

July 26, 1995 Letter, Ben Sanders to Shephard Forman

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Summary:

Summary of activities of the PPNN and request for further action along with a funding proposal for the Ford Foundation.

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Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation

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Bon.
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With Compliments

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Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation



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Mr Shepard Forman Program Officer International Affairs Programs The Ford Foundation 320 East 43rd Street New York NY 10017

26 July 1995

Dear Mr Forman,

In my letter of 29 May I wrote to you about the decision taken by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to extend that Treaty indefinitely. My letter referred to the role which the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN) played in helping to bring about this outcome, and mentioned further tasks which we see arising from it for our organization.

As I recalled in my letter, PPNN did a great deal of work during the years of preparation for the Review and Extension Conference, helping diplomatic personnel from states party to the Treaty to ready themselves for their participation and publishing material on issues that would play a role at the Conference. I also mentioned the wide variety of functions which members of PPNN's Core Group had at the Conference itself: Ambassador Dhanapala as its President; seven Core Group members serving as members of delegations: and five Core Group members representing PPNN as such, acting as resource persons, staging press conferences and lunches where specific issues were presented and distributing printed material. I served as secretary of the Drafting Committee and as advisor to the Conference Secretariat and the President.

Among the contributions made by PPNN some are seen as having been particularly significant. These include:

- * before the NPT Conference, helping to keep its prospective President abreast of developments relating to the non-proliferation regime, and assisting him in building a network of international contacts; and during the Conference, contributing to his awareness of developments, and providing advice;
- * holding weekend seminars where diplomats from many countries encountered the major aspects of the subjects to be treated at the Conference, were able to question experts in the field, and had a chance to develop personal relationships that proved particularly beneficial at the Conference;

- * creating various other opportunities for delegates to meet on a personal, rather than on an official basis. Some of the documents and approaches that led to the positive extension decision can be traced back to these occasions;
- * providing written materials and expert advice to delegates on a non-partisan basis. This was especially useful to small delegations who would otherwise have been unable to participate fully in the Conference;
- * publishing our quarterly **Newsbrief**, which, as the only publication that summarizes events in all areas of nuclear non-proliferation, helped keep government officials, diplomats and members of the press generally informed of relevant developments.

Summing up, I think it is fair to say that PPNN is widely seen as an authoritative and objective source of information on political and technical aspects of nuclear non-proliferation which can be relied upon for solid and impartial advice. We have received many indications that PPNN has gained a high level of international credibility in its field and has obtained the trust of people from a wide range of countries working in that area.

We are now analyzing events at the Conference, and hope to be able to reflect the results in a PPNN study. Already now, however, we see clear grounds to draw some conclusions about the consequences arising from the decisions taken at the Conference, both in the short term and over a longer period. It is our conviction that there is vital work to be done to ensure that the new review process initiated by the 1995 NPT Conference will strengthen the Treaty rather than detract from its effectiveness. We have strong reason to believe that this calls for the services of a truly international, independent, non-governmental organization like PPNN. Comments we received during the Conference and the events that have followed it have made us aware that many in the international community feel that PPNN is uniquely qualified for this task.

In that light, we have drawn up a programme for further activities that would initially run through 1997, when the Preparatory Committee for the next Review Conference will have its first session. Depending on needs that would become apparent at that time, the programme might be further extended to the end of the decade.

I enclose a funding proposal for the initial stage and very much hope that we can count on your support. Looking forward to your response, both John Simpson and I will be happy to discuss the proposal with you at your convenience.

Yours sincerely,

Ben Sanders
Executive Chairman

PROGRAMME FOR PROMOTING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

PROPOSAL TO THE FORD FOUNDATION FOR A PROGRAMME TO PREPARE FOR THE 1997 PREPARATORY COMMITTEE SESSION OF THE NEXT REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

INTRODUCTION

The issue of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons remains at the forefront of international security considerations and continues to increase in urgency and complexity. The decision of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 (NPT) has not necessarily strengthened the non-proliferation regime as such. Current and potential proliferation problems raise as much concern as before, but the Treaty's indefinite extension has avoided a situation where the non-proliferation regime, of which the NPT is the center-piece, might have been greatly weakened by uncertainty about its long-term survival.

