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Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Newsbrief, Number 1

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Summary:

A compilation of the latest news, events, and publications related to nuclear weapons and nuclear non-proliferation. The "Newsbrief" was produced by the PPNN and personally edited by Ben Sanders.

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PROGRAMME FOR PROMOTING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

Number 1

NEWSBRIEF

March 1988

The Programme

The Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN) was established in the Spring of 1987 with the ultimate purpose of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. PPNN's shorter-term goal is to contribute to the success of the fourth review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and of the 1995 conference that will decide on the Treaty's extension. To this end, the PPNN provides for the creation of an international, non-governmental and informal system of collecting, exchanging and analysing relevant information. The intention is then to bring this information to the attention of government officials, diplomats, the research community, parliamentarians, non-governmental organisations and the media, so as to help foster among those groups, and particularly among their younger members, a greater interest in, and a deeper knowledge of, the issues involved.

PPNN's central element is an international networking exercise based on a Core Group of high-level experts from a dozen industrialised and developing nations. These experts give general guidance to the Programme, pool and exchange information on the many different aspects of the question of nuclear (non-) proliferation and make the respective communities of which they form part aware of the need to support the non-proliferation regime and the Treaty. The Core Group meets approximately twice a year. Between meetings they seek to keep in touch, *inter alia*, through a Newsbrief containing information on the work of non-governmental groups in related areas, highlighting topical developments of interest to the Programme, featuring extracts of and references to press reports, publications and articles on nuclear proliferation and on steps that are being taken, or that might be taken, to deter it.

The Newsbrief

The Newsbrief was therefore initially conceived as a means of communication from the chairman of the PPNN Core Group to the members, to acquaint them with developments he considered to be relevant to the aims and activities of the Programme. Given its general nature, however, the Core Group felt that the Newsbrief might play a useful part in the outreach effort which constitutes a major element of the Programme. As such, the Newsbrief should be addressed to a somewhat wider audience of persons interested in the subject. It would supply them with material that might help them in alerting their respective environments to the issue of nuclear non-proliferation and inform them about developments in that context, including PPNN's activities.

Readers should note that the Group's chairman is responsible for the contents of the Newsbrief and that, unless expressly stated, the inclusion of any item does not imply the agreement of the members of the Core Group collectively or individually with its substance or with its relevance to the Programme.

I. Topical developments

Introductory Remarks

One question to be answered at the outset is how to choose the starting point for the information that is carried in the Newsbrief. Any choice of this kind obviously involves an element of arbitrariness. The subject of nuclear non-proliferation goes back a long time. An understanding of the present situation presumes awareness of much that went before. Many current events have long histories, of which one needs at least some general knowledge to grasp their full import. It is clearly impossible, however, for a publication of this modest size and scope to attempt to give even a brief background for all the items reported and to include events going back more than a year or so. Somewhat subjectively, therefore, we have chosen the time that the Programme got underway - mid-1987 - as the approximate starting date for the items to be presented (although some of the articles and books included in the literature survey for this first issue date back to 1985, the time of the last NPT Review Conference). This issue of the Newsbrief will therefore report on events that have occurred - or have been publicised - during the past seven or eight months. If it is possible, as intended, to publish a minimum of three issues of the Newsbrief a year, each following issue should cover the preceding nine or ten months. While this will mean that older information (that is, the events of the first three or four months covered in the preceding issue) will be omitted from the next issue, readers will find that many items are repeated over the years and months, as media reports on nuclear developments tend to recur over time with surprising regularity.

In selecting items it is assumed that readers of the Newsbrief generally stay abreast of major developments relevant to its subject, such as progress in arms limitation and disarmament negotiations. The Newsbrief will avoid reporting on events in flux, such as ongoing negotiations, of which the outcome is still uncertain.

a. The Present Situation

At the start of 1988, the nuclear non-proliferation balance sheet shows a number of credit, as well as debit items. On the credit side, the signing of the INF agreement by the two superpowers is a step towards the fulfilment of their obligations under Article VI of the NPT to negotiate in good faith on measures of nuclear disarmament. The cause of nuclear non-proliferation is directly served by the accession of Spain, a state with a very considerable nuclear power programme, to the Treaty. The arrangements reported to be under discussion between Argentina and Brazil for mutual inspection visits to their respective nuclear installations are also a potentially positive development. However, from a global perspective, the apparent lack of involvement of the IAEA in these activities is disappointing. Finally, the expressed willingness of South Africa to accede to the Treaty may offer the prospect of bringing a 'near-nuclear' state into the formal non-proliferation regime.

