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**Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation [PPNN], 'General Report on the Fourteenth Meeting of the PPNN Core Group, 4-7 November 1993'**

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**Summary:**

Summarizes events and agenda of the fourteenth meeting of the PPNN core group in Kandy, Sri Lanka including a report of the South Asia, Nuclear energy, and nuclear nonproliferation workshop.

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**PROGRAMME FOR PROMOTING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION [PPNN]**  
**GENERAL REPORT ON THE FOURTEENTH MEETING OF THE PPNN CORE**  
**GROUP**

**4-7 November 1993**

**INTRODUCTION**

1. The Fourteenth meeting of the PPNN Core Group was held at the Tourmaline/Topaz Hotel complex, Kandy, Sri Lanka on Thursday 4 to Sunday 7 November 1993. This meeting was organised on behalf of PPNN by the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, [MCIS] Southampton, UK and the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka, and chaired by Ben Sanders, the Executive Chairman of PPNN. On Friday 5 November to Sunday 7 November, the Core Group extended participation in its meeting by convening an international workshop on **South Asia, Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Non-Proliferation**. Participants included twelve specialists from nine states associated with the region (Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka and the United States); representatives of the IAEA and the United Nations; and Ray Forbes, the Director of the Bandaranaike Centre. In addition, the final session was attended by twelve observers from the Kandy region, including faculty members from the University of Peradeniya; from the Institute of Fundamental Studies; from the Pugwash Group of Sri Lanka and from the Institute for International Studies. [for details, see separate report on the workshop]

2. All members of the PPNN Core group were present, with the exception of Olu Adeniji, Djali Ahimsa, Thérèse Delpech, Oleg Grinevsky and Harald Müller, who were prevented from attending due to a variety of professional commitments. Support staff in attendance were Jan Bird and Darryl Howlett from MCIS, Fabian Chapman from the Bandaranaike Centre and Susan Curzon-Howe.

3. Members of the Core Group and participants in the Workshop also took part in three additional events in Colombo on Monday, 8 November. In the morning, a three hour seminar on regional security and non-proliferation was convened at the Marriott Hotel, attended by nine of those who had participated in the Kandy meeting and ten members of the faculty of the University of Colombo. This was followed by a working lunch. In the early afternoon a media briefing was organised for PPNN by the Bandaranaike Centre in the same location and attended by sixteen members of the local and international press. In the early evening, the Bandaranaike Centre organised a public meeting on security and nuclear proliferation on South Asia chaired and addressed by several of those who had attended PPNN's Kandy Workshop. In addition, PPNN's Executive Chairman and Programme Director had a short meeting that evening with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka, the Hon. A.C.S. Hameed, MP.

## CORE GROUP BUSINESS SESSIONS

4. The Chairman welcomed Jan Murray to the meeting, following her acceptance of his invitation to rejoin the Core Group. He also reported on consultations that had been taking place on the recruitment of a Chinese member of the Group. Later in the meeting, a formal invitation was extended by the Chairman to Ambassador Fan Guoxiang to join the Core Group, which was accepted.

5. Four papers on the work of PPNN had been circulated to members of the Core Group in advance of the meeting:

PPNN/14/3 -	Publications and Outreach
PPNN/14/4 -	Financial Position of PPNN 1993 - 1995
PPNN/14/5 -	PPNN Core Group Meetings and Conferences, 1994/1995
PPNN/14/6 -	Draft Schedule of PPNN Activities 1993 - 1995

6. The substance of PPNN/14/3 was noted by members of the Core Group. It was suggested that in addition to the papers proposed for publication in 1994, David Fischer and Roland Timerbaev might produce an **Issue Review** on the proposals for a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for military purposes. This would address in particular the verification and safeguards aspects of this proposal. It was also stressed that the proposed **Issue Review** on the statistics of nuclear armaments and disarmament since 1969 should place special emphasis on projected future levels of nuclear armaments.

7. Members greeted with satisfaction the information contained in PPNN/14/4 which suggested that full funding of the programme through 1995 was now likely to be achieved.

