

November 2, 1989
**Special Analysis: Hungary: Reorienting Security
Policy** □

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Summary:

An analysis of increased liberalization in Hungary and the country's membership to the Warsaw Pact.

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~~Top Secret~~

6.2(d)

Special Analysis

HUNGARY:

Reorienting Security Policy

Growing liberalization promises changes in Hungary's foreign and defense policies and is raising doubts about its continued membership in the Warsaw Pact.

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Budapest's foreign policy establishment apparently has concluded that Pact opponents of its democratic transformation, not NATO, are the greatest threat to Hungarian security. Hungary singles out Romania as a particular danger because of tensions over Romanian persecution of the large Hungarian minority in Transylvania and because it fears Romanian leader Ceausescu is not rational. Budapest reportedly is eager to relocate military forces from western Hungary to the Romanian border.

3.3(b)(1)
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The leaders of the ruling Hungarian Socialist Party support the complete withdrawal of remaining Soviet troops from Hungarian territory but appear willing to accept Moscow's view that further reductions must await the outcome of the CFE talks. A government with substantial participation by other parties, such as is likely after next year's elections, probably will press Moscow for further withdrawals. A National Assembly subcommittee, after hearing citizen complaints about noise and environmental pollution near a Soviet military airfield, has already introduced Hungary's nascent democracy to security policy by recommending that the government ask Moscow to close it.

3.3(b)(1)
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The Neutrality Issue

Any popularly elected government almost certainly will put withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact on the agenda with the USSR in its first two years to protect its domestic legitimacy. All of the major opposition groups have called at least for eventual neutrality, and the heat of an open election campaign may lead some to demand immediate, unilateral withdrawal from the Pact. The next government may be the more tempted to press the Soviets harder on neutrality because economic austerity will deprive it of other issues, except the dispute with Romania, that can win it immediate popular support.

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Although several senior Soviet officials told [redacted]
[redacted] Hungary could leave the Pact if it wanted to do so, Soviet
Deputy Foreign Minister Aboimov's later remarks suggest Moscow
still believes the Pact must remain intact as long as NATO exists.
Neutrality is likely to become a major issue in Hungary in the next
several months, and half-measures such as special status for Hungary
within a reformed Pact are not likely to satisfy either the most radical
opposition groups or the voters. [redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

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