There remain a range of nuclear issues not directly addressed by the Treaty. Those include the question of restrictions on the international trade in nuclear items, the problem of illicit trafficking in fissionable material and the protection of such material in storage and transport - to select a few salient aspects. Most importantly, perhaps, there are states with significant nuclear programmes that remain outside the purview of the Treaty. Besides making certain that the NPT is fully implemented, the international community must remain alert to the proliferation risks arising from these and other non-NPT issues.

THE OUTCOME OF THE 1995 NPT CONFERENCE

The most significant consequence of the indefinite extension of the NPT is the reconfirmation of the global norm against nuclear proliferation. However, the continuing viability of that norm will depend on the broad perception that the Parties are fulfilling in good faith the commitments they accepted in the Treaty, and that they will continue to do so. Without this, the existing international consensus on non-proliferation may break down, Treaty compliance may decline and eventually withdrawals from the Treaty could occur.

It was the perception that the nuclear-weapon states in particular had not fulfilled their commitments under article VI of the NPT (namely, to end the nuclear arms race and to pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations in good faith) that proved the greatest threat to a long or indefinite extension of the Treaty at the 1995 Conference. As it turned out, the decision on indefinite extension was achieved by the adoption of a package of collateral measures by which all Parties redefined their commitments under the Treaty and through which they, and in particular the nuclear-weapon states, agreed to be more clearly accountable for their fulfilment.

These commitments are contained in two documents that are tied to the extension decision. One, entitled *Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament*, contains a series of yardsticks for measuring progress in the implementation of the Treaty. These include: universal adherence to the Treaty; the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons; disarmament and particularly the completion by 1996 of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, the start of negotiations on a convention on the cut-off of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons globally; the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones; the extension of negative and positive security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states, in the form of a legally binding instrument; strengthened safeguards; and access by all states to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The second document, called *Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty*, provides ways to make the periodic conferences for reviewing progress in the implementation of the NPT more capable of achieving practical results. That document contains several important innovations: it makes it mandatory to hold a Review Conference every five years, rather than leaving it to the parties to take a decision to that effect each time; and it provides that the committee to prepare for those five-yearly Review Conferences (the PrepCom) will meet for ten days in each of the three years preceding the Conference, both to make the procedural preparations and to serve as a forum for substantive debate on the implementation of the Treaty. Moreover, the document says that besides reviewing what has happened in the past, Review Conferences should be forward-looking. In practice, this will mean that from 1997 onwards, there will be an NPT meeting almost every year and that those meetings will provide a forum for the discussion of new substantive initiatives in all relevant non-proliferation areas, possibly including those not currently deemed to be within the purview of the Treaty.

CHALLENGES TO THE NPT AND THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME

It is not yet clear whether and how this new review process can promote and maintain confidence in the NPT. Over the long term, the new arrangements could result in a more constructive international dialogue on nuclear non-proliferation, in increasing confidence and co-operation between states on nuclear non-proliferation issues, in a greater ability to isolate and deal with potential proliferators, and in an environment more conducive to furthering the nuclear disarmament agenda. However, the collateral package only provides a general outline of the substance and the procedures of the new review process. While the document on *Principles and Objectives* contains elements that are of direct political significance, their realization will require answers to many new questions, both substantive and procedural. Unless those questions can be answered, there is a risk that the revised procedures will weaken the implementation of the Treaty rather than reinforce it. Some of these questions are:

i. The objective of the revised review process is obviously to contribute to full realization of the purposes of the NPT, but the 1995 NPT Conference provided little guidance regarding the way this could be achieved. One key issue is how to implement the new process in a way that strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole. For instance, it is not clear:

- * How proposals for new substantive initiatives should be handled: should they address nuclear non-proliferation as a whole and in that way strengthen the implementation of the Treaty as a central element of the nuclear non-proliferation regime?
- * Whether the reports of all the main committees of the Review Conference will have to be adopted jointly to reach a formal agreement, or whether the work of each can stand on its own, so that a lack of agreement in one committee does not automatically mean that the products of all are jointly doomed to oblivion?
- * What should be the end product of each of the Review Conferences? Should those Conferences try to agree on a final declaration as they did prior to 1995, and will parties have to adopt those declarations by consensus? Or should Review Conferences focus on the way parties have fulfilled their commitments under the Treaty according to the agreed principles and objectives, and report the disparate views that will no doubt be expressed, rather than seek the "bridging language" of the traditional consensus document?
- * At what stage, and how, will the *Principles and Objectives* be updated?
- ii. The PrepComs to be held in each of the three years prior to any future Review Conference will consider substantive matters as well as procedural ones. They are to consider ways of promoting the full implementation of the Treaty, including its universality (i.e. the adherence also of states that have so far refrained from joining an injunction addressed notably at Israel), and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference. In particular, they will consider whether and how the implementation of the Treaty meets the new 'yardsticks'; and they will review these yardsticks and update them. This raises several difficult issues:
 - * What standards should they use for their judgement and how should parties with different views agree on those standards?
 - * How can one ensure that the PrepComs do not detract from the importance of the Review Conferences themselves by providing those Conferences with an excuse to put off decisions until the next PrepCom session which will be only two years away?

One may raise many questions of this kind. Unless agreements can be forged on answers to them, there is a danger that future Review Conferences will be as divisive as some were in the past and that their PrepComs will come to resemble standing committees, stuck in a perpetual impasse with no pressing deadlines to motivate movement by any of the Parties.

iii. At the 1995 Conference it was made clear that the yardsticks contained in the document on *Principles and Objectives* would be living and flexible concepts, which could be revised during the review process. It is important to ensure that new goals,

especially in the area of nuclear disarmament, are practically attainable and are based on the interests of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states. If the nuclear-weapon states fail to meet what are seen as reasonable yet essential disarmament goals, a significant number of states may lose faith in the value of the Treaty as a non-proliferation measure. It is likely that this backlash will come not just from the states of the non-aligned movement, but also from some of the allies of the nuclear-weapon states. It is therefore vital that all parties not only live up to their commitments but help make the new review process work. It would indeed be counterproductive if the new review process was found to weaken rather than reinforce the pressure on parties to abide by their commitments. To help avoid this happening during the new review process, concrete initiatives are needed to facilitate productive discussions of disarmament and other nuclear issues.

iv. The experience of the 1995 NPT Conference underlined the significance of having well briefed and motivated individuals within the Presidency, Secretariat and national delegations at such conferences. In this connection, one fundamental problem that will arise in the new NPT review process, covering as it does activities over a 2-4 year time-period, is **continuity of personnel, and thus of knowledge**. It is difficult for diplomatic and administrative services, whose personnel tend to stay only 2-3 years in a given area of work, to ensure such continuity. These problems will be most acute in the services of small, developing countries, which lack independent information on the evolving issues that may play a role at the various PrepCom sessions and at the Review Conferences that will follow them. They have neither the means to maintain permanent offices to compile such information nor the staff able to devote their full time attention to this task, yet they may not want to be dependent on other states or inter-state groups that have such capabilities.

THE PAST AND FUTURE ROLES OF THE PROGRAMME FOR PROMOTING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION (PPNN)

At present, PPNN is the only international body working on a truly global basis to facilitate the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Its non-governmental status permits it to do things for which intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations, the IAEA or the Secretariats of nuclear-weapon-free zones, are not equipped and do not have the mandates. Bodies such as the Non-Aligned Movement or the European Union may be expected to cover some of the relevant issues, but they will approach them from a specific political point of view which will not necessarily appeal to the entire nuclear non-proliferation community at large.

