

June 11, 1990

National Intelligence Daily for Monday, 11 June 1990

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Summary:

The CIA's National Intelligence Daily for Monday, 11 June 1990 describes the latest developments in Canada, USSR, Liberia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, EC-Iran and Haiti.

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
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

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Canada: Proposal for Senate Reform

Senators are appointed by the Governor General on the advice of the Prime Minister. The 104 seats are now distributed according to regional representation. Quebec and Ontario account for about half the members.

The compromise package provides a five-year deadline for the provincial premiers to reform the Senate into an elected body with more equal representation among the provinces. If an agreement is reached, according to press reports, Ontario would give up six of its 24 seats; New Brunswick and Nova Scotia would lose two each. Quebec would keep its 24 seats but would gain in proportion to Ontario. Should the premiers fail to reach agreement, the Senate automatically would be reapportioned to add two new seats each for the four western provinces and Newfoundland.

Current Distribution of Senate Seats

| | | | |
|---------------------------|------|-----------------------|----|
| <i>Western Provinces</i> | (24) | Ontario | 24 |
| Alberta | 6 | Quebec | 24 |
| Saskatchewan | 6 | Newfoundland | 6 |
| British Columbia | 6 | Yukon Territory | 1 |
| Manitoba | 6 | Northwest Territories | 1 |
| <i>Maritime Provinces</i> | (24) | | |
| New Brunswick | 10 | | |
| Nova Scotia | 10 | | |
| Prince Edward Island | 4 | | |

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CANADA:

Constitutional Crisis Resolved

Prime Minister Mulroney and the provincial premiers on Saturday patched together an agreement on the Meech Lake accord, but a more decentralized Canada almost certainly will result.

The Premiers of Manitoba and Newfoundland—the last two to approve the accord—signed a compromise that would begin Senate reform but would not alter Meech Lake's recognition of Quebec as a "distinct society." The premiers added a nonbinding letter by constitutional experts declaring that the "distinct society" clause complements but does not override the Charter of Rights; the letter is not part of the Meech package. A special commission will examine a largely symbolic "Canada clause" to be added to the preamble to the Constitution. It expands definition of the Canadian identity to include recognition of multicultural and native groups.

The Premiers of Newfoundland, Manitoba, and New Brunswick have the support needed to win approval of the package in their legislatures by the 23 June deadline. However, Newfoundland's Premier Wells, chafing over the deal, is threatening to hold a provincewide referendum on the issue.

Comment: Despite his threat, Wells is unlikely to risk the compromise by placing the issue before the public in Newfoundland, where the accord is unpopular. Quebec Premier Bourassa and Mulroney have scored big political gains. Bourassa will be viewed in Quebec as having won the province's right to protect its French language and culture. Mulroney, taking credit for having "saved Canada," probably will try to take a more federalist approach in the immediate future to undercut his rival Jean Chretien, a strong federalist who is likely to be the next Liberal Party leader.

Quebec's demands for more autonomy, however, are likely to continue. Any concessions to Quebec are likely to draw similar requests from other provinces, particularly in western Canada. Senate reform is likely to grant more seats and influence to the smaller and western provinces, increasing their ability to fight for regional interests.

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Interethnic Conflict in Kirghiz S.S.R. and Uzbek S.S.R., 10 June 1990



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USSR:

Control Extended in Kirghiziya and Uzbekistan

Although the casualty count continues to rise, apparently mostly from delayed reporting, security forces maintained control in the Kirghiziya and Uzbekistan areas of the Fergana Valley and in Frunze yesterday in a still-explosive situation. [redacted]

Scattered fighting continues in smaller cities near Osh, and Soviet media report at least 115 dead and 460 injured in the conflict between Kirghizis and Uzbeks, including three dead and 41 injured in the security forces. Nevertheless, authorities claim partial success in calming Osh and the Uzbekistan border region. Ministry of Interior and army forces reportedly control the ethnic Uzbek city of Uzgen, where 68 deaths and the worst destruction apparently occurred. Armed bands, some dressed in police uniforms, reportedly are still engaging in hit-and-run attacks in many of the region's smaller cities. Efforts to evacuate some Uzbeks and open up intercommunal dialogue reportedly are also under way. [redacted]