On the debit side, a number of developments offer cause for profound concern. The Vanunu trial in Israel has strengthened the circumstantial evidence indicating that it has developed the necessary technology and has the means to manufacture nuclear weapons. Similarly, events such as the attempt by Arshad Parvez to export nuclear-weapon related steel alloys from the United States have added to concern over Pakistan's nuclear programme, despite the certification by the President of the United States at the end of 1987 that it 'did not possess a nuclear explosive device'. The security position in South Asia seems likely to be further complicated by the 'lease' of a Soviet nuclear submarine to India. This action, and the reported progress of Brazil towards the indigenous construction of a similar boat, may have a negative impact upon the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This makes it all the more regrettable that France and the United Kingdom, who profess to support the cause of non-proliferation, are currently competing to help Canada, one of the strongest defenders of that cause among the non-nuclear-weapon states, acquire a fleet of similar submarines.

b. NPT Events

On 21 September 1987 (the opening day of the 31st Regular Session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency) the Permanent Mission in Vienna of South Africa issued the following press release:

"The following statement was issued today by South African State President P.W.Botha in Cape Town.

'The Republic of South Africa is prepared to commence negotiations with each of the nuclear weapon states on the possibility of signing the non-proliferation treaty. At the same time the Republic of South Africa will consider including in these negotiations safeguards on its installations subject to the NPT conditions. The nature of these negotiations will depend on the outcome of the 31st General Conference of the IAEA which is being held as from 21 September.'

'South Africa hopes that it will soon be able to sign the NPT and has decided to open discussions with others to this end. Any safeguards agreement which

might subsequently be negotiated with the IAEA would naturally be along the same lines as, and in conformity with, agreements with other NPT signatories.'

(See also para. e. below).

In the general debate during the 31st regular session of the Agency's General Conference, Nigeria, a member of whose government had been reported to have expressed the intention to develop nuclear weapons, announced that it had decided to conclude a safeguards agreement with the Agency, pursuant to its commitments under the NPT.

On 5 November 1987, Spain deposited in London its Instrument of Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Treaty now has 135 parties, including the three depositary States: USSR, UK and USA (IAEA Press Release PR 87 / 39 of 23 November 1987).

c. Other Non-Proliferation Developments

- The Government of Chile has requested the IAEA to apply safeguards in relation to the supply by the People's Republic of China of uranium hexafluoride (20% enriched) to be used in MTR-type fuel elements (IAEA Document GOV/2317, 14 August 1987).
- President Alfonsin of Argentina and Brazilian President Sarney together visited the former's uranium enrichment facility at Pilcaniyeu, reinforcing hopes that a bilateral inspection system can be worked out between these States (Jornal do Brasil and La Nacion, 17 July 1987; New York Times, July 22, 1987; Washington Post, August 14, 1987).
- Given fears that Libya "might seek to adapt any nuclear programme for military purposes", the USSR is said to have "had second thoughts" about co-operation with that country in constructing a nuclear power station with two Soviet-type 400MWe VVER reactors (Nuclear Engineering International, December 1987).

d. Nuclear Trade

• Argentina:

Conclusion of agreement for nuclear co-operation with Iran: development of a new core for the Teheran research reactor to allow it to work with 20% enrichment; help in completion of both units of 1300 MWe power station at Bushehr, partly in conjunction with Kraftwerk Union (KWU) of FR Germany (Nucleonics Week, November 12, 1987);

Negotiations on supply of research reactor and fuel to Albania;

Offer to Indonesia to overhaul its Triga reactor; talks about supply of "Argos" power reactor;

Talks on nuclear cooperation with Algeria and Morocco;

Training of Cuban reactor operators. (**Nuclear Engineering International**, July 1987; **Washington Post**, August 14, 1987).