PPNN's reputation among diplomats, national officials, international civil servants and the media as an invaluable source of objective research and information is unparalleled. Its meetings have been seen by the diplomatic community as essential unofficial fora to identify, analyze, and discuss issues related to non-proliferation, and as useful sources of information for those not familiar with the subject. A combination of favourable factors has given PPNN unique access to a wide range of authorities in the non-proliferation field, including government officials, diplomats, international civil servants, researchers and academics, from whom it has been able to recruit the Core Group that constitutes the basis of its analytical capabilities.

The work PPNN was been able to do for, and at, the 1995 Conference has given it further broad international support. That, in turn, has moved many in the international community to look to it to provide the venue in which the groundwork for a successful PrepCom in 1997 can be laid and to supply new ideas and information. A body like PPNN, both through its meetings and its publications, will be able to furnish foreign services with the necessary intellectual continuity in cases where personal continuity at the national level cannot be maintained. Also, at the 1995 Conference there was a discernable trend away from the large, established caucus groupings and towards smaller, more informal networks of delegations sharing other political interests, especially with respect to arms control. The extension decision was produced to a large extent through the activities of these informal groupings. Several of the delegations involved in these emerging informal groupings had close contacts with PPNN's past activities, and based some of their ideas on work done by PPNN. This new situation would thus seem to offer fertile ground for PPNN to continue to help state officials develop concrete initiatives for the new NPT review process.

Accordingly, PPNN hopes to continue its work in the first instance for a two-year period through 1996 and 1997, with a programme of activities designed to help shape this new NPT review process. This would be done with the help of a reconstituted Core Group, somewhat reduced in size and rejuvenated. It would again be drawn from a broad range of industrial and developing states, including nuclear-weapon states, countries prominent in regional arrangements and above all states that can provide persons with expertise in non-proliferation issue areas. It would be the intention to recruit members from states newly emerging as key players in the field, e.g. from countries in Southern Africa, East Asia and/or the Pacific.

THE PROPOSED PPNN PROGRAMME FOR 1996-7

The situation outlined above indicates the existence of a set of needs that it would be highly desirable for PPNN to meet in the immediate term, and permits the formulation of a programme of action to meet those needs.

a. Needs

- * To promote early consideration and discussion of issues relevant to the implementation of the new NPT review process, and to generate constructive solutions to problems likely to be encountered at the first PrepCom in 1997;
- * To brief those participating in the 1997 NPT PrepCom on both the background to the new review process and the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and on the evolving challenges that the regime will face.

b. Objectives

* To identify the substantive and procedural problems that may have to be addressed and resolved if the new NPT review process is to be implemented in a co-operative and harmonious fashion, and so to promote a productive outcome to the 1997 NPT PrepCom;

* To sustain continuity of knowledge on the NPT review process and the nuclear non-proliferation regime among key diplomats and officials likely to participate in the 1997 NPT PrepCom and so lay a foundation for the sessions that will be held each year up to the Review Conference itself.

c. Programme of Action

Actions to achieve these objectives will consist of three integrated elements: analysis/problem solving; dissemination of information; and meetings.

i. Analysis/Problem Solving

Analysis and problem-solving will be largely the task of the newly constituted Core Group, reinforced on occasion by outside experts. The work will take off from indepth analyses of the new NPT review process, its possibilities, needs and problems. Substantive and procedural issues likely to be encountered in the implementation of this process will be identified, and innovative approaches to address them developed. This will be done by individual members of the Core Group and/or in discussions among all or several of them.