[redacted] In Frunze, demonstrations by students and nationalists have been prohibited, and the people warned that troops have been ordered to fire if necessary. [redacted]

Comment: Authorities seem anxious to begin the work of peaceful reconciliation. However, casualty figures may further inflame the situation. In Uzgen, most of the casualties probably are Uzbeks. Having secured control of Frunze, Kirghiz Republic authorities are able to ignore calls for political change by an emerging nationalist movement, but Kirghiziya is likely to face further interethnic conflict and political instability. [redacted]

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

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


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LIBERIA: Peace Talks Planned as Fighting Continues

Delegations from the Liberian Government and the Liberian Council of Churches are expected to arrive in Sierra Leone today for peace talks with rebel representatives. The discussions reportedly are designed to seek common ground for negotiating a cease-fire and an end to the civil war. Fighting continues for control of the Firestone rubber estate. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] army forces probably still control the town of Harbel.

Meanwhile, arrests and killings continue in Monrovia, [Redacted]



Comment: The negotiating positions of the two sides are likely to be far apart. The rebels probably will continue to demand that President Doe leave office before a cease-fire can be arranged. Meanwhile, Doe still refuses to step down [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Barring a major army offensive, the rebels are likely to continue gaining the upper hand militarily and may be in a position to resume consolidating their troops at the rubber estate near Roberts International Airfield. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Czechoslovakia: Prime-Ministerial Possibilities

This week President Havel probably will ask Marian Calfa, a member of Public Against Violence, to stay on as Prime Minister. But Havel, a consensus builder, may give the prime-ministership to the Christian Democratic Union to help heal campaign wounds and broaden his support base. In that case, he probably will tap current Deputy Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky.

Marian Calfa

Calfa quit the Communist Party in January, a month after becoming Prime Minister. He has worked for political and economic reform. If he stays on, he probably will continue to be a policy implementer, leaving policy formation largely to Havel.

Jan Carnogursky

A longtime Catholic activist and right-of-center opponent of the Communist regime, Carnogursky had been out of prison only two weeks when he was named to the government last December. He is a prominent voice in Slovakia for continued union with the Czech lands but with increased autonomy for Slovakia. His Christian Democratic Union did worse than expected, but he will continue to wield considerable influence, especially in Slovakia, whether or not he becomes prime minister.

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~~Top Secret~~**CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Civic Forum Triumphs in Vote**

President Vaclav Havel's ruling alliance apparently has a clear mandate to carry out political and economic reforms. More than 90 percent of the eligible voters turned out for the election on Friday and Saturday. Exit polls indicate Civic Forum and its Slovak counterpart, Public Against Violence, received 48 percent of the ballots cast. The Christian Democrats and the Communists were distant runners-up, each receiving 10 to 12 percent.

Comment: The alliance can control the Federal Assembly by themselves, but its leadership almost certainly will accept the Christian Democrats as junior partners. The size of the victory might encourage the next government to speed up economic restructuring while its mandate is still strong. But the alliance is an amalgam of many small groups, and internal disputes over its role might interfere with its ability to govern. Havel, assured of reelection, will play a key role in keeping factional infighting from derailing the reform program.

BULGARIA: Likely Communist Win

Preliminary election projections indicate the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)—the former Communist Party—will finish well ahead of the main opposition group, the Union for Democratic Forces (UDF). Predictions based on a "quick count" of about 38 percent of the party preference vote, carried out by a nonpartisan Bulgarian monitoring group and the US National Democratic Institute, give the BSP 48.3 percent and the UDF 34.9 percent. The Agrarian Party is winning 8.3 percent and the pro-Muslim Rights and Freedoms Movement 5.7 percent; no other party is receiving more than 1 percent. Official results for the half of the 400 parliamentary seats to be determined by proportional representation are expected early today, but winners in the 200 single-seat districts will not be known until late tonight. Foreign observers said the vote probably was fair.

