

March 10, 1970
**TelCon between President Nixon and Henry A.
Kissinger, March 10, 1970**

Citation:

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<https://wilson-center-digital-archive.dvincitest.com/document/240283>

Summary:

A conversation between Kissinger and President Nixon, discussing the US position towards Israel (specifically economic assistance and media response)

Original Language:

English

Contents:

Original Scan

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6



By KLV NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELCON
President/Kissinger
10:40 am 3/10/70

P: I can't get ~~to~~ into this Israeli thing. I have a (education) group meeting coming up. I don't quite understand States' position and what we favor here. I want economic assistance and taking care of their losses and then the game plan -- with increased Soviet movement we will move in amount (dictated). What basically is different?

K: State sent over a transigent statement. Bill will agree after i work it over.

P: So the statement is put on guidance. We will provide economic assistance up to 7 million dollars ;and provide for losses but we're not going beyond that point.

K: There seems to be some discussion over who will make the announcement. State thinks it's going to be made over here.

P: They will make the announcement. That's an order.

K: My concern is Jewish control of the press and Rabin's request to see me with a message from Meier. I should tell Rabin that we will replace their losses and let the good news come out of here and the bad news from State.

P: Call Rabin in Thursday and tell him the good news - - economic up to whatever it is.

K: Close to 8 mill. dollars.

P: Replace losses and Third, we will re-evaluate if there is a change.

K: Sisco recommends that they keep production at such a level we can get planes to them.

P: I recommended no on the memo because I didn't want anything announced. I don't want it to seem we are giving the Israelis everything they want.

K: We have to get across ~~to~~ to the Israelis that this is a tactical move.

P: Tell Rogers that this is a diplomatic move and I want them to use it as a move with the Soviets on this.

K: If the Soviets stop moving arms, then we move right on this. We will change if the Soviets keep sending arms.

P: This is ^{not} ~~is~~ the time to do it. We have problems in this country, even from those they think they have support from.

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By KW NARA, Date 5/13/04

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K: ? ? ? ? ? Media will go for this even more. That's my concern.

P: Rabin couldn't control them against Pompidou and I'm not sure he can control the intellectuals. Rabin should know this is policy.

K: The danger is that if we keck them in the teeth they might start a war.

P: We aren't. We field the losses -- put this in a peaceful context. We will be of assistance there then put it to the Soviets. We are not going along on a massive Israeli request. It would force the Soviets into a massive reaction including men into the UAR.

K: They have held back and now we must see what they are doing.

P: You decide whether you want to tell Dobrynin.

K: I'm seeing him today on SALT.

P: But I don't think this soon. Let Rogers tell him. And State is to make the announcement.

K: I will get that set this afternnon and they will make the announcement Friday.

P: You prepare the papers. I will be tied up until

K: There's another issue -- My Lai. That general is going to find disciplinary problems and I think you should stay out of that.

P: That should be done at the Laird level.