

August 10, 1988

Ichiro Suetsugu, Secretary General, Council on National Security Problems, 'Results of Nakasone-Gorbachev Meeting and Future Issues: Putting the Northern Territories Issue at the Center'

Citation:

"Ichiro Suetsugu, Secretary General, Council on National Security Problems, 'Results of Nakasone-Gorbachev Meeting and Future Issues: Putting the Northern Territories Issue at the Center'", August 10, 1988, Wilson Center Digital Archive, 2019-1220, Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs, published online by the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Translated by Stephen Mercado.
<https://wilson-center-digital-archive.dvincitest.com/document/250391>

Summary:

On 22 July 1988, former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone met Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow as part of a Japanese campaign to recover four islands lost to the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War. In the aftermath of the visit, Ichiro Suetsugu, secretary-general of the Council on National Security Problems, wrote a report appraising the former Japanese leader's performance on his Soviet visit and assessing future issues in the campaign.

Original Language:

Japanese

Contents:

Original Scan
Translation - English

民権2818

昭和63年8月10日

中曾根・ゴルバチョフ会談の成果と
これからの課題

— 北方領土問題を中心に —

安全保障問題事務局長

末次 一郎

有意義だった中曽根訪ソ

こういう言い方をしては甚だ失礼であるが、先般の中曽根前首相のモスクワ訪問については、正直なところ、事が終るまで頻りに気を揉みつづけた。とくにゴルバチョフ書記長との会談を通じて、たとえどちらからにせよ、予想もしなかったようなことが飛び出してこなければという思いからであった。

しかし、事が終ってみると、流石な前首相、2時間40分にわたる書記長との会談を通じて、終始堂々たる態度を貫いてわたり合った。

論議は、国際情勢の全般、ソ連のペレストロイカ（再編・改革）の現状・展望、アジア・太平洋問題、そして日ソ関係と広範にわたって行われたが、とくに注目されていた「北方領土問題」については、前首相が真正面から問題の根源を衝いて日本の主張を堂々と述べて迫った。もちろん書記長もソ連の立場からこれに应酬したが、おそらくこのやりとりを通じて、彼としてもかなり強烈な印象をもって受けとめたのではあるまいか。

ゴルバチョフ書記長が自ら北方領土問題について論議したのは今回がはじめて、という一部の報道があったが、それは正確ではない。

一昨年（1991年）の五月末、その年一月のシェワルナゼ外相の訪日につづく外相定期協議のためモスクワを訪れた安倍外相（当時）は、クレムリンに赴いて書記長表敬を行った。その際外相は、当然のことながら「北方領土問題を解決して平和条約を締結するために、交渉をはじめたい」と、強く申し入れた。

そのときゴルバチョフは、ブレジネフのように、「問題は存在しない」として逃げるのではなく、“戦後の国境は不可侵”、“それによってヘルシンキ協定ができた”と应酬している。今回の場合も、基本的にはこのときの立場から一步も出ていない。

しかしあのときは表敬、今度は会談。中曽根前首相は「北方領土問題はスターリンの錯誤からはじまった」とその根源にふれ、たっぷりと、しかも切り口も鋭く迫ったのである。その場での应酬はともかく、新たなアジア・太平洋戦略、とくに対日戦略の組み立てをはじめつつあるゴルバチョフ書記長が、この会談の内容をどう受けとめ、これに対してどのように対応するかはすべて、これからの問題ではあるが、かなり強烈な印象をもって受けとめたであろうことは否定できまい。

ところで、数か月前に、中曽根首相のモスクワ訪問の話しが出はじめたころ、今だ機熟せずと考えていた私は、率直にその旨を申し入れた。

沖縄の祖国復帰問題に取り組んでこれを成し遂げ、次は戦後処理の最後の課題である「北方領土問題」だとして、長年にわたって取り組んできた者の「勘」であった。

また、たとえ立場は異なるとしても率直な対話の場を設けることが必要だと考えて、日ソ双方のそれぞれ有力な学者、専門家をもって組織し、これまで10回にわたる会議を重ねて白熱の論議をたたかわせてきた立場からの「読み」でもあった。

“ソ連の対日戦略の腰はまだすわっていない。これからだ”と読んでいたわれわれは、今、前首相がモスクワに乗りこんで、政治家としての功を焦って妙な変化球を投げられたら困る、という不安があったからである。私の脳裏には、鳩山内閣時代の河野一郎氏のごとく去来してもいた。

しかし、事は前向きにすすんだ。前首相がソ連側の招きに対してつけていた条件、つまり、①ゴルバチョフ書記長との間で北方領土問題について一步突っ込んだ話合いをしたい②ソ連の国際戦略や外交政策の専門家に対して講演をしたい③テレビを通じて、ノーカットでソ連国民に語りかけたい、という三つを、ソ連が応諾してきたのである。

そうなると、われわれとしても評論したり傍観しているわけにはいかぬ。その詳細はここには書けぬが、「小手先を用いることなく堂々の正攻法で」と、いくつかのことについて強く希望を申し述べることにした。

というわけで、モスクワにおける事の経過について、人一倍気を揉みつづけたという次第である。

時節柄、事の経過については新聞、テレビなどが大々的に報道した。それに加えて前首相自身も、自らインタビューに答えて、補足を加えて喋りすぎるくらいに語っているので、良く知られている。

しかしわれわれとしても、これからの対応を考えていくために一連の経過を整理し、とくに北方領土問題を中心にした今回の対話の意義と今後の課題などを、掘り下げておきたいと思うのである。

どよめいた講演会場

中曽根前首相は、ソ連滞在中に若干の儀礼行事、寺院訪問、バルチック海岸沿いのリトアニア共和国への旅行などをこなしたが、ハイライトは、ゴルバチョフ書記長との会談、専門家を対象とする講演、およびテレビ出演であった。

21日午前に行われた講演は、翌日に予定されている書記長会談への布石的な意味をもつものであったから、まずその概容から見よう。

講演は、21日午前11時から、モスクワの中心部から少し離れたところにある「世界経済国際関係研究所（略称IMEMO）」で、約1時間にわたって行われた。

「新しい国際社会の構築に向けて」と題する講演は、「ロシア革命70年余、21世紀を前にした大きな世界の変化の中であって、ソ連社会がどのような問題に直面しているか、また、ソ連国民がそれぞれにどのように取り組んでおられるかを、この膚で感じ、この耳で聞きたいと思ったから」という切り出しではじまった。

まず、人類千年の歴史の中に流れてきたそのときどきの“時代精神”にふれ、産業革命から科学技術革命を経て、今や新しい時代精神が求められていると訴えた。

次いで、第二次大戦後の東西関係をとり上げ対立と強調とを織りなしてきた東西関係の流れの中で、緊張の要因となったものとして東のスターリニズムと膨張主義、西の封じ込め政策の相克を挙げ、それが今、新しい思考によって新しい流れを生み出しつつあるとし、ゴルバチョフによるソ連の改革努力を評価、期待していると述べた。

