

**November 27, 1989**  
**Special Analysis: USSR: Ukrainian Politics Come  
Alive**□□□

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**Summary:**

An analysis of Ukraine's popular front, Rukh, and its potential effects on Communist rule in.

**Original Language:**

English

**Contents:**

Original Scan

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[Redacted]

6.2(d)

**Special Analysis**

**USSR: Ukrainian Politics Come Alive**

*Rukh, the Ukraine's fast-developing popular front, is raising national consciousness in the republic and rallying support for substantial autonomy. Ukrainian nationalism does not yet pose a problem as immediate as that Moscow faces in the Baltics, but the trend is toward greater assertiveness, less control from Moscow, and in the western Ukraine outright independence. If events begin to move too quickly, new Ukrainian party chief Ivashko might switch from tacit cooperation and attempts at co-optation to tougher measures.* [Redacted]

6.2(d)

Rukh's leaders say their immediate objective is that scheduled republic and local legislative elections in March be fair and free. They plan to field a candidate for every seat available. Ultimately, Rukh wants a multiparty system, religious freedom, ownership of private property, and Ukrainian economic self-management. It rejects secession but would eliminate the constitutional article guaranteeing the Communist Party the "leading role" in Soviet society and politics. [Redacted]

6.2(d)

**The Labor Connection**

Rukh is courting elements of the independent labor movement, and [Redacted] the miners are being politicized. [Redacted] Representatives of strike committees in Donetsk, Kremenchuk, and Poltava attended Rukh's founding congress in September. The miners may support Rukh's social and ecological reform proposals but are not interested at present in nationalist and secessionist issues. Many Donetsk miners are either non-Ukrainians or Russified Ukrainians who reportedly value their ties to the USSR's other miners over ties to Ukrainian nationalists. [Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

6.2(d)

Poland's Solidarity is influential with some Ukrainian activists. Rukh has made contacts with Solidarity and has expressed interest in emulating its organization. At Rukh's founding congress, a Solidarity delegation advised striking miners to support Rukh, and miners in the western Ukraine have hinted at forming a free union modeled on Solidarity. Workers apparently copied Solidarity tactics in successfully organizing last month's citywide strikes in Lvov to protest police brutality. [Redacted]

6.2(d)

**New Party Leader Ivashko**

In an interview last month, Ivashko called himself a reformer in Gorbachev's mold. [Redacted] Ivashko met with the organization's new leader three days before Ivashko was appointed.

3.3(b)(1)

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first secretary and agreed to support Rukh's proposals to liberalize the republic's election and language laws. Many nationalists, however, believe that Ivashko is still a son of the old system and only a temporary solution, although an improvement over his hardline predecessor. [redacted]

6.2(d)

Skepticism about Ivashko's commitment to reform has been heightened by the brutal suppression of a nationalist demonstration in L'vov on 1 October and by the appointment of Ideology Secretary Yelchenko—a staunch opponent of nationalism who once said Rukh would exist only over his dead body—to head a new department of interethnic relations. Nevertheless, Ivashko probably will continue to cooperate with Rukh at least in the runup to the March elections, which are likely to sweep out many traditional party officials. [redacted]

6.2(d)

#### Outlook

The Ukraine has not experienced the interethnic conflicts that have occurred elsewhere in the USSR; most differences there have been between Ukrainians who see themselves as members of the larger Russian nation, which includes their Russian and Belorussian cousins, and those who do not. The Kharkov faction of Rukh recently split from the parent group, accusing it of radical nationalism. The faction's leader said his group will join the Kharkov People's Front, a more moderate organization that seeks only to preserve Ukrainian culture. The absence of widespread anti-Russian sentiment among the eastern Ukrainian population probably will continue to moderate Rukh's assertive nationalist agenda, but tensions between the western and the eastern Ukraine and between the western Ukraine and Moscow are likely to rise. Addressing Soviet students last week, Gorbachev warned that Crimea and Donetsk might opt to join Russia if the Ukrainian language is imposed exclusively in that Russified area of eastern Ukraine. [redacted]

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Ivashko probably is hoping to co-opt some of Rukh's leaders by being responsive to its agenda. At the same time, he is likely to try to polarize and thus weaken the movement by sowing dissension among its various factions. Moscow is not likely to tolerate prolonged unrest in the USSR's second-largest republic but will be reluctant to use force on a large scale. Flashpoints will occur if Rukh presses its demands for a multiparty system or an independent Ukrainian Communist party or if demonstrations in the western Ukraine increase in size and frequency. [redacted]

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