

**June 7, 1990**  
**National Intelligence Daily for Thursday, 7 June  
1990**

**Citation:**

"National Intelligence Daily for Thursday, 7 June 1990", June 7, 1990, Wilson Center Digital Archive, Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency, September 1, 2009, Document #0005301363. Contributed by Mark Kramer.  
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**Summary:**

The CIA's National Intelligence Daily for Thursday, 7 June 1990 describes the latest developments in China, UK, USSR, Romania and Czechoslovakia.

**Original Language:**

English

**Contents:**

Original Scan

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APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
01-Sep-2009

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
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





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





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





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CHINA:

**Prisoner Releases Augur No Change**

*Although China apparently hopes the release yesterday of 97 more political prisoners in Beijing and Shanghai will improve its image abroad, the regime is keeping a firm grip on dissent.*

The releases bring the total number of prisoners freed to almost 900. All reportedly had "confessed" to authorities. For the first time, the government released two of the 21 student leaders who were on its "most wanted" list after the prodemocracy demonstrations last June. Another is a Hong Kong resident whose imprisonment had become a cause celebre in the Hong Kong press.

security precautions remain in effect in the capital; security is particularly tight in the university quarter, where students staged protests and threw bottles earlier this week. Three dissidents who had planned a press conference last week demanding the release of political prisoners are still missing; friends say they may have been arrested.



**Comment:** The releases appear timed to influence deliberations in the US Congress on China's most-favored-nation status. Leaders may hope to counteract foreign criticism of heavyhanded security measures in Beijing over the anniversary weekend, including police harassment of foreign journalists. The releases also smooth the way for the mayor of Shanghai to make visits this month to the US, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Nevertheless, the regime almost certainly will maintain strict controls on the population of Beijing, at least until the Asian Games in late September.

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
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


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
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
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


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### Gorbachev's Agenda for Thatcher Visit

The close relationship between President Gorbachev and Prime Minister Thatcher has cooled somewhat, largely because of differences over German unification. Gorbachev probably does not expect his arguments against German membership in NATO will sway Thatcher, but he may hope to win support on related issues such as limiting German forces and the need for a peace treaty.

On Lithuania, any reassurance Gorbachev offers is unlikely to break new ground. He may repeat statements the Soviets made at this week's CSCE conference that the USSR is the only European nation where ethnic minorities have a constitutional right to secede.

Gorbachev probably will not reach any specific arms control compromises with Thatcher, though he will underline the importance of concluding a CFE agreement in time for a CSCE summit later this year. He probably will try to persuade Thatcher that, as arms control negotiations move beyond START I, the UK's long-range nuclear forces need to be addressed. He may raise the recent Soviet initiative on SNF but in order to avoid a delay in SNF negotiations probably will not insist that the UK's short-range nuclear deterrent be included.

Gorbachev may use the visit to highlight mutual interest in a European institution to reduce the risk of conflict and the human rights proposals both nations are supporting at the Copenhagen CSCE conference. He may use the two topics to head into discussion of the agenda for the first CSCE summit preparatory committee meeting next month.

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~~Top Secret~~**UK: Thatcher Visiting USSR**

Prime Minister Thatcher hopes her four-day trip to the Soviet Union beginning today will bolster Soviet President Gorbachev's domestic position, even though London can offer little concrete help. Thatcher will hold talks with Gorbachev—but not with Boris Yel'tsin—and travel to Kiev for a British trade fair. British media say Thatcher, hoping to ease the way for final agreement on a START treaty, will assure Gorbachev the UK will maintain only the minimum credible nuclear deterrent.

**Comment:** Thatcher is concerned the Soviets will try to curtail US-UK nuclear cooperation in START follow-on negotiations but is also preoccupied with trying to persuade Gorbachev to accept German membership in NATO. London probably suspects Moscow's recent announcement of further unilateral cuts in short-range nuclear arms is intended to entice Bonn to accept a deal requiring denuclearization in return for staying in NATO. Although increasingly worried that the issue of independence for the Baltic republics could undermine the recent improvement in East-West relations, Thatcher is unlikely to go beyond privately pressing Gorbachev to begin serious negotiations with those republics. She had hoped the visit would help boost Anglo-Soviet trade, but the USSR's economic problems have made British industry more wary of doing business.