そして東西関係のこれからの触れ、これまでに達成された対話と交渉の成果をさらに深化・拡大させるとともに、将来に向かって「新しい原理と体系による世界的和解と新たな東西関係の正常化を目指すべきだ」とも訴えた。

次いで、アジア問題に言及、2年前のゴルバチョフのウラジオストック演説を取り上げ、

その中で提案されたアジア・太平洋会議構想などが必ずしもこの地域の賛同を得ていないことに触れ、その理由として、そうした提案を検討するために必要なソ連との信頼関係が欠けている、と指摘した。したがってこの地域の政治的対立の原因をなしている問題の解決が先決だとして、「北方領土問題の解決」、「朝鮮半島の緊張の緩和」、そして「カンボジア問題の政治的解決」を挙げた。

最後に日ソ関係をとり上げ、「日本は重要な隣国であるソ連との関係を重視している」とし、また両国の「実務的関係の諸分野で関係は進展している」としながらも、しかし発展の潜在力が十分に活用されておらず、その原因は「北方領土問題を解決して平和条約の締結という両国間の基本を正しく構築しない状況」にあることを、鋭く指摘した。

歴史哲学論からはじまり、今日のソ連の改革努力を評価しつつ東西関係の将来への努力方向を語った上で、最後に両国関係をとり上げ、関係改善を妨げている根源的問題としての「北方領土問題」を正面から堂々と持ち出したこの講演は、関係研究所などからも参加して会場を埋めた約120名の専門家たちに、極めて強烈な印象を与えた。

さらに質問第一号の「北方領土問題以外に日ソ関係の前進を阻むものはないか」に対して、きっぱりと「ない」と答えた中曽根前首相が、「北方領土問題は、スターリンの誤認によって、北海道に所属する島にソ連軍を入れたことから始まった」と補足したときには、会場に大きなよめきがあったという。

私のところには、そのとき会場にいたソ連の学者の感想が寄せられてきたが、外国人による大胆なスターリン批判が、聴衆に強烈な印象を与えたようである。

講演ののちに挨拶に立った主催者、この研究所の所長であるプリマコフ博士は、「広い角度から問題を提起され、相互理解の促進のために大変有意義であった」と締めくくったというが、彼を良く知る私から見ると、それは決して儀礼的なものでも皮肉でもなく、彼はその本音を率直に述べたものであると思う。

かくして講演は成功裡に終り、充分にその目的を達したといってよい。

白熱した論議ではあったが

中曽根前首相とゴルバチョフ書記長との会談は、翌22日午前11時から約2時間40分、クレムリン内の書記長執務室で行われた。通訳の時間を差引いたとしても、それは十分に手応えのある会談であった。

昭和60年3月、チェルネンコ前書記長の葬儀に参列した中曽根首相（当時）を迎えたのが就任早々のゴルバチョフ書記長であったから、3年4か月ぶりの再会ということになる。

歓迎のあいさつをした書記長は、“これまで会いたいと思っていたが実現しなかった。貴下が望まれなかったのか、ソ連側に手落ちがあったのか”、“日ソ関係はスリップしていると思うがどう思われるか”と切りこみ、会談は冒頭から緊張した空気に包まれていた。

会談は、予め議題を決めて順序立ってすすめるというわけでもなく、また一問一答式の対話というわけでもなかったが、大筋でいえば、国際関係の現状認識と将来の展望、ソ連のペレストロイカをめぐる諸問題と今後の展望、アジア・太平洋にかかわる諸問題、そし

で最後に、北方領土問題を中心とした日ソ関係などが話合われた。

その内容については既に多くの報道でとり上げられたし、その上、前首相自身が新聞、テレビのインタビューに答えて、補足をも加えて詳しく語っている（少し喋り過ぎるくらいだと思うが）ので、ここで再録する必要はない。

しかし、領土問題を中心とした日ソ関係の部分については、今後の対応の在り方とも深くかかわってくるので、必要な部分についてはできるだけ正確に、そしてわかり易くするために問答風に整理してみた。

中曽根 日ソ関係の改善を希望しており、そのために訪ソした。ソ連側は領土問題を持ち出されるのを嫌うが、領土問題についてはこれまでやり方が下手だった。われわれは共に法学士だから、戦後の日ソ関係の基礎から考えたい。その原点は共同宣言だ。またこれに添えられている松本・グロムイコ書簡だ。これによって両国は国交を回復し、ソ連の協力もあって日本は国連に加盟した。共同宣言は1956年10月19日に鳩山・ブルガーニン両首相が署名、松本・グロムイコ書簡は9月29日に交換された。この中には、両国の外交関係が再開した後に、領土問題を含む平和条約交渉を行うことを規定している。

ところが1960年、日本が日米安保条約を改正したら、その内容は日本にとってもソ連にとっても良い改正であったにも拘らず、ソ連は共同宣言の内容を否定するような覚書を送ってきた。共同宣言は両国が共に批准した国際条約であるのに、そこでその後田中・ブレジネフ会談（73年）で共同宣言に戻す努力が行われたのだ。

ゴルバチョフ 原則的にソ日関係の改善を望んでいる立場に変わりはない。日本との政治対話の活性化、経済、文化、科学技術面での交流など、幅広く考えている。

2年前に前総理と会ったときも同じことを言ったと思うが、それから今日までソ連と多くの国との関係は拡大してきたのに、日本との間は固定化し、落ち込んだ分野もある。

われわれはまるでソ連の方が日本より強く関係改善を望んでいるとの印象だ。日本人はソ連の方が新しい技術が欲しいので頭を下げてくると思っているという情報が入るが、それは大きな思い違いだ。

中曽根氏は1956年からはじめたが、戦後の現実から始めるべきだ。そうすれば56年の様相は違った。ソ連は正常化のための歩み寄りに2島を還すという立場をとった。一つのチャンスだった。しかし日本は4島の返還を要求した。

この問題でソ日間にいろいろ言われているが、これは原則問題、戦後の国境不可侵の問題だ。1940年の地図を出してその当時のようにしたら、世界をつくり変えねばならぬ。ここではさまざまな問題が絡み合っているが、にも拘らず欧州ではヘルシンキの合意が生まれた。何故か。それは第二次大戦の結果に疑いの目を向けられずすべてがこわれてしまうからだ。ソ連は2千万人の人命を捧げたことを忘れない。