Comment: Even if the BSP wins a clear majority, it will try to form a coalition government. It is looking to the West for approval and economic assistance, and Prime Minister Lukanov repeated yesterday that the BSP sees a coalition government as in the country's best interest. An effective government may still be some distance away; the UDF and the Agrarian Party are pledged not to join a BSP government. Even if they go back on this pledge and enter a coalition, consensus on pressing issues like economic reform and depoliticizing the bureaucracy and security service will be difficult to reach.

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~~Top Secret~~**EC-IRAN: New Talk About Repairing Relations**

The EC appears ready to accept an Iranian official's suggestion of a way to normalize relations ruptured last year by Tehran's death sentence on Salman Rushdie. According to a British press report, an Iranian Foreign Ministry official last week suggested Tehran would not pursue its vow to kill Rushdie if the EC condemned "insults" to Islam. The UK, which has blocked efforts to lift EC diplomatic sanctions against Iran, responded favorably to the suggestion, according to press [redacted] it was disappointed by later objections from Supreme Leader Khamenei. The Irish, who currently hold the EC Presidency, reportedly are circulating among member states a draft acceptance reflecting the Iranian official's suggestion. [redacted]

Comment: Iranian hardliners remain opposed to rapprochement, but this formula could offer both sides a way out of the impasse. Although the normalization process could be sabotaged at any point, the West Europeans are eager for a share in Iranian reconstruction contracts. They also believe normalizing relations with Tehran might hasten the release of hostages in Lebanon. [redacted]

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~~Top Secret~~**HAITI: New Tests for Trouillot**

President Trouillot faces renewed pressure from within and outside her administration that may further reduce her ability to move toward an election. [redacted] arrest warrants issued last week for three Army officers have fueled concerns in the military that the populist Council of State, which shares power with Trouillot, is trying to persecute the armed forces for past abuses. [redacted]

[redacted] the President has angered the Council by unilaterally naming a new finance minister. Meanwhile, hardline Duvalierist Claude Raymond has announced his candidacy for president and warned the government not to challenge his right to run. [redacted]

Comment: The military's reaction to the arrest warrants poses the most immediate threat to Trouillot. Salary supplements and protection against external investigations have kept key military units in check, but their tolerance may evaporate quickly if the warrants are served. Although the Council probably will not try to force Trouillot to withdraw the finance appointment, it will look for new ways to limit her autonomy, and some members may resign in protest. It is unclear how the Provisional Electoral Council, which oversees voting, will rule on Raymond's candidacy; excluding him on constitutional grounds would increase prospects for new rightwing violence. [redacted]

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
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In Brief



Americas

— Novelist Vargas Llosa conceded Peru's presidential election yesterday to opponent Fujimori after early exit polls give latter 7- to 9-point lead . . . final count expected late this month.



USSR

— Soviet Uzbek Communist party congress last week blamed Moscow's economic policies for causing republic's low living standard . . . called for political, economic sovereignty . . . most defiant gesture so far by Central Asian party.




Europe

— In Yugoslavia, Serbian Republic's Communist Party, Socialist Alliance to merge, forming Socialist Party . . . Communist strength declining, strongman Milosevic trying to improve position before anticipated Serbian elections later in year.



— East Germans Thursday arrested Red Army Faction terrorist living in East Berlin for a decade . . . probably had long-term involvement with state security service . . . more arrests likely as East, West Germans examine security files.