**USSR: Diplomat Criticizes US Afghanistan Policy**

In the harshest public remarks the Soviets have made recently, a high-ranking diplomat specializing in Afghan policy said in a British newspaper article published Tuesday that the US and Pakistan want to continue the war. He accused Secretary of State Baker of backing away from encouraging a dialogue between President Najibullah and the resistance. The diplomat said the US demand that Najibullah surrender power to an interim government would be capitulation and is not realistic. He asserted peace could be assured only through an arms cutoff to both sides and by the removal of sophisticated military equipment.


**Comment:** The Soviet's remarks probably reflect Moscow's decision to hang tough on the question of Najibullah's status during a transition period, even though this point has stymied recent negotiations between Washington and Moscow. His characterization of Najibullah's resignation as capitulation suggests the Soviets remain highly concerned about the manner of Najibullah's possible departure and about saving face for themselves.

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
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~~Top Secret~~**ROMANIA: Internal Conflicts Intensifying**

The massive election victory last month of the ruling National Salvation Front (FSN) has not ended political skirmishing in Bucharest. A committee of reformist Army officers early this week called for the dismissal of Interior Minister Chitac and praised Defense Minister Stanculescu as the most "morally" qualified for military command; the officers implicitly accused Chitac of having links with the Securitate. The Defense Ministry, in turn, has charged the reformist officers with interfering in domestic politics and fostering disunity. Prominent FSN adviser Silviu Brucan has become more sharply critical of President Iliescu and, along with former Defense Minister Militaru, continues to circulate the charge that the revolution was a coup masterminded by the FSN.



**Comment:** The public airing of differences reflects splits in the FSN, rivalries among senior military commanders, and distrust of the security forces among mid- and junior-level military officers. Discord in the military is likely to grow, fed by perceptions that the security forces are benefiting at the military's expense, that most top Defense officials have been co-opted by the FSN, and that the Front continues to protect the Securitate. Brucan's statements suggest he is trying to position himself to gain advantage from splits in the Front. His remarks will help further factionalize the FSN, already divided over the pace and extent of political and economic reform.

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
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



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
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
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


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





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


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
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
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
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
**In Brief**




**USSR**

— Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee holds annual meeting today in Moscow . . . will discuss **Germany**, European security . . . President Gorbachev will brief Pact leaders on summit . . . East Europeans likely to propose reforms. 


— **Soviet Communist Party Central Committee** to meet on weekend to prepare for 28th Congress . . . may consider Premier Ryzhkov's economic reform program, which traditionalist Ligachev, others have complained party was circumvented on. 



**Europe**

— **Albania** for first time to attend CSCE meeting as observer . . . furthers effort to end 45 years of self-imposed isolation . . . delaying full membership, probably fears human rights obligations might encourage unrest. 

**East Asia**

— Senior **Philippine Communist Party** member Antonio Tujan captured yesterday . . . key organizer, head of commission for student, labor, women's activities since 1987 . . . half of party's executive committee now in custody. 

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Czechoslovakia [Redacted]

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**The Economic Challenge**

The new government will face the difficult task of reviving a slumping economy while beginning a transition to a market economy.

Prague thus far has tinkered with economic reform. It has passed joint-venture and private-enterprise laws and has announced plans to introduce internal currency convertibility by yearend and to free prices completely by the end of next year. Prague has been acting as much for political as for economic results. It lowered prices on popular consumer electronics items last month and has postponed planned price hikes for foodstuffs until after the election. It also intends to compensate consumers fully for cuts in food subsidies through direct monthly payments.

Although the new government may recognize the need to speed economic change, concerns over the social impact probably will cause disputes and could slow the pace. President Havel, who apparently favors a cautious approach that maintains broad social guarantees, probably would support a more radical approach only if presented with evidence that a cautious approach could prolong the economic slump.

