

**May 12, 1989**  
**Fifth Meeting of PPNN Core Group, 12-14th May  
1989**

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**Summary:**

Summarizes the events and issues of the fifth PPNN Core group meeting.

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ANNEX A

**FIFTH MEETING OF PPNN CORE GROUP**  
12-14th May 1989

**1. General**

The Core Group of the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation held its fifth meeting at the Old Government House Hotel, Guernsey, Great Britain from 12 to 14 May 1989. All members were present at this meeting except Oleg Grinevsky. The substantive part of the meeting was also attended by Michael Wilmshurst (IAEA observer); by two paper presenters (Dennis Fakley and Adolf von Baeckmann) and by a number of those invited to assist the Core Group during the Conference for Diplomats that took place on 14-17 May ( Charles van Doren, John Redick, and Frans Terwisscha van Scheltinga).

The following summary report is intended as an 'aide memoire' for participants and to give funding organisations a general idea of what transpired. The report has not been formally adopted or agreed to by the participants. It notes points raised and proposals made, but does not pretend to attribute any particular opinions to individual participants.

**2. Programme of Work**

The Core Group adopted the agenda (PPNN/CG5/1.Rev.2) and the Programme of Work (PPNN/CG5/2/Rev.3). Its substantive discussions followed the pattern agreed at the Second Core Group meeting at Charlottesville of:

- i. Systematically examining the Articles of the NPT and identifying problems likely to be encountered over them in the 1990 Review Conference;
- ii. Examining functional issues affecting the nuclear non-proliferation regime;
- iii. Examining "problem" countries or situations;
- iv. Receiving reports on recent NPT developments from Core Group members.

In the course of these discussions it considered the following papers and/or presentations:

1. Lewis Dunn: Article VI;
2. Ian Smart: The Significance for the NPT of Missile Technology Proliferation and Attempts at Control;
3. Dennis Fakley: New Technologies and Nuclear

- Proliferation;
4. Adolf von Baeckmann: Modern Fuel Cycle Technologies: Challenges to IAEA Safeguards;
  5. Harold Mueller: France and the NPT;

### 3. Directors Report

#### i. Publications

The directors reported that since the November 1988 Core Group Meeting in Charlottesville, two further editions of the Newsbrief had been published and the Occasional Paper on China was in the process of being prepared for printing. It was reported that the latter would be printed on different quality paper, and that this and other methods of reducing costs and weight were under active consideration. Desk-top publishing software had been purchased to enable the typesetting to be done in-house in Southampton, and it was hoped this would speed up the production process.

It was suggested that some attempt might be made to list letters received concerning the publication, with some indication of the content, in order to gauge feed-back to the publication programme. It was also suggested that copies of mailing list should be available for Core Group members to consult and amend at the Vienna meeting.

#### ii. Finance and Budget

The directors presented a paper (PPNN/CG5/3) which set out the programmes financial position. It recorded that additional funds totalling \$275,000 had been obtained since mid-1988. It was reported that this was sufficient to finance the expanded programme option discussed at the last meeting. Thanks were expressed to Hilary Palmer of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund for her invaluable assistance in this matter.

#### iii. Media Strategy and Outreach Activities

The directors reported that despite the best efforts of APCO, which had been hired to assist the Programme with its media efforts, the results of the campaign to date were difficult to gauge. It was suggested that in future, activities should be concentrated upon enhancing the image and credibility of the Programme via the press launches of Occasional Papers. In addition, the Programme Directors should be prepared to react to events by preparing a Press Release commenting on them, and use APCO as a device to have the media ask for advice on interpreting events. This role would be increasingly important as the review conference approached.

A further suggestion was that an Article on the work of PPNN should be placed in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, or alternatively a Special Edition of the Bulletin should be proposed concentrating on the 1990 review conference. It was also proposed that the Directors should make use of the imminent NANPEA seminar for journalists in Brussels to publicise PPNN activities.

#### 4. Future Activities

##### i. Core Group Meetings

Discussion on this item was focused around the proposals in PPNN/CG5/4, which set out ideas for the "Extended" Core Group Meeting and seminar for senior diplomats in Vienna in November 1989. A consensus emerged that Friday, 17th November should be reserved for meetings restricted to the Core Group on the future activities of the Programme, including a review of the experiences of the Guernsey Conference for Diplomats. Substantive discussions with paper presenters and Ambassadors present would start on the Saturday and run through to 4pm on the Sunday. Amendments suggested to the programme for these substantive sessions included the replacement of the existing b)i. by a paper entitled "Projects for the use of Plutonium in Civil Applications and the impact of the increasing quantities of separated plutonium upon the IAEA Safeguards Regime", which William Walker would be requested to provide; amendment of c)i. to read "Israel and South Africa" and amendment of c)ii. to read "Compliance with the NPT". The aim would be to invite a dozen IAEA officials and permanent representatives to attend.

In the discussion which followed on the Core Group meeting and Conference planned for Geneva in the Spring of 1989, four separate activities were identified as its essential components:

- a. A meeting of the Core Group devoted to the issues likely to arise in the 1990 NPT Review Conference;
- b. A Conference/Seminar and Reception for Ambassadors stationed in Geneva to discuss with them the 1990 Conference;
- c. A Press event to alert the media to the 1990 Conference and issues related to it;
- d. A second briefing conference for working level diplomats, in order to cover 40-50 states which had not been invited to the 1989 Guernsey Conference.

There was a consensus that d) would need to be held outside of Geneva in a retreat type setting, and a number of possible venues were suggested. It was further emphasised that none of these activities ought to be seen as a rehearsal for the NPT, rather as an opportunity for those present to devote their thoughts to the problems of the review conference.

[In later informal discussions among Core Group members, the idea emerged of separating out the conference for working level diplomats from the other activities, and holding the former in England about a month before the Geneva events, if this change could be accommodated within the budget. This conference would be run with a much reduced Core Group participation. This would ease the administrative burden of attempting to run all the activities simultaneously. Planning has subsequently proceeded on the basis of a Conference in Guernsey over a weekend in mid-May and the other events taking place over a Saturday-Tuesday period at the end of June]

ii. PPNN Conferences

The Directors reported on the arrangements that had been made for the Conference for Diplomats from 14-17th May 1989, and clarified several points in relation to it. Although the briefing book existed in draft form, there had not been time to finalise it and a bound volume of relevant papers and chapters had been sent to participants in its place. The aim now was to finish the briefing book in early 1990.

5. **Briefings by Core Group Members and Invited Speakers**

i. **Examination of the Articles of the NPT**

The Core Group continued its systematic analysis of the issues likely to be raised in the 1990 Review Conference on the basis of a presentation by Lewis Dunn on **NPT Article VI**. The main points raised in his presentation were:

that this article had been most contentious issue in 1985, with nuclear testing the most difficult single question that had to be resolved;

that in 1990 the implementation of the INF Treaty would be well advanced, and considerable progress would be reported on START, Chemical Weapons, Conventional Forces in Europe and Nuclear Testing;

With START, the outstanding problems were verifiable limits on sea-launched cruise, whether restrictions should be applied to mobile missiles and the linkage between strategic offence and defence forces;

With Chemical Weapons, the key issues were which chemicals were to be prohibited and which facilities were to be destroyed, as well as what could be verified with certainty [e.g. destruction of materials or facilities] and what could not [e.g. holding small stocks of chemicals for defensive research purposes]. Given the commitment of President Bush

to concluding this treaty, the prospect of a complete and total ban on chemical weapons within 2-3 years appeared good;

With conventional forces in Europe, the US and USSR had now reached an agreement on what forces to reduce and where those reductions should be. At the same time, given conceptual consensus, it would not be surprising to see the outstanding issues of limits on naval forces and air forces, links to nuclear forces and verification resolved very rapidly;

With Nuclear Testing, it was probable that an additional verification protocol for the TTBT and PNET would be agreed in 6-12 months, but no agreements were in prospect for either a CTBT or a lower threshold or quotas on tests;

It has to be accepted that after START 1 there will be limits on the reductions in numbers of weapons, as attention will probably be focused on enhancing stability [e.g. by the introduction of single warhead missiles] rather than deep cuts;

This record of activity and the current prospects for progress clearly demonstrate that negotiations on disarmament are taking place in good faith. The only area where this could be argued not to be occurring is CTBT.

In the subsequent discussion, the following points were raised:

The negotiating history of Article VI indicated that emphasis should be placed on nuclear disarmament. On the other hand, the superpowers did not promise to conclude a test ban during the NPT negotiations, though the non-aligned have subsequently read this into the situation;

Although more progress on disarmament will be reported in 1990 than in 1985, the INF treaty will dispose of only 3-4% of the superpower's nuclear weapons;

The attempts to exclude naval armaments from European negotiations were of concern to many states which want restrictions on naval armaments in other regions;

A PTBT Amendment Conference taking place before the 1990 review conference would provide opportunity for a thorough debate in advance of the review conference and might clear the ground for it;

One aim of those supporting a PTBT amendment conference was to find a new negotiating forum for a CTBT, and perhaps to encourage negotiation of a new treaty. However, such

activities could have an uncertain impact upon the NPT review conference;

A depository has only to abstain from voting to prevent a PTBT amendment coming into operation;

The Indian proposal for Total Elimination of Nuclear Arms [TENA] was not being pushed hard, and would not figure in the debate in 1990;

In the United States, attempts were being made to convert the de-facto cut off of the production of fissile materials into nuclear weapons into a bi-lateral agreement with the USSR [excluding tritium production and U235 for submarines], as an alternative to spending money on refurbishing the existing plants.

## ii. Functional Issues

### a. The significance for the NPT of Missile Technology Proliferation and attempts at control

In the presentation by Ian Smart and the subsequent discussion, the following points were made:

Ballistic missiles are a destabilising influence on global security, both because of their inherently offensive nature, their "one shot" characteristics and because they have a propensity to extend regional conflicts into other areas;

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) seems to have been specifically linked to nuclear proliferation in order to "sell" the concept, and is really tackling a conventional arms or technology transfer problem;

The underlying argument behind this linkage is that the acquisition of ballistic or cruise missiles is directly related to a desire to acquire nuclear weapons. In particular, their inaccuracy appears to mean that they must have a warhead with mass-destruction characteristics if they are to be effective;

The evidence on whether missile proliferation leads to nuclear proliferation is contradictory. There is one group of states which appear to be both seeking missiles and maintaining an ambiguous position over nuclear weapons; a second group with much less obvious nuclear weapon intent; and a third group with no nuclear weapon intent at all;

Ballistic missiles are part of wider problem of advanced delivery systems, which include high speed combat aircraft.

One advantage they possess is that they are relatively cheap to acquire and operate, particularly in comparison to modern combat aircraft;

The MTCR has a number of flaws: the thresholds are too high, there are too many loopholes and the restraints are too vague, leading to disputes over compliance. In addition, the regime may need to be renegotiated if it is to become open to any state to join;

The thresholds mean that many nuclear-capable missiles, such as Lance, Jericho, Scud and Condor, are excluded from the regime either on grounds of insufficient range or payload;

Any regime to limit ballistic missiles would also have to struggle with the practical problems of dual-use of missiles for space research and satellite purposes;

The MTCR is seen by many Third World states as a further example of technological discrimination, especially given its limited, Western membership;

The issue of missile proliferation should be kept separate from that of the NPT in order to facilitate a successful outcome to the 1995 NPT extension conference, as it is a second order problem. Unfortunately the justification of the MTCR in terms of nuclear non-proliferation may make this increasingly difficult.

b. New Technologies and Nuclear Proliferation

In the presentation by Dennis Fakley and the subsequent discussion, the following points were made:

There were no new technological developments which significantly changed previous assessments of the non-proliferation problem;

There was a marked decrease in the tendency to see nuclear weapons as having war fighting, as against deterrent utility, though it remained unclear how potential proliferators viewed them;

Over the last five years, there have been no developments in conventional weapons technologies which would affect the desire of a non-nuclear weapon state for nuclear weapons;

New long range missiles under development in the advanced states, however, have near zero CEP and allow targets to be attacked with pin point accuracy. They would allow those states to attack non-nuclear states nuclear weapon capabilities with conventional warheads, as well as any



missiles not in silos;

Missile proliferation is a second order effect as the real problem and constraints are to be found in the nuclear warhead area, not in the delivery field;

Missile proliferation could, however, act as the stimulus for another state's nuclear programme, [for example a Pakistan short range missile capability triggering India into a nuclear weapon programme] rather than the development of a similar missile;

A state could acquire a fission weapon capability without testing, if it was able to acquire the materials through an unsafeguarded or clandestine fuel cycle. One new possibility was that it might use isotope separation of reactor grade plutonium to acquire such materials;

Ultracentrifuge plants for plutonium isotope separation were possible in theory, but had so many practical problems that they have been abandoned as long term production plants in favour of laser facilities, which are relatively small and efficient.

Uranium isotope separation plants cannot be converted to plutonium for technical reasons. They can go from low to high enrichment of uranium in 2-3 cycles, but monitoring of the input would reveal what was taking place;

At least one of the existing nuclear weapon states would not be prepared to put a boosted weapon design into its stockpile unless it had first been tested;

Boosted devices are significant in that they allow more efficient use of nuclear materials, resulting in both more and smaller warheads;

Concern over Tritium and boosting are symptomatic of the fact that the problem of nuclear proliferation is changing: one aim now is to alter the scope and consequences of those clandestine weapon programmes that may exist, and in particular to prevent advanced weaponisation, such as the development of missile warheads;

Application of high seismic frequencies may enhance confidence in the verification of a nuclear testing ban. The core US and UK objection to a ban, however, has been that new deterrent weapons cannot be deployed if testing has not taken place to give confidence in their functioning.

c. The Safeguards implications of New Civil Technologies

In the presentation by Adolf von Baeckmann and the discussion which followed, the following points were raised:

The linkage between nuclear power and nuclear weapons is a false one, as no state had used a nuclear power programme to acquire materials for a weapon. However, low burn-up, on-load refuelling reactors were especially sensitive in this regard, particularly if they are outside safeguards;

IAEA safeguards concepts were all developed in the 1970s and automation was now creating difficulties for the application of some of them. It might be useful to start to rewrite the existing safeguards agreements, perhaps starting with Canada and using this as a model;

The Hexapartite programme had demonstrated that commercial secrets could be protected, while yet allowing safeguards to operate;

Large enrichment plants posed special problems, as sensitive technology is combined with large amounts of fissile material;

Laser enrichment of uranium is being experimented with by several countries, although centrifuge plants are working well and there appears to be no incentive to go beyond them. Work on the enrichment of Plutonium is only taking place in the weapon states and only for weapon purposes;

Advanced fuel cycle technologies were posing problems for safeguards, as demountable pins made it possible to change enrichments within assemblies, making accountancy and measurements difficult. In addition, fuel was being stored for 1-2 years at the reactor and then being placed in transport containers for at least a further five years, where it could not be physically inspected easily;

No country appeared willing to address fully the question of final disposal of nuclear fuel. No plans existed for this to take place without reprocessing, as no state wanted to throw it away. One problem was that it continued to be regarded as high burn-up irradiated fuel, even though the activity levels had declined significantly and it could be more easily reprocessed;

Plutonium was still treated as a standard product, even though there had been some pressure to separate it out into weapon/ near weapon grade material and material which was more difficult to use in weapons, and apply enhanced safeguards on the former;

IAEA safeguards did not apply to Tritium. The technology of producing tritium from deuterium in heavy water reactors was now well established. Heavy water was not mentioned in the IAEA statutes [though it could be covered by the phrase "other materials"], and thus could not technically be subject to safeguards, unless it was regarded as a component of the plant under the terms of an INFCIRC 66 non-NPT safeguarding agreement. Little thought had been given to the practicalities of how heavy water and tritium might be safeguarded by the IAEA - one possibility was a system to verify that tritium had not been removed from the heavy water. It remained, however, a second order problem;

The number of significant nuclear activities outside of IAEA safeguards was increasing. It was no longer just research reactors that were involved, but large power reactors, enrichment plants, reprocessing plants and heavy water facilities. This meant that whole fuel cycles were now outside of IAEA safeguards;

Sweden had estimated in 1985 that the IAEA safeguards budget might have to double if safeguards were applied to nuclear materials in the civil nuclear fuel cycles of all the nuclear weapon states. This might be reduced if the objectives for safeguards in these states were redefined;

If nuclear submarines had to be safeguarded, it would be necessary for inspectors to go aboard for an initial inspection and in principle they should be able to place electronic seals with 12 digit numbers on the cores. These seals could be read each month by the Captain and the numbers sent back to the IAEA, to verify that the cores had not been opened;

The IAEA budget was currently operating on the basis of zero growth, which meant that there was an urgent need for more budgetary resources and staff just to sustain the current situation;

The IAEA Safeguards system was still effective, but it needed support to protect it against false accusations, and changes in the annual safeguards reports to limit the possibilities of misquotation.

### **iii. "Problem" countries or situations**

#### **a. France and the NPT**

In the presentation by Harald Mueller and the subsequent discussion, the following points were raised:

There were three permanently operating factors in French policy: the experiences of the 40s and 50s; the symbolic utility of nuclear independence and the shape and power of the nuclear bureaucracy, particularly the CEA;

The CEA had a success story to offer, and this was one of the reasons it was so difficult to change the Gaullist heritage. The infighting between the Quai & the CEA had been resolved by having a diplomat as head of the CEA External Relations directorate, and for the last 4-5 years there had been little difference between the positions of the two organisations on nuclear non-proliferation. However, the change at the top of the nuclear disarmament department in the Quai now offered some prospect for movement on this matter;

French policy had changed significantly over time, starting with exports being unsafeguarded in the 60s to being subject to supplier group guidelines in the mid 70s and then subject to monitoring by the Council on Foreign Nuclear Policy, chaired by the President, after 1976;

Independence was still significant, but the situation had changed out of all recognition from 10-15 years ago. In particular, there was the Framtome/KWU merger, the Cogema/Veba arrangements resulting in the cancellation of Wakersdorf and the potential collaboration between Britain and France over nuclear delivery systems;

French export law and regulations were very strict, and the punishments involved went far beyond those in the FRG. The trigger list was very tight, with tritium technology going on the list in 1981, well in advance of the FRG;

French exports were characterised by a persistence of rumours of deals but little action. French industrialists have been prepared to talk, but have found their aspirations vetoed by the politicians, despite industry's need for exports;

The prospects of sales to Pakistan were now held up only by the dispute over breach of contract on the reprocessing plant. The sale of reactors by the USSR to India was seen by the CEA to have legitimised a Pakistan deal;

France has taken a more positive stance towards the NPT recently in the EPC framework, and has been prepared to go along with statements on the value of the NPT and the need for it to continue after 1995, in the context of the wider system. This opens up the possibility of stronger support for the NPT in return for financial assistance to enable Third world countries to acquire research reactors, plus

expanded markets for Framtome;

At this stage, it may be utopian to hope that France would join the NPT. The current Prime Minister may be prepared to contemplate this, but is being held back by his bureaucracies. However, it may be useful to encourage three activities:

- i. Having the EPC, including France, make a high level statement before the next Review Conference supporting the Treaty;
- ii. Encouraging France to apply for official observer status at the NPT Review Conference;
- iii. Creating an informal EPC caucus within the review conference framework, which France could attend as an observer;

The substantive costs of France entering the treaty now appear minimal, while the trading benefits may be considerable, as would be the simplification of its relations with other EPC members (c.f. Spain's entry). This might make it easier to argue the case for entry prior to 1995, though it would involve risking the reopening of many old bureaucratic wounds.

#### 6. Reports From Core Group Members

It was reported that at the Pugwash conference in Dublin the previous week:

- i. The PTBT Amendment conference and the Indian TENA proposal had been discussed at length;
- ii. The IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report was now to be published in a form which would be less open to misinterpretation if leaked.
- iii. It appeared that the 1990 IAEA budget was to be lower than that for 1989;
- iv. There was considerable concern for the North Korean situation within the IAEA;

It was reported that Mhunir Khan had said that Pakistan had made a decision not to conduct a nuclear test, as this would be against the interests of his country;

Changes in the US structure for handling non-proliferation matters were reported. These included Ambassador Richard Kennedy remaining in place as Special Ambassador, with the undersecretary in charge at the State Department being Richard Bartholemew who was expected to be more active than his predecessor. At the White House, Arnold Kantor on Scowcroft's staff was responsible for the subject, but no deputy specifically responsible for the area had yet been appointed. Henry Rowan in the Pentagon could also become a significant actor. ACDA was not fully staffed, and the

position of the new administration had yet to be thought through;

The Aspen strategy Group was to spend its summer session on non-proliferation, the first time the subject had been raised for 10 years. One issue that was emerging was that chemical and missile proliferation would be given a greater priority than nuclear;

The discussions on the waiver of the application of the 1978 NNPA requirements to the US-Euratom nuclear co-operation agreement would have to turn into a serious negotiation at some time prior to 1995, as at that point the original agreement would expire and need replacing by a new one;

Concern was expressed over the need for the President to issue a further certification by the end of September 1989 that Pakistan was not attempting to acquire nuclear weapons, in order to allow a continuation of the flow of aid to that country. It was felt that the wording of the previous certification might make this very difficult to do;

Informal discussions in Moscow had revealed that the USSR wished to negotiate on the control of missiles and their technology, but on the basis of a much broader regime than the MTCR. It was also indicated that the 1990 NPT review conference should be approached in terms of current issues, and not as a dress rehearsal for 1995, and there was a recognition of the danger of idealists attempting to create a perfect treaty in 1995;

Moscow supported the PTBT amendment attempts, but recognised the dangers that this might adversely impact upon the 1990 review conference. It had differences with the US over when it should be held and who would pay for it. The Indian TENA proposal was not seen as something which would turn into a significant campaign;

Moscow was particularly interested in regional issues, as it appeared to be in the process of trying to sort out what its policy towards the Third World should be. They had abandoned ideas of the "class struggle" as the basis for policy and were now using ideas of "balance of interest" and cooperation between the superpowers to stabilise regions;

FRG export laws were being strengthened to make the actions of FRG nationals abroad punishable under domestic law. More budgetary resources had been allocated to the export licensing system;

Attempts were being made to organise briefing meetings in Ireland and Italy, which would hold the Presidency of the

EEC in 1990, on the 1990 NPT review conference;

Attempts by the OPANAL Secretary General to organise an informal seminar to discuss the Tlatelolco treaty with Argentina and Brazil had failed, because both countries had refused to participate, possibly because the IAEA was also involved. Attempts were still taking place to aid the construction of some type of bi-lateral Argentina/Brazil safeguards regime;

North Korea was one of a number of NPT parties that had not concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA, but was one of only two with significant nuclear facilities [an unsafeguarded production reactor and a reprocessing facility]. Vietnam is the other state in this position. In February, the IAEA Board of Governors had expressed concern at the situation, and in March North Korean representatives had spent two days discussing the matter with the IAEA. On the first day, they had delivered a long lecture complaining about the world press publishing libelous articles about them and the inclusion of these articles in the IAEA press cuttings service, and about statements made by members of the Board of Governors, and demanding that the IAEA do something about this. On the second day they discussed the procedural side of the safeguards agreement, and said they would react to this in writing, though nothing has yet been received. The June Board of Governors is thus likely to set a deadline of September for completing this safeguards agreement;

It was anticipated that the PLO would follow the precedent it had set in a number of other bodies by asking to be accepted as an observer to the IAEA General Conference a delegation in the name of Palestine;

The current problems with the IAEA Safeguarding operations were identified as not being a need for additional inspectors but deficiencies in the supporting infrastructure, which was much more difficult to rectify. In addition, the way the UN pension fund had operated over the last year had led to a major exodus of experienced people;

An EPC working group on South Africa had been suggested by the Netherlands Foreign Minister at an informal meeting of EEC Foreign Ministers. One aspect of this would be to have legal experts look at the possible conflict between NPT Article 4 obligations and the current EEC trade embargo, on the assumption that if South Africa acceded to the Treaty it would make trading requests to EEC states. The result was that the issue had been passed on to the political directors of the European Commission;

South Africa had asked how long it would take to negotiate a safeguards agreement, and been told 18 months. It appeared to be conducting a systematic campaign of seeking out inconsistencies in state positions by asking the same questions of several embassies in Pretoria, rather than asking the IAEA. The issue still divided the South African Cabinet and was likely to be on the back burner until after the elections in September. The impression in Vienna was that the USSR would use its influence to give the South Africans another years grace;

Discussions had been taking place in Vienna on the need to update INFCIRC 225 relating to the Convention on Physical Protection. Unintended releases of radioactivity were not well covered in this document. France and the UK were against this move, as they did not want to draw public attention to the vulnerability of nuclear power plants to sabotage;

At a conference at MIT on nuclear submarines, it has been made clear that India regarded itself as having a manifest destiny to rule the Indian Ocean, and had a requirement for nuclear submarines and missiles to keep the big powers out. It also appeared that a class of hybrid submarines was under construction, with the hull being built in Holland and the "slowpoke" reactor in Canada. It was not envisaged that such a boat would represent a safeguarding problem;

It was reported that the first NPT preparatory Committee meeting had passed off uneventfully in New York. The only innovation was a substantive statement made by the Egyptian representative, offering a list of initiatives which included a dialogue with those outside of the treaty.

#### **7. Draft Document on Issues Before the 1990 NPT Review Conference**

This was presented to the Core Group by the Directors, but no discussion took place, as it was a document which reflected their own views, rather than those of the Core Group.