

May 5, 1988

Third Meeting of PPNN Core Group, 5-8th May 1988

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Summary:

Summarizes the events and issues of the third PPNN meeting in Guernsey, UK.

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PPNN-REP.3

THIRD MEETING OF PPNN CORE GROUP
5-8th MAY 1988

1. General

The Core Group of the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation held its third meeting at the Old Government House Hotel, Guernsey, from 5 to 8 May 1988. As indicated in Annex 1, all members were present at this meeting. Michael Wilmshurst, the observer from the IAEA, and Andrew Barlow, both of whom presented invited papers, participated in the substantive part of the meeting, for which four postgraduate students from Southampton University were also present. The meeting was further attended by the two Southampton University staff members involved in the Programme.

The following is a summary report on the meeting. This is intended as an 'aide memoire' for participants and to give funding organisations and other interested parties a general idea of what transpired. The report has not been formally adopted or agreed to by the participants. It records conclusions reached and does not pretend to attribute any particular opinions to individual participants.

2. Programme of Work

The Core Group adopted the agenda (PPNN/CG3/1) and the Programme of Work (PPNN/CG3/2/Rev.1) attached as Annexes 2 and 3, respectively. Its substantive discussions followed the pattern agreed at the Second Core Group meeting at Charlottesville of

- i. Systematically examining the Articles of the NPT and identifying problems likely to be encountered over them in the 1990 Review Conference;
- ii. Examining functional issues affecting the nuclear non-proliferation regime;
- iii. Examining "problem" countries or situations;
- iv. Receiving reports on recent NPT developments from Core Group members.

In the course of these discussions it considered the following nine papers and/or presentations:

1. Lewis Dunn: Implementation of NPT Articles I and II;
2. David Fischer: Implementation of NPT Article III.1;
3. Walter Rehak: Technical Aspects of IAEA Safeguards;
4. Michael Wilmshurst: The Future of IAEA Safeguards;
5. Lewis Dunn: US Perspectives on Nuclear Supply;
6. Andrew Barlow: European Supplier Policies;
7. Ian Smart: Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East;

8. Ben Sanders and John Simpson: Nuclear Submarines and Non-Proliferation: Cause for Concern;
9. Jorge Morelli Pando: The Prospects for the Non-Proliferation Regime in the Latin American Region.

In addition, Ben Agu presented written texts of his reports on "Nigeria and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime", and "Recent Press Attack(s) on the IAEA Safeguards System".

3. Briefings by Core Group Members and Invited Speakers

i. Examination of the Articles of the NPT

The Core Group commenced its systematic analysis of the issues likely to be raised in the 1990 Review Conference with a presentation by Lewis Dunn on NPT Articles I and II. This identified likely problems for 1990 as:

The Israeli and South African situations and the issues arising from them. Specifically whether Israel would be debarred from participating as an observer; whether Israel would be condemned in the final document and whether that document would link the Israeli situation with that of South Africa. The United States would probably walk out under any of these circumstances.

The reduced freedom of manoeuvre for the United States and other countries over the Israeli issue compared to 1985 because of the Vanunu affair, among other things.

A proliferation shock through an open or semi-open spread of nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear-weapon state.

Proposals for action offered in the ensuing discussion included¹:

The construction and adoption of a moderate, compromise formula with regard to Israel. This might involve a wording deploring its apparent breach of the obligation it had accepted not to use heavy water supplied by Norway for military purposes; calling upon it to continue to implement its declared policy not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East and demanding that it neither test nor deploy nuclear weapons.

Attempting to avoid the association of the cases of Israel and South Africa. Also attempting to avoid Israel being singled out, by having its case linked with all other hold-out states.

¹ All proposals for action reported in this document originated with individual members and, although variously supported by others, are not necessarily agreed to by the entire Group.

The preparation of a plan of action to deal with the consequences of a United States walk-out from the Review Conference in the event of a condemnation of Israel.

Instituting contingency planning for responses to a "proliferation shock". Such an event would not only provide problems but also important opportunities to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

The promotion of an informal meeting of the Latin American members of the NPT in Vienna with a view to expanding it to include other NPT members of the G77. This would enable consultations to occur at the earliest opportunity over Neutral and Non-aligned policies towards the Review Conference.

ii. Functional Issues

Presentations on NPT Article III on safeguards were made by David Fischer and Walter Rehak. In addition, Michael Wilmshurst introduced his linked functional paper on the future of IAEA Safeguards. These presentations identified among the main future issues inter alia the following:

The growing inadequacy of the financial resources available for IAEA safeguards as a result of the Agency's zero-growth budget.

The dissemination of nuclear submarine reactors to non-nuclear weapon states and its consequences for IAEA safeguards.

The impact of new verification concepts included in INF, START and CW, such as challenge inspections, upon the IAEA safeguards system.

Bringing the Tlatelolco Treaty into full effect.

The use of the IAEA to monitor peaceful uses of nuclear materials released as a result of disarmament measures.

The maintenance of a strict separation between the military and civil fuel cycles in the nuclear-weapon states with a view to the eventual cessation of the production of fissionable material for military purposes.

Proposals for action arising from the discussion included:

Alerting governments to the need for adequate funding of IAEA safeguards.

The introduction of the concept of a "users' fee" for funding safeguards, in particular in industrialised countries with a complicated fuel cycle.

Economising on the safeguards operation by concentrating on

bulk material handling plants, particularly sensitive operations and/or high risk countries.

Making a study of the amount of plutonium that would become available for peaceful uses following disarmament agreements, and the relevance of that amount to the civil nuclear fuel cycle.

The presentation on US supply policy by Lewis Dunn identified the following potential challenges to the supply regime in the 1990s:

Covert attempts to evade supply controls.

Emerging suppliers not abiding by the rules of the regime.

Market changes which release pent-up demand.

The need to apply controls on dual-use exports.

Nuclear submarine programmes.

Proposals for action in this area included:

Strengthening cooperation among old suppliers.

Initiating consultations between old and newly emerging suppliers.

Restrictions on supplies to countries in volatile regions.

Andrew Barlow's presentation on European supplier policies highlighted:

The increasing harmonisation of the supply policies of the three principal nuclear suppliers in Western Europe.

The danger that non-proliferation policies might become dominated by the minutiae of supply controls, at the expense of a broader perspective on non-proliferation tasks.

In the ensuing discussions it was pointed out that de facto full-scope safeguards was a basic condition now for any export by the Federal Republic of Germany. It was suggested, inter alia, that

Efforts should be made to bring France and China into the NPT.

European supply policies should be more effectively coordinated and to this end the tendency for bureaucratic power to pass from technical authorities to ministries of foreign affairs should be utilised.

Domestic systems for monitoring and implementing agreed supply guidelines should be improved and the system for agreeing these guidelines should be revitalised.

In the presentation on nuclear submarines by Ben Sanders and John Simpson, the following issues were identified:

The negative precedent for IAEA safeguards that might arise from an extensive application of the exemption arrangements made pursuant to Para.14 of INFCIRC/153 in the case of Canada.

The risks arising from the expansion of the spread of unsafeguarded fissile material, especially to non-NPT parties.

A new dimension being added to nuclear proliferation.

The implications for the non-proliferation system of the use of this "loophole".

The end of what used to be a simple dichotomy between civil and military uses of nuclear energy and the impression this creates of lower priority being given to non-proliferation.

The consequences for the safeguards arrangements of the level of enrichment of the reactor fuel.

Proposals for action offered in the ensuing discussion included:

Consultations - initially among the three depositary states and eventually among all potential suppliers - with a view to initiating a process for agreeing on international rules for the transfer and safeguarding of nuclear submarine technology, including the supply of key non-nuclear components.

Making adherence to the NPT a condition of supply.

Narrowing the "loophole" in Art. 14 of INFCIRC/153, by declassifying data needed to safeguard fuel cycle stages that are not inherently military.