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### Special Analysis

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#### CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Civic Forum Heading for Election Win

*The Civic Forum and its Slovak counterpart Public Against Violence appear certain to win a plurality in the national election tomorrow and Saturday.*

Only a handful of the 23 parties and coalitions vying for seats in the Federal Assembly and in the National Councils of the Czech and Slovak republics are likely to win the 5 percent of the popular vote needed to gain representation. Recent polls indicate that the alliance of the Forum and the Public Against Violence, which toppled the Communist regime in November, could win as much as 40 percent of the vote. The Christian Democrats probably will come in a distant second, followed by the Communists. Several other parties, including the Greens and Social Democrats, have dropped in the polls recently but could still win seats.

Regional parties probably will make stronger showings in the balloting for the Czech and Slovak legislatures. Separatist sentiment probably guarantees a strong minority voice to the Slovak National Party, which advocates independence for Slovakia. The Society for Moravia and Silesia, which backs autonomy for that region, is likely to do well in the Czech lands.

President Havel is certain to be reelected. He has stressed that a government with a strong popular base is necessary for a smooth transition to democracy and to ensure support for economic reforms. He probably will support the inclusion in the next government of most parties that clear the 5-percent hurdle, regardless of the Forum's showing. The Communists are the only significant political party certain to be consigned to opposition.


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
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### Special Analysis

#### USSR: Public and Party Increasingly Estranged

*The Soviet public's pervasive and growing anti-Communist sentiment after 70 years of party misrule has not yet spilled over into broad-based acts of violence, but it has led to scattered outbursts of hostility and bolder expressions of contempt for party leadership. While the party in the near term probably will remain politically dominant, its likely responses fall short of what would be required to improve its popularity.*

Populist Boris Yel'tsin's election as Russian Republic chairman is the most recent sign of public disaffection with party rule. Yel'tsin's popularity is based on widespread resentment of elite privileges and on the public's perception that the party bureaucracy has tried to make him a scapegoat; the more President Gorbachev and others in the party attacked him, the more support he appeared to pick up from undecided delegates.

The major gains reform coalitions made in elections to local soviets (councils) this spring were another blow to the legitimacy and staying power of the party, particularly in Moscow, Leningrad, and other key cities. In a recent poll of residents in the Moscow area, only 9 percent said they trust the CPSU. On May Day, marchers in Moscow for the first time openly expressed their contempt for the party leadership, bearing slogans such as "Down With the Empire of Red Fascism" and, according to a Soviet newspaper, shouting obscenities against Gorbachev.

Growing consumer shortages—and especially anxiety about food supplies—are fueling the public's resentment of privileges enjoyed by party members. In one illustrative incident reported in the Soviet press in January, citizens of Chernigov in the Ukraine were outraged to find smoked sausage and other delicacies in the chauffeured car of a local Ukrainian party official involved in an accident. They smashed his Volga, put it in front of the regional party committee building, and three days later demonstrated more than 20,000 strong against such privileges; two senior oblast party officials were subsequently ousted.

The public has also become embittered over continuing revelations of Iosif Stalin's crimes and over rising crime rates. And it is holding central authorities responsible for polluting the environment.

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### The Party's Response

Responding to increasing public hostility toward corrupt and incompetent leaders, some regional party organizations have retired their leaders and adopted more democratic methods to select their successors. Party bureaucrats early this year also returned a token number of dachas to social welfare organizations; stopped distributing goods from special outlets to party, state, and economic organizations; and restricted the use of official vehicles. These actions have not been enough to improve the party's popularity. [redacted]

### Prospects

The party's unpopularity has not dislodged it from its political dominance, and party bosses in the provinces are routinely elected as heads of the local governments. Nonetheless, party officials are finding it more difficult to compete in local elections, and will no doubt find public anger against them increasingly hard to deflect. Increasing democratization and the attendant feeling among a growing number of people that they can influence political decisions—as shown by Yel'tsin's recent victory—can help defuse the situation and make Romanian-style popular revolution less likely in the USSR. [redacted]

Regime repression and broken promises, however, risk more widespread violence. Embittered coal miners, exasperated at the unfulfilled promises made last summer for better conditions, have begun to organize for renewed strikes this summer. [redacted]

[redacted]

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