1960年に日本は米国と急接近し、その後当該地域に米国のプレゼンスが拡張された。

中曽根 戦後の現実というが、欧州とアジアでは大きく異なる。米国は十数万の命を捧げた沖縄を日本に還した。スターリンは誤ってわが国の北海道に属する島々に兵を送った。4つの島が北海道に属していることは日露通好条約、千島樺太交換条約に明確に規定されている。ソ連軍は千島列島を南下して4つの島の手前で一端止まったが、米軍も日本軍も

いないことが解って侵入した。1956年の日ソ共同宣言は国際条約だ。あくまでもこれに立脚すべきだ。60年の覚書は国際約束ではなく、単なる一方通告に過ぎない。

私は領土が直ちに還ってくるとは思っていない。しかしわれわれは国際的な合意文書で関係を回復した以上、この原点に戻るべきだ。そうすれば両国間系の正常化に貢献する。

シェワルナゼ外相の訪日はコミュニケで合意されている。今年中の訪日を指示して貰えぬか。

ゴルバチョフ わかった。指示しよう。本年中ということだ。

中曽根 私の現職時代に貴書記長を招待し、貴下も受諾された。できるだけ早期に実現するようにして欲しい。そうでないと日ソ関係がまた後退したと受け止められる。それは困る。

ゴルバチョフ 賛成だ。私もそういう印象を与えることは好まない。

訪問は実現する用意がある。しかし現在の状況を出発点とする訪問なら、状況が改善されるよりも関係を悪くするのではないか。これは私は望まぬ。私はどうしてよいかわからない。お互いにどうすればよいか、もう一度よく考えてみななければいけない。

以上が日ソ関係及び北方に関する両者の応酬の記録である。こうして整理してみても、白熱した論議の空気が伝わってくる。

成果を評価するとすれば

われわれは、ここで中曽根訪ソの結果を総括して評価するとともに、そこに見られる問題を正確に摘出しなければならない。

それには当然、ここに整理した以外の両者の会談内容、つまり、アジア・太平洋問題、朝鮮半島問題、さらには東西関係の緊張緩和の問題なども含まれなければならない。

また、会談の直後に収録されて、その夜11時過ぎに放映されたテレビ放送も含まれなければならない。中曽根前首相は、会談や講演でとり上げた重要部分について率直に語ったが、とくに「第二次大戦の末期に、スターリンは誤って北海道に属する島にソ連軍を入れた」ということや「日ソ間には、戦後未解決の問題を解決して平和条約を締結するという大きな課題がある。これには当然領土問題が含まれる」という部分も、カットされることなく放映された。

今年の天皇誕生日に、武藤駐ソ大使がソ連国営テレビであいさつした際に、ソ連側ははじめて「北方領土問題」にふれることを認めた。いわゆるグラスノスチ（情報公開）の成果ではあるが、前首相の「スターリンの錯誤」をもそのまま放映したことは、もちろん前例のないことである。

私は、今回の中曽根前首相の訪ソは、現段階としてはぎりぎりのところまで、総体としては十分にその意義を果たしたと評価している。

第一は、中曽根前首相が妙な変化球を投げたりすることなく、堂々たる正攻法をもって日本の主張を突きつけたことである。

今日のソ連のアジア観やアジア・太平洋政策の甘さを衝いて鋭く迫ったことも迫力があつたが、日ソ関係の根源としての領土問題について堂々の論陣を張って迫ったことは、高く評価すべきである。

日露通好条約や千島樺太交換条約を根拠として4島がわが国の固有の領土であることを主張し、それが侵されて今日“未解決の問題”となっている原因を「スターリンの錯誤」ときめつけたが、外国人が公式的にこのような問題の出し方をしたのはおそらく他に例を見ないであろう。このような問題提起をゴルバチョフがどう受けとめたかは今後に俟たねばならぬことであるが、戦後の東西緊張の要員を「スターリニズムと西側の封じ込め政策」として結びつけたこの切り込みを、強い印象を持って受けとめたことは違いあるまい。

56年の共同宣言と、松本・グロムイコ書簡とを結びつけて迫ったことは当然であるが、60年の日米安保条約改定の中味にふれて「日本にとってもソ連にとっても良い改定」と迫ったことを、ソ連側がどう受けとめたかも興味深い。つまり56年の共同宣言のときには既に安保条約は存在しており、60年の改定は日本の自主性を確定するものであったからである。

もちろん、欲を言えばここはもう一つというところがないわけではない。

北方領土問題が発生した原点をスターリンの責任としたのは良いとしても、それだけでは充分ではない。ルーマニアをはじめ、ソ連が第二次大戦前後に収奪した領土（約67万平方キロ）は、すべてスターリンの責任で行われたものである。

1969年9月に故コスイギン首相が愛知外相（当時）に、「国境を一つ動かすと、他に大きく波及する」と述べたことに、実はソ連がもっとも恐れる本音があるからである。

したがって、ここで大事なことは、ゴルバチョフが1940年の地図の話を持ち出したときに、すかさず、かつてはロシア領であったものを旧に復したという地域と北方4島との違いを、衝いてもらいたかったことである。わが北方4島は、日露通好条約、千島樺太交換条約によってはじめてその地位が定められて以来、日本以外の如何なる国にも支配されなかったという北方領土問題の特異性を説くべきであった。

また、ゴルバチョフが「56年ではなく戦後の現実から考えるべきだ」と言ったとき、ソ連軍の千島侵攻が、日本がポツダム宣言を受諾して無条件降伏をした3日後からはじまったこと、そして問題の「北方4島」については8月下旬から9月はじめにかけて侵攻したという事実を指摘してソ連の不法ぶりを明らかにすべきであった。

また、ゴルバチョフは“戦後の現実”として「国境不可侵の原則」を持ち出したが、これは全く奇妙である。というのは、ヘルシンキ協定の大詰めの段階で採めた問題がこれだったからである。「戦後の国境不可動」と最後まで主張したのがソ連。それに対して「不可侵」を主張したのが西独。結局大勢に抗しきれずソ連が一步退いてできたのが“不可侵の原則”。それによってヘルシンキがまとまったのである。3年前の安倍外相の表敬のときもゴルバチョフは「不可侵」ということばを使ったが、明らかに矛盾がある。この点も鋭く衝いてもらいたかった点である。

桑港（サンフサンシスコ）条約当時、時の吉田内閣は、齒舞・色丹を北海道の一部とし、国後・択捉をわが国固有の領土とした。中曽根前首相は4島を一括して「北海道に属する島」としたが、この辺りも首尾一貫した方がよいのではあるまいか。

