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**Report on the Eighteenth Meeting of the Program
for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN)
Core Group**

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Summary:

Summarizes events and agenda of the eighteenth meeting of the PPNN Core group including a report on the Consequences of the 1995 NPT conference

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*EIGHTEENTH PPNN CORE GROUP REPORT***PROGRAMME FOR PROMOTING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION (PPNN)****GENERAL REPORT ON THE EIGHTEENTH MEETING OF THE PPNN CORE GROUP
12 OCTOBER- 17 OCTOBER 1995****INTRODUCTION**

1. From Thursday 12 to and including Tuesday 17 October, PPNN held a series of meetings at the Chilworth Manor Conference Centre of the University of Southampton, Chilworth, Southampton, United Kingdom. The meetings were organised by the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies and chaired by Ben Sanders, the Executive Chairman of PPNN.
2. As set out in this report, from Sunday 15 to and including Tuesday 17 October, PPNN's Core Group held a workshop on **The Consequences of the 1995 NPT Conference**. This included an evaluation of the past work of PPNN and an examination of the implications for the nuclear non-proliferation system of the outcome of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. In the light of these analyses, the Group sought to identify the tasks that PPNN could usefully perform in the period through to the end of 1997, the year that the first session of the preparatory committee (PrepCom) for the NPT review conference of the year 2000 is to be held.
3. Starting with dinner on the evening of Thursday, 17 October, through to lunchtime on Saturday, 19 October, a workshop on **Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the Middle East** was held involving members of the PPNN Core Group and fourteen participants in the regional discussions on the nuclear aspects of the Middle East peace process, drawn from thirteen states. Also present as an observer was a representative of the W.Alton Jones Foundation. A general and substantive report on the workshop is being distributed to funders and Core Group members along with this report. Additional copies of these reports are available from PPNN's Southampton office.
4. All members of the PPNN Core Group were present at the Chilworth meeting with the exception of Lewis Dunn. In addition, several former members of the Core Group, Ben Agu, Jorge Morelli-Pando, Walter Rehak, Larry Scheinman and Ian Smart, were present during the Core Group meeting, while Peter Goosen and Sven Jurschewsky were invited to make specific presentations at the Core Group workshop. Support staff in attendance were Emily Bailey, Darryl Howlett, Deborah Ozga, Hilary Palmer, Abigail Sanders and Andrew Skeat.

CORE GROUP BUSINESS SESSION

5. The Executive Chairman pointed out that the existing PPNN Core Group would cease to exist at the end of 1995, and a new one would need to be formed to take the Programme through 1997. In consultation with the Programme Director, he would convene a new Core Group and issue invitations to participate in its work in early 1996.
6. Two papers on the work of PPNN had been circulated to members of the Core

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Group in advance of the meeting:

PPNN/CG18/3 - Publications and Outreach

PPNN/CG18/4 - Financial Position of PPNN

CORE GROUP SUBSTANTIVE SESSIONS

7. In the reporting session, members discussed the following items:
- * progress in drafting a South East Asian NWFZ Treaty;
 - * the completion of the African NWFZ treaty;
 - * nuclear power programmes in the Czech and Slovak Republics;
 - * the supply crisis in the nuclear reactor field resulting from the lack of proven new designs;
 - * increased demand for uranium and its implications;
 - * the French nuclear testing programme and its consequences;
 - * the European dimension of future French and British nuclear weapon policies, and the role of Germany within it;
 - * the implications for the future of arms control of both the general election in the Russian Federation and US attempts to amend the ABM Treaty;
 - * progress in negotiating a CTBT in the CD in Geneva;
 - * the question of the utility of using nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes and its military implications;
 - * changing nuclear deterrence doctrines and possibilities for agreement on a no-first use treaty;
 - * the evolving nuclear situation in South Asia, and the possible consequences of the deployment of nuclear capable missiles by India and Pakistan;
 - * developments in the nuclear supplier guidelines and arrangements for their implementation;
 - * KEDO and the DPRK situation;
 - * nuclear smuggling.

Core Group Workshop on The Consequences of the 1995 NPT Conference

8. This workshop was initiated by a presentation from Jayantha Dhanapala, based on his circulated paper on *The 1995 NPT Conference*. The following general

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points emerged from this session:

- * the conference proved to be a remarkably successful multilateral endeavour, particularly in view of the prior prediction that agreement on an extension option without a vote was most unlikely;
- * the positive roles played by South Africa, and after the Bandung Conference by Indonesia, were crucial in achieving this outcome;
- * the extension decision can be regarded as having fulfilled an essential pre-condition for moving the process of nuclear disarmament forward;
- * the extension package consisted of three interlinked decisions, which should be viewed as a whole, and a resolution on the Middle East;
- * the lack of an agreed rule on voting on an extension decision may have proved to be a blessing in disguise;
- * the failure to achieve a consensus final declaration on the review of the Treaty may increase pressures for the adoption of alternative methods for reporting on the results of such reviews;
- * the *Principles and Objectives* document that was part of the extension package represents an authentic statement of the current meaning of the Treaty, and thus a state might use non-fulfilment of specific yardsticks by others as a basis for withdrawal;
- * the inability of the NAM to coalesce around a common position on extension was a consequence of their not having recognised that the 1995 conference was different from a normal review conference, in that bilateral pressures would be deployed in capitals and elsewhere which would prove more effective in their results than the more normal processes of multilateral caucusing.

9. Peter Goosen followed the initial presentation with one on *The Consequences of the 1995 Conference for the NPT: The Yardsticks for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament*. This gave rise to the following general points:

- * the *Principles and Objectives* document can be argued to have created a set of specific yardsticks against which individual state behaviour can be measured. It, and the decision on *Strengthening the Review Process*, relate to each other "like a hammer and an anvil". Their political impact is illustrated by the use made of one of the phrases in it, "utmost restraint", to spearhead criticisms of Chinese and French nuclear testing;
- * a contrary perspective is that this document weakens the NPT, as its contents are alleged to be less demanding than those of the Treaty. It might also be argued that it would have been better to start with a strong document in the presidential consultations, and then allow it to be weakened, rather than start with a compromise one and try to strengthen it;

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- * it can be argued that the decisions on *Principles and Objectives* and the *Strengthened Review Process* were consensus decisions, and thus have considerable political authority;
 - * the *Principles and Objectives* document should be regarded as a dynamic instrument not a static one. It offers a vision of the future, and thus is open to continuous updating;
 - * through the wording of paragraph 4 (c), nuclear disarmament is now specified as a distinct and independent goal from the achievement of general and complete disarmament;
 - * if the first test of the effectiveness of the document, agreeing a CTBT in 1996, is not passed successfully, the political credibility of the *Principles and Objectives* may be irreparably damaged;
 - * Not only are the traditional caucus groups that have operated in NPT conferences showing signs of disintegrating, they are also subject to significant internal changes. In particular, the rapid economic developments taking place in some of the Asian states, and how they have been accomplished, have yet to impact on leadership roles in the international political arena;
 - * What distinguished the work of the Presidential Consultations in 1995 from other activities was the common focus on achievable objectives;
 - * In future conferences, solutions to problems, particularly how to revise the *Principles and Objectives* document, may have to be sought through informal gatherings outside the conference environment, rather than in negotiations within it.
10. Sven Jurschewsky continued the analysis of the results of the 1995 conference by presenting a paper on ***The Consequences of the 1995 NPT Conference for the NPT: The Revised Review Process***. In the course of this session, the following issues emerged:
- * It was important to ensure that the revised review process did not operate in the sterile way that it had in the past. This might mean it had to address measures which would strengthen the regime, but were not being discussed in depth elsewhere, such as security assurances; detailed issues concerning regime implementation; and new topics, such as nuclear smuggling;
 - * the "subsidiary bodies" envisaged in the revised review process constituted a new mechanism to give focused attention to specific problems, such as nuclear smuggling and compliance questions;
 - * what has been created is an annual conference of the parties, a

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Conference on Non-Proliferation, which could be used to strengthen the Treaty by focusing on short-term agenda items, but it is not necessarily a forum for negotiating substantive agreements;

- * one area of procedural uncertainty is whether PrepComs can now agree recommendations and have them implemented, or whether these will only be actioned following authorisation by a review conference. Another is how subsidiary bodies can be created in advance of the main committees, which have in the past only come into existence at the review conference;
 - * as the governments in several key states may change in 1996, few developments in the implementation of the *Principles and Objectives* document are likely before the PrepCom in 1997.
11. The workshop concluded with a discussion on the potential future tasks for PPNN, structured around three papers/ presentations: Ben Sanders on *The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime after the 1995 NPT Conference*; Larry Scheinman on *The Role and Future of NGO's in the Non-Proliferation Process*; and John Simpson on *The Consequences of the NPT Review and Extension Conference and PPNN's tasks for the Future*. In the discussion which followed, the following points were raised:
- * NGOs are particularly useful if they conduct educational efforts, especially on the technical and legal aspects of an issue, and if they make no attempt to orchestrate the reaching of preconceived conclusions;
 - * the indefinite extension of the NPT has prevented a weakening of the regime, but not solved any of its outstanding problems. Moreover, if no progress is made in implementing the yardsticks contained in the *Principles and Objectives* document, the Treaty will lose its credibility and attractiveness for many of the parties. Thus the key issue is to start the implementation process before the 1997 PrepCom, and to make sure that the activities involved sustain visible movements towards the designated targets;
 - * the *Principles and Objectives* document has given future NPT conferences an integrated agenda and programme for action. This involves a wide spread of activities and responsibilities, and PPNN will have an important role in explaining that agenda and programme and moving them forward. It will also have a role in explaining that the document is a dynamic one, which will need continued updating, particularly in the disarmament area. Otherwise there is a danger of NPT meetings becoming a forum for a repetition of the debates in the UN General Assembly and the CD, and suffering a "death by *déjà vu*";
 - * The main focus of PPNN's future activities should be the *Principles and Objectives* document, and the identification of methods for implementing the yardsticks contained within it. This could involve work on at least six topics: the promotion of nuclear-weapon-free zones; methods of ensuring

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compliance with NPT obligations; co-ordinating the work of an increasing number of international verification agencies; increasing the transparency and acceptance of export controls; giving substantive meaning to technical assistance under Article IV of the NPT; and assessing nuclear smuggling risks;

- * PPNN's future work should look also outside the *Principles and Objectives* document to the problem of future proliferation. In the first 25 years of the NPT's existence a priority non-proliferation task had been to recruit support for the NPT and the regime: in the next 25 years it will be one of sustaining compliance internally and addressing the nuclear ambiguity generated by those who choose to stay outside of the regime. Compliance issues have not been worked through in detail, either in terms of what constitutes non-compliance, how it might be detected or what sanctions could be used against it. All of this needs more analysis before an attempt can be made to build an international consensus behind a plan of action. This is one issue that PPNN needs to address systematically. Another is how to deal with non-parties to the Treaty, and the resultant problem of creating universality ;
- * Given the significance of moving the disarmament agenda forward for the future credibility of the non-proliferation regime, it appears that PPNN's activities over the next two years should be concentrated more on the policies and activities of the five nuclear-weapon states than in the past. Meetings might therefore take place in their capitals, rather than in regional venues;
- * PPNN should not attempt to become heavily involved in regional security questions, as it is difficult to get the right people to attend meetings, and they have to meet regularly for the effort to yield results. It should also not attempt to build itself up as a group dealing with all aspects of international security, as it does not have the expertise for this;
- * Steps should be taken to continue the production of the Newsbrief even if money cannot be found to keep the Core Group functioning effectively;
- * After the NPT conference, non-proliferation is suffering a downgrading of status and attention in many states. This makes it even more important for PPNN to continue its work, in order to ensure continuity of knowledge and interest in the topic;
- * The *Review* and the *Principles and Objectives* documents were intended to be closely linked. PPNN has a task to perform in considering how the reforms in the review process could be made meaningful in terms of the yardsticks in the *Principles and Objectives* document, and how "subsidiary bodies" could be used in this process.
- * PPNN can perform an invaluable role as the institutional memory for the non-proliferation system. It should try to concentrate on the substance of non-proliferation issues, and regard procedural matters as of secondary

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concern;

- * The PPNN Core Group itself is an important resource for the international community, and its internal chemistry, which has been built up over the years, is a significant element contributing to the frank atmosphere and productivity of its discussions.