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Africa

— **Ivory Coast** President Houphouet-Boigny has sacked Army Chief of Staff . . . almost certainly scapegoat for recent mutiny by Army troops . . . new chief likely to establish rapport quickly, gain respect of disgruntled junior officers. [Redacted]

South Asia



— **India** says trade dispute with **Nepal** over . . . probably suspending economic sanctions only temporarily to bolster new Nepalese Government . . . Kathmandu still must address New Delhi's concern about Nepal's ties to **China**. [Redacted]

— **Sri Lankan** Tamil militants killed one, wounded 10 Army troops yesterday . . . first clash in 13 months . . . may derail negotiations, both sides prepared for more violence. [Redacted]

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


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Special Analysis

USSR: Democratic Reformers Challenging Gorbachev

Unless President Gorbachev makes decisive moves, democratic reformers will increasingly dominate Soviet politics. The more they do, the more Gorbachev will also come under pressure to move sharply to the left or the right to regain the initiative.

Boris Yel'tsin's election as chairman of the Russian legislature gives democratic reformers a highly visible although divided platform for promoting reform. In Moscow, Leningrad, and other key cities, reformer-controlled city councils are pursuing bolder reform agendas. The non-Russian republics, especially in the Baltic region, are pressing for greater autonomy and Western-style political and economic systems. Even the Communist Party's Democratic Platform faction, which is demanding an end to the leadership's tight control, is rapidly gaining strength and now claims the support of about 40 percent of party members. A poll this spring indicated that, although more than a third of all Soviets favor "slow, cautious" reform, 41 percent support accelerated change.

The democratic reformers face serious obstacles, however, before they can change Soviet policy. The party bureaucracy still controls most of the levers of power in the center and the provinces and will offer serious political battle. Moreover, most democratic reformers in the peripheral republics have focused on local nationalistic and ethnic issues over which they have greater influence. They generally favor bolder moves toward a multiparty democracy and blame the apparatus for domestic problems.

The Western-style reformers among them favor private property and a free market economy. This view is especially strong among intellectuals in big cities and among supporters of the Democratic Platform. Yel'tsin and other populists back a strong economic and social safety net.

Gorbachev's Response

Gorbachev has consistently underestimated the strength of the democratic reformers and increasingly appears to be reacting to events. He seriously miscalculated in trying to stop Yel'tsin's bid to chair the Russian legislature. By ducking a direct election to the presidency last March, Gorbachev missed an opportunity to get a popular mandate for the forceful actions necessary to reverse the

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USSR's slide. Moreover, the belief is spreading that his program is largely a series of half measures. His public approval rating is dropping.

Gorbachev nonetheless apparently thinks he can hold the center together. He has tried to regain control of events in recent weeks by reining in democratic forces and giving priority to the concerns of traditionalists while continuing to advance some reforms. Although he remains fundamentally at odds with traditionalist objectives, he needs the support of the military to control unrest and will continue to rely on the party as his chief political base, at least in the short term.

Forced To Choose

Democratic reformers appear to be outpacing traditionalists, pushing the country further toward democratic change. The empowerment of democratic institutions could press the central leadership harder to seek a genuine popular mandate. Rather than let himself be overtaken by events, Gorbachev might opt for bold initiatives, such as standing for popular election as President, abolishing the Congress of People's Deputies and making the Supreme Soviet directly elected, embracing the program of the Democratic Platform at the party congress, or forming a new proreform coalition. Such moves would not give Gorbachev control over the Westernizing reformers, but they would increase his odds of remaining the key player.

If Gorbachev is willing and able to accommodate the democratic reformers, he may succeed in limiting the polarization and confrontation that threatens to dominate politics at both the national and regional levels. Nevertheless, confrontations between increasingly assertive popularly elected institutions and leaders and an intransigent party apparatus could paralyze policy. Gorbachev might use his presidential prerogatives to reimpose some authoritarian controls and curb the growing radicalization of the institutions and public. As the traditionalists, especially party and security officials, grow increasingly alarmed by the breakdown of social order, they could take action on their own. Although such an effort probably would fail, it could compound social polarization and instability.


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




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




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