このように、細かくいえばもう一息という思いがなくもないが、総体としてみると、今回の訪ソは充分その意義があったと評価すべきであろう。

ソ連のアジア戦略は今後のテーマ

中曽根訪ソの第二の意義は、研究所での講演やテレビによる呼びかけによって、ソ連の新しいオピニオンリーダーや国民大衆に対して、新たな問題提起をしたことである。

講演を主催したIMEMOのプリマコフ博士は、ソ連科学アカデミーの正会員という高い地位の学者であるが、ゴルバチョフの信任厚いブレーンの一人である。この3月、モスクワに新設された「アジア・太平洋経済協力国家委員会」の議長に就任、5月に大阪で開かれた「太平洋経済協力委員会（PECC）」にはゲストとして参加した。ソ連のアジア・太平洋政策の責任者の一人である。

われわれがやってきた「日ソ専門家会議」のソ連側の代表であって、私とは10年余りの交友があるが、仲々の人物である。毎年来日するが、9月に会ったときに彼の感想を聞くのが楽しみである。

会談を終えた一行がバルト海沿岸のリトアニア共和国に旅したとき、随所でテレビのことが話題になったというが、かなりの人が視聴したらしい。スターリンの強引な策によってソ連邦に併合されたところだけに、ロコミの話題として大きく広がっていくことであろう。

中曽根訪ソの第三の成果は、ゴルバチョフの人物像と彼の今日の考え方などを非常に鮮明に引き出したことである。

会談の記録を見ても、前首相がしばしば語っているように、頭の回転が早くて発想力も豊か、その上自分自身の言葉で語っている相当な人物と見受ける。その場だけの場あたりではなく、国家への気くばりも充分な発言を見ても仲々繊細な神経の持ち主でもある。

三極委員会の計画で、キッシンジャー、ジスカーデルスタンと共に11月に訪ソしてゴルバチョフと会談することになっている前首相の、そのときのための取材的質問に対しては、肝心のところを外して軽く体をかわすという強（したた）かさも持っている。仲々に端倪（たんげい）できぬ人物でもある。

その上で、ゴルバチョフについてははっきりしたことが3つある。

その1は、北方領土問題についての態度に何の前進もないということである。

不勉強な日本の新聞の中には、領土問題は「存在しない」と言わなかったから前進したとか、56年の共同宣言に言及したから「2島返還を示唆」などと早とちりする者もいたが、正しくない。

一昨年1月に来日したシェワルナゼ外相は、「ソ連邦の基本的態度は変わらぬが、議論はしてもよい」と、安倍外相と約1時間半にわたって議論した。実りのある議論になる筈もないが、しかしその時点で「存在しない」というのは消えている。

56年の共同宣言にふれて、“2島”を持ち出したのは単に歴史経過に触れたに過ぎず、彼が固執したのは“戦後の現実”であり、戦後の国境を認知した上に成り立った“ヘルシンキの先例”であった。

ただ少し注意してみたいと思うのは、今度の場合、果たして彼が自身で十分に考えたことだろうかという疑念が残る点である。これは次のこととも関連する。

はっきりしたことのその2は、日本についての不勉強ぶりである。

首相時代の中曽根発言を引用したり、日本のある研究所の報告の一部を見当違いに引用して、事前の俄か勉強をしたことは良くわかったが、しかし、「最先端技術の進歩によって、日本では益々中央計画的な要因が重要になっている」とか、「労働のモラルや規律について、日本はソ連から学んでいる」というような発言は、日本認識の貧弱さや誤りをそのまま示している。旧いタイプの日本担当の報告を受けるだけで自分で勉強することを怠っている証左であるが、北方領土問題も例外ではあるまい。

その3は、会談の内容を子細に見当してみると、ゴルバチョフの対アジア外交、とくに対日外交について、まだその戦略シナリオが固まっていないと思われることである。

私から見れば案の定というところで、その故にこそ中曽根訪ソの機熟せずとしたのであったが、考えてみると無理もないことであろう。

アメリカとの核軍縮交渉も容易ならざる負担であったが、仲々うまく進まぬペレストロイカ、降って湧いたような民族問題、そこにレーガン大統領の来訪、保守派を抑えこむための全ソ党協議会の開催とその準備、終るや否やポーランドに飛んで東欧諸国の足並みの調整、というように、息つく暇もなく動き廻ってきたのである。この辺で一服して、それからアジア、日本問題を、というところであったろう。

もしこの観点に大きな誤りがなければ、今度の会談をもその大きな参考の一つとして、自分自身でじっくりと考えてもらいたいものである。

とはいっても、幻想を抱いているわけではない。

良く見ると、ペレストロイカもグラスノスチも、そして外交軍事戦略の見直しも、世界のことを考えてというよりもソ連のためにやっていることである。当然のことではあるが、しかし、だからこそアジア観にしても日本観にしても、あの傲慢さが目について仕方がないのである。

外交はきびしい。かりそめにも日本の立場を考えてくれるだろうというような甘い幻想を抱いてはならない。

どうする、これからの対応

以上に述べてきたような次第で、日ソ交渉は、これから新しい段階に入ることになる。当面、外交事務レベルによる国連協議などが予定されているが、本格的な外交活動は、9月の国連総会における宇野・シェワルナゼ会談で具体的に決まるであろうシェワルナゼ外相の来日からと考えてよいだろう。多分それは12月ということになるのではあるまいか。

したがって日本側としては、その目標のもとにさまざまな準備にとりくんでいかねばならない。

第一に、政府は今回の中曽根・ゴルバチョフ会談の結果を十分に踏まえた上で、「4島一括返還」を主軸とする原則を再確認して基本姿勢を整えるべきである。

とくに与党である自民党は非常に幅が広く、真剣に問題の解決を願う人もいるし、中に

は反ソ感情で固まっている人もいる。これについては党幹部の指導よろしきを得て、しっかりした姿勢を整えてもらう必要がある。

アジア・太平洋をめぐる戦略状況からみても、また、今度の会談に見られるソ連側の姿勢からみても、壁はまだ相当に厚いものがあると考えねばならぬ。したがって、ここでしっかり姿勢を整え直すことが重要である。

第二に、外交当局の場合であるが、ソ連側首脳に対して日本を理解させるための努力が足りぬことを大いに自省し、その上での有効な積極的行動を起すことに着手すべきである。

また、外交というものはすべてがそうであろうが、とくに対ソ外交においては、政治、軍事、経済その他広範な局面が深くかかわりをもって来る。したがって、予想される先方のアプローチの仕方などについて今から十分な検討作業をすすめる必要がある。

これまで、どちらかというとな純な一本調子で、しかも相手の出方を見てから対応の仕方を考えるというやり方が気になってきたが、これからはそうであってはならない。

第三は、マスコミの動きであるが、今回の場合でも気になることが少なくなかった。例えば「ゴ書記長、2島返還を示唆」というような見出しが踊ったが、一つには激しい競争社会の競争意識がそうさせる場合もあるし、同時に不勉強からくる事実認識もある。

先般も、東京のある研究所で開かれた日ソ学者の研究会議に関して、「ソ連側、共同統治を提案」という見出しを踊らせた新聞があったが、これなどはソ連の若い学者が全く個人的に、しかも例示的にふれただけのことである。

