

**May 3, 1994**

**Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN), 'General Report on the Fifteenth Meeting of the PPNN Core Group, 3-8 May 1994'**

**Citation:**

"Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN), 'General Report on the Fifteenth Meeting of the PPNN Core Group, 3-8 May 1994'", May 3, 1994, Wilson Center Digital Archive, Contributed by Michal Onderco from the private papers of Benjamin Sanders. <https://wilson-center-digital-archive.dvincitest.com/document/260439>

**Summary:**

Summarizes events and agenda of the fifteenth meeting of the PPNN Core Group in Caracas, Venezuela.

**Credits:**

This document was made possible with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY)

**Original Language:**

English

**Contents:**

Original Scan

**PROGRAMME FOR PROMOTING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION (PPNN)****GENERAL REPORT ON THE FIFTEENTH MEETING OF THE PPNN CORE GROUP**  
**3 - 8 MAY 1994****INTRODUCTION**

1. The Fifteenth meeting of the PPNN Core Group was held at the Eurobuilding Hotel, Caracas, Venezuela from Tuesday, 3 May to Sunday, 8 May 1994. This meeting was organised by the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, with the co-operation of the Instituto Internacional de Estudios Avanzados (IDEA), Caracas, and chaired by Ben Sanders, the Executive Chairman of PPNN. From Tuesday 3 May to Friday 6 May the Core Group extended participation in its meeting by convening an international seminar on **Issues at the 1995 NPT Conference** for representatives from states of the Americas. This was attended by 40 speakers and participants from: states of the Americas Parties to the NPT; states signatories to the Protocols of the Tlatelolco Treaty; Argentina; Brazil; Chile; Cuba; Germany; representatives of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the United Nations; and by Dr. Nancy Angulo, Director of the IDEA. A representative of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and two officials from the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation of Japan also attended as observers. Separate reports are available on this seminar.

2. All members of the PPNN Core Group were present at the Caracas meeting with the exceptions of Dr. Djali Ahimsa and Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, who were prevented from attending due to professional commitments. Support staff in attendance were Emily Bailey, Darryl Howlett and Abigail Sanders from PPNN and Gabriela Schütte and Delcira Rondon from IDEA.

3. Members of the Core Group also took part in a half day briefing seminar on "Issues and Challenges for the Evolving Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime" at the Institute of Higher Diplomatic Studies - Pedro Gual, during the morning of Monday, 9 May.

**CORE GROUP BUSINESS SESSIONS**

4. Four papers on the work of PPNN had been circulated to members of the Core Group in advance of the meeting:

PPNN/CG15/3 -	Publications and Outreach
PPNN/CG15/4 -	Financial Position of PPNN, 1994-5
PPNN/CG15/5 -	PPNN Core Group Meetings and Conferences, 1994/5
PPNN/CG15/6 -	PPNN Participation in 1995 NPT PrepComs and Conference

5. The contents of PPNN/CG15/3 were noted by members of the Core Group. It was reaffirmed that as far as practicable, all drafts of Studies and Issue Reviews should be discussed by the Core Group before publication. The following issues were addressed in the course of the discussion:

- i. Charles Van Doren had submitted a draft paper on the issues involved in any attempt to amend the NPT for possible publication as an Issue Review. It would need extensive editing before publication, and might already have been published elsewhere. This proposal was to be further investigated;

- ii. The draft of Study 6, Security Assurances and Guarantees as a Method of Reinforcing the NPT, which was completed in the summer of 1993, is to be rewritten over the summer of 1994, and submitted to Olu Adeniji and Mohamed Shaker for comment;
- iii. A co-author was now needed for the Study on Article IV originally to be written by Jayantha Dhanapala alone. One possibility to be explored was to ask Warren Donnelly to take on this task;
- iv. Waldo Stumpf had submitted a paper on South Africa's process of nuclear disarmament and its accession to the NPT for publication as a possible PPNN Study. This was not suitable for publication in its current form, but could form the basis for a more general study of the issues confronting states which chose to "step back from the brink". Ways of undertaking this more general study were to be further investigated.
- v. A new Study was proposed on the relationship between regional systems of nuclear safeguards and the global system administered by the IAEA. David Fischer agreed to produce a first draft of this for discussion at the October 1994 meeting;
- vi. An Issue Review was proposed on Nuclear Safeguards and their relevance to security. This was to be further elaborated, and a possible author identified;
- vii. It was suggested that there was an urgent need to produce a PPNN Study on compliance and non-compliance with non-proliferation norms, an issue partly covered by Lewis Dunn in his paper for the seminar. The modalities of undertaking such a study were to be further investigated.

6.PPNN/15/5 outlined proposals for conferences in 1994 and 1995. After considerable discussion, it was accepted that it would be impossible to organise a PPNN meeting on the Middle East before the 1995 NPT Conference, but that one might be held in October 1995 in conjunction with the Eighteenth Core Group meeting. It was also agreed that the schedule and programme for the meeting being organised by the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy [ELIAMEP], Athens in Halki, Greece in September made it unsuitable for co-sponsoring by PPNN, and that PPNN should play no direct role in it.

