

May 18, 1991
**Ninth Meeting of PPNN Core Group, Guernsey,
British Channel Islands, 18-20 May 1991**

Citation:

"Ninth Meeting of PPNN Core Group, Guernsey, British Channel Islands, 18-20 May 1991", May 18, 1991, Wilson Center Digital Archive, Contributed by Michal Onderco from the private papers of Benjamin Sanders.

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Summary:

Summarizes the events and issues of the ninth PPNN Core Group meeting.

Credits:

This document was made possible with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY)

Original Language:

English

Contents:

Original Scan

NINTH MEETING OF PPNN CORE GROUP
Guernsey, British Channel Islands
18-20 May 1991

INTRODUCTION

1.The Ninth meeting of the PPNN Core Group was held in Guernsey, British Channel Islands, UK from Saturday 18 to Monday 20 May 1991. This was the first meeting in Phase II of the work of the Programme, and the first meeting of the PPNN Core Group in its new composition [See Annex A].

2.All members of the Core Group attended, with the exception of Olu Adeniji and Lawrence Scheinman. Roland Smith (UK) was present for the substantive sections of the meeting in his capacity as a paper presenter, while PPNN support staff in attendance were Darryl Howlett, Simon Crowe and Angela Wilkinson.

3.This summary report is intended as an "aide memoire" for those attending and to give honorary consultants and funding organisations not represented at the meeting a general idea of what happened. It has not been formally adopted or agreed to by the participants.

BUSINESS SESSIONS

4.The meeting opened with a review of activities since the previous meeting at Charlottesville in November 1990. These have included publication of Newsbriefs 12 and 13, work on PPNN Studies 1 and 2 [which are due for publication in the Summer and early Autumn, respectively], and negotiations for commercial publication of an expanded version of the PPNN Briefing Book.

5.Members then discussed the financial status of Phase II of the Programme (PPNNCG9/3). Information was received from Yoshio Okawa that the Japanese Atomic Industrial Forum was prepared to provide PPNN with a grant of 10 million yen [Approx.\$70,000] in their financial year 1991-2, and hoped to make further annual contributions. Harald Mueller reported on his ongoing negotiations with the Volkswagen Foundation of Germany for grants in support of PPNN's work, and in particular the extended Core Group meeting and conference in Frankfurt in the spring of 1992. It was concluded that while the Programme was not yet fully funded, especially in its last two years, the financial situation was relatively satisfactory.

6.The provisional programme and schedule for the tenth PPNN Core Group Meeting [PPNNCG9/4], to be held at Princeton University, New Jersey, US from 8-10 November 1991 was discussed. The substantive part of this meeting will be a one-day seminar on the linkages between a CTBT and the NPT on Saturday, 9th November, meant primarily for senior diplomats attending the United Nations General Assembly.

7.The Core Group then discussed PPNNCG9/5, which contained a schedule of PPNN activities through to the end of 1995. In the course of this, the following points were made:

- * November 1992 might be a suitable time for a Core Group meeting in Japan;
- * It was desirable to hold a Core Group/Regional meeting in Africa, probably in 1993/4;

- * Any meeting in Latin America should probably be in 1994/5;
- * The regional meetings would have to be planned with a view to conducting as effective a dialogue as possible with officials, researchers and journalists from the region;
- * The briefing conferences in 1994/5 need involve only about one-third of the Core Group members.

8. In relation to future PPNN studies, it was suggested that their main role was to raise awareness about non-proliferation-related issues by publishing future-orientated pieces and developmental studies to move the non-proliferation dialogue along. In this light, it was suggested that titles of future PPNN studies might include:

- * Future Options for IAEA safeguards;
- * Non-Proliferation in Southern Africa;
- * The implications of the Gulf War/Iraqi disarmament/ emerging role of UN Security Council for nuclear non-proliferation;
- * The relationship of the NPT to other non-proliferation regimes;
- * Security Assurances;
- * Nuclear Export Controls;
- * The views of persons from four developing states on the value of the NPT.

REPORTING SESSIONS

9. Members presented reports on the following items;

- * The construction of a 10-15 MWth research reactor in Algeria;
- * The rumours of the supply by USSR to Israel of a desalinisation reactor;
- * The negotiations between Argentina, Brazil and the IAEA on a full-scope safeguards agreement;
- * Attempts to get North Korea to sign its INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreement with the IAEA;
- * The civil nuclear power position in Eastern Europe, the energy dependence of specific states on nuclear power and the options available to improve safety, management and hardware;
- * Current projections of the future demand for nuclear power, power reactors and uranium production;
- * Indonesia's civil nuclear energy plans;
- * The consequences for Japanese reprocessing plans of the outcome of recent domestic elections;
- * Changes in German legislation on the export of nuclear related items;
- * Randomisation of IAEA inspections and changes in definitions of significant quantities.

SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS

a. NPT ISSUES:

10. Procedural Aspects of the 1995 NPT extension conference. David Fischer introduced the drafts of two papers by himself and by George Bunn and Charles van Doren [2CGP 1&2] on the negotiating history of Article X.2 of the NPT and its implications for 1995. It was suggested that the choice in 1995 was between an indefinite extension; one for a fixed period; or some type of conditional regular extension involving an ability to terminate the Treaty. In addition, unless there was a large turnout in 1995 a small group of countries would be able to block an

extension proposal. This raised the issue of whether the inability of an extension conference to make a decision would be a decision for indefinite extension or for termination. Finally, there was the question of whether the conference was to be just an extension conference, or a review and extension conference combined.

Issues raised in the course of the resulting discussion included:

- * Concern that the complexity of the extension process was not yet fully recognized by the depositary states or other parties, and that an extensive education exercise was going to be necessary in this area before 1995;
- * If the conference was both a review and extension meeting, voting on extension might open the way to voting on the review;
- * There was a paramount need for the extension to be decided on the basis of consensus, rather than voting. This would remove any uncertainties arising from substantial abstentions and negative votes, and possible subsequent withdrawals from the Treaty;
- * It might be necessary for a legal officer to be present during the proceedings to adjudicate on the legal issues involved, but the conference would not have the means of appointing one. The only alternative was to make sure that UN legal assistance was available to the conference;
- * It appeared to be desirable to try to resolve as many of the areas of procedural uncertainty as possible during the preparatory process;
- * There appeared to be uncertainty over whether the term 25 years was to be taken literally in setting the starting date for the conference;
- * The extension process was not in itself an amendment to the Treaty, as all states had agreed to it when they became parties;
- * If an extension involving an indefinite number of fixed periods had implicit within it an ability to terminate the Treaty at the end of each period, there appeared no obvious reason why conditions could not be attached in advance to individual extensions;
- * There seemed a need to draw the attention of the international community to these issues as soon as possible, starting preferably at the time of the 1991 UN General Assembly.

11. The PTBT Amendment Conference and its consequences for the NPT

This discussion was introduced by Adolfo Taylhardat, one of the Vice-Presidents of that conference. He indicated that the amendment tabled had been the maximum aspiration of its proponents, but that many obstacles had prevented it being attained. The outcome of the conference had been to leave open the possibility of a further conference in two years time, and the setting up of an inter-sessional mechanism. He argued that two new major factors had contributed to the lack of positive movement at the conference: the more cautious attitude taken by the USSR towards it; and the lack of priority given to it by many states as a consequence of the Persian Gulf Crisis.

The discussion produced the following observations:

- * The East European Countries had changed their position over a CTBT to one more closely aligned to their European neighbours;
- * The West European non-nuclear weapon states have no interest in a continuation of testing, but with the exception of Denmark will not go public on this because of the position taken by their nuclear weapon state allies;
- * It would help the US position in many allied states if the US could produce a short,

- * simple document which explained why it thought testing was necessary;
- * All diplomatic efforts to achieve a CTBT were now focused on the constitution of the ad hoc committee of the CD in Geneva;
- * One of the major weaknesses of the amendment initiative was that only three nuclear weapon states [UK,US and USSR] were involved. The advantage of using the CD was that China and France were also present;
- * US policy on a CTBT was determined by calculations of benefits and costs. This relationship has moved over time. Benefits now would not include reductions in deployed weapons or prevention of India/Pakistan/Israel being able to deploy weapons. Costs would be in terms of safety, reliability and the ability to develop new weapons. In the 1990s, it may be necessary to step back and do these calculations again, especially if there are significant costs involved in terms of the extension of the NPT in 1995;
- * The debate in the US Congress was now concentrating on a low-yield threshold with an escape clause - perhaps 25 kt with 4 tests a year up to 150 kt. One issue was what type of positive moves in this direction [i.e. the step by step approach] would make an agreement on extension of the NPT easier;
- * It was difficult to draw immediate conclusions on the future of the PTBT amendment initiative due to it being overshadowed by the Persian Gulf War, and its future would be decided by what happened at the next General Assembly;

b.FUNCTIONAL QUESTIONS

12.The March 1991 meeting of Nuclear Suppliers.

Roland Smith, who had been present at this meeting, gave a report. He indicated that this was the first meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) since 1978, and because of the sensitivities involved it had been an informal meeting of all countries adhering to the guidelines, to try to eliminate the idea of an inner core constructing the guidelines and an outer one adhering to them. The Agenda had included invitations to new suppliers [Argentina, Brazil, China, Yugoslavia, South Korea] to join those adhering to the guidelines; all states accepting FSS as a condition of supply to non-NPT parties; controls on Dual-Use items [which led to the setting up of a working group on the subject]; harmonisation of trigger lists and the date and place of a further meeting [March 5-7 1992 in Warsaw].

In the ensuing discussion, the following points were made:

- * The resurrection of the NSG calls into question the future of the Zangger Committee, whose mandate is to define what is covered by Article III.2 of the NPT. However, the NSG is concerned with supply to all states, not just non-NPT Parties, and France is not yet a member of the Zangger Committee;
- * It would be useful to bring China into the NSG, as there appeared to be a gap between what they say and what they might be doing;
- * Everyone present at the initial meetings of the NSG in 1974 understood that the term restraint meant no exports;
- * The German position in favour of FSS has a loophole covering safety technology, and this issue needs to be addressed;
- * Accumulations of dual-use items may trigger special inspections by the IAEA;
- * There had been a meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in Tokyo two weeks after the Hague meeting, with Austria and New Zealand present for the first time. This meeting had discussed the need to bring additional states into the regime,

and whether the parameters of the regime should be amended to cover all missiles of a given range;

- * The Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) had met informally in Vienna in early May. IAEA officials had included information on the NSG meeting in its preparatory papers, and no one had objected;
- * There was a need for a PPNN Study to offer a background history and analysis of the complex issue of supplier constraints.

c.REGIONAL QUESTIONS;

13.A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Southern Africa

David Fischer made a presentation on this topic, based on an article [2CGP-3] he had written for the UN journal "Disarmament". He indicated that one major question was whether there should be a single Treaty covering the whole of Africa or several covering its sub-regions. One problem in both cases was how to define what might be meant by Sub-Saharan Africa. The indispensable elements of such a treaty would be the renunciation of the acquisition and possession of nuclear weapons for all time; the prohibition of testing; negative security assurances; and IAEA safeguards, including special inspections. Optional elements would be a prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities and the creation of a regional authority to oversee the treaty and its implementation. Such an authority would be required to make annual reports on the non-proliferation situation in Africa. In the ensuing discussion the following points were made:

- * the value of such a treaty would be that it would provide a fall-back position in two specific cases - if the NPT were to be terminated and if South Africa was to withdraw from it;
- * Such a treaty would link into the area covered by the Tlatelolco, Raratonga and Antarctica Treaties and enhance "Non-Proliferation Creep";
- * All parties in a sub-region should be involved in negotiations and it should enter into force once a specified number had ratified. Any African regional authority would need to be linked to the OAU, as one problem in Latin America was that OPANAL was a free standing organisation;
- * Any zone which included Egypt would have to address the issue of transit of nuclear weapons through the Suez Canal.

14.The Consequences of the Persian Gulf War for Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy

This subject was introduced by Mohamed Shaker. He suggested that the action of the Security Council in passing Resolution 687 had raised several questions: was Iraq a one-off case, and would and should the Council act in the same way towards Israel or Iran; why was no distinction drawn in the resolution between military and civil facilities; how could the enhanced links between the Security Council and the IAEA be further developed; was the IAEA now going to embark on additional activities in furtherance of its role as an arms control agency, such as verifying a fissile material cut-off; and was the best way to tackle proliferation in the Middle East through a nuclear weapon-free zone or a zone free from weapons of mass destruction. In the discussion which followed, the following points were raised:

- * The IAEA was involved in three areas of activity in Iraq: inspection and designation of facilities; taking custody of nuclear weapon usable material; and the removal,

- destruction or rendering harmless of that material;**
- * **The action in Iraq is being carried out by the Director-General of the IAEA under authority given to him by Security Council Resolution 687;**
- * **Given the size of the task, it seemed unlikely that the Security Council timescales on removal and destruction would be met;**
- * **A permanent system of more intrusive safeguards over Iraq's activities may require negotiation of a special agreement or treaty between that state and the IAEA. In two years time, it might be very difficult to sustain the inspection regime without this, in the face of Iraqi intransigence;**
- * **The accusations about Iraq breaching the NPT will have to be dealt with outside the framework of the Treaty. If Iraq is penalised for breaching it, this may have the effect of further dissuading the current non-parties from joining it;**
- * **If a special inspection regime is created for Iraq, this might act as a model for its use in other states;**
- * **Inspections in Iraq on the basis of national intelligence information might provide a model for future Special Inspections, and also encourage the IAEA Board of Governors to act more aggressively over future reports of violations;**
- * **Since Iraq was a defeated country, it was unwise to regard conditions applied to it as a precedent for more general changes in the IAEA safeguards system. However, the Iraqi episode may provide the stimulus for agreement on a more intrusive safeguards system.**

15. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the USSR

This discussion was introduced by Roland Timerbaev. He indicated that the USSR was in constant discussion with a number of threshold states, particularly those in South Asia, and was also encouraging the DPRK to sign its INFCIRC/153 and lobbying Cuba to remove ambiguity over its nuclear weapon position. The agreement to build two 1,000 mw powerplants in India would be under an INFCIRC/66 IAEA safeguards agreement. New domestic legislation was being introduced in the areas of nuclear energy, nuclear safety and radioactive protection. Internally, centrifugal political processes had probably moved as far as they were likely to go, and the need now was to elaborate a new Union Treaty. If any further fragmentation were to occur, the Russian Federation seemed likely to retain all the USSR's nuclear weapons. In the resultant discussion, the following points were made:

- * **The transfer of nuclear submarines to India had resulted from a personal agreement between Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi: they had been returned for maintenance cost reasons;**
- * **The USSR's stated policy was still to repatriate all used fuel from reactors it had supplied to other states;**
- * **All the USSR's nuclear weapon production facilities are in the Russian Federation;**
- * **The threat of terrorists seizing weapons from USSR stockpiles was a limited problem, as special protection methods were used to prevent this;**
- * **Although the Republic of the Ukraine was lobbying in Vienna to have itself accepted as a potential NPT party, it was still prepared to allow USSR nuclear weapons to be based on its territory;**
- * **The USSR parliament had recently written FSS as a condition of supply into new nuclear energy legislation.**

ANNEX 1**MEMBERS OF THE PPNN CORE GROUP, PHASE II 1991-95**

Ambassador Olu Adeniji (Nigeria), - Served until 1991 as Ambassador to France. Deputy Director-General for Regional Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs, Abuja;

Dr. Djali Ahimsa (Indonesia) - Director-General, Indonesian Atomic Energy Agency, Djakarta;

Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka) - Served as his government's Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and chaired one of the three committees of the 1985 NPT Review Conference. Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva;

Dr. Lewis A. Dunn (United States) - Served from 1981-87 as Assistant Director for nuclear and weapons control of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Alternate US Representative to the 1985 NPT Review Conference. Vice President, Negotiations and Planning Division, Science Applications International Corp., McLean, Virginia;

Mr David A. Fischer (United Kingdom) - Former South African Diplomat. Transferred to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957. Until 1982 held the post of its Director and subsequently Assistant Director-General for External Relations;

Dr. Jozef Goldblat (Sweden) - Former diplomat with experience in disarmament negotiations in Geneva and New York, including service at the UN. Was Head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Programme of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Sweden. Senior Fellow at the Graduate Institute in Geneva and in UNIDIR;

Ambassador Oleg Grinevsky (USSR) - Member of the Soviet delegation when the NPT was negotiated and subsequently Head of the USSR delegation to the CSCE confidence building measures negotiations in Stockholm. Head of the USSR delegation to the CSCE/CFE negotiations in Vienna;

Ambassador Davidson L. Hepburn (Bahamas) - former Bahamian Ambassador to the United Nations. Permanent Under-Secretary, Ministry of Employment and Immigration, Nassau, and Bahamian Ambassador to Cuba and Haiti;

Dr. Harald Müller (Germany) - Director of International Programs of the Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt and of its European Non-Proliferation Program;

Ms. Jan Murray (Australia) - Director-General, Uranium Institute, London;

Ambassador Yoshio Okawa (Japan) - Former Japanese Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Advisor to the President of The Bank of Tokyo Ltd.;

Dr. Walter Rehak (Germany) - Former Head of the Information Services department in the Berlin office responsible for Atomic Safety in the GDR. Member of the IAEA Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) [Resigned from the Core Group July 1991 upon taking up a post with the IAEA in Vienna];

Mr. Ben Sanders (Netherlands) - **Chairman** - Served in the Dutch Foreign Ministry, the

Safeguards Department of the IAEA and the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs. Secretary-General, 1985 NPT Review Conference;

Professor Lawrence Scheinman (United States) - former advisor to the Director-General, IAEA. Professor of Government, Cornell University;

Ambassador Dr. Mohamed I. Shaker (Egypt) - Former representative of the Director General of the IAEA to the United Nations in New York; President of the 1985 NPT Review Conference and of the 1987 United Nations Conference to Promote International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE). Currently Egyptian Ambassador to the United Kingdom;

Professor John Simpson (United Kingdom) - **Rapporteur** - former member of the UN Secretary General's Study group on Conventional Disarmament and of the UK ministerial advisory panel on arms control and disarmament. Professor of International Relations at the University of Southampton, UK and Director of its Mountbatten Centre for International Studies;

Ambassador Adolfo R. Taylhardat (Venezuela) - Former Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Venezuela. Venezuelan Ambassador to Paris.

Ambassador Roland Timerbaev (USSR) - Permanent Representative of the USSR to the International Organisations in Vienna.