マスコミの影響が大きいだけに、大いに留意したいものである。

第四に、学者、評論家の動向も気になる。沖縄のときもそうであったが、少し新しい動きの気配が見えると、無責任な言動が目につくようになる。個人の見解は自由だということではあるが、相手が相手だけに、時には国論の分裂を印象づけて誤解をを与える場合もあり得るだけに、慎重を期してもらいたいと願うのは、長年運動に携わってきたものとして当然のことと考える。

いずれにしても、問題の性格から見てもその解決への道は極めてきびしいものではあるが、しかし、一つの新しい山場が近づいてきつつある。お互いに心してとりくんでいきたいと思う。

August 10, 1988

Results of Nakasone-Gorbachev Meeting and Future Issues

- Putting the Northern Territories Issue at the Center -

Ichiro Suetsugu, Secretary General, Council on National Security Problems

Nakasone's Meaningful Visit to the Soviet Union

This is a terribly rude way of saying it but, in regard to former Prime Minister Nakasone's recent visit to Moscow, honestly, I was on the edge of my seat until the end. That was due to my thinking that something unexpected would have to spring forth, from one side or the other, particularly through the meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.

However, it ended with the former Prime Minister, as one would expect, having carried a dignified attitude throughout two hours and 40 minutes of talks with the General Secretary. The discussion ranged broadly over the general state of international affairs, the present state of and prospects for perestroika (restructuring and reform), the Asia-Pacific issue, and the Japan-Soviet relationship. Concerning the Northern Territories issue, the subject of particular attention, the former Prime Minister made a frontal strike at the root of the problem and squarely asserted Japan's argument. Of course, the General Secretary answered this from the Soviet position, but I suspect that this exchange left him with a rather strong impression.

There was some media reporting that this was the first time for General Secretary Gorbachev to personally discuss the Northern Territories issue, but that is not correct.

At the end of May, the year before last, (then) Foreign Minister Abe, who had visited Moscow for the Foreign Ministers' Regular Talks following the visit to Japan in January that year of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, paid a courtesy call on the General Secretary on arriving at the Kremlin. On that occasion, naturally, the Foreign Minister strongly proposed the "wish to start negotiations in order to resolve the Northern Territories issue and conclude a peace treaty."

At that time, Gorbachev did not escape like Brezhnev in saying "the problem does not exist." He answered with "the inviolability of postwar borders" and "the Helsinki Agreement was concluded based on that." This time, too, he basically did not taken a single step from his position then.

However, that time it was paying respects; this time, it was talks. Former Prime Minister Nakasone, touching on the root, that "The Northern Territories issue started as Stalin's mistake," pressed in a solid and sharp way. How did he take the substance of these talks? How will he respond to them? All of this is a future issue. Whatever his response then and there, one cannot deny that General Secretary Gorbachev, who is starting to put together a new strategy for the Asia-Pacific, and in particular a strategy for Japan, must have received a rather strong impression.

By the way, several months ago, when talk began to emerge of Prime Minister Nakasone visiting Moscow, thinking that the time was not ripe, I frankly said so. It was my intuition as someone who had been grappling with such issues for many years that, in undertaking the issue of Okinawa's reversion to the Fatherland and accomplishing it, next would be the Northern Territories issue, the final one in our postwar settlement.

Also, considering it necessary to provide a place for frank dialogue, even if positions differed, I organized one with various influential scholars and academics of Japan and the Soviet Union. There has also been a “reading” gained from the position of white-hot discussions over the course of meeting 10 times.

We were reading the situation as, “The Soviet Union’s Japan strategy is not yet settled. It will be from this point forward.” We were uneasy that there would be trouble if the former Prime Minister came marching in now and, eager for glory as a politician, threw some strange curve ball. Also, in the back of my mind, I kept thinking about Ichiro Kono at the time of the Hatoyama Cabinet.

However, things went positively. The Soviet Union agreed to the three terms that the former Prime Minister set: (1) He wished to have in-depth discussion with General Secretary Gorbachev on the Northern Territories issue; (2) He wished to give a speech to Soviet specialists in international strategy and diplomatic policy; (3) He wished speak on television, without any cuts, to the Soviet people.

When that happened, it would have been wrong for us to criticize, to stand on the sidelines or such. I will not write here about the details, but we decided to express strongly our hope that he “not use any tricks but make a bold frontal attack” and a number of other things.

In such circumstances, we were uncommonly anxious about how things would go in Moscow.

In view of the times, the press, television, and such reported extensively on the progress of events. On top of that, the former Prime Minister himself is well known for giving interviews, expanding on his remarks and speaking to the point of talking too much.

However, we wished to arrange a series of developments in order to consider future measures and wished to delve into the significance of the dialogue this time, future issues, and such, centering in particular on the Northern Territories issue.

Resounding Lecture Hall

Former Prime Minister Nakasone on his visit to the Soviet Union took care of a number of ceremonial events, visited churches, traveled to the Lithuanian republic on the coast of the Baltic Sea, and such, but the visit’s highlights were his talks with General Secretary Gorbachev, his speech to experts, and his appearance on television.

The speech on the morning of the 21st had the significance of an opening move in advance of his talks with the General Secretary, scheduled for the following day, so let us examine first the contents of that speech.

The speech took place on the morning of the 21st, given at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), which is located a little outside of Moscow, and which ran for approximately one hour.

The speech, whose title was “Towards a New International Community,” started with the following opening: “More than 70 years after the Russian Revolution, in the midst of great global change in advance of the 21st century, what kind of problems is Soviet society facing? Also, how are the Soviet people addressing them? I came here wishing to learn at first hand.”

First, the former Prime Minister, touching on the “spirit of the times” that from time to time has flowed in mankind’s history over the past millennium, he made an appeal that a new spirit of our times was required with the passage from the Industrial Revolution through the revolution in science and technology.

Next, he brought up East-West relations after the Second World War. Raising the conflict between the East’s Stalinism and expansionism and the West’s policy of containment as a factor of tension in the flow of East-West relations interwoven with conflict and cooperation, he praised Gorbachev’s efforts at reform and expressed his hope for them.

Then, touching on the East-West relations going forward, he also made an appeal that, along with further deepening and expanding the results of dialogue and negotiation obtained to date, for the future, “We should aim for a global reconciliation and the normalization of a new East-West relationship based on new principles and systems.”

Next, mentioning Asia, he brought up Gorbachev’s Vladivostok speech of two years ago. Touching on its concept of an Asia-Pacific Conference not having received an entirely favorable response in the region, the former Prime Minister pointed out that the reason was an absence of relations of trust with the Soviet Union necessary to consider such a proposal. Accordingly, he brought up prerequisites for settling the problems at the source of this region’s political conflicts: “the resolution of the Northern Territories issue,” “the easing of tension on the Korean Peninsula,” and “the political resolution of the Cambodia issue.”