ii. Meeting Programme

The aim of the meeting programme will be to provide fora where new ideas and solutions to current and future problems can be discussed, and to create opportunities for direct informal contact among key players who might not otherwise be able to break through the regional and political barriers between them. Two sorts of meetings are envisaged - workshops and briefing seminars. At the first workshop, key individuals in the non-proliferation field will evaluate initial analyses prepared by PPNN Core Group members and others on the procedural and substantive issues that will affect the outcome of the 1997 PrepCom. Building on the discussions at this workshop, two briefing seminars will be held, involving between 40 and 50 senior national representatives likely to attend the 1997 NPT PrepCom. A second workshop will be held after the 1997 PrepCom to evaluate the outcome of that PrepCom and to discuss ideas for solutions to any problems it generated.

iii. Publication Programme

As hitherto, the publication programme will disseminate the results of PPNN's analytical work and the products of its discussion fora to the widest possible audience; provide those involved in non-proliferation questions with an international perspective on critical issues in that field; and supply institutions and individuals concerned with non-proliferation issues with comprehensive information on relevant current developments. The publications programme should help ensure that the non-proliferation debate is sustained at a high level of competence, that those states in particular that do not have large research departments are fully cognizant of the issues, that new ideas have a broad dissemination before the next PrepCom starts, and that possible solutions to problems are widely considered both in advance of, and at, the PrepCom.

At least three types of publication are envisaged:

- * The PPNN Newsbrief: this will continue to be published quarterly in its present form. It remains the only publication in the world that provides authoritative and concise coverage of all aspects of nuclear non-proliferation. The information base for the Newsbrief includes newspaper reports from around the world, periodic publications of both a general and a specialised nature, radio and television broadcasts, and reports from scientific and diplomatic meetings. The editor's extensive international contacts permit this information to be checked with technical experts, governments or international organisations in order to ensure accuracy. The material is presented with a minimum of comment. As a consequence, it is considered authoritative worldwide. It is currently distributed on a global basis to over 2,800 diplomats, national officials, international civil servants and media personnel in 112 countries. It is also provided in computer readable form to the IAEA and a number of other organisations for incorporation in their data bases.
- * PPNN Issue Reviews: between four and six Issue Reviews, presenting brief examinations of specific topics of relevance to the 1997 PrepCom and the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, will be produced in the course of the proposed programme. The substance of these Issue Reviews will be based on the results of the analyses of selected problems and solutions undertaken at PPNN workshops and seminars.
- * PPNN Briefing Books: PPNN will produce an up-dated version of its Briefing Book Volumes I and II, that were used by delegations at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, for use as a reference handbook for participants at the 1997 PrepCom. Volume I offers a short analysis and description of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the role of the NPT and its review conferences within it. Volume II contains documentation relevant to the regime and NPT review conferences. In addition, spiral bound compilations of papers prepared for PPNN Briefing Seminars may be disseminated if this appears appropriate and useful.

d. Schedule for Action

The objectives and activities outlined above imply a phased plan of action, with some programme elements necessarily preceding others. It is difficult to offer a detailed schedule of activities at this stage, as no information is available on the timing of the 1997 NPT PrepCom. However, six sets of activities are envisaged to meet the programme objectives:

- * an initial identification and analysis of the substantive and procedural issues inherent in the 1995 Conference documents and likely to be encountered at the 1997 NPT PrepCom this is likely to occupy a period through to mid-1996;
- * discussion of the issues identified, their further analysis and the development of constructive solutions to problems through the workshops centred on a reconstructed PPNN Core Group and key individuals involved in the 1995 NPT Conference this is likely to occupy a period from mid-1996 to early 1997;