7.A detailed discussion took place on the objectives and target audience for the Briefing Conference to be held in October at the Pocantico Hills Conference Centre of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund in the United States, during which the following points arose:

- i. The target audience should be either Chiefs of Mission in New York or in Geneva;
- ii. Key states to be invited included the former Soviet Republics; Mauritania; Indonesia; Iran; and North Korea. In addition, the Chairmen of the PrepCom Committees should be invited;
- iii. Special emphasis should be placed on how a long NPT extension could be obtained, and on the problems of compliance and non-compliance.

8.It was agreed that the last PPNN briefing meeting before the NPT Conference should be held in the United States, in conjunction with the Seventeenth Core Group Meeting, from

9-12 March 1995, with 16-19 as alternative dates if accommodation was unavailable at the earlier date. It was suggested that the states likely to cause difficulties at the conference, and other major players at the Conference, should be invited to this meeting.

9.The final Core Group meeting in October 1995 will probably incorporate a regional meeting on the Middle East. Participants would include all parties involved in the Multi-lateral Working Group on Arms Control in the Middle East.

10.PPNN/CG 15/6 outlined several issues connected with the role to be played by PPNN at the NPT Conference. There was a consensus that PPNN should be represented at the Conference, and that its main contribution would be to provide information to delegates on the functioning of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the value of a long extension of the Treaty.

11.A brief discussion took place on whether an attempt should be made to extend the work of PPNN beyond 1995. There was general agreement that whatever happened in 1995, there would be a need for a networking exercise of the PPNN-type in the nuclear non-proliferation area, if only to prepare for a review conference in 2000. It was also essential that the PPNN Newsbrief should continue to be produced and distributed. At the same time, it was accepted that any new programme would have to be based upon a new focus, unless the 1995 Conference resulted in a very short extension of the NPT.

#### **CORE GROUP SUBSTANTIVE SESSIONS**

12.During its regular reporting session, members took the opportunity of the presence of Victor Slipchenko, Deputy-Head of the Russian delegation to the CTBT negotiations, to obtain a full briefing on their current status, and to conduct a detailed analysis of them. They also used the presence of Vilmos Cserveny of the Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Policy Section of the IAEA to be briefed on initiatives being developed by the IAEA to enhance the effectiveness of safeguards in advance of the 1995 NPT Conference and on the current state of the dialogue between the IAEA and the DPRK, and to engage in a discussion on these issues.

13.Members discussed the following items in the remainder of the reporting session:

- \* progress in drafting the African NWFZ Treaty;
- \* the IAEA Seminar on Safeguards in March 1994;
- \* the Middle East Peace Process and limitations on Weapons of Mass Destruction;
- \* European Union [EU] activities in the area of nuclear non-proliferation, including the negotiations for a new US-EU Agreement for Nuclear Co-Operation;
- \* nuclear developments in the Pacific Basin;
- \* the nuclear situation in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan;
- \* Progress in negotiating enhanced Security Assurances.

13.Under the heading of NPT related issues, members discussed PPNN Study 6, Nuclear

Verification Under the NPT: What Should it Cover - How far May it Go?, written by George Bunn and Roland Timerbaev. Points raised in the course of the discussion which followed included:

- \* Article II of the NPT clearly involves prohibitions on activities other than the final assembly of nuclear weapons/explosive devices;
- \* many aspects of nuclear weaponisation involve dual-use technologies, making monitoring the non-fissile material aspects of nuclear weapon development and production inherently difficult: for the IAEA or the UN to design a system to do this with confidence would be very demanding;
- \* INFCIRC/153 was specifically focused upon fissile materials in order to achieve the most acceptable compromise between the intrusiveness and cost of inspections and the requirement to deter nuclear weapon programmes through the risk of discovery - it did not seek to detect other aspects of weaponisation as these were judged to have little utility in the absence of fissile materials;
- \* the key issue is whether this is a problem that now needs to be addressed. One argument is that a potential new proliferation route has appeared, where a state develops the non-nuclear components of a nuclear weapon, and then buys clandestinely High-Enriched Uranium [HEU] or plutonium from sources in the former USSR.

14. Under the heading of Functional Issues, members discussed a presentation by David Fischer on the current proposals to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-Off Convention. Points raised in the course of the discussion which followed included:

- \* a cut-off convention would only affect the five nuclear states plus Israel, India and Pakistan, but it was unclear whether such a convention would be signed by these eight alone, or would be open for signature by all other states;
- \* the specific objective of the proposal is to cap the nascent nuclear arms race in South Asia, but in doing so it could have the effect of giving the three "threshold" states quasi-nuclear status. But are the perceived benefits of the cut-off going to be commensurate with the non-proliferation costs inherent in giving them this status?
- \* the role the IAEA would play in verifying a cut-off and the detailed objectives it would seek to achieve would be significantly different from its role in relation to the NPT. There remained uncertainty over whether a broad verification approach similar to the IAEA's NPT safeguarding concepts should be applied, or whether it should be one limited to verifying the cessation of production at specified declared facilities only;
- \* it was unlikely that the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines on supplying nuclear technology and materials only to states accepting Full-Scope Safeguards [i.e. not to Israel, India and Pakistan] would be relaxed for these states if stocks of nuclear materials from past production were not declared and placed under safeguards;

- \* special provisions might have to be made to cover the use by these countries of HEU as submarine fuel;
- \* it remained uncertain whether transfers of material to safeguarded stockpiles and constraints/cut-offs of tritium production would be an integral part of the proposal;
- \* problems might arise over whether the cut-off was of material produced for nuclear explosive purposes, or of weapon grade material.

15. The Core Group concluded its meeting with a Colloquium on Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation in the Post-Cold War World. This had several sessions, each initiated by a short presentation by John Simpson. In the course of the Colloquium, the following points were highlighted:

i. On the Role of Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament Measures in the New Environment:

- \* there exists no consensus on the nature of security in the post Cold War world, or of the role, if any, of nuclear deterrence;
- \* several dozen weapons are all that is currently needed by the US and Russia: the problem is the rate of disposal of the rest, and the need for the P5 to discuss future numbers and roles of these weapons.
- \* nuclear weapons are now irrelevant to most areas of the world, though to some states and their leaders they may still be regarded as a potent status symbol;
- \* the issues associated with developing the role of the UN in the new context, including retaining nuclear weapons for its use, need to be explored. However, a clear vision of its future role in the security area may take at least a decade to evolve;
- \* new disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives seem likely to be regionally, rather than globally based, and closely linked to regional security problems and solutions. A major problem with this approach, however, is the lack of clear boundaries between regions [e.g. India's insistence that China is part of the South Asian region, and China's denial of this], and the reliance of these initiatives upon the full implementation of existing global arrangements;
- \* South Asia is viewed from outside as the region where the highest risk of a nuclear war now exists, but those inside it argue that the risk is low. This may be because India and Pakistan believe they are able to communicate effectively and clearly with each other through overt threats and other means, and that a stable deterrence relationship exists between them, whereas the rest of the world does not;
- \* the risk of inter-state war continues to exist: it should not be ignored because of the current emphasis upon attempting to tackle intra-state conflicts;
- \* the role of China in the new international context will be very significant, given its economic growth rate and its opening out to the rest of the world;
- \* the objectives of arms control are changing from preventing conflicts degenerating into nuclear war to creating sets of agreed rules for the size and conduct of military

forces;

- \* the Non-Aligned Movement are insisting that the old nuclear disarmament agenda should be concluded before any move takes place to address a new agenda;

ii. On the Current Non-Proliferation Regime, and how to deal with Hold-Outs, Renegades and Break-Outs

- \* Israel, India and Pakistan may not threaten directly the integrity of the NPT, as they are not parties to it, but they do jeopardise the credibility of the overall non-proliferation regime;
- \* the current hold-outs cannot be brought within the NPT as anything less than full non-nuclear weapon parties, if a major role of the Treaty is a normative one of encouraging non-possession of nuclear weapons. As a consequence, none of the hold-outs should be given any form of recognition as nuclear weapon states. To do so would also make it more difficult for them to withdraw from their current ambiguous status via the NPT;
- \* a political and economic price would have to be paid if the hold-outs are to be persuaded to join the regime as non-nuclear weapon states. That price may have to be different for each of the three states involved;
- \* the likelihood of the hold-outs giving up their weapons is low, but they might be persuaded to do so on a slow, incremental basis through the manipulation of "sticks and carrots" by other states, which demonstrated that it was in their own interests to do so;
- \* the main problem for the future may be how to handle NPT parties who are suspected of attempting to acquire nuclear weapons, despite the absence of hard proof of suspicions;
- \* renegades can be deterred by tightening verification procedures: if the chance of detection is high, the incentive for renegade action is reduced;
- \* one problem for the future is that IAEA safeguards may become so technical and professional that it will be difficult for national authorities to form independent judgements on their findings;
- \* breaking-out from the regime could be discouraged by spelling out in advance the probable consequences of such action, particularly the mechanisms and processes the UN Security Council would use to respond;
- \* one key issue is whether the UN should be prepared to contemplate nuclear deterrent threats being issued in its name to combat proliferation;
- \* at the moment, the NPT does not contain any specific compliance mechanisms. A question for the future is whether these should be added to it;
- \* greater thought needs to be given to the future role of the UN in connection with non-proliferation, specifically of the Security Council and the General Assembly.