Lastly, bringing up the relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union, while saying that “Japan attaches great importance to its relations with its important neighbor” and that between both countries “relations are developing in various fields of practical relations,” he said that its development potential was not being fully utilized. He pointed out that the reason for this was “the situation where the basis for both countries – the resolution of the Northern Territories issue and the conclusion of a peace treaty – was still not correctly established.”

This speech, which started with with historical and philosophical arguments and, after having praised the Soviet Union’s present efforts at political reform and spoken of the efforts in the direction of the future of East-West relations, lastly raised the relationship between the two countries and squarely suggested the issue of the Northern Territories as the fundamental issue preventing relations from improving. The speech made an extremely strong impression on the approximately 120 specialists, in attendance from IMEMO and elsewhere, who filled the hall.

Furthermore, it is said that there was a resounding clamor in the hall when, in response to the first question – “Is there not anything other than the Northern Territories issue impeding Japan-Soviet relations from moving forward?” – former Prime Minister Nakasone flatly said “no” and added, “The Northern Territories issue began with Stalin’s mistakenly putting the Soviet military on islands belonging to Hokkaido.”

The thoughts of those Soviet academics in the hall at that time were sent to me, but it seems that bold criticism by a foreigner made a strong impression on the audience.

Dr. Primakov, the president of IMEMO, speaking as the host after the speech, concluded with words of praise for it: “It was very meaningful for presenting issues from a wide angle and promoting mutual understanding.” I think, knowing him well,

that his praise was neither pro forma nor cynical. I think that he said directly what he thought.

Thus, one can say that the speech concluded successfully and that it fully achieved its goal.

There Was White-Hot Discussion

The meeting between former Prime Minister Nakasone and General Secretary Gorbachev took place for approximately two hours and 40 minutes on the following morning of the 22nd in the General Secretary's office in the Kremlin. Even deducting the time spent interpreting, the meeting was good enough.

In March 1985, at the funeral of former General Secretary Chernenko, it was General Secretary Gorbachev, who had promptly assumed office, who greeted (then) Prime Minister Nakasone, so it was their second meeting after three years and four months.

The General Secretary in his greeting pressed him: "I had been wanting to have a meeting with you but did not make it happen. Did you not want one? Was the fault on the Soviet side?" The meeting was enveloped in tension from the start.

The meeting neither proceeded in order of an agenda determined in advance, nor was it a dialogue of question and answer. In broad outline, there were discussed such issues as the perception of the present state of international relations and their future prospects; issues in the Soviet Union's perestroika and its future prospects; issues involving the Asia-Pacific; and, lastly, the Japan-Soviet relationship, centered on the Northern Territories issue.

Concerning the substance of their discussions, they have already been taken up in many media reports. On top of that, the former Prime Minister himself has given many newspaper and television interviews, adding supplementary details and talking at length (to the point of saying little too much, I think), so there is no need to record it again here.

However, concerning the part about the Japan-Soviet relationship, centered on the Northern Territories issue, because it is deeply involved with how our response should be from this point forward, I arranged the necessary parts as accurately as possible and, in order to make them as easy to understand as possible, in a question-and-answer style.

Nakasone: I have come to the Soviet Union in the hope of improving the Japan-Soviet relationship. The Soviet side dislikes having the Northern Territories issue brought up, but the territorial issue has been poorly handled to this day. We both have a bachelor's degree in law, so I would like to consider the issue from the basis of the postwar Japan-Soviet relationship. Its starting point is the Joint Declaration. Along with this there are also the Matsumoto-Gromyko letters. The two countries thereby restored diplomatic relations and, with the cooperation of the Soviet Union, Japan joined the United Nations. The Joint Declaration was signed by Prime Minister Hatoyama and Premier Bulganin on October 19, 1956. The Matsumoto-Gromyko letters were exchanged on September 29. They stipulated that our two countries, after the restoration of diplomatic relations, would conduct negotiations for a peace treaty, including the territorial issue.

In 1960, however, when Japan revised the Japan-US Security Treaty, the Soviet Union sent a memorandum rejecting the content of the Joint Declaration, even though the content of the revised security treaty was good both for Japan and for the Soviet Union. This happened even though the Joint Declaration is an international treaty that

both countries ratified. After that, then, efforts were made at the meeting between Tanaka and Brezhnev (1973) to go back to the Joint Declaration.

Gorbachev: In principle, there is no change in our position of desiring to improve the Soviet-Japan relationship. I am thinking broadly of invigorating the political dialogue with Japan, of economic, cultural, and scientific and technological exchanges, and such.

I think that I said the same thing in meeting you two years ago. Since then, even though relations between the Soviet Union and many countries have expanded, with Japan there are still fields that are stuck in place and in an unfavorable condition.

Our impression is that it is the Soviet Union, more than Japan, that strongly desires improved relations. There has been reporting that the Japanese think that the Soviet side, wanting new technologies, will come with its head bowed, but that is a big mistake.

Mr. Nakasone, you started from 1956, but we should start from the postwar realities. If we do so, then the aspect of 1956 was different. The Soviet Union offered to return two islands as a compromise for the sake of normalization. It was an opportunity. However, Japan asked for the return of four islands.

Various things have been said between the Soviet Union and Japan on this issue, but this is an issue of principle, that of the inviolability of postwar borders. If we took out a map from 1940 and made things as they were at that time, we would have to remake the world. There are various issues intertwined here. Even so, in Europe the Helsinki Accords came into being. Why? That is because if we were to cast doubt on the results of the Second World War, then everything would collapse. The Soviet Union does not forget having sacrificed 20 million lives.

In 1960, Japan suddenly drew close to the United States. After that, the United States expanded their presence in the relevant area.

Nakasone: Speaking of postwar realities, they have differed greatly in Europe and Asia. The United States returned Okinawa, where they sacrificed over 100,000 lives, to Japan. Stalin made a mistake and sent troops onto islands of ours that belong to Hokkaido. That the four islands belong to Hokkaido is clearly stipulated in the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and Russia and in the Treaty for the Exchange of Sakhalin for the Kurile Islands. The Soviet military, proceeding south from the Kurile Islands, stopped short of the four islands. Realizing that neither American nor Japanese forces were there, however, the Soviet force then invaded them. The 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration is an international treaty. We should strictly decide our position on this basis. The 1960 memorandum is not an international treaty. It is nothing more than a more unilateral notification.

I do not expect the immediate return of the territories. However, having restored relations with international agreements and documents, we should return to this starting point. Doing so would contribute to the normalization of relations between our two countries.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Japan has been agreed to by communique. Could we not have you issue instructions for the visit to Japan this year?