With specific reference to the case of Canada, seeking international agreement on an interpretation of Art. 14. which leaves the smallest possible gap in the safeguards system.

Seeking more information on the nature of the arrangements between India and the USSR.

Publishing and circulating the paper with suitable changes at the earliest opportunity to the widest possible audience.

iii. "Problem" countries or situations

The presentations on the Middle East, by Ian Smart and Mohamed Shaker, identified three possible consequences arising from the Vanunu revelations on developments in Israel. These were

Israel might be triggered into publicly acknowledging its nuclear weapon programme.

Other states in the region would not continue to accept the Israeli position with equanimity.

Attempts to bolster the security of Arab states by acquiring advanced weapons systems, particularly long-range missiles, might act as an engine for nuclear proliferation.

In the discussion that followed it was suggested that the following measures should be investigated:

The negotiation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

A regional test-ban treaty.

Linking a general settlement in the Middle East with a nuclear freeze and nuclear disarmament.

Developing a general approach to the problem of states which were either close to having a nuclear weapon capability or already had it but had not made it public.

It was felt that, while Israel had no good reason for declaring itself a nuclear-weapon state as a result of external pressures, it was not impossible that this would occur as a product of domestic political circumstances. The view was also expressed that the current non-proliferation problem in the Middle East and elsewhere could only be addressed through specific regional policies rather than universal global ones.

The presentation by Jorge Morelli Pando on the prospects for regional non-proliferation arrangements involving Latin American states, led inter alia to suggestions for:

A regional nuclear-test ban.

Domestic legislation prohibiting the use of nuclear material for military purposes.

The presenter's assertion that in 1990 the non-aligned nations would be far less likely to accept a compromise on the question of a comprehensive test ban than they had been in 1985, led to an intensive debate on that subject, which is referred to under the next agenda item. It was also pointed out that in 1990, Article VII would probably be as important a point of contention as Article VI, because of the increasing confrontation between Western nuclear-weapon states and parties to nuclear-weapon-free zones.

4. Reports From Core Group Members

Ben Agu reported that a safeguards agreement between Nigeria and the IAEA had been signed in February 1988. He also documented the attacks made on the integrity of the Agency's safeguards system, mainly as a consequence of the "NUKEM" affair.

Jayantha Dhanapala expressed his satisfaction at the inclusion in the Preamble of the INF Treaty of a reference to Article VI of the NPT, a possibility the Core Group had discussed at its previous meeting. He also suggested approaching the Groupe de Bellerive for some form of cooperation, on which he was willing to take an initiative.

David Fischer reported that there had been no progress in the matter of South Africa's accession to the NPT. The South African cabinet remained divided on the issue, and reports suggested that its preconditions for ratification included the unrealistic one of South Africa being reinstated as a member of the Agency's Board of Governors. South Africa also seemed to be seeking an irreversible commitment from the US Congress for an unrestrained supply of nuclear technology. It was clear that South Africa was not likely to have taken any positive action in regard to ratification before the Agency's General Conference in September, so that the question of its expulsion will probably resurface. Whereas it was debatable that restrictions on the import of South African uranium by any further countries would be useful as a lever, a simultaneous ratification of the NPT by South Africa and the "Front-Line States" might have some appeal in Pretoria.

Walter Rehak referred to the international conference on nuclear-weapon-free zones to be held in Berlin in June 1988, to which the government of the German Democratic Republic has invited the Chairman of the Core Group and where Mohamed Shaker will present a paper. He also reported on a recent meeting of the socialist suppliers' group in Warsaw, which had yielded an opportunity to acquaint its members with the existence, nature and purposes of PFNN.

Joe Nye expressed the view that under a Dukakis presidency non-proliferation would have high priority and sought the Group's views as to the role a nuclear test ban would play in the 1990 Review Conference. It was suggested that there had to be doubts whether in practice a Democratic administration might be able to pursue a comprehensive test ban, despite its general commitment to such a measure. In discussion, it was made clear that any lesser measure, such as a ban with a threshold of 10 kilotons, would fail to satisfy the demands of the neutral and non-aligned states in the context of Art. VI. Several possible alternatives to a comprehensive ban, and their likely consequences, were also discussed. So too were the problems of verification associated with all these measures. One view expressed was that a further threshold treaty between the two major Powers involving reductions on yield and frequency of tests sufficient to prevent the development of new weapon designs might serve to satisfy

critics, as long as it was seen as part of a transition to a CTBT. It was also made clear that only a measure that would perceptibly affect the testing ability of the major Powers would be acceptable to the non-aligned Group. There was general agreement that nuclear testing would again be a major issue at the next Review Conference.

Harald Müller briefed the Group on the details of the "NUKEM" affair in the Federal Republic of Germany and the subsequent parliamentary inquiry. This had provided the first comprehensive hearings on non-proliferation since that country had signed the NPT. As a result of the fact that EURATOM was functioning as the "national system of accountancy and control" for nuclear materials, the Federal authorities had abdicated that function and were ignorant of the quantities and location of German nuclear material. The hearings had revealed great carelessness, and in some cases dishonesty, on the part of those concerned, but there was no evidence of any illicit export of fissile materials. The affair had been useful in drawing attention to the question of non-proliferation, but it was to be hoped that it would not lead to a less favorable perception of the IAEA and safeguards. It might result in an improved system of physical security and in a separation between the promotional and regulatory functions of the Ministry of Technology, whose power over nuclear issues was expected to be reduced as a consequence.

5. Proposals for Action on Substantive Issues Discussed During the Meeting

As reported above, this item was covered in the course of the briefings and reports.

6. Finance, Budget and Staffing

The Directors reported on the funding situation. No further grants had been obtained since the last meeting but an unsolicited donation of £ 5,000 to offset accommodation costs of a further meeting in the UK in May 1989 was expected. At the end of 1987, the shortfall between funds pledged to the Programme and its current budget was \$ 66,255.00. Subsequent changes in exchange rates had added to this estimated shortfall.

The situation was further exacerbated by three factors. The increased emphasis given to outreach, especially to public media activities, would necessitate the use of costly consultants' services. It had also become obvious that the Directors needed to devote a far greater part of their time (for a total of about 3/5) to the Programme than had been expected. Thirdly, the Programme involved more administration, correspondence and research than initially budgeted for, due to a large extent to the wide interest in the work of the Programme and the positive response to the Newsbrief.

The Core Group asked the Directors to intensify their attempts to obtain further funding. It was suggested that the Volkswagen foundation should be asked to support the May, 1990 conference.

The Canadian Institute for Peace Studies, in Ottawa, should also be approached for assistance.

The Group also asked to be given two budgets: one, which should indicate what could be done with the means now available, and one specifying the amounts needed to carry out the full programme so far contemplated. Given the limitation of funds the Core Group agreed to adopt a clear order of priorities among the various elements of the Programme. It did so in the realisation that its main strength lay in its collective ability to analyse all facets of the subject of non-proliferation and to formulate concrete policy options and proposals. In this light it listed the Programme priorities as: (1) the work of the Core Group; (2) Conferences (or "expanded Core Group meetings" - see below); (3) the Newsbrief (which some considered as being of equal priority with the conferences); (4) further publications; (5) a full-fledged media strategy. In connection with the last point there was agreement that individual contacts with press representatives, and the involvement of the latter in various meetings should continue to be encouraged within available means, but that media consultants should only be employed extensively if funds were granted specifically for that purpose.

7. Media Strategy and Outreach Activities

A paper on a Long Term Media Strategy, prepared by Christopher Lee, was considered and the main points noted. Emphasis was laid on the need to prepare documentation on the NPT in advance of the Review Conference. It was recognised that important publicity can be obtained for the Programme through the attendance by the Directors or members of the Core Group, at meetings related to the subject. Members gave information on suitable occasions of this kind arising in the near future.

Members stressed the strikingly positive response given to the first issue of the Newsbrief, which filled an apparent gap partially by its coverage of the entire field of non-proliferation. They were less certain of the need for an extensive series of occasional papers. Following discussion on means of publicising ideas and analyses contained in papers prepared for the Core Group, it was suggested that the Newsbrief should be expanded to contain synopses of the facts and recommendations contained in some of these contributions. It would also be noted in the Newsbrief that copies of the papers in question could be obtained from the Programme. "Occasional papers" would only be issued in the case of especially topical and important subjects; authors of other papers should be encouraged to seek any appropriate outlet for their material, but would be requested to make a clear attribution in such publications to the role of PPNN in their preparation.

With further reference to the Newsbrief, it was agreed that the circulation list should be sent to all members of the Core Group, with the request that they would make such additions as they considered useful; that the Newsbrief should be sent to newspapers and other public media, governmental agencies,

libraries and "target" institutes; and that it should include mention of relevant conferences attended by members of the Group (who would inform the Editor of details).

Members stressed the usefulness of participation in both intergovernmental and non-governmental conferences and agreed that, among others, FPNN should be represented at UNSSOD 3, the next IAEA General Conference, the March 1989 International Studies Association meeting in London, the September 1989 symposium of the Uranium Institute and the conference in Berlin on nuclear-weapon-free zones.

8. Programme of Future Work for the Core Group, and FPNN Conferences

There was discussion on the programme for the next Core Group meeting (Charlottesville, November 1988) and the following arrangements were agreed:

Article IV: paper by Jayantha Dhanapala.

Prospects for nuclear power and fuel cycle plants outside OECD and CMEA: paper by Robert Skjoeldebrand (Fischer to make the approach).

Nuclear power and non-proliferation policies in South-East Asia: paper by Michael Brenner (Simpson to make the approach).

Verification approaches contained in new disarmament agreements, and what impact they might have on the IAEA system: paper/presentation by Lewis Dunn.

The use of satellite verification for non-proliferation purposes: paper by L.S. Spector (Sanders to Make the Approach).

An extensive discussion took place about the purposes, dates, venues and financing of the planned conferences. The Group arrived at the following plan of action, bearing in mind in particular the desire to reach junior diplomats and officials and allow them to participate actively in substantive discussions:

In May 1989 there would be an "extended" Core Group meeting in Guernsey, the substantive part of which would be attended by up to a dozen younger diplomats and officials involved in non-proliferation matters as well as two to three journalists invited as individuals, to familiarise themselves with the subject.

In November 1988 the Core Group would decide whether the meeting in November 1989 would also be an "extended" Core Group meeting involving younger diplomats, or a full-fledged conference. There would also be a further discussion concerning the conference to be held in the spring of 1990; there was a general tendency to think of Geneva as the proper venue for that conference, to reach

delegates stationed there.

9. Role of the Core Group at the Fourth Review Conference

A paper on this subject was circulated and the Directors were asked to provide a revised version that would make a distinction between what the Group as such would be able to do and what individual members might seek to achieve through their governments.

10. Information Base

The Information Officer, Darryl Howlett, presented a report on the work done so far in creating the PFNN information base at Southampton. It was suggested that members should be given a list of the headings under which information was categorised. Members present expressed their gratitude to him for his work both with the data base and with other aspects of the programme.

11. Other Business

Members present expressed their appreciation for the work done by Mrs Elizabeth Schlamm in organising, and assisting at, the meeting and for her other work on behalf of PFNN.

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PPNN/CG3/1

Annex2
5 May 1988Agenda for Third Core Group Meeting

1. Opening remarks to Core Group by Chairman
2. Adoption of Timetable of Work and Agenda for 3rd Core Group Meeting
3. Briefings by Core Group Members and invited speakers (PPNN/CG3/11-16)
4. Reports from Core Group Members
5. Proposals for action on substantive issues discussed during the meeting
6. Outreach Activities
 - a) Media Strategy (PPNN/CG3/3 & 16)
 - b) Newsbrief (content and distribution)
 - c) Occasional Papers (titles and distribution)
 - d) Information Base (PPNN/CG3/4)
 - e) Other Outreach Activities (inc. UNSSOD 3, June, 1988; ISA Conference, April 1989)
7. Programme of Future Work for the Core Group (PPNN/CG3/5)
8. PPNN Conferences (PPNN/CG3/6)
9. Dates and Venues of Conferences and Further Core Group Meetings (PPNN/CG3/7)
10. Role of the Core Group at the Fourth Review Conference (PPNN/CG3/8)
11. Finance, Budget and Staffing (inc. composition of Core Group) (PPNN/CG3/9 and 10)
12. Summary of agreed conclusions (PPNN/CG3/17)
13. Any other business

PFNN/CG3/2.Rev1

Annex 3

Timetable for Third Core Group MeetingTHURSDAY, 5TH MAY

| | |
|-----------|---|
| 1400-1800 | Arrival at Old Government House, Guernsey |
| 1830-1915 | Informal drinks in the Governors Bar |
| 1930-2115 | Dinner (end of Dining Room) |
| 2115-2145 | Opening Session [Agenda Items 1 and 2] (Conference Room) |

FRIDAY, 6TH MAY

| | |
|-----------|---|
| 0700-0845 | Breakfast (own room or Dining Room) |
| 0845-1015 | NPT Articles I and II - Lewis Dunn (Conference Room) |
| 1015-1045 | Tea/Coffee (Centenary Bar) |
| 1045-1300 | NPT Article III - David Fischer and Walter Rehak [PFNN/CG3/11 & 12] The Future of IAEA Safeguards - Michael Wilmshurst [PFNN/CG3/13] (Conference Room) |
| 1300-1415 | Lunch (end of Dining Room) |
| 1415-1600 | US Supplier Policy - Lewis Dunn European Supplier Policy - Andrew Barlow [PFNN/CG3/14] (Conference Room) |
| 1600-1745 | Tea (Centenary Bar) |
| 1745-1930 | The Middle East - Mohamed Shaker and Ian Smart [PFNN/CG3/15] (Conference Room) |
| 2000-2200 | Dinner (end of Dining Room) |
| 2200-2245 | Video Presentation (Conference Room) |

SATURDAY, 7TH MAY

| | |
|-----------|---|
| 0700-0845 | Breakfast (Dining Room or own room) |
| 0845-1015 | Nuclear Submarines - Ben Sanders and John Simpson [PFNN/CG3/16] (Conference Room) Latin America - Jorge Morelli-Pando |

[PPNN/CG3/18] (Conference Room)

1015-1045 Coffee (Centenary Bar)

1045-1115 Reports from Core Group Members and Proposals for action on substantive issues [Agenda Items 4 & 5] (Conference Room)

1115-1315 Finance, Budget and Staffing [Agenda Item 11 ** [PPNN/CG3/9 and 10]; Media Strategy and Outreach Activities [Agenda Item 6a-c ** PPNN/CG3/3 and 17] (Conference Room)

1315-1430 Lunch (end of Dining Room)

1430-1615 Programme of Future Work for the Core Group and PPNN Conferences [Agenda Items 7 & 8 ** PPNN/CG5 & 6] (Conference Room)

1615-1700 Tea (Centenary Bar)

1700-1845 Dates and Venues of Conferences and Core Group Meetings and Role of the Core Group at the Fourth Review Conference [Agenda Items 9 & 10 ** PPNN/CG3/ 7 & 10] (St Anne's Room)

2000-2200 Dinner (end of Dining Room)

SUNDAY, 8TH MAY

0700-0845 Breakfast (own room or end of Dining Room)

0845-1015 Outreach Activities [Agenda Items 6d & e] (Conference Room)

1015-1045 Coffee (Centenary Bar)

1045-1215 Summary of Agreed Agenda, Conclusions and Any Other Business [Agenda Items 11-12 ** PPNN/CG3/8-10]

1215-1600 Lunch and Departure

NB Programme items indicated between the double lines (====) on Thursday, 5 May and from 11.15 on 7 May onwards are for Core Group members only.