of September 1, 1975). Comparisons are drawn with the "1966 elite" (the occupants of 112 key positions as of the end of 1966; 57 of these individuals remained in the "1975 elite"). Additionally, for some purposes the subject of analysis is the total of 186 individuals, termed the "postwar elite sample," for which biographic files were compiled. When available, fragmentary published Yugoslav data on general officers and on the officer corps as a whole is also utilized. In the case of collateral political positions, systematic biographic information was not available, so positional and aggregate indicators from published Yugoslav sources have been utilized exclusively.

There is a serious absence of even rudimentary biographic information on about 20 percent of the "1975 elite." These "unknowns" are principally division commanders, Party secretaries at the military district level, third echelon leaders, and republican defense officials.

1. Age

A breakdown of the military elite by date of birth is given in Table 5. The known median age of the 1975 elite is 55; 73 percent of the known dates of birth occurred between 1918 and 1922. In contrast, the median age of the 1966 elite was 47.5; sixty-one percent of known dates of birth occurred between 1916 and 1921.<sup>1</sup> By this calculation the median age of the 1975 elite has increased almost as much since 1966

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<sup>1</sup>The average age of the general officer corps in 1953 was 38, according to an unverified 1953 USG study. (*Area Handbook for Yugoslavia* [1959], p. 1223.) The median age of the officer corps as a whole in 1947 was 25 or 26 (Kacaventa [1975], pp. 387-388).

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TABLE 5

YEAR OF BIRTH OF MILITARY ELITE  
(absolute numbers)

<u>Year</u>	<u>1975 Elite</u>	<u>1966 Elite</u>
1909		1
1910		
1911	1	3
1912	1	6
1913		4
1914		3
1915	2	8
1916	2	11
1917	4	7
1918	8	12
1919	9	11
1920	17	15
1921	12	11
1922	8	8
1923	3	4
1924	1	3
1925	2	1
1926	3	1
1927	1	1
Missing	30	2
Total	104	112

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as the intervening number of calendar years. The significant missing cases (29 percent) probably offset only partially this "aging"; the missing cases are individuals who entered the elite since 1966, yet the available evidence indicates they are 50-year olds, not 40-year olds. A tentative conclusion is that the military elite is aging (impressionistically, more so than the political elite as a whole, with the exception of a few key top positions) whereas a decade ago the military and political elites had a similar age structure.<sup>1</sup>

## 2. Party Membership

A breakdown by year of entry into the Party for the "1975 elite" and the "1966 elite" is given in Table 6. Although information is lacking on the Party status of 33 members of the "1975 elite," it is certain that all are LCY members.<sup>2</sup> Of 71 cases of known dates of entry into the Party, 5 are prewar Communists, while 56 joined during World War II. Of the latter group, 46 joined the Party at the outset of the Partisan War, in 1941 or 1942. It may be assumed that most of the missing dates of entry into the Party occurred during World War II; based on this assumption the relative percentages of prewar and wartime Party members are 14 and 86 percent respectively. By contrast, 28 percent of the "1966 elite" were prewar Communists; 72 percent joined the Party during World War II (all but five in 1941 or 1942, with 5 missing cases).<sup>3</sup> In comparison, only 40 percent of the political-economic elite of 1968 joined the Party during the war; 15 percent were prewar members and the remainder postwar members.<sup>4</sup> The present military elite contains significantly fewer prewar "Communist Internationalists" and more "Partisan Party" members than its counterpart of nine years ago;

<sup>1</sup>Barton, et al. (1973), p. 56.

<sup>2</sup>In 1969, 94 percent of all officers, 83 percent of all junior officers and career civilians in the Army, and 9 percent of all conscripts were Party members. (*Prva konferencija* [1969], p. 67.)

<sup>3</sup>Sixty percent of a group of 34 key military figures analyzed in 1959 were prewar Communists. Fifty percent of the general officer corps in 1953 were prewar Communists. (*Area Handbook* [1959], pp. 1204, 1266.)

<sup>4</sup>Barton, et al (1973), p. 100. The sample was 517 "opinionmakers" excluding the top 20 political figures.

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TABLE 6.

DATE OF COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP  
OF MILITARY ELITE

(absolute numbers)

<u>Year</u>	<u>1975 Elite</u>	<u>1966 Elite</u>
1933		1
1934		1
1935	1	4
1936		2
1937	1	3
1938	2	2
1939	4	10
1940	7	8
1941	24	40
1942	22	31
1943	6	4
1944	1	
1945	3	1
Missing	33	5
<u>Total</u>	<u>104</u>	<u>112</u>

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the proportion of "Partisans" in Party membership terms greatly exceeds that of the political elite.

### 3. Nationality and Region of Birth

Table 7 lists the national composition of the "1975 elite" and the "1966 elite." Table 8 gives these data in percentages, as well as published Yugoslav data on all general officers, the officer corps, and the Yugoslav population as a whole for selected years. The Serbian share of the 1975 military elite has declined to a level slightly short of Serbs' 40 percent share in the population as a whole; in 1966, Serbs were slightly overrepresented. Croats remain slightly overrepresented in the 1975 elite;<sup>1</sup> Montenegrins remain strongly overrepresented. The Muslim national representation in the military elite has increased significantly, from 5 percent in 1966 to 7 percent in 1975, almost equal to the share in the population at large. More striking has been the increase in Macedonian representation, from two percent in 1966 to seven percent in 1975, larger than the Macedonian proportion of the population at large. Slovenes constituted seven percent of the elite in 1966; today they constitute nine percent, slightly more than the percentage of Slovenes in the population at large. Kosovo Albanians remain grossly underrepresented, with one representative (Ethem Recica, whose promotion to Major General in 1972 was celebrated with some fanfare as the first promotion to general officer rank of a Yugoslav Albanian). Hungarians remain unrepresented; the "other" listing refers to Army General Kosta Nadj, of Hungarian extraction, who is the sole leading military figure to insist that he is a "Yugoslav" only.

The national groups other than Serbs and Montenegrins are much less well represented in the officer corps as a whole. Significantly, the percentage share of Croats and Slovenes has declined over the postwar period, while the percentage share of the other national groups has risen.

<sup>1</sup> According to an unverified count by a Croatian emigré, 18 percent of the officers promoted to Colonel General rank between 1960 and 1973 were Croats. (Sporer [1974], p. 10.)

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Table 7

NATIONALITY OF MILITARY ELITE  
(absolute numbers)

<u>Nationality</u>	<u>1975 Elite</u>	<u>1966 Elite</u>
Serb	30	50
Croat	21	27
Slav Muslim	7	5
Slovene	9	8
Albanian	1	0
Macedonian	7	2
Montenegrin	11	17
Hungarian	0	0
Other	1	1
Unknown	17	2
Total	<u>104</u>	<u>112</u>

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Table 8  
NATIONALITY OF MILITARY ELITE  
(percentages, rounded)

Nationality	1975 Elite <sup>a</sup>	1966 Elite	General Officers 1970 [1]	Delegates to 1969 Army Party Conference [4]	Officer Corps 1970 [1]	Officer Corps 1946 [2]	Total Population 1971 [3]	Total Population 1948 [3]
Serb	37	46	46.7	40	57.4 b	51.0	39.7	41.5
Croat	26	25	19.3	21	14.7	22.7	22.1	24.0
Slav Muslim	7	5	3.2	1	4.0 a	1.9	8.4	5.1 d
Slovene	9	7	6.3	9	5.2	9.7	8.2	8.9
Albanian	1	0	0	2	1.2	c	6.4	4.8
Macedonian	7	2	3.9	12	5.6	3.6	5.8	5.2
Montenegrin	13	16	19.3	13	10.3 b	9.2	2.5	2.7
Hungarian	0	0	0.4	1	0.6	c	2.3	3.2
Other	1	1	0.9	1	1.0 a	1.9 c	4.6	4.6

Notes:  
<sup>a</sup> Approximation. Missing cases in first column allocated proportionately as Serbs, Croats, and Montenegrins.  
<sup>b</sup> Serbs and Montenegrins together constitute 67.7 percent of the officer corps; breakdown is estimated. Discrepancies in addition due to rounding.  
<sup>c</sup> Includes Hungarians and Albanians.  
<sup>d</sup> "Muslim" was not a recognized national group in 1948; this was the percentage of the "undeclared" group, mainly Slav Muslims.

Sources:  
 [1] Derived from data in *NIN*, September 20, 1970. This source gives the following rank order (only) of the nationality of generals occupying "leading positions" in the Defense Secretariat: Serb, Croat, Montenegrin, Muslim, Slovene, Macedonian. These calculations differ slightly from those made by Antic (1972).  
 [2] Stanišić (1973), p. 409, citing data in the FSND Personnel Administration. Similar figures are given in Kačaventa (1975), p. 389.  
 [3] Official census data.  
 [4] *Prva konferencija* (1969), p. 389.

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Republican defense officials, i.e., territorial defense command personnel, are necessarily all natives of their respective republics. Their national composition in each republic evidently approximates the respective intrarepublican national breakdown, where this is significant. The goal of proportional national balance in the territorial defense "officer corps" as a whole, i.e., the active, retired, and reserve YPA officers who provide the cadre for the TDF, is evidently being approached. In the province of Kosovo, for example, 64 percent of the TDF "officer corps" is Albanian and 28 percent Serb, as compared to respective shares of Albanians and Serbs in the total population of Kosovo of 74 and 18 percent, respectively.<sup>1</sup>

Cross-tabulation of nationality by region of origin for military elite members is contained in Table 9. Of principal significance is the identification of the large number of *pričani* Serbs -- Serbs born outside of Serbia proper (i.e., in Croatia, Bosnia, and Vojvodina): 18 identified Serbs born outside of Serbia proper and 10 from Serbia proper in 1975, as compared to 37 and 12, respectively, in 1966. Granting the uncertainties of missing information, it appears that there has been some reduction in the relative proportion of *pričani* Serbs in the military elite since 1966, but that this group continues to play a disproportionately large role in the apex of the Yugoslav military establishment.

Examination of the nationality of the total "postwar elite sample" for the three military services confirms the commonsense supposition that the naval officers included are almost all of Croat origin.

#### 4. Origins and Education

Social background information on the military elite is generally missing; it is presumed that most came from peasant families, although many have identifiable nonpeasant backgrounds. Information on pre-World War II occupations is sparse; again, most were presumably involved

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<sup>1</sup>*Jedinstvo*, May 24, 1976.

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Table 9

CROSS-TABULATION OF NATIONALITY BY REGION OF BIRTH  
YUGOSLAV MILITARY ELITE

(absolute numbers)

(Count for 1975 Elite in top of each square)

(n = 104)

(Count for 1966 Elite in bottom of each square in parentheses)

(n = 112)

REGION OF BIRTH

NATIONALITY	<u>REGION OF BIRTH</u>								
	Unknown	Serbia	Croatia	Bosnia- Hercegovina	Slovenia	Kosovo	Macedonia	Montenegro	Vojvodina
Unknown	15 (1)			1					1 (1)
Serb	2 (1)	10 (12)	14 (25)	2 (11)					2 (1)
Croat	2		15 (23)	3 (4)					1
Slav Muslim	2			6 (5)					
Slovene					9 (8)				
Albanian	1								
Macedonian	2						5 (2)		
Montenegrin	1							9 (17)	
Hungarian									
Other									1 (1)

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in agriculture, although a number of nonagricultural occupations are represented. Of the 38 members of the 1975 elite whose prewar occupation can be identified, 9 were students; 8 artisans; 7 served in the prewar military in some capacity; 4 were peasants; 3 were teachers or professional men; and two were minor officials, Communist activists, and workers, respectively. Corresponding figures for the 1966 elite -- with 70 known cases -- were 18 students; 13 prewar military; 8 artisans; 7 workers; 7 peasants; 6 teachers or professional men; 5 miscellaneous; 3 minor officials; and 3 Communist activists. At the end of the Partisan War, 40 percent of the individuals in the officer corps as a whole (roughly 33,000) were officially considered to have been peasants; 22 percent workers; 21 percent "intellectuals"; 12 percent former military; and four percent artisans.<sup>1</sup>

Information on "civilian" education is limited. Compared to the Yugoslav population as a whole, a relatively large proportion of the military elite appears to have had some education beyond the primary school level. Of 45 known cases from the 1975 elite, 27 had some secondary or trade school training; 15 had university-level training. Corresponding figures for the 1966 elite (75 known cases) were 37 at the secondary/trade school level and 31 at the university level.

#### 5. Military Background, Training, and Travel

Ten percent of the 1975 military elite had prewar military experience (other than conscript service); one "Spaniard"<sup>2</sup> remains, along with six prewar junior officers and three prewar NCOs. This represents a significant "Partisanization" of the military elite since 1966; at that time, 24 percent had corresponding prewar military experience, 9 as "Spaniards," 9 as prewar officers, and 9 as prewar NCOs.

<sup>1</sup>Kačaventa (1975), p. 387, citing data in the archives of the Military History Institute. Percentages rounded.

<sup>2</sup>Prewar Yugoslav Communists who fought in International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War. Of 34 key military figures analyzed in 1959, 30 percent were "Spaniards." (*Area Handbook* [1959], p. 1266.)

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Indigenous training has been the trend in military education. Twenty percent of the 1966 elite had some training in Soviet military schools, 12 percent attended U.S. military schools, while the rest were trained solely at home. Contrasting figures for the 1975 elite are: 10 percent with Soviet training and 9 percent with U.S. training. Most of these are known to have attended the Higher Military Academy as well; the vast majority attended only the HMA and more advanced Yugoslav military schools.<sup>1</sup>

Members of the Yugoslav military elite have traveled extensively abroad in the course of their official duties. One-half of the 1966 elite are known to have traveled abroad (a quarter of them having undertaken more than 10 trips); corresponding figures for the 1966 elite were three-fourths and one-half, respectively.

#### 6. Partisan (World War II) Service

Information is lacking on the Partisan careers of a third of the 1975 elite, but it is assumed that almost all or all of the elite members fought in the Partisan movement during World War II.<sup>2</sup> Of the known cases, all but 10 entered the Partisan war at its outset, in 1941. This pattern characterized the 1966 elite; in 95 of 106 known cases (out of 112) the future YPA officer joined the Partisan war in 1941.<sup>3</sup> Military elite members who joined the Partisan movement in 1941 and remained active during the war received the politically prestigious Partisan Medallion of 1941. Correlating data on year of

<sup>1</sup>Today, no officer is eligible for promotion above rank of major without completion of an advanced military school, generally the command and staff school of his respective service, then the School of National Defense (as the War College has been renamed); (*NIN*, March 7, 1976.)

<sup>2</sup>As compared to the officer corps as a whole, 70 percent of which was made up of postwar officers in 1972 (*NIN*, March 7, 1976).

<sup>3</sup>The breakdown of the Partisan officer corps of 1945 as a whole by year of entry into the movement is as follows: 1941, 15 percent; 1942, 20 percent; 1943, 38 percent; 1944, 20 percent; 1945, 6 percent (Kačaventa, [1975], p.389, figures rounded).

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entry into the Partisan movement and year of joining the Party indicates 85 percent of the 1975 elite joined first the Partisans and then the Party; the corresponding figure for the 1966 elite was 70 percent, reflecting the higher percentage of prewar Communists.

Partisan war "dominant career type"<sup>1</sup> can be specified for 62 of the 104 officers in the 1975 elite; 21 were commanders, 33 commissars or Party representatives, six held both positions, and two were in other kinds of posts. Of 103 known cases of the 1966 elite, 49 were commanders, 43 were commissars, eight occupied both positions, and five were primarily in other posts. While gaps in information preclude generalization about possible differences in the Partisan career type of the 1975 elite as opposed to the 1966 elite, it is clear that "commander" and "commissar" were generally mutually exclusive Partisan career paths and that both remain strongly represented in the 1975 elite. They constituted roughly equal proportions of the 1966 elite.

Comparison of level of postings at the end of World War II, as summarized in Table 10, suggests that the 1975 elite on balance saw less "senior" service in the Partisan war than did the 1966 elite. (It is assumed that the missing cases in the 1975 elite saw service in 1945 at the divisional level or below.)

Members of the Yugoslav military elite fought the Partisan war predominantly, although not exclusively, "at home," in their respective native regions of Yugoslavia. This conclusion -- consistent with the regionally-based organizational structure of the Partisan movement -- is suggested by analysis of known regional postings of the "postwar

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<sup>1</sup>In this usage, the individual is ascribed a pure "dominant career type" if he had no more than one recorded wartime position of a different nature. For example, an individual with three recorded command positions and one political position is considered a "commander"; if two political positions are recorded, he is considered a "mixed" career type.

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Table 10

1945 LEVEL OF POSTING OF MILITARY ELITE

(absolute numbers)

<u>Level of Posting</u>	<u>1975 Elite</u>	<u>1966 Elite</u>
Main Partisan		
Headquarters	0	3
Army Headquarters	4	7
Regional Partisan		
Headquarters	2	5
Corps Headquarters	6	16
Division Headquarters	27	38
Brigade and below	7	13
Other	9	10
Unknown	51	20
Total	<u>104</u>	<u>112</u>

elite sample" of 186 individuals.<sup>1</sup> Table 11 indicates the percentage of native regional postings for each year between 1942 and 1945 (as well as for the postwar period). The significant exceptions to the pattern were the Montenegrins (and at the outset of the war, when there was no fighting in Serbia, the Serbs). Conversely, the region in which most "outsiders" fought was Bosnia-Hercegovina (where key Partisan battles were waged prior to 1944).

### 7. Postwar Careers

(a) Career Types. Table 12 displays the postwar career patterns of the Yugoslav military elite.<sup>2</sup> Analysis of dominant career type

<sup>1</sup>The recorded regional postings during World War II of the 1975 elite or the 1966 elite separately are too few for analysis. It is assumed that neither of the specified "elites" would differ from the Partisan movement as a whole in this regard. The proletarian brigades were the exception to native-region based combat; eight of the proletarian brigades spent between 57 and 88 percent of their time, respectively, fighting during the war outside their home regions. (Stanišić [1973], p. 84.)

<sup>2</sup>A "pure" career type is defined as permitting one exception to the respective career type in all known positional data. For example an officer with 20 known yearly postings as commander, one known yearly

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Table 11

REGIONAL POSTINGS OF YPA ELITE

Year	Percentage of Regional Postings In Native Regions	(Number of Regional Postings Counted)
1942	62	(37)
1943	72	(86)
1944	72	(99)
1945	71	(93)
1946	38	(32)
1947	34	(29)
1948	36	(25)
1949	41	(32)
1950	45	(29)
1951	28	(32)
1952	27	(30)
1953	30	(30)
1954	15	(27)
1955	17	(24)
1956	36	(25)
1957	36	(25)
1958	33	(24)
1959	40	(25)
1960	46	(26)
1961	55	(31)
1962	50	(34)
1963	43	(46)
1964	38	(50)
1965	37	(51)
1966	35	(49)
1967	36	(44)
1968	42	(38)
1969	60	(30)
1970	67	(24)
1971	64	(25)
1972	65	(23)
1973	60	(25)
1974	60	(20)
1975	61	(18)

posting as political officer, and 9 years unknown, is considered a "commander" for the purposes of this analysis. As noted in Section II, commissars existed in all units until 1953 as full-time Party positions, simultaneously serving as Party secretaries; after 1952 commissars were replaced by assistant commanders for political affairs, who were directly responsible to the commanders, not the Party apparatus, for political affairs, but who nevertheless continued to serve as Party secretaries until 1966.

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Table 12

POSTWAR CAREER PATTERNS OF YUGOSLAV MILITARY ELITE  
(absolute numbers)

<u>Dominant Career Type</u>	<u>1975 Elite</u>	<u>1966 Elite</u>
Commander	32	56
Commissar/Political Officer	11	12
Mixed: Commander - Political Officer	19	22
Intelligence officer	4	7
Other	10	8
Missing	28	7
Total	<u>104</u>	<u>112</u>

indicates that the 1966 military elite was dominated by commanders, with mixed, commander-political officers second, and political officers a poor third. The 1975 military elite is characterized by the same rank ordering, although information gaps preclude a comparative analysis with the 1966 elite in this regard. (Indication of dominant career type is lacking for the holders of 17 command positions, 10 political positions, and one other position in 1975.) Analysis of the postwar elite sample indicates a stronger relationship between post-1953 command posts and pre-1953 political posts than between post-1953 and pre-1953 political posts, suggesting that many commissars shifted to command channels after the institution of commissar was abolished in 1953.

(b) Regional Postings. Table 11 contains data on native regional postings by year for the entire postwar period (along with wartime data). Although the limited number of known regional postings and uncertainties regarding comparability of the counts from year to year necessitate caution in drawing definitive conclusions, this table does suggest the existence of four distinct postwar periods in regional posting patterns: (1) the late 1940s, when the Partisan pattern of predominantly "native" regional postings was reversed; (2) the early

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1950s, when home regional postings became almost the exception; (3) the end of the 1950s and early 1960s, when non-native regional postings still exceeded home regional postings, but to a lesser extent than in the 1950s, and; (4) the post-1968 period, when home postings again exceeded foreign postings (approaching the ratio of 2 to 1). Note that this comparison of regional postings applies exclusively to the regular YPA and excludes republican defense officials who, irrespective of their active, inactive, or retired YPA status are necessarily "natives" of the respective republics. Since the positions of republican defense commanders and chiefs of staff did not exist in 1966, their inclusion in the 1975 elite makes the pattern of home postings more pronounced. Simultaneously, average posting lengths have increased; new officers are now assured of no more than six physical relocations in the course of their entire career, an innovation intended to make the military profession more appealing to the youth by reducing economic hardship and increasing home regional postings.<sup>1</sup>

This swing in regional posting patterns is apparent, more conclusively, at the military region and subregion headquarters levels. Sixty-three percent of the respective subgroup of the 1975 elite for which data are available serve at home. Commanders of the respective regions and subregion account for many of the home postings; all but one is a "native"; the exception being Bruno Vuletić, commander of the Niš military region, who is a Croat born in Croatia. (However, a Serb from Croatia is commander of the Zagreb region.) Below the position of commander, non-native regional postings still seem to outnumber home postings (although the missing cases preclude definitive conclusions on this). At the divisional commander level, three commanders whose native region is established serve at home, and one elsewhere (but the native region of one is unknown and three have not been conclusively identified).

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<sup>1</sup>*NIN*, March 14, 1976.

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In contrast, 38 percent of the relevant subgroup of the 1966 elite at the military region and subregion level served at home. Four of the five regions in 1966 were commanded by "natives" (but these included a Bosnian Serb in Sarajevo and a Croatian Serb in Split). At the divisional level, two division commanders were "natives" and nine served in other regions (with the origins of one unknown and several division commanders not definitely identified).

(c) Career patterns. Career patterns of two subsections of the 1975 military elite, senior Defense Secretariat and General Staff officials and military region commanders, have been examined. This subsection reviews, for each group, relevant individual career attributes and the resulting career pattern. This pattern illuminates the composition and characteristics of the subgroup, suggests major factors that seem to explain the promotion of one individual instead of another, highlights the impact of unusual influences, and provides a better basis for predicting future promotions.

Senior Officials of the Defense Secretariat and General Staff.

✓ The Federal Secretary of National Defense, Nikola Ljubičić (age 59)<sup>1</sup> was appointed in 1967 following a career of exclusively "command" positions during and after World War II. He was named commander of the Frontier Guard in 1959; of the War College in 1962; and of the Belgrade military region in 1965. He was promoted to Major General in 1946 and spent eight years each in the grades of Major General (MG), Lieutenant Colonel General (LCG), and Colonel General (CG) prior to his promotion to General of the Army in 1970. It should be noted that his posting as commander of the War College was a stepping stone, not a bypath, in his career. His promotion to Federal Secretary in 1967 bypassed numerous CGs with more seniority and higher posts in the defense establishment; his elevation was widely and plausibly interpreted at the time as due to special ties with Tito originating from World War II (when Ljubičić served as the chief of Tito's headquarters guard).<sup>2</sup> Ljubičić's political importance prior to his appointment was

<sup>1</sup>Ages in this Section are as of 1975.

<sup>2</sup>Ljubičić was interviewed on this wartime experience in *Front*, May 15, 1960.

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indicated by his election to the LCY Central Committee in 1964. In 1969 he was included in the Party Presidium; he is a member of the 1974 Central Committee.

The present Deputy Secretary of National Defense, Miloš Šumonja (age 57), was appointed in 1969. Šumonja, too, had a wartime and postwar career of "command" posts, interrupted importantly by duty as head of Tito's military cabinet between 1953 and 1961. In 1961, Šumonja was appointed commander of the Split military region; his appointment as Chief of the General Staff in 1967 reportedly (and plausibly) owed much to his long association with Tito.<sup>1</sup> He was promoted to MG in 1947 and served eight years as MG and seven years as LCG prior to promotion to CG in 1962. A heart attack in 1969 led to his elevation to the less demanding post of Deputy Secretary of National Defense.

Djoko Jovanić (age 58) was appointed to the newly created post of Under Secretary of National Defense in 1974. Jovanić's military career consisted exclusively of command posts; he was appointed Assistant Chief of the General Staff for Organization and Mobilization in 1962, was appointed commander of the Zagreb military region in 1967, and in 1974 was appointed Under Secretary of Defense. A MG by the end of World War II, he served 12 years as LCG prior to his promotion to CG in 1959 (at age 42). An archetypal "commander," Jovanić was the commanding officer of a number of the other members of the top military leadership; these include the present Chief of the General Staff, the Party Secretary in the YPA, and two of the assistant defense secretaries. A Serb from Croatia, he retained strong ties with his native region of Lika; he was a key organizer of the Partisan movement in Lika and was commander of the Sixth Proletarian Division, based in the area. Jovanić displayed strong political instincts, in keeping with his prewar Communist activism. He was a frequent public speaker in Lika in the 1960s. In 1971, as commander of the Zagreb military region, he publicly and decisively

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defended the Serb minority in Croatia against what the Serbs saw as the rising Croat nationalist threat.<sup>1</sup> Yet he remained aloof from Croatian Party affairs. He did not become the source of controversy in Croatian politics that one of his subordinates, LCG Rade Bulat, became; Bulat, also a Serb from Croatia, had been prominent in the Croatian Party organization since the early 1950s. Jovanić was included in the 1974 Party Central Committee.

The appointment of Jovanić in 1974 to the new position of Under Secretary (with direct responsibilities for security, intelligence, and personnel policy) can be viewed as an indication of both the seriousness with which the Yugoslav leadership viewed external and internal threats to the country in the early 1970s and of their resolve to place these matters under a successor to General Ivan Mišković acceptable to the professional military, the commanders. (Mišković was the career counterintelligence officer who served as Tito's security affairs advisor from 1971 to 1973; the "Mišković affair" is summarized in Section V.) Yet Jovanić was removed from this key post in early 1977 for unknown reasons; it may be speculated that he, too, concentrated security responsibilities in his hands sufficiently to threaten Ljubičić.

The present Chief of the General Staff, Stane Potočar (age 56) also has a career history of exclusively command posts. In 1965 he was appointed chief of staff of the Sarajevo military region; in 1970, he became commander of that region; in 1971, he was transferred to command the military region in his native Slovenia. In 1972, he was appointed Chief of the General Staff, an appointment reportedly (and plausibly) linked with his nationality (since Ljubičić and Šumonja were Serbs, while Croats held other prominent senior military posts).<sup>2</sup> His performance in the Freedom-71 military exercises of 1971 (the first large-scale exercises held since the 1950s) evidently demonstrated his military capabilities.<sup>3</sup> He was promoted to Major General in 1953 and

<sup>1</sup>Speech of July 27, 1971.

<sup>2</sup>DIA Biographic Data (U), August 1975, Confidential.

<sup>3</sup>Potočar acknowledged that the maneuvers (in which he commanded the "blue" forces) played a role in his promotion. Interview in *Večerni*, November 27, 1975.

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served seven years in that grade and 11 years as LCG prior to promotion to CG in 1971. He was elected to the 1974 Party Central Committee.

The senior Yugoslav military officials below these top four without primary political responsibilities in the military generally reached their present posts through steady progression from one command position to another. Enver Čemalović (age 55), Commander of the Air Force and Air Defense Corps (and an Assistant Federal Secretary of Defense since 1972), was a commissar during World War II, but in the postwar period he occupied command positions culminating in command of the Ploče airbase between 1965 and 1970. He was appointed deputy commander of the Air Force in 1971. Promoted to MG in 1959, he served six years in that grade and eight as LCG prior to promotion to CG in 1973.

The present Commander of the Navy (and corresponding Assistant Federal Defense Secretary), Branko Mamula (age 54), had a mixed career history: a wartime commissar, his postwar career embraced major command, political, and intelligence posts in the Navy. He was appointed head of Naval Intelligence in 1958, chief political officer of the Split military region in 1964 (serving under Šumonja for several years), and assistant chief of the Navy in 1967. He was promoted to Rear Admiral in 1960 and served five years in that grade and eight years as Vice Admiral prior to his promotion to Admiral in 1973.

The post of Assistant Federal Secretary of Defense for Rear Services has been occupied since 1972 by Petar Matic (age 55). Matic had a mixed commander-commissar Partisan career, but spent the postwar years in command positions culminating in command of the War College in 1969 and appointment to the post of Assistant Chief of the General Staff for Operations in 1971. Promoted to Major General in 1953, he served eight years as MG and nine years as LCG prior to promotion to CG in 1970. Prominent in the Vojvodina Party organization earlier, he was included in the 1964 LCY Central Committee but dropped from subsequent top Party bodies; his political visibility declined as his military career progressed.

The post of Assistant Federal Secretary of Defense for Military Economy has been occupied since 1971 by Dušan Vujatović (age 55), who spent the Partisan war as a commissar and held some political posts in the early

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postwar period, but since the 1950s has progressed to higher command positions; in 1965 he was appointed commander of the 20th Armored Division; and in 1969 named head of a section in the General Staff. Promoted to Major General in 1953, he spent seven years in that grade prior to promotion to LCG in 1970 (and was promoted to CG in 1975).

✓ The present deputy chiefs of the general staff are career commanders. Janko Sekernik (age 54), who has protocol and territorial defense responsibilities in the General Staff, served under Potočar in the Ljubljana region, and this association plausibly explains his transfer to Belgrade in 1972. Promoted to Major General in 1959, he spent seven years as MG and eight years as LCG prior to promotion to CG in 1974.

✓ Dušan Pekić (age 54) was appointed the first Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Ground Forces (an elevation of status of the ground forces command) in 1975. A wartime commander and commissar, Pekić held exclusively command posts in the postwar period, including appointment as commander of the Armor School (1961), commander of a military subregion (1964), and Assistant Chief of the General Staff for Training (1969). In 1971 he was appointed Deputy Inspector-General. Promoted to Major General in 1957, he served seven years in that grade and six as LCG prior to promotion to CG in 1970.

✓ The post of Inspector-General, created in 1967, served initially as a channel for easing prominent military leaders out of the limelight. The present incumbent, Dušan Korač (age 55), does not completely fit that pattern. A wartime commissar, Korač occupied primarily political posts in the postwar period, serving from 1958 to 1965 as political officer of the Zagreb military region. In 1967 he was appointed Assistant Chief of the General Staff for Organization and Mobilization; in 1970 he was the (on professional grounds, unlikely) first incumbent of the newly-established post of Assistant Chief of the General Staff for Ground Forces (a post he retained for only one year). Promoted to Major General in 1947, he spent 11 years in that grade and 11 years as LCG prior to promotion to CG in 1969.

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The career paths of the principal political officers in the Yugoslav military at present have been more varied. Ivan Dolničar (age 54), Assistant Federal Secretary of Defense with liaison functions, advanced his career on the basis of "commissar" posts. In 1961 he was appointed commander of the Air Force academy, from which he was elevated in 1967 to the post of Assistant Federal Secretary of Defense for Political Affairs. His prominence at that time was indicated by his membership on the LCY Presidium of 1969 (one of three military members); his appointment was foreshadowed by his membership on the 1964 LCY Central Committee. In 1969 he was transferred to his present Assistant Secretary post and was prominently involved in establishment of the territorial defense system. His meteoric career is demonstrated in his promotion record: a new major general in 1960, he was promoted to LCG in 1967 and, after only three years, to CG in 1970. Thereafter, Dolničar's prominence waned, evidently due to conflict with Ivan Mišković, and for a period his responsibilities were limited to civil defense.<sup>1</sup> Although Dolničar's visibility increased after Mišković's ouster, and he was re-elected Secretary of the National Defense Council (the key government body responsible to the state Presidency for defense policy), his position was weakened; a prime indicator was his absence from the 1974 LCY Central Committee.

Dolničar's former post, Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs, was filled in 1971 by Dane Petkovski (age 53). Petkovski held both political and command posts in his career but had a solid record of command positions prior to 1971; in 1964 he was appointed commander of the 6th Division; in 1967, of a military subregion; in 1969, of the infantry section of the General Staff. While filling these command positions, he continued to play a prominent role in the Party organization in his native Macedonia, and as a result was a member of the LCY Central

<sup>1</sup>The relationship between Mišković and Dolničar was perceptively analyzed by the Canadian military attaché (DIA IR 6904007973, Confidential).

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Committees of 1964 and 1974. Promoted to Major General in 1964, he served only four years in that grade and six years as LCG prior to promotion to CG in 1974.

The post of Assistant Secretary for Personnel has been occupied since 1974 by a career intelligence officer, Radovan Vojvodić (age 53), who had been a commissar (and regional Party secretary) during World War II. Prior to his present appointment, Vojvodić served as Assistant Chief of the General Staff for Intelligence; his present importance is indicated by his membership on the 1974 LCY Central Committee. A major general in 1963, he spent eight years in that grade prior to promotion to LCG in 1971 (and was promoted to CG in 1976).

The present head of the Military Security Service<sup>1</sup> is a professional "commissar." Dane Čuić (age 53) was appointed to this post in 1974; his career as political officer culminated in his appointment as political officer of the Belgrade military region in 1967. In 1969, he transferred to the personnel section of the Defense Secretariat. A Major General in 1963, he spent eight years in that grade prior to promotion to LCG in 1971 (and was promoted to CG in 1976). His appointment broke the postwar domination of career counterintelligence officers over the security service; a change, as explained in Section V, occasioned by the Mišković affair. The most plausible explanation for the appointment of Čuić lies in personal ties with Djoko Jovanić; Čuić was Jovanić's political commissar in the Sixth Proletarian Division at the end of World War II.

The chief Party official in the armed forces, Džemail Šarac (age 54), assumed his position as Secretary of the military Party organization in 1971. A Muslim Slav, he has occupied exclusively political positions during and since the war. In 1966 he was appointed chief political officer of the Zagreb military region, where he served under Jovanić; in 1969 he transferred to Belgrade to head the political department and became an assistant secretary of defense. In 1970 he also headed the newly-established department of territorial and civil defense; in 1971 he became chief Party secretary in the armed forces and, ex officio, a member of the federal Party Presidium. He sits on the 1974 Party Central Committee.

<sup>1</sup> Formerly the Counterintelligence Service, KOS.

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Promoted to MG in 1963, he was elevated to LCG in 1970 (and was promoted to CG in December 1975).

In recapitulation, commanders dominate the apex of the Yugoslav military establishment; the only pure political officers are the head of the security service (an appointment introducing new blood into that service, after the Mišković affair), the now less influential Assistant Secretary for Liaison, Dolničar, and the secretary of the military Party organization. The Federal Secretary and his deputy had personal connections with Tito prior to their appointment; in contrast, "minority" national affiliation was evidently important in the promotion of the present Chief of the General Staff. The number three man in the military establishment in 1975 was a Partisan commander evidently brought in to control a security establishment that was viewed as essential by the political and military leadership but that had threatened to turn against its masters. All other nonpolitical and nonsecurity posts have been filled by "commanders" who progressed up a "command" ladder; command of military schools served as an important rung. A latter-day "commander" is in charge of political affairs in the military. The chief personnel officer is the former intelligence chief. At the senior level, the average time in grade as major general was 7.9 years; as lieutenant colonel general, 7.7 years. There were four exceptions to what seems to emerge as a rule of six years minimum time in grade; all were for political officers (however, promotions from this group to CG rank in 1975 and 1976 occurred after five years).

#### Military Region Commanders

As the preceding discussion indicates, the senior posts in the Yugoslav military have in recent years been filled by occupants of military region command posts, and it is to the military region level that one should look first for future successors to those senior officials.

Dušan Čorković (age 54) was appointed to the Zagreb military region command, replacing Djoko Jovanić, in 1974. With a history of exclusively command posts during and after World War II, Čorković was named commander of the 20th armored division in 1959, of the armor section of the

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general staff in 1967, and head of the ground forces in 1971. Promoted to MG in 1961, he spent eight years in that grade and six as LCG (prior to his promotion to CG in December 1975). A Serb from Croatia, he was reportedly not on the list of nominees of the Croatian Party leadership (all of whom were Croats) to replace Jovanić.

✓ Mirko Jovanović (age 52) was appointed commander of the Belgrade military region in 1969 (and was replaced in the fall of 1975). More a "commissar," he held political posts during World War II and through the 1950s. He served as divisional commander in the early 1960s, became chief-of-staff of the Skopje region in 1965, commander of that region in 1967, and moved to Belgrade in 1969. His promotions were unusually rapid; a new Major General in 1959, he spent only four years in that grade and five years as LCG prior to promotion to CG in 1968. He was included in the 1974 Central Committee. He is a Serb from Serbia proper.<sup>1</sup>

✓ Rahmija Kadenić (age 55), commander of the Sarajevo military region, had, like Jovanović, a more "political" career path. Occupying both command and political posts during and after World War II, Kadenić served in the Skopje region command in 1965. In 1971 he was made chief-of-staff of the Belgrade region; in 1974 he transferred to Sarajevo as commander. A new Major General in 1961, he spent eight years in grade prior to his promotion to LCG in 1969 (and was promoted to CG in 1976). He is the first commander of the Sarajevo region of Muslim nationality (the largest national group in Bosnia-Herzegovina).

✓ Vasko Karaangelski (age 54) was appointed commander of the Skopje military region in 1969 after a wartime and postwar career of exclusively command positions. A Major General in 1960, he spent only three years in that grade and six as LCG prior to his promotion to CG in 1969. A Macedonian, his appointment was plausibly reported to have been intended to assuage national feelings in Skopje;<sup>2</sup> his rapid promotion rate may be interpreted in the same light. (Karaangelski died in February 1977.)

<sup>1</sup>Jovanović was replaced by LCG Petar Gračanin, age 52, likewise a Serb from Serbia, who joined the Partisans in 1941 and subsequently advanced along on a "commander" career path.

<sup>2</sup>DIA IR 2704 0136 69, Confidential.

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Ivo Purisić (age 55), appointed commander of the Split (maritime) military region in 1970, had a straight career of naval command positions during and since World War II. Prior to his last post he served (after 1961) as Commander of the Fleet. Promoted to Rear Admiral in 1968, he spent eight years in that position and six as Vice Admiral prior to his appointment to Admiral in 1974. A Croat from Croatia, he was included in the LCY Central Committee in 1974. (Purišić died in September 1976.) ✓

Franc Tavčar (age 55) was appointed commander of the Ljubljana military region in 1972, succeeding Potočar. A Slovene, he held political and command positions during World War II, but since the war he has held exclusively command positions; in 1963, he was appointed commander of the Engineering School Center. On inactive status in 1968-1969, in 1970 he moved to Ljubljana as a deputy to Potočar. A Major General in 1957, he spent seven years in that grade and nine as LCG prior to promotion to CG in 1973. He was included in the 1974 LCY Central Committee. ✓

The commander of the Niš military region since 1973 has been Bruno Vuletić (age 51), a Croat from Croatia. A wartime commander, Vuletić served in attache and intelligence posts after the war until 1965, when he was appointed commander of the 8th (Varaždin) Division. In 1970 he was picked to head Tito's military cabinet; in 1973 he moved to Niš. A Major General in 1963, he spent seven years in that position prior to promotion to LCG in 1970. Some reports linked his departure from Tito's military cabinet in 1973 with the Mišković affair (but Vuletić was nonetheless promoted to CG in 1976). ✓

In recapitulation, of the seven incumbents of the full military regions in 1975, four had exclusively command careers, one combined intelligence and command posts with a key position on Tito's staff, and two had more political career histories. Of the latter, one was of Muslim nationality (a national group with very few representatives in the senior officer corps); the other has since been replaced. With the exception of Vuletić; all are native sons of the region in which the military region

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is located; Vuletić's appointment to Niš can be viewed as a political counterweight to the command of the Zagreb military region by Croatian Serbs, first Jovanić and then Čorković. Croatian Party recommendations (and popular feelings of Croats) were disregarded in Čorković's appointment. This can be viewed alternatively as the consequence of a refusal by Tito to let national distinctions within a given republic play more of a role than professional qualifications in promotion, or as a more punitive policy dictated from Belgrade favoring the continued predominance of Croatian Serbs in military posts in Croatia as a counter to Croatian nationalism.<sup>1</sup> In contrast to the Croatian case, Karaangelski's earlier appointment to Skopje was evidently intended to assuage Macedonian national feelings. At the military region level, the average number of years spent by the present occupants as major general was 6.4; the same figure applies to tenure as lieutenant colonel generals. The only exceptions to the six year minimum rule were Jovanović, whose "political" career has been noted, and Karaangelski, member of a "minority" nationality.

Promotions of the present incumbents of senior and military district command posts do not conform to the norm (suggested by one foreign attache) of two years in an appropriately high "slot" and eight years minimum time in grade prior to promotion.<sup>2</sup> The existence of a hierarchy of "slots" keyed to ranks is confirmed by Yugoslav sources; promotion requires prior advancement to that slot. However, six years, rather than eight, appears to be (with allowance for exceptions) the minimum time in grade.

(d) Occupancy of Selected Posts. Comparison of the rank of occupancy of certain positions between 1966 and 1975 may point

<sup>1</sup>There is some indication (or at least a feeling on the part of Croats) that "packing" of defense posts in the city of Zagreb itself with Croatian Serbs is deliberate policy. See *The Political Role of the Yugoslav Military* (1975), p. 22; Sporer (1974), pp. 13-14.

<sup>2</sup>Analysis of the former Canadian military attache in Belgrade, DIA IR 6904 009974, March 21, 1974, Confidential.

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to structural changes in the military establishment. Political and republican defense positions will be considered here. The position of Party secretary at the military region level has been devalued since 1966. In 1967, after the post of Party secretary was separated from the post of assistant commander for political affairs at the military region level (as throughout the YPA), it was evidently a Major General slot. As late as 1972, five of the seven military region Party secretaries had ranks higher than colonel. In 1965, when the Party secretaries at the military region level were the assistant commanders for political affairs, all were Lieutenant Colonel Generals. In contrast, in 1975 these Party secretary posts were all filled by colonels (with the exception of a Major General in the Belgrade military district). In 1969, two military region Party secretaries were included in the respective republican Party Central Committee; in 1972, three; but in 1975, none. The post of assistant commander for political affairs at the military region level appears to remain a Lieutenant Colonel General post; the identified occupants all have that rank.

On the other hand, an upgrading appears to have occurred in the level of occupancy of republican defense posts. In 1966, the identified republican defense secretaries were all Major Generals; in 1975 at least two were Lieutenant Colonel Generals, an evident upgrading. More important, in 1975 the commanders of the republican defense headquarters (posts created after 1968) included four Colonel Generals, one Lieutenant Colonel General, and three Major Generals. This was roughly the breakout in 1969. Now as then, the commanders are 55 years of age or older and have strong regional ties.<sup>1</sup>

(e) Collateral Political Activities. Although a systematic comparison of the collateral political positions occupied by members of

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<sup>1</sup> This pattern contradicts the conclusion, drawn by some observers, that placement of younger officers less tied to particular republics in the top territorial defense posts was a vehicle for enhancing the regular military's influence over the republican defense staffs. This erroneous conclusion may have resulted from confusion of the post of commander of the respective republican defense headquarters with the post of chief of staff. The latter are (judging from three identified) Major Generals from the respective republic with recent division- or regimental-level command experience.

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the 1975 military elite and the 1966 military elite proved impractical, other indicators of the nature of and changes in involvement of the military in politics are available. The number of military men in top political posts is one such indicator. In 1966, the only quasi-military man occupying a senior political post was CG Milutin Morača, and he retired from regular service prior to assuming the duties of a member of the Federal Executive Council (i.e., the government executive body). Today, in contrast, one of the Party Executive Committee Secretaries is CG Ivan Kukoč; the Federal Secretary of Internal Affairs is CG Franjo Herljević; the Public Prosecutor is MG Vuko Gozze-Gučetić; and LCG Ljubiša Čurguš heads the Directorate of Civilian Aviation. MG Dragoslav Radisavljević was appointed Director of JAT, the civilian airline (however, for most of its postwar history JAT has been headed by a military man). Only Gozze-Gučetić is known to have formally retired.

Membership of military officers on the Party Central Committee is another indicator of political involvement. Table 13 indicates the proportion of military members on postwar Party Central Committees.

Table 13

MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN POSTWAR LCY CENTRAL COMMITTEES

<u>Date</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage of Total CC Membership</u>
1974 (Tenth Congress)	17	10
1969 (Ninth Congress Presidium)	3	6
1964 (Eighth Congress)	9	6
1958 (Seventh Congress)	4	3
1952 (Sixth Congress)	6	6
1948 (Fifth Congress)	2	3

The present Central Committee contains a larger proportion of military members than at any time in the postwar period; this increase is all the more significant since, as indicated in Section II, 15 of the present 17 military seats are allocated to the Army Party organization (the remaining military men being included in the Central Committee representations from individual republics and provinces). In

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comparative terms, the military representation on the Yugoslav Central Committee is now greater than in the USSR and Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, although much less than in the PRC and Cuba of the mid-1960s.<sup>1</sup> Five of the military seats on the Central Committee are occupied by top defense secretariat officials; three are held by military region commanders; two are held by generals politically prominent outside the army; three are held by political officers; and only two are held by full-time military-Party officials, one of whom is the Secretary of the military-Party organization. (The positions of two individuals remain unidentified.)

In contrast to more military involvement in the federal Party Central Committee, at the republican level military representation on Party Central Committees reached its peak in 1969 and has subsequently declined. Table 14 displays the proportion of military representatives on postwar republican and provincial Central Committees. These data indicate that the policies of the mid-1960s aimed at reducing the barriers between the Army and the rest of Yugoslav society did lead to greater lateral ties between the Army and the republican Party organizations. Moreover, the military contingent on the republican Central Committees included some of the Army Party secretaries for the respective military regions. On the other hand, the further increase in a role for military men in the federal Party Central Committee after the political turbulence of 1971-1972 has been accompanied by a constriction of military representation on the republican Central Committees.

Additional (albeit fragmentary) indicators of military participation in politics indicate a greater (but not overwhelming) role played by military men in contemporary Yugoslav political institutions. The new

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<sup>1</sup>The proportion of military representatives on the Central Committees of other Communist countries for selected recent years is as follows: Bulgaria (1966) 13 percent; Cuba (1965) 51 percent; Czechoslovakia (1971) 6 percent; Hungary (1970) 5 percent; Poland (1971) 8 percent; PRC (1973) 30-40 percent; Romania (1969) 6 percent; USSR (1976) 7 percent. (Kelleher [1974], p. 232; Beck and Rawly [1975]; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, March 31, 1976.)

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Table 14

MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN POSTWAR  
REPUBLICAN PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEES

Republic/Province	Percentage of Total CC Membership					
	1949	1954	1959-1960	1965-1966	1968 <sup>a</sup>	1974
Bosnia-Hercegovina	4	c	0	0	4	1
Croatia	5	0	1	2	4 <sup>b</sup>	1
Kosovo	(First separate congress held in 1968)				0	3
Macedonia	2	0	0	0	6	1
Montenegro	5	0	c	0	3	0
Serbia	3	1	0	0	2	2
Slovenia	0	6	c	0	4	1
Vojvodina	(First separate congress held in 1968)				0	1

Notes:

- a) As of early 1970.
- b) Reduced to 0 in 1972, when all three military representatives were expelled from the Croatian CC.
- c) Data not available.

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electoral system introduced in 1974<sup>1</sup> provided that military units and organizations be separately included in the new system of multiple indirect representation; the issue of such separate representation was a subject of controversy during the preparation of the new electoral system. By mid-1974, local YPA "delegations" had been chosen with a total of 5450 members (92 percent of whom were Party members); these delegations elected seven military delegates to the Federal Assembly; 54 to republican and provincial assemblies (an average of eight per republic or province), and 975 to local assemblies.<sup>2</sup> By way of comparison, in 1964 the then much larger federal assembly included eight military men; only five military officers were among the delegates to all the republican assemblies.<sup>3</sup> More precise data were supplied for the Skopje military region for 1974: 19 percent of the officers and civilian officials in the military Party organization were reportedly active in nonmilitary organs; two hundred and ninety-five were selected for the "delegations" of military units, while 14 were included in the "delegations" of other, nonmilitary local entities; one was a delegate to the Federal Assembly; four were delegates to the republican assembly; 30 were delegates to communal assemblies; while 300 were active in leadership bodies of "social-political organs," primarily the Socialist Alliance and the veterans organization.<sup>4</sup> In the Air Force, 18 percent of the officers were reportedly active in leadership organs of nonmilitary organizations.<sup>5</sup>

Corresponding data for the period prior to the political turbulence of 1971-1972 are not available; isolated bits of information do suggest

<sup>1</sup>The 1974 Constitution revamped Yugoslavia's electoral system, replacing direct with indirect multiple representation through a network of locally-chosen "delegations" who in turn elect "delegates" to multi-cameral representative assemblies at the local, republican, and federal levels. A description is given in Stankovic (1974).

<sup>2</sup>*Narodna armija*, June 27, 1974.

<sup>3</sup>Data derived from *Savezna i republičke skupštine* (1964).

<sup>4</sup>*Narodna armija*, July 18, 1974.

<sup>5</sup>Tanjug, December 3, 1974.

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that the greater involvement of the military in nonmilitary institutions evident at the federal and republican Party levels after 1966 was reflected at lower level Party organs as well.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>In 1968, 2729 Army Communists were included in nonmilitary Party organs at all levels, while 300 military Party members in the Zagreb military region were reportedly included in nonmilitary Party leadership bodies. (*Prva konferencija* [1969], p. 19; Kovačević [1968], p. 34.)

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## Appendix D

RESULTS OF OPINION POLLS OF THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY

Survey research within the Yugoslav military is, as noted in Appendix A, highly developed. Although the results of this research are generally classified, from time to time fragmentary data are published in Yugoslavia. However selective and politically motivated, these published results shed additional light on attitudes within the military.

This Appendix reconstructs, to the extent possible from fragmentary reporting, the results of two key polls of the officer corps. All of the polls were conducted by the Center for Andragogical, Psychological, and Sociological Research of the FSND. Each of the following subsections indicates the nature of the poll; lists actual or reconstructed questions asked (questions reconstructed from paraphrase are enclosed in brackets) and available breakdown of responses; and adds any other information about the results.

Survey of Military Party Members on Army Party Organization Issues, 1968<sup>1</sup>

Information on poll: The sample size was 3236; 2489 were officers and NCOs; 747 were conscripts.

Question 1

[How great is the influence of the Party on life and work in the Army?]

Influence could be greater - 67%

Influence is very strong - 20%

About three quarters of the respondents are not completely satisfied with the influence of the Party in YPA.

10% of those who find LCY influence insufficient are soldiers.

Respondents with lower rank (NCOs, lieutenants, etc.) are more likely to answer that Party influence is very strong than are those of higher rank (majors, lt. colonels, colonels).

<sup>1</sup> Source: Vjesnik, January 6, 1969.

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Conscript respondents of peasant origin and agricultural experience are most likely to see Party influence as very strong, while soldiers from urban milieus are least satisfied with [i.e., evaluate as too limited] Party influence.

Question 2

[Did the reorganization of the LCY in the Army bring about an enrichment of the content of Party work in your organization?]

Yes - 50%  
No change - 33% of the officers  
No opinion - 16% of the officers  
19% of the NCOs

Question 3

[Did the reorganization of the LCY in the Army bring about an intensification of the socio-political activities of NCOs and officers in local communities outside the Army?]

Yes - 30% of the officers  
18% of the NCOs  
No - 43% of the officers  
Don't know - 27% of the officers

Question 4

[To what extent is the work of the Party in the Army influenced by the military hierarchy?]