Gorbachev: I understand. I shall issue instructions. For this year.

Nakasone: I invited you, General Secretary, in my time in office to visit, and you

accepted. I would like you to realize this visit as soon as possible. If not, then it will be taken as a step backwards in the Japan-Soviet relationship. That would be too bad.

Gorbachev: I accept. I, too, would not wish to give such an impression.

The visit is ready to be realized. However, a visit making its starting point the present situation may worsen relations rather than improve the situation. I would not want that. I do not know what to do. Together, we must consider once again what to do.

The above is a record of the exchange on Japan-Soviet relations and the Northern Territories issue. Even when arranged this way, the record conveys an atmosphere of white-hot discussion.

If We Were To Appraise the Results

Here, together with making a general appraisal of the results of Nakasone's visit to the Soviet Union, we must accurately expose the problems visible there.

Naturally, it must include the contents of the talks between the two men other than those sorted out here, that is, such issues as the Asia-Pacific, the Korean Peninsula, and the easing of tensions in East-West relations.

We must also include the television program recorded right after the meeting and televised that night after 11 o'clock. Former Prime Minister Nakasone spoke frankly in the meeting and in his speech concerning the important parts that he raised. In particular, there was broadcast uncut even such parts as, "At the end of the Second World War, Stalin made a mistake and sent Soviet troops onto islands that belong to Hokkaido" and "For both Japan and Russia, resolving unresolved postwar issues and concluding a peace treaty are important tasks. Among them, of course, is included the territorial issue."

When Ambassador to the Soviet Union Muto spoke on Soviet state television this year on the occasion of the Emperor's birthday, the Soviet side for the first time recognized the "Northern Territories issue" in referring to it. It probably was the result of so-called glasnost (openness), but broadcasting as it was the former Prime Minister's "Stalin's mistake" remark was, of course, unprecedented.

I appraise that the visit of former Prime Minister Nakasone to the Soviet Union, to the extent possible at this stage, on the whole fully achieved significant results.

First, former Prime Minister Nakasone did not throw some strange curve ball or any such thing but, by a bold frontal attack, confronted them with Japan's argument.

His going after the superficial optimism of the present Soviet view of Asia and its Asia-Pacific policy was impressive, but we should highly appraise him for pressing the argument squarely and firmly on the territorial issue as the root of the Japan-Soviet relationship.

He argued on the basis of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and Russia and the Treaty for the Exchange of Sakhalin for the Kurile Islands that the four islands are our country's inherent territory and branded as "Stalin's mistake" the reason for their invasion and their existence to this day as an "unresolved issue." Foreigners in all likelihood have never seen such an issue raised publicly in such a way. We will have to wait and see how Gorbachev received such a presentation of the issue, but without a doubt an attack linking "Stalinism and the West's policy of

containment” to the main cause of the postwar tensions between East and West made a strong impression on him.

It is a matter of course to press the issue in linking the 1956 Joint Declaration and the Matsumoto-Gromyko letters. Of interest is how the Soviet side received his pressing that “revision was good both for Japan and for the Soviet Union” in referring to the 1960 revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty. In short, the reason is that the Security Treaty already existed at the time of the 1956 Joint Declaration and the 1960 revision was for the purpose of confirming Japan’s autonomy.

Of course, it is possible to wish for more here.

Even though it is good to assign responsibility to Stalin as the starting point for the Northern Territories issue, that alone is not enough. Starting with Romania, the seizure of territory by the Soviet Union around the time of the Second World War (approximately 670,000 square kilometers) was all Stalin’s responsibility.

Within the late Premier Kosygin’s statement in September 1969 to (then) Foreign Minister Aichi is what the Soviet Union truly fears the most: “If we moved one border, it would have a major ripple effect on the other ones.”

Accordingly, what is important here is that, when Gorbachev brought up the map from 1940, I would have liked Nakasone to have made a distinction immediately between the restoration of an area that was formerly Russian territory and the four islands of the Northern Territories. He should have explained the singular character of the Northern Territories issue: the four islands of our Northern Territories, since their status was set for the first time according to the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and Russia and the Treaty for the Exchange of Sakhalin for the Kurile Islands, have never been under the control of any country other than Japan.

Also, he should have pointed out, when Gorbachev said that he “should start not from 1956 but from the postwar realities,” that the Soviet military’s invasion of the Kurile Islands began eight days after Japan had accepted the Potsdam Declaration and surrendered unconditionally and the fact that they invaded from the last days of August until the beginning of September. He should also have made clear the Soviet Union’s illegal behavior.

Also, Gorbachev brought forth the “the principle of the inviolability of borders” as a “postwar reality,” but this is completely odd. That is to say, it is because this was the issue in dispute at the final stage of the Helsinki Agreement. It was the Soviet Union that insisted to the end that “postwar borders are immovable.” Against that, it was West Germany that insisted that they were “inviolable.” In the end, unable to go against the general trend, the Soviet Union took a step back to the “principle of inviolability.” The Helsinki Agreement was concluded on that basis. Gorbachev used the term “inviolability” when Foreign Minister Abe paid a courtesy call on him three years ago, but there is clearly a contradiction. This, too, is something on which I would have liked Nakasone to have pushed sharply.

At the time of the San Francisco Treaty, the Yoshida Cabinet of that time stated that Habomai and Shikotan are part of Hokkaido and that Kunashiri and Etorofu are our country’s inherent territory. Former Prime Minister Nakasone said of all four islands that they are “islands belonging to Hokkaido,” but it may be better to be consistent on this.

In this way, I do think that there could have been more effort on the details. On the whole, however, I think that we should appraise the visit to the Soviet Union as fully significant.

Soviet Union's Asia Strategy a Future Theme

The second significance of Nakasone's visit to the Soviet Union is that, in his speech at IMEMO and the appeal he made on television, it made a new presentation of the issue to the Soviet Union's new opinion leaders and the Soviet masses.

Dr. Primakov, from IMEMO, which hosted the speech, a scholar of high rank – he is as an academician of the Soviet Academy of Sciences – is a deeply trusted member of Gorbachev's brain trust. In March this year, he assumed the post of chairman for the Russian Inter-Ministerial Commission on the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), established in Moscow. In May, he participated as a guest at the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) General Meeting held in Osaka. He is one of those in charge of Soviet Asia-Pacific policy.

He has been a representative on the Soviet side of the Japan-Soviet Specialists Conference that we have held. He has been an acquaintance of mine for more than 10 years. He is quite a man. He comes to Japan each year, and I look forward to hearing his thoughts when I meet him in September.