- **France** denies having committed itself to rebuilding the Osirak reactor in Iraq, which was damaged in the Israeli air raid in 1981 (**New York Times**, August 6, 1987).
- **India** and the USSR are negotiating an agreement on the provision by the latter of two 440 MWe PWRs under safeguards limited to the plant and supplied nuclear material (**Nuclear Engineering International**, September 1987).
- **U.S.-Japan**: completion of negotiations for the revision of the bilateral agreement for nuclear co-operation. The revised agreement contains a blanket authority ("programmatic consent") for thirty years for Japan to reprocess nuclear fuel covered by the agreement and to use the resulting plutonium without the case-by-case approval previously required (**Issue Brief** of July 21, 1987 by Warren H. Donnelly, Congressional Research Service). Objections have been raised in both houses of the US Congress as well as by the Defense Department and the NRC, but the Reagan Administration is prepared nevertheless to tell Japan that it intends to proceed with the agreement (**Washington Post**, December 18, 1987; **Nuclear Fuel**, December 28, 1987; **New York Times**, January 13, 1988).
- **Canada** and **Switzerland** have negotiated a new agreement for nuclear co-operation superseding the previous one which was suspended after India's nuclear test. The new agreement takes account of current international practice as incorporated in the NPT, the London Group suppliers' guidelines and the revised Zangger ('trigger') list. A similar agreement is said to have been concluded between **Switzerland** and **Australia** (**Nuclear Fuel**, November 30, 1987).

e. IAEA Developments

- The text of a resolution adopted by the General Conference at its 31st regular session (by 60 votes in favour, 20 against and 4 abstentions. South Africa was not present) postponing a decision to suspend South Africa as a member of the Agency, is reproduced in Section V.
- The text of a resolution adopted by the General Conference at its 31st regular session (by 48 votes in favour, 29 against and 12 abstentions - 12 member states being absent, including Israel) demanding that Israel place all its nuclear facilities under safeguards, asking the Director General to report on the matter and deciding to put the item "Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat" on the agenda of the 32nd regular session, in 1988, is reproduced in Section V.

f. Peaceful Nuclear Developments

- **Argentina**: "Argentine Nuclear Effort Running Out Of Steam": article of August 14, 1987 by the **Washington Post Foreign Service**, about slow-

down in **Argentina's** peaceful nuclear energy programme. Disputes about the price of indigenous yellowcake (**Nuclear Fuel**, August 10, 1987). Reports of imports of Chinese UF6 (**Nuclear Fuel**, August 24, 1987)

- **USSR**: is now reprocessing irradiated fuel from PWR plants supplied to other nations. It has started building a large-scale reprocessing installation using the Purex process, with the intention of utilising the extracted plutonium in fast breeder reactors (**Nuclear Fuel**, November 30, 1987)

g. Developments of Concern for Vertical Proliferation

- **US**: Department of Defense has decided to redeploy the B53 hydrogen bomb, which is said to be more than six times as powerful as the most destructive bomb or warhead now in the American nuclear arsenal (**New York Times**, August 5, 1987).
- **Voters in Palau** (US Trust Territory in the Pacific) decide to waive a constitutional prohibition against allowing nuclear weapons and technology into that territory (**Far Eastern Economic Review**, 6 August 1987; **New York Times**, August 7, 1987).
- While the US Administration is seeking to persuade foreign governments (in its programme for Reduced Enrichment in Research and Test Reactors - RERT) to move away from the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU), the US Department of Energy is going ahead with a new reactor fuelled with HEU (**Science**, vol. 238, December 1987).
- **China**: announces that it has acquired a "reliable nuclear counterattack potential" (**New York Times**, January 10, 1988).

h. Developments of Concern for Horizontal Proliferation

- **Brazil**: President Sarney announces a "secret military programme" of \$ 1 billion a year under which scientists at Sao Paulo have without any outside help achieved "complete domination" of the ultracentrifuge process of enriching uranium. Enrichment is said to be limited at present to 1.2 % but a new installation, operating under the supervision of the Brazilian navy, will "soon achieve 20% enrichment" in "industrial quantities". Brazil is "rapidly and independently moving to develop the technology required to build an atomic-fueled submarine and ... use the experience to construct nuclear weapons" (**New York Times**, September 6; **Chicago Tribune**, September 7; **The Independent**, 9 September; **Washington Post**, September 10; **New Scientist**, 17 September; **Christian Science Monitor**, November 13 - all 1987).
- **India**: India is far ahead of Pakistan in its "bomb programme", has a programme to develop a hydrogen bomb and was about to conduct an underground test of a deliverable bomb in 1984, when it was deterred from doing so by diplomatic pressure (**Foreign Report/The Economist**, June 25 1987).

India is not building an enrichment plant (*Nucleonics Week*, July 23, 1987). India is stockpiling "large amounts of weapons-grade plutonium" and its government "is believed to be building a uranium enrichment plant at Ratanahalli, near Mysore in the state of Karnataka" (*The Economist*, September 5, 1987). Prime Minister Gandhi rejects a US proposal for a treaty with Pakistan banning nuclear weapons (*The New York Times*, October 11, 1987).

- **Iran:** informs the IAEA of (air) attacks (by Iraq) on the site of the Bushehr power plant and requests assistance by the Agency in the form of a visit by safeguards inspectors and of an expert mission on nuclear safety and radiological protection. The Agency's Director General gives the organisation's "preliminary opinion" that the amount and nature of nuclear material at the site could not create a significant radiological hazard to the public (*IAEA Newsbriefs*, Vol. 2, No.15, 25 November 1987).
- **Israel:** press reports on the successful testing of a Jericho II intermediate-range ballistic missile over a distance of 500 miles (*International Defense Review*, as quoted in *New York Times*, July 22 and 29; Soviet reactions in Hebrew-language Tass programme: *Washington Post*, August 1, 1987). After a postponement of three months, due to illness of the presiding judge (personal information from Israeli representative in Vienna), the trial of Mordechai Vanunu, former Israeli nuclear technician accused of having betrayed secrets about his country's production of nuclear weapons, got under way in secret, in early December 1987 (*Washington Post*, December 11, 1987). "Although the United Nations does not have conclusive proof that Israel possesses nuclear weapons, circumstantial evidence ... would seem to indicate that (it) has developed the necessary technology and has the means to manufacture nuclear weapons, if it so chooses" (*Report of the Secretary General*, A/42/581, 16 October 1987). Various reports on the use of heavy water (deuterium oxide) supplied by Norway for peaceful uses, in the production by Israel of plutonium and tritium; refusal by the latter of international inspection (Prof. Gary Milhollin quoted in *Jerusalem Post*, November 19, 1987 and in *Christian Science Monitor*, December 2, 1987; article by same in *New York Times*, November 25, and in *International Herald Tribune*, November 26, 1987. See also Gary Milhollin, "Heavy Water Cheaters", in *Foreign Policy*, Number 69, Winter 1987-88, which alleges similar activities on the part of France and India.
- **Pakistan:** Pakistan-born Canadian businessman Arshad Z. Pervez is arrested in Philadelphia trying to export 50,000 lbs of special steel alloy for the manufacture of ultracentrifuges or bomb casings (*New York Times*, July 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 23, 29; *Washington Post*, July 15, 17, 22; *Nucleonics Week*, July 16, 23; *Wall Street Journal*, July 22; Statements in US Congress by Rep. S.J. Solarz and Sen. J. Glenn; *Newsweek*, July 27, 1987). U.S. State Department concludes that Pakistan government was involved in Parvez' attempt at exporting the steel alloy and buying beryllium (*New York Times*, January 14, 1988) "...Despite our best efforts, Pakistan has proceeded to the threshold of nuclear

weapons possession...The Pakistani Government, beginning in 1985, has provided unequivocal assurances ... that it would not engage in illegal procurement activities in the United States... We have also informed Pakistan that this case reinforces our concerns about Pakistan's nuclear program and increases the need for steps to demonstrate that Pakistan's nuclear program is "peaceful"...(Richard W. Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, July 22, 1987). A U.S. grand jury indicts retired Pakistani general Inam ul-Haq for conspiracy to obtain nuclear-related material in USA (*New York Times*, July 29; *Washington Post*, August 13, 1987). Pakistan rejects request by U.S. Undersecretary of State M.H. Armacost for inspection of the Kahuta (enrichment) plant (*Washington Post*, August 4 and 5; *New York Times*, August 2, 6; *Christian Science Monitor*, August 6; *Nuclear Fuel*, August 10, 1987). Reports that Pakistan is building a second uranium enrichment plant at Golra, near Islamabad, are denied by the Pakistani Embassy in Washington ("... There is no truth in any reports that Pakistan is building a processing plant (sic) at Golra") but confirmed by US sources (*New York Times*, January 10, 1988). The US Congress decides to continue American military and economic assistance to Pakistan notwithstanding US concerns about that country's nuclear activities (*Christian Science Monitor*, December 14, 1987; *Washington Post*, December 18, 1987).

II. PPNN Activities

The PPNN Core Group (which had held its first semi-annual meeting in June 1987 in Jersey, in the British Channel Islands) had its second meeting at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, from 19 to 22 November 1987. Members attending were Benson Agu (Nigeria), Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka), Lewis Dunn (USA), David Fischer (UK), Jozef Goldblat (Sweden), Oleg Grinevsky (USSR), Harald Müller (FRG), Joseph Nye (USA), Walter Rehak (GDR), Ben Sanders (Netherlands; chairman), Mohamed Shaker (Egypt), John Simpson (UK; rapporteur) and Ian Smart (UK). Prvoslav Davinic (United Nations), Michael Rosenthal (US/ACDA) and Joseph Pilat (US/Center for Security Studies, Los Alamos) attended part of the meeting as observers. There were four invited speakers, who briefed the Core Group as follows: William C. Potter (Center for International and Strategic Affairs, UCLA) discussed the data base on new nuclear suppliers which was being established at UCLA; Tariq Rauf (Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament) addressed the Canadian plans to purchase nuclear submarines; John R. Redick (University of Virginia) spoke on nuclear restraint in Latin America, with special reference to Argentina and Brazil; and Leonard S. Spector (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) discussed nuclear relations between India and Pakistan. In addition, David Fischer talked about the present position of South Africa, which he had just visited.

The Core Group discussed current developments in the area of non-proliferation and initiatives it might take to help improve the situation. In that regard, it was

generally felt that members should alert the governments and organisations with which they were associated to opportunities for underlining and publicising progress in the implementation of the NPT. The Group reviewed the Programme's long-term objectives and discussed a plan of action for the shorter term. The need of enhancing the public credibility of the Programme was stressed and several ways to achieve this were agreed upon. As part of this, the *Newsbrief* was to be given a role in PPNN's outreach efforts. It was further agreed that future meetings of the Core Group should be set up around three categories of topics: the elements in the NPT that might be the focus of debate in 1990; functional questions, of general relevance to the non-proliferation regime; and "problem" countries or situations. A meeting schedule was worked out on that basis. Similarly, consensus was reached on the focus to be adopted in the two conferences. The first, in 1989, would have a relatively broad scope and evaluate the current non-proliferation position, while the second one, in early 1990, would focus more narrowly on the NPT and the fourth review conference.

III. Other Non-Governmental Groups Active in Related Areas

There are many non-governmental bodies working in areas of direct interest to the Programme. The *Newsbrief* will include information on the activities of such bodies, on the basis of information made available to it by readers. For the present, a listing is given of some bodies and projects with which the Programme is in contact or a working relationship has been, or is being, established (including projects with which members of the Core Group are themselves involved):

American Academy of Arts and Sciences: Dr Jeffrey Boutwell, Norton's Wood, 156 Irving Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, United States of America, is engaged in research on a number of aspects of nuclear proliferation, and recently ran a workshop on Opaque Proliferation (27-29 January 1988).

Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament: Tariq Rauf and Marie-France Desjardins; 151 Slater Street, Suite 710, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1P 5H3 - **Non-Proliferation Project.**

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: L. Spector; 11 Dupont Circle, N.W. Washington D.C. 20036, United States of America - publication project **Nuclear Proliferation Today.**

Center for International and Strategic Affairs, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90024, United States of America: William C. Potter: **The Emerging Nuclear Suppliers and Non-proliferation.**

Centre for European Policy Studies: (Peter Ludlow), Peter Lomas (with Peace Research Institute Frankfurt); Rue Ducale 33, 1000 Brussels, Belgium - **European Non-Proliferation Questions.**

Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Sector F-5/2 P.O. Box 1173, Islamabad, Pakistan: Nazir Kamal: **Nuclear Non-Proliferation in South Asia.**

Institute for Resource and Security Studies: Gordon Thompson; 27 Ellsworth Avenue, Cambridge MA 02139, United States of America - **Proliferation Reform Project.**

Nuclear Control Institute: Paul Leventhal and Milton Hoenig; 1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 704; Washington D.C. 20036, United States of America - **prevention of nuclear terrorism and the promotion of non-proliferation (non-use of plutonium).**

Peace Research Institute Frankfurt: Harald Müller; Leimenrode 29, 6000 Frankfurt am Main 1, Federal Republic of Germany - **European Non-Proliferation Questions.**

United Nations Association of the United States of America (UNA/USA): Toby Gati; 300 E. 42nd St., New York, N.Y. 10017, United States of America - **outreach activities in support of non-proliferation.**

University of Wisconsin: Gary Milhollin; c/o Natural Resources Defense Council, 1350 New York Avenue, N.W., Washington D.C. 20006, United States of America - **Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Toward a Strategy for the 1990s.**

IV. Some recent books and articles on Nuclear Non-Proliferation:

Books:

R.L. Beckman, **Congress and the Control of Peaceful Nuclear Activities**, (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985), 446 pp. (pbk)

I. Bellany, C. D. Blacker and J. Gallacher (eds.), **The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty**, (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1985), 134 pp. (hbk)

J.C. Carasales, **El Desarme de los desarmados: Argentina y el Tratado de No Proliferacion de Armas Nucleares**, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Pleamar, Spring 1987).

D.B. Dewitt (ed.), **Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Security**, (Beckenham, U. K.: Croom Helm for the Research Programme in Strategic Studies, York University, Ontario, 1986), 304 pp. (hbk)

D. Fischer and P. Szasz with J. Goldblat (ed.), **Safeguarding the Atom**, (London and Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis for SIPRI, 1985), 243 pp. (hbk)

D. Fischer, commissioned by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), **The International Non-Proliferation Regime 1987**, (UN publication: Sales No. G.V.E.87.O.2)

J. Goldblat (ed.), **Non-Proliferation. The Why and the Wherefore**, (London and Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis for SIPRI, 1985), 343 pp. (hbk).

J. Goldblat and D. Cox (eds.), **Nuclear Weapon Tests. Prohibition or Limitation?**, (Oxford University Press, 1988 for SIPRI), 423 pp. (hbk)

A. Kapur, **Pakistan's Nuclear Development**, (London, Sydney and New York: Croom Helm, 1987), 258 pp. (hbk)

S.A. Khan (ed.), **Nuclear War, Nuclear Proliferation and their Consequences**, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 350 pp. (hbk and pbk).

J.D.L. Moore, **South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation**, (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press, 1987), 227 pp. (hbk)

H. Müller (ed.), **A European Non-Proliferation Policy: Prospects and Problems**, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). 416 pp. (hbk)

J.E. Pilat, R. E. Pendley and C. K. Ebinger, **Atoms for Peace. An Analysis After Thirty Years**, (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985), 299 pp. (pbk)

D. Pitt and G. Thompson (eds.), **Nuclear-Free Zones**, (London, Sydney and New York, 1987), 145 pp. (hbk).

M. Reiss, **Without The Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation**, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). 337 pp. (hbk)

L. Scheinman, **The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order**, (Washington D. C.: Resources for the Future, 1987), 320 pp. (pbk)

J. Simpson (ed.), **Nuclear non-proliferation: an agenda for the 1990s**, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 237 pp. (hbk)

J.C. Snyder and S. F. Wells, Jr. (eds.), **Limiting Nuclear Proliferation**, (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger for the Wilson Center, 1985), 363 pp. (hbk)

L.S. Spector, **Going Nuclear**, A Carnegie Endowment Book, (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1987), 370 pp. (pbk)

R.W. Walters, **South Africa and the Bomb: Responsibility and Deterrence**, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987). 176 pp. (hbk)

P. Worsley and K.B. Hadjor, **On the Brink, Nuclear Proliferation and the 3rd World**, (London: Third World Communication, 1987) (hbk and pbk).

Carnegie Task Force on Non-Proliferation and South Asian Security, **Nuclear Weapons and South Asian Security**, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1988).

Council on Foreign Relations in co-operation with the Centre for European Policy Studies, **Blocking the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: American and European Perspectives**, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), 153 pp. (pbk)

Other materials:

D. Albright, "Pakistan's Bomb-Making Capacity", **Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists**, Vol. 43, No. 5, June 1987, pp. 30-33.

D. Albright, "Preventing a Pakistani-Indian Nuclear Arms Race: Halting Production of Weapons-Usable Material", **FAS Public Interest Report**, May 1987, p.7.

F. Barnaby, "The Nuclear Arsenal in the Middle East", **Technology Review**, May/June 1987, pp. 27-34.

L. Bertin, "The need for continued nuclear testing", **Jane's Defence Weekly**, Vol. 7, No. 9, 7 March 1987, p. 372.

D. Bobb and R. Singh, "Pakistan's Nuclear Bombshell", **India Today**, Vol. 12, No. 6, 31. March, 1987, pp. 8-16.

B. Commoner, "Nuclear Power for the Third World: Bane or Blessing", **World Policy Journal**, Spring 1987, pp. 231-55.

W.H. Donnelly, **India and Nuclear Weapons. Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons. Israel and Nuclear Weapons**, Washington D. C., Congressional Research Service, Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division, Issue Brