

**August 17, 1989**

**Poland: Communists, Solidarity On Collision Course**

**Citation:**

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**Summary:**

An analysis of Solidarity's efforts to form a new Polish government.

**Original Language:**

English

**Contents:**

Original Scan

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~~Top Secret~~

6.2(d)

**POLAND: Communists, Solidarity on Collision Course**

*Solidarity has reversed its earlier position and now is insisting that its sweeping election victory and the public's demand for change entitle it to form a new Polish Government.*

6.2(d)

Leaders of the movement say they will invite the Communists to head the sensitive Ministries of Defense, Internal Security, and possibly Foreign Affairs. Solidarity's legislative leadership yesterday proposed Lech Walesa as its candidate for prime minister, but he declined the job.

6.2(d)

President Jaruzelski and Premier Kiszczak, who between them control the military and security forces, continue to claim that a Solidarity-led government is unacceptable—at least until the opposition shows it will pursue "compromise" and put forward "constructive" solutions to Poland's problems.

6.2(d)

Jaruzelski is to meet soon with leaders of the various political groups to seek a way out. He may try to put off Solidarity by proposing that a Communist reformer, or an independent-minded member of a small party traditionally allied with the Communists, head a new government.

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[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

**Comment:** Kiszczak's offer to resign, and his suggestion that United Peasant Party leader Malinowski be named premier, suggest the party's position may be flexible. Jaruzelski probably would promise specific reforms to Solidarity while also reminding Walesa that security forces already are urging a crackdown.

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Solidarity leaders are sensitive to public pressure for fundamental change and are unlikely to back down unless convinced that Jaruzelski would take drastic action, such as dissolving the legislature.

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