Nakasone's party, after having finished the meeting, traveled to the Lithuanian republic on the coast of the Baltic Sea. Everywhere they went at that time, the television broadcast was a topic of discussion. It seems that there had been a considerable audience for it. I imagine that the broadcast spread widely there, a place forcibly annexed to the Soviet Union as the result of Stalin's policy, as a topic of discussion.

The third achievement of Nakasone's visit to the Soviet Union is that it very clearly brought out Gorbachev's character and his thinking at present.

In reading the record of the meeting, I have the impression, as the former Prime Minister often says, that Gorbachev is quite a man, quick on the uptake, a man of ideas, and on top of that, someone who speaks in his own words. He does not say things simply to please someone with whom he is talking at the moment. Judging from his remarks, which are attentive to his country, he is a man of rather fine sensibilities.

The former Prime Minister, in response to an interviewer's question on a plan of the Trilateral Commission for him to visit the Soviet Union in November, together with Kissinger and Giscard d'Estaing, and meet Gorbachev, simply left out the main point and dodged it. Such is the sly character that he has. He is also a rather inscrutable person.

On top of that, there are three things that have become clear about Gorbachev.

The first thing is that there has been no progress in his attitude regarding the Northern Territories issue.

In Japan's inattentive press were those who jumped to the conclusion that there was progress because Gorbachev did not say that the territorial issue "does not exist" or that, because he referred to the 1956 Joint Declaration, he had hinted at "the return of two islands," but such conclusions are wrong.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, who came to Japan in January the year before last, said, "The Soviet Union's basic attitude has not changed, but we may have a discussion," and he had a discussion with Foreign Minister Abe for approximately an

hour and a half. It was hardly likely that it would be a fruitful discussion. However, at that point “does not exist” disappeared.

Gorbachev’s raising of the “two islands” in mentioning the 1956 Joint Declaration did nothing more than simply touch on the course of history. What he insisted on was “postwar realities” and the “Helsinki precedent” that was built on the recognition of postwar borders.

Something to which I would like to pay some attention is, in this case, the point where there remains doubt as to whether or not he himself really gave it sufficient thought. This is also related to the following.

The second thing, which has become clear, is his inattentiveness regarding Japan. That he had crammed in advance, drawing on a statement of Nakasone from his time as prime minister and drawing incorrectly on part of a report from a certain Japanese research institute, is well understood. However, such statements as “With the progress of leading-edge technology, in Japan the factor of central planning is becoming increasingly important” or “Japan is learning from the Soviet Union in regard to labor morale and discipline” show the weakness and error of his awareness of Japan as it is. It is proof of his simply receiving report from officials of the old school responsible for Japan and neglecting to do his own studies, and the Northern Territories issue is no exception.

The third thing is that, when we look closely at the contents of the meeting, in regard to Gorbachev’s Asia diplomacy, particularly in regard to diplomacy with Japan, it seems that the strategic scenarios are still not decided.

As I see it, as expected, and for those very reasons, the time was not ripe for Nakasone to visit the Soviet Union but, thinking about it, I believe that it also was not unreasonable.

He had the difficult burden of the nuclear arms reduction negotiations with the United States; perestroika, which is not going all that well; the nationalities issue, suddenly arisen; President Reagan’s visit there; the holding of the All-Union Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to suppress the conservatives, and the conference’s preparation; and, right after that, flying to Poland to bring the countries of Eastern Europe into line. With all that, he was running around without any chance to catch his breath. I imagine him, at the end of all that, taking a break and then turning to address the issues of Asia and Japan.

If this way of looking at it is not too far off, then I would like him to take this meeting as a major reference and ponder it thoroughly himself.

Having said that, it is not that I have any illusions.

Looking closely, we see that he is undertaking perestroika, glasnost, and the revision of diplomatic and military strategy less in thinking of the world than for the sake of the Soviet Union. I suppose that it is natural, but it is for that very reason that, whether it is his view of Asia or his view of Japan, that arrogance is striking and cannot be helped.

Diplomacy is harsh. It will not do to harbor the sweet illusion that he will give even the slightest degree of consideration to Japan’s position.

What to Do, Our Future Response

Japan-Soviet negotiations, as I have stated above, will from this point enter a new stage. For the time being, United Nations discussions at the diplomatic working level and such are planned. One can probably consider full-fledged diplomatic activity starting with the coming to Japan of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the details of which will be decided in the meeting between Uno and Shevardnadze at the United Nations General Assembly in September. It may take place in December.

Accordingly, Japan must make various preparations on the basis of that objective.

First, the Government, having fully considered the results of this meeting between Nakasone and Gorbachev, should reconfirm the principle whose main axis is "the return of all four islands together" and prepare its basic position.

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party, in particular, is a very big tent. Within it are both persons who seriously desire the issue's resolution as well as those who are set in their anti-Soviet emotion. Regarding this, I think it necessary to have party executives show leadership and prepare a strong position.

From the strategic situation concerning the Asia-Pacific and from the Soviet side's position, as seen in this meeting, we must consider that the wall is still a considerably thick one. Accordingly, it is necessary to resolutely prepare and improve our position here.

Second, and this pertains to the diplomatic authorities, they should reflect deeply on the insufficiency of the efforts to have the Soviet side's leaders understand Japan and, having done so, they should start to take effective and positive action.

Also, diplomacy - and this holds for all of it, but in particular for diplomacy toward the Soviet Union - involves a wide range of aspects, including political, military, economic, and other ones. Accordingly, it is necessary from this point forward to study fully the other side's expected approach and other issues.

Until now, it has been, if anything, simply monotonous. Moreover, I have become concerned over the way of proceeding, that of considering one's action in response to seeing how one's opponent moves. This will no longer do.

Third, pertaining to the mass media's actions, much of what they did this time as well was a cause for concern. For example, there were striking headlines like "Secretary General Gorbachev Hints at Return of Two Islands." For one thing, the competitive mentality of a fiercely competitive society makes them do this. At the same time, it is also a recognition of the facts that comes from inattention.

Recently, too, concerning a research meeting of Japanese and Soviet scholars held at a certain research institute in Tokyo, there was a newspaper that put up the headline "Soviet Side Proposes Joint Administration," but this and other remarks were only things that young Soviet scholars were saying in a completely personal and exemplary way.

As the mass media's influence is great, I would like to pay close attention to it.

Fourth, I am also concerned about the attitude of scholars and critics. It was that way at the time of Okinawa, too, when you would notice them say and do irresponsible things at the sign of some slightly new movement. I suppose that individuals are free to have their own views. Given who the other side is, however, there is the possibility of such views at times giving the Soviets an impression of a split in our public opinion and misleading them. For that reason alone, asking scholars and critics to exercise

caution is, to me, someone who has been involved in campaigns for many years, a matter of course.

In any case, in view of this issue's nature, the road to its resolution will be extremely difficult. However, we are nearing a new peak. I would like us both to be careful in approaching this.