

November 10, 1986

Cable No. 3026, Foreign Minister to Ambassador Nakae, 'The Prime Minister's Visit to China (The Meeting with Chairman Deng - on World Affairs)'

Citation:

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<https://wilson-center-digital-archive.dvincitest.com/document/220105>

Summary:

The Japanese Prime Minister and Chairman Deng discuss U.S.-Soviet relations, specifically the recent U.S.-Soviet Summit.

Original Language:

Japanese

Contents:

Original Scan
Transcript - Japanese
Translation - English

(7)

※総第 [redacted] 号007公館宛

※昭和 61年 11月 10日 10時 44分 秒受付

略 暗

YYYY

暗秘

(回覧番号) 電 信 案

260 電信課長
260 事務次官
代 官

大 臣 秘書官 政務次官 事務次官 外務審議官 外務審議官 官房長	主管 アシア局長 エ号 中川局長	※発電係 1/2 起案 昭和61年11月8日 起案者 植田 電話番号
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(※印欄内は電信課記入)

協議先
北東局長 ソ連局長
北東局長 ア東局長

在 中国 大 伊 総領事 あて 外務大臣 発

件名 総理府中 (鄧小平主席の会見 - 世界情勢)

主管・文書記号 ア中	※電番 第3026号	大至急 至急 普通 (優先処理)	パターン・コード [redacted]
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転電・転送・転報 在 米ソ、外、上海、杭州、香港	※転電番号 合第17026号	大至急 至急 普通 (優先処理)
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宛先 3023号新電3

(八〇字)

(昭和六〇・十一・一改正)

※ [redacted] 優先 TYUUGOKU 等007 漢

GB-1

外務省 (注意) 1枚目は、機械で処理しますので、折り曲げない様願います。

9

(110011)

日. 総理判、米ソ首脳会談がソ連の外交
 政策への影響をいかに見ているかを、この対し
 野文化は海とより述べて
 日合はいつ、対話には賛成する。対^抗
 米賛成する。米ソ首脳会談自体はよいに
 であり、^{現在は}米ソの交渉の場、日合は意
 義を低くはみてゐる。彼らから引き続き対話を
 行うのを賛成。緊張は緩和される。
 ソ連の外交政策への影響は、米^ソの
 交渉に一定の影響を及ぼすに、ソ連の歩み
 は大きくない。~~中門~~。中門^とソ連^{との関係に同じ}の歩みは
 限りでは、ソ連の歩みは中門から多い
 が多い。三大障^害を排除して^は原則的
 同意してゐるから、実際には何も出てゐない。
 アフガニスタンでもせいぜい5%の軍隊を撤

8

(11004)

³²退²は²在²に、²それ²の²防²空²部²隊²に。毛²ソ²ソ²
 駐²留²軍²の²撤²退²の²中²味²は²な²い。~~軍²隊²~~
~~は~~自²分²は²ソ²連²が²カ²ン²フ²ク²の²障²碍²を²取²り
 除²く²な²ら²ば、コ²ソ²フ²の²合²意²の²行²な²ら²ばと
 言²う²事²が²な²い。「カ」内²題²は²最²の²実²質²的²内²題²で²あ
 り。三²大²障²碍²を²取²り²除²く²とい²う²の²て²及²ば²な²い。
 最²の²中²味²の²な²ら²ば²「カ」内²題²で²あ²り、ソ²連²の²
 中²味²を²知²ら²な²い。中²ソ²内²の²ホ²ット²ポ²イ²ント²は
 「カ」に²あ²り、ソ²連²の²誠²意²が²あ²る²か²を²知²ら²ば²「カ」に²
 対²し²て²い²う²事²が²な²い。「カ」が²解²決²す²中²味²
 中²ソ²は²正²常²比²す²。
 (総²理²料、²それ²は²三²大²障²碍²は²実²は²一²大²
 障²碍²に²な²ら²な²い、と²言²う²事²が²な²い)
 それ²の²い²ふ²事²。一²か²し²信²息²と²い²う²三²大²障²
 碍²と²言²い²続²け²る。中²ソ²内²境²に²は、在²毛²、軍²が

GB-3

9

(1110011)

撤退（この50数個師団を残し、ソ連の3分の1
 のミサイルをおおわす。二つは日中交渉のため。
 是處の南心の友の句題であり、東門のついで
 南心の友の句題である。

（経路別更へ、東軍艦の青島寄港は行わ
 ぬ。東中軍事提携はど：東：ソ連、北
 北と：3）

東門は東門遠くまでゆく：北は北、
 中国も同じだ。中国の外交政策は独立自主で
 あり、他人の事と自分とを併りつけようとする
 北は（北）

米、ソ、外、上海、廣州、香港に電報した。
 (3)

Received at 12:46:44, November 10, 1986

Drafted on November 8, 1986

Primary: Director General of Asian Bureau approved
[illegible]
Director of China Division approved

From: Foreign Minister
To: Ambassador to China

Title: The Prime Minister's Visit to China: Meeting with Chairman Deng: on World Affairs

Cable No. 3026

Secret, Urgent

[...]

The Prime Minister [Nakasone] asked the Chairman what he thought of the U.S.-Soviet Summit and the Soviet Union's foreign policy, and Mr. Deng said:

I'm always in favor of dialogue. I do not agree with the confrontation. The U.S.-Soviet summit is a good thing in itself, and neither side now views the significance of the meeting in a lesser light. I'm in favor of them continuing to engage in dialogue. Relaxation is better than tension.

□

As for Soviet foreign policy, as I said in response to a U.S. television interview, the Soviet Union has not made great strides. As far as the relationship between China and the Soviet Union is concerned, there is much that the Soviet Union says that has no substance. They agree in principle to remove the three major obstacles, but nothing comes out of it in practice. Even in Afghanistan, at best, only five-percent of the troops are being withdrawn, and that's an air defense force. There is also nothing about the withdrawal of troops stationed in Mongolia. So I said that I could go and see Gorbachev if the Soviets would remove the Kampuchea obstacle. The "power" issue is the most substantive issue. If we are to truly remove the three major obstacles, the most contentious one is the "power" problem, and the Soviet Union knows this. The hot point between China and the Soviet Union is "power," and you can tell whether the Soviet Union is sincere or not by looking at "power." Once the "power" is resolved, China and the Soviet Union will be normalized.

(The Prime Minister asked if the three major obstacles had actually become one major obstacle.) That could be said. But I [Deng] still keep saying the three major obstacles. Some 50 divisions remain on the Sino-Soviet border even if the forces in Mongolia are withdrawn, and one-third of the Soviet Union's missiles are located there. This is an issue of common interest to both Japan and China, and it is of interest to the United States as well.

(When the Prime Minister further asked about how far would the military cooperation between US and China go in the light of in the wake of the U.S. warship's port call to Qingdao) The US won't go very far, and neither will China. China's foreign policy is independent and self-reliant, and it doesn't try to stake itself on other people's affairs.

[Cable] relayed to the [Japanese diplomatic missions in] the U.S., Soviet Union, Thailand, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Hong Kong.