Partially influenced - 49% of the officers  
45% of the NCOs  
45% of the soldiers  
Strongly influenced - 14% of the officers  
17% of the NCOs  
15% of the soldiers

Overall about 60% of the respondents believe that the military hierarchy partially or strongly influences the work of the Party.

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Question 5

[How independent is the Party organization in your unit?]

Totally independent - 25% of the conscripts

Partially or strongly

influenced by the

military hierarchy - 44% of the conscripts

72% of the conscripts with highest educational level believe that the Party in the YPA is not totally independent.

Question 6

[What is the effect of military subordination on the democratization of relations in Party organizations?]

Negative - 60% of the officers

48% of the NCOs

30% of the soldiers

Question 7

[Military subordination is an obstruction to democratic processes in the Party.]

Agree - 11% of the officers

10% of the NCOs

5% of the soldiers

Question 8

[What aspects of the work of the of the LCY in the YPA should be given the greatest attention on the eve of the IX Congress of the LCY?]

Full realization of the role of the  
LCY in the YPA

- 27% of the officers

25% of the NCOs

26% of the total sample

Ideological preparation of the LCY  
members in the YPA

- 24% of the officers

22% of the NCOs

23% of the total sample

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- Increased efforts to combat and defeat  
bureaucratic and conservative concepts. - 19% of the officers  
14% of the NCOs  
18% of the total sample
- Intra-party relations and increased  
struggle of ideas. - 12% of the officers  
22% of the NCOs  
15% of the total sample
- Other problems. - 18% of the officers  
17% of the NCOs  
18% of the total sample

### Question 9

[What aspects of the development of the Army should be given the greatest attention in the preparation for the IX Congress of the LCY?]

- Education of personnel and the preparation of commanders that are also specialists. - 48% of the officers  
48% of the NCOs  
48% of the total sample
- Increased military preparedness. - 25% of the officers  
27% of the NCOs  
26% of the total sample
- Other problems - 27% of the officers  
25% of the NCOs  
26% of the total sample

### General Survey of Officer Attitudes, May 1971<sup>1</sup>

Information about poll: This survey was conducted anonymously between May 4 and May 12, 1971 and utilized a standard representative sample of military personnel with the rank of sergeant and above. All ranks and nationalities were proportionally represented in the sample.

<sup>1</sup> Source: NIN, June 20, 1971.

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Question 1

[Will the constitutional amendments (of 1971)<sup>1</sup> create favorable conditions for strengthening the influence of the working class in all social affairs?]

Yes - 85% +

No - 1.7%

Rank and nationality do not significantly influence responses.

22.9% of the sergeants and sergeants first class have no opinion.

Question 2

[What impact would the strengthening of republican statehood<sup>2</sup> have on the development of self-management?]

Positive - 80%

very positive - 31.5%

positive - 47.5%

Negative - 0.9%

Rank and nationality do not significantly influence responses.

Question 3

[What impact would the strengthening of republican statehood have on the development of national equality?]

Positive - 73%

Negative - 2.4%

No opinion - 19%

Positive responses increase proportionally with rank.

Nationality does not significantly influence responses.

<sup>1</sup>The constitutional changes of 1971 codified the substantial decentralization of political power from the federal to the republican level.

<sup>2</sup>"Republican statehood" was a key term utilized by the proponents of greater republican-level powers.

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Question 4

[What impact would the strengthening of republican statehood have on Yugoslav unity?]

Very positive &  
positive - 67%  
Negative - 3%  
No opinion - 20%

Nationality does not influence responses.

Question 5

[What impact would the strengthening of republican statehood have on the defense capabilities of Yugoslavia?]

Positive - a large majority  
Negative - 4%

Respondents of the Croatian and Macedonian nationalities are somewhat more positive.

Question 6

[In your opinion what emphasis should be given to the class factor and what to the national factor<sup>1</sup> in the further development of social relations in our country?]

Both factors should be given  
equal emphasis. - 44.1% of the officers  
The class factor should have  
priority. - 18.9%  
Of those: 10.6% noncoms  
19.8% officers  
37.2% high-rank officers

Preference for emphasis on class factor increases proportionally with rank, while the reverse is true regarding the national factor.

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<sup>1</sup>Attention to the relative weight of "class" and "national" factors was central to the post-1969 political debate in Yugoslavia; the "national" factor was stressed by the strongest proponents of national and republican rights.

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Respondents of the Montenegrin and Slovenian nationalities would prefer a class emphasis to a much higher degree than others:

Montenegrins - 28%  
Slovenians - 25%

#### Question 7

[In your opinion was the national problem adequately dealt with in the discussion on the (1971) constitutional amendments?]

The national problem was overemphasized in the discussion over 1/2 of respondents

Of those: 72.1% high-rank officers

The national problem was not adequately emphasized in the discussion

- 3.2%

Among the officers as a whole, a small majority believes that the national problem was overemphasized. The reverse is true about NCOs.

Respondents of the Slovenian, Montenegrin, and Serbian nationality, as well as those listed as "other," believe that the national problem has been overemphasized somewhat more than the other nationalities.

#### Question 8

[What effect would the proposed constitutional amendments (of 1971) have on the unity and brotherhood of our nations?]

positive - 87.1%

no opinion - 10%

85.5% of sergeants major respond in the positive.

The percentage of positive responses of Croats and Macedonians is somewhat larger than those of the other nationalities.

#### Question 9

[In your opinion what are the most important factors that unite the Yugoslav peoples?]

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The respondents were asked to choose three out of eleven possible answers.

More than 50% indicated the following factors as contributing most to unity:

- (1) The People's Liberation War<sup>1</sup>
- (2) Socialism and self-management
- (3) Common defense and security
- (4) The League of Communists of Yugoslavia

Young officers and NCOs tend to stress the unifying character of the PLW more, while officers of higher rank give priority to socialism and self-management and common defense and security.

16% of the responders list the ethnic similarity of the Yugoslav peoples as one of the three most important unifying factors.

16% list economic interests as one of the three major factors of unity. The economic interests factor is sixth most important overall.

Among respondents who list the PLW as the most important factor, the Macedonians and the Serbs are the most numerous, while Muslims are the least numerous.

#### Question 10

[From time to time one hears about dangers that threaten the Yugoslav socialist community. Which, in your opinion, is the greatest present danger?]

The respondents could choose among the following five answers:

- (1) Unitarian hegemonism<sup>2</sup>
- (2) Nationalism and chauvinism
- (3) External aggression
- (4) Unsolved economic problems
- (5) Subversive and espionage activities of the external and internal enemy

<sup>1</sup>The Partisan War.

<sup>2</sup>A "code" phrase meaning proponents of a Soviet-style Communist system dominated by Serbs.

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Nationalism and chauvinism was chosen as the greatest danger by 50% of respondents.

58% of colonels

54% of high-rank officers

40% of all officers

47% of NCOs

This percentage is four times larger than the number of respondents who listed foreign aggression as the main danger.

Nationality does not significantly influence responses.

Officers of Slovenian nationality stress the danger stemming from unsolved economic problems more than other officers.

#### Question 11

[What are the major weaknesses in our society? ]

Increasing social differentiation and negative developments in socio-economic life .

- 72%

81.3% of colonels

56% of sergeants

The tendency to regard increasing social differentiation as the major weakness increases with rank of the respondents.

Unemployment as a major weakness takes second place overall.

The choice of private sector growth as a major weakness is considerably more pronounced among the sergeants than it is among the colonels.

#### Question 12

[What are the major strengths of the Yugoslav socialist community?]

Responses included the following rank order:

- (1) Brotherhood and unity - unanimous choice as most important asset.
- (2) Sovereignty and independence
- (3) Personal freedom and security
- (4) Self-management and pay according to work.

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