8. The proposals for meetings in 1994 and 1995 were discussed in considerable detail. Revisions were suggested to the programme for the Briefing Seminar to be held in Venezuela on **4 to 6 May 1994** [a revised version of this programme is appended as Annex 1].

9. There was a discussion on the proposal to hold a colloquium on the current situation in nuclear non-proliferation on **6 to 8 May**, following the Venezuela Briefing Seminar. It was agreed, however, that it would be more appropriate if the Core Group alone were to discuss the subject in its meeting from **6 to 8 May**, while the colloquium as such, involving 10-12 additional non-proliferation experts, would be held in conjunction with the meeting in the United States in the Autumn of 1994.

10. In order not to have the Autumn 1994 meeting coincide with the annual non-proliferation meeting of Southern Methodist University in Dallas, Texas, its date was changed to the extended weekend of 20 to 25 October 1994. [This has subsequently had to be moved for reasons outside the control of PPNN to **27 October to 1 November 1994**]

11. Preliminary views were also exchanged on the possibility of completing PPNN's schedule of regional PPNN meetings by convening one in early 1995 on the Middle East, if possible in or adjacent to that region. A key issue was whether it was feasible to combine this with the requirement to hold a further briefing conference on a global basis in February/March 1995, in either Geneva or the United Kingdom. One idea that emerged was to hold the briefing meeting in the United Kingdom, to simplify its organisation.

12. It was also suggested that the financial and other implications of organising a briefing meeting on the 1995 NPT conference in Vienna for representatives of Permanent Missions to the IAEA should be explored. With minimal assistance from the IAEA, this might be implemented at an acceptable cost.

### **CORE GROUP SUBSTANTIVE SESSIONS**

13. During its regular reporting session, members discussed the following items;

- \* the French and Chinese positions over nuclear testing;
- \* the North Korean situation;
- \* Japan's non-proliferation stance; and
- \* the position of specific former Soviet republics in relation to the NPT.

14. Under the heading of NPT related issues, members discussed a paper by Roland Timerbaev on **Security Assurances**. In the course of the discussion, the following points were raised:

- \* Any new UN Security Council Resolution should cover both positive and negative security assurances and have a simple formulation;
- \* Any resolution which appeared to condone continued possession of nuclear weapons, or the use of nuclear weapons against a conventionally armed aggressor, would not be acceptable to developing states. This problem might even prevent any reiteration of the existing UN Security Council Resolution 255;
- \* The International Court of Justice had now been asked to offer an opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons altogether;
- \* The idea of a no-first use agreement had been debated and rejected in the US. Although this was no longer opposed in the European context, nuclear weapons were still seen as having a deterrent role in the Korean peninsula and in deterring the use of chemical and biological weapons. In addition, there was the problem of overcoming arguments about the value of nuclear weapons in conditions of uncertainty;

- \* Russia's position on commitments to no-first use of nuclear weapons was now unclear, following the promulgation of its new military doctrine. Britain and France were also unenthusiastic about this idea;
- \* China wants a legally binding treaty between all five nuclear weapon states involving commitments to no-first use against all states and no use at all against non-nuclear weapon states or within nuclear-weapon free zones. Such a treaty was also seen to be linked with a CTBT;
- \* One problem with a treaty on the negative security assurances or no-first use would be the definition of a nuclear weapon state: another related problem was how to frame an escape clause or procedure which would negate in an unambiguous manner any negative security commitments made by the nuclear weapon states if proliferation were to occur.

15. Jayantha Dhanapala outlined several issues he hoped to cover in his PPNN Study on **The Implementation of Article IV: Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy**. Points raised in the course of the discussion which followed included:

- \* The fullest possible exchange of nuclear information and resources was part of the original "NPT Bargain" contained in Article IV;
- \* In 1975 a proposal had been made for the creation of a special fund for nuclear development, access to which was to be limited to NPT parties. This proposal had yet to be implemented, as had any schemes for security of supply of nuclear fuel. Indeed the statistics appeared to demonstrate that the bulk of assistance had gone to non-NPT parties, rather than NPT parties, over the last 20 years;
- \* If the IAEA was given responsibility for verifying a CTBT and a fissile material cut-off, an issue would arise over whether the Agency's technical assistance budget should in future be linked to all IAEA expenditure on verification and not just to the NPT safeguards budget;
- \* Over the last two years, the targets for voluntary contributions to the IAEA's technical assistance budget have gone up, but the money actually pledged has remained static;
- \* Demand for nuclear power in developing countries also appears static, with few states showing any interest in it;
- \* There is a need to address the long-term global demand for energy, and nuclear energy's role in it, as the world's population is expected to treble over the next 30 years;

- \* To limit criticism over the implementation of Article IV in 1995, the IAEA and the World Bank might collaborate on a study of the amount of money required to facilitate the growth of nuclear energy in developing states.

16. Under the heading of Functional Issues, John Simpson introduced his paper on **A CTBT and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime**. In the course of the animated discussion which followed, the following points were made in response to the presentation:

- \* The issue of whether payoffs from a CTBT are predominantly political, rather than technical, remains a subject of controversy;
- \* Part of the value of a CTBT resides in the shift in national thinking about the role of nuclear weapons that it symbolises, in particular their marginalisation and delegitimisation and the strengthening of the anti-nuclear taboo;
- \* A CTBT may serve as a vehicle for signalling a desire for restraint on the part of the three unacknowledged nuclear weapon states, in particular by India and Pakistan, who would thereby freeze their current nuclear explosive technologies. The constraints on unacknowledged nuclear weapon states created by becoming party to a CTBT would be further reinforced by them becoming parties to a fissile material cut-off;
- \* A CTBT will only hurt nuclear weapon states, not non-nuclear weapon ones. All states could design a crude nuclear weapon without resort to testing. But the US and other nuclear weapon states will be unable to produce new advanced designs from scratch following a CTBT, as without a test they would have no yardstick to evaluate the design and no ability to obtain a precise estimate of yield. This means the end of modernisation of their existing nuclear arsenals, and may also mean significant changes in their attitudes towards the military and political roles of such weapons;
- \* It is inadvisable to define a test [i.e. what is to be banned] in the CTBT text;
- \* Expanding the role of a CTBT to cover all development work related to nuclear weapons may be dangerous, if this results in a ban on the existence of nuclear weapon laboratories which, among other things, are responsible for the continued safety of stockpiled [and inherently dangerous] nuclear weapons and of the nuclear weapon production complexes;
- \* A ban on preparing testing sites in a CTBT would have positive non-proliferation consequences, as it would deny to a potential proliferator the "South African option" of using such activities for political signalling and bargaining. However, some nuclear weapon states may oppose such a ban as they perceive it reduces

assurances against the adverse consequences of a clandestinely organised breakout from the CTBT by other nuclear weapon states;

- \* Politically, it would be unwise to contemplate a CTBT of other than indefinite duration, but the option exists to negotiate a treaty with a duration of a single fixed period of ten-fifteen years, or successive fixed periods with a procedure for further extension;
- \* Arguments will be made in nuclear weapon states for a treaty of limited duration, to safeguard against the appearance of safety problems in stockpiled weapons. Alternatively, a nuclear-weapon state could respond to such a situation by activating the withdrawal clause in the Treaty, though this would clearly be a most undesirable procedure. Another option would be to build into the treaty mechanisms to enable a nuclear-weapon state to undertake an internationally monitored and condoned test. Such a test would have to be approved by the UN Security Council, in the context of a national quota of perhaps one test every ten years;
- \* The IAEA is the most suitable organisation to manage the verification of a CTBT;
- \* Arguments will be advanced that the financing of a CTBT verification system should fall most heavily upon the nuclear weapon states;
- \* If no CTBT has been negotiated and signed by April 1995, there is a real danger that any decision on the further duration of the NPT will be postponed until work on the CTBT has been completed;
- \* The entry into force of a CTBT will probably depend upon a fixed number of states [forty-five was suggested] ratifying it, including perhaps the five nuclear weapon states;
- \* Provision for conferences to review the implementation of a CTBT will probably be included in the draft text. This will raise the issue of the relationship between such conferences and those of the NPT: one solution might be to hold them at the same time;
- \* Two other options other than negotiating a CTBT exist to guarantee that a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosive testing will be in place in 1995. One is to amend the PTBT to include underground testing. Another is to negotiate a separate treaty banning underground tests. One of these options may prove to be a surer way of guaranteeing that a treaty will be in place by April 1995 than negotiating a CTBT from scratch;
- \* All treaty options for producing a comprehensive ban on testing will need some

verification provisions if they are to be ratified by the US Senate and acceptable to the majority of states;