- * conducting the two residential seminars for key diplomats and officials, to provide them with briefings on the issues that need to be addressed at the 1997 NPT PrepCom and on possible solutions to problems that may be encountered these will probably take place in the 6-9 months prior to the PrepCom;
- * continuing to provide foreign offices and other interested groups and individuals with objective information on the evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation regime through the widespread dissemination of the PPNN Newsbrief this will occur at quarterly intervals throughout the 24 month period;
- * disseminating information relevant to the issues likely to be encountered by state parties at the 1997 NPT PrepCom through PPNN Issue Reviews and revised volumes of the PPNN Briefing Book this activity will probably be concentrated in the 12 month period prior to the PrepCom;
- * holding a final workshop in late 1997 to analyze events at the 1997 PrepCom, and to identify initial proposals for further constructive action to strengthen the non-proliferation regime this will take place in October/November of 1997.

e. The Host Institution

PPNN has its administrative base at the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies (MCIS) in the United Kingdom. MCIS was founded in 1990 as a small unit within the Department of Politics at the University of Southampton, with the mission of carrying out externally funded work on international security issues, especially arms control and disarmament questions and UN peacekeeping activities. The Centre, through the participation of members of its staff in various committees and advisory groups, has close links with the United Nations and many governments.

The University of Southampton, situated in the south of the United Kingdom, is a public charitable educational institution, with a teaching staff of 550 professors and instructors and a student body numbering approximately 10,000. Financial administration of all grants awarded to PPNN, or to MCIS, is undertaken by the University of Southampton, which also accepts accounting responsibility for them.

f. Personnel

Ben Sanders and John Simpson will continue to direct PPNN's activities as Executive Chairman and Programme Director respectively, assisted by a somewhat smaller and rejuvenated Core Group drawn from a range of states, including those newly emerged from the NPT Conference as key players in the field. It will also embody expertise across the spectrum of non-proliferation issues. Informal soundings suggest, for example, that Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, President of the 1995 NPT Conference would be ready to serve on the reconstituted Core Group

Ben Sanders will be resident in New York with an assistant to support him, while the PPNN support staff at Southampton will consist of the current Programme Co-ordinator, Emily Bailey; a part-time information officer, Deborah Ozga, and a full-time graduate intern

(Brief biographical sketches of Ben Sanders, John Simpson, Emily Bailey and Deborah Ozga are attached at Annex A).

g. Budget

An expenditure budget for this programme of PPNN activities in 1996 and 1997 is attached at Annex B. The overall cost of this programme is estimated to be \$1,195,870 for the two year period from January 1996 to December 1997, based on an exchange rate of £1=\$1.65. The 1996 figures represent a substantial decrease of almost 30% from PPNN's expenditure budget for 1995 [The expenditure budget has actually been reduced even further than this figure, but the University of Southampton has decided it can no longer afford to provide office space and other services to PPNN free of cost, and has increased its overhead rate to include this charge].

h. Income and Resources to hand

PPNN has already received a grant of \$105,000 towards this total from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund for part of the costs of the production of the Newsbrief. In addition, as PPNN's 1994 Annual Report indicated, at least \$200,000 is likely to remain unspent at the end of 1995. This unspent balance is the total of the amounts remaining from the general support grants provided by the Rockefeller Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the Japanese Atomic Energy Research Organisation. This leaves approximately \$891,000 to be raised to finance the planned programme for the two-year period 1996-97.

i. The Request

The Ford Foundation has generously supported the work of PPNN in the past, I am writing to you now, along with other past funders of our programme, to request your support at a level of \$200,000 for PPNN's proposed new programme of activities for the two year period 1996 to 1997.

ANNEX A

BENJAMIN SANDERS

Mr Ben Sanders is executive chairman of PPNN and a citizen of the Netherlands, resident in the USA. He joined the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1955 and in 1958 was seconded to the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. In 1961, he was seconded to the United Nations for technical assistance work in Africa and Yugoslavia, and returned to the Safeguards Department of the IAEA in 1965, where he was responsible for the drafting of key documents which now form part of the IAEA safeguards verification system. He was first secretary of the Standing Advisory Group for Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) and represented the IAEA at the Non-Nuclear Weapon State Conference of 1968. He joined the Disarmament Centre of the United Nations in New York in 1977, to set up the Disarmament Yearbook and the periodical 'Disarmament' and take charge of the disarmament studies commissioned by the UN General Assembly. In 1985, he was Secretary-General of the third NPT Review Conference. At the 1995 NPT Conference he was consultant to the Secretariat.

JOHN SIMPSON

John Simpson serves as the Programme Director of PPNN. He was born in the United Kingdom and joined the University of Southampton in 1965 as a junior lecturer. He specialised in security matters and weapons procurement issues. From 1982-4 he served as the United Kingdom representative on the UN Secretary-General's Study Group on Conventional Disarmament, and in 1985 was a member of the UK delegation to the UNESCO conference in Sofia. He has also served as a consultant to the UK Ministry of Defence Arms Control Unit, and is currently a member of the UN Advisory Board for Disarmament Matters. He became Professor of International Relations at the University of Southampton in 1990, and in the same year was appointed as the founding Director of its Mountbatten Centre for International Studies.

EMILY BAILEY

Emily Bailey is Programme Co-ordinator of the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton, a position she has held since 1991. She was previously Programme Officer at the International Peace Academy, New York, an international training and research organisation examining peacekeeping issues; and Assistant Director of the British Atlantic Committee, a non-governmental public affairs organisation focusing on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and UK security issues. She holds an MSc in International Studies and a BSc in Environmental Science, both from the University of Southampton. She is also a qualified teacher.

DEBORAH A. OZGA

Deborah A. Ozga is the new Information Assistant for the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation and is working towards her Ph.D. at the University of Southampton. From July 1994 - June 1995, she served as an intern and then as a consultant to the International Atomic Energy Agency. For four years, she worked at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, California, as a Research Associate for the International Missile Proliferation Project, a Staff Writer for *The Nonproliferation Review* and later as the Project Manager for the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Project. She holds an MA in International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute and a BS in both Business Administration and German from Georgian Court College, New Jersey.

PPNN PROGRAMME BUDGET 1996-7 (Assuming Exchange Rate of £1=\$1.65)

	1996	1997
SALARY COSTS		
Executive Chairman (Sanders 80% FTE)*	85,203	85,995
Programme Director (Simpson 80% FTE)	66,000	68,640
Support Staff (New York)	10,000	10,400
Programme Co-ordinator (Bailey)	46,619	48,949
Information Officer (Ozga 30% FTE)	10,000	10,400
Support Staff (Southampton)	20,000	21,070
Sub-Total	237,822	245,454
CORE GROUP STIPENDS		
Sub-Total	13,000	13,000
STAFF TRAVEL & SUBSISTENCE		
Sub-Total	28,000	29,400
DIRECT WORKSHOP AND SEMINAR COSTS		
Workshop	40,000	42,000
Briefing Seminar**	90,000	94,500
Sub-Total	130,000	136,500
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GENERAL OFFICE EXPENSES		
New York/US	10,000	10,400
Southampton	13,000	13,650
Sub-Total	23,000	24,050
PUBLICATION COSTS		
Newsbrief	34,016	35,716
Issue Reviews	12,000	12,600
Briefing Book	-	2,000
Sub-Total	46,016	50,316
CONTINGENCY RESERVE		
Sub-Total	10,000	10,000
SUBTOTAL	487,838	508,720
UNIVERSITY OVERHEADS (20%)***	97,568	101,744
TOTAL	<u>585,406</u>	610,464

^{*} Sanders himself is expected to bear the cost of appropriate office facilities, including rental, utilities (light, air conditioning, heating, water) and service fees (doormen, cleaning, rubbish disposal)

^{**} This assumes that the PrepCom will be in April/May 1997 and one briefing seminar will be held in late 1996 and another in early 1997. If the PrepCom is held in September 1997, the two briefing seminars may need to be held in 1997, and the costs of the first will be expended in 1997, not 1996.

^{***} This overhead charge on total expenditure includes all costs of PPNN office facilities and services in Southampton