- \* Although past debates have suggested the linkage between a CTBT and the NPT is central to the future of the latter, in the longer term the link between a CTBT and total nuclear disarmament may be the more significant issue.



**ANNEX 1****PPNN International Briefing Seminar on the 1995 NPT Conference**

**For Senior Government Officials**  
Caracas, Venezuela, May 4-6 1994

**1.Objectives**

This seminar is intended to bring together the majority of the PPNN Core Group, other invited speakers and representatives from all the states of the Western Hemisphere to discuss matters that specifically affect the region and issues likely to affect the outcome of the 1995 NPT conference. The latter will be addressed through briefings based on materials produced for the summer 1993 conference in Chilworth. It is not envisaged that any written product will result from the meeting.

**2.Content**

The seminar will start with four plenary sessions surveying the current regional and global non-proliferation situation, and then break up into three working groups which will be briefed in turn on four teams each covering a specific cluster of issues.

**3.Plenary Sessions**

The four initial plenary sessions will be:

- i. The Tlatelolco Treaty: its global and regional impact, current status and future role - [New Secretary-General of Opanal]
- ii. Argentina, Brazil, ABAAC and the IAEA - [Carasales, Pfirter or Berasatequi]
- iii. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the Caribbean Region - Davidson Hepburn
- iv. The 1995 NPT Conference: Issues and Context - David Fischer

**4.Issue Clusters and Briefing Groups**

The issue clusters and the briefing groups will be:

**Issue Cluster/Briefing Group A: The Process of Extending the Treaty**

Chair: [Adolfo Taylhardat]

- i. Pre-Conference Activities - Substantive and Organisational Work by States and Secretariat  
- [Ben Sanders]

- ii. Procedural Issues - The Nature of the Review/Extension Conference:  
Implications for the Extension Decision  
- [George Bunn]

Issue Cluster/Briefing Group B: The Review of the Treaty - Security Questions

Chair: [Jayantha Dhanapala/Oleg Grinevsky]

- iii. The Obligations of Parties (Articles I and II)  
- [Lewis Dunn]
- iv. Nuclear Disarmament - (Article VI)  
- [Wolfgang Kötter]
- v. Nuclear-Free-Zones and Positive and Negative Security Assurances  
- [Jozef Goldblat]

Issue Cluster/Briefing Group C: The Review of the Treaty - Peaceful Uses and Verification

Chair: [Jiri Beranek]

- vi. Peaceful Uses (Article IV)  
- [Djali Ahimsa/IAEA representative]
- vii. International Safeguards, and Action in the Event of Non-Compliance (Article III)  
- [Lawrence Scheinman]
- viii. Export Controls  
- [Harald Müller]

Issue Cluster/Briefing Group D: The Review of the Treaty - Regional Issues

Chair: [Thérèse Delpech]

- ix. The Middle East, Israel and Iraq  
- [Mohamed Shaker]
- x. North East Asia  
- [Yoshio Okawa]
- xi. The CIS States  
- [Roland Timerbaev]

## 5. Participation

Representatives will be invited from the following states:

Argentina	Guyana
Bahamas	Haiti
Barbados	Honduras
Bolivia	Jamaica
Brazil	Mexico
Canada	Nicaragua
Chile	Panama
Colombia	Paraguay
Cuba	Peru
Costa Rica	Saint Lucia
Dominican Republic	Suriname
Ecuador	Trinidad and Tobago
El Salvador	United States
Grenada	Uruguay
Guatemala	Venezuela

Also some of those states which have signed the Tlatelolco Protocols [China, France, Russia, United Kingdom].

In addition, it was suggested that the secretary-general's of OPANAL and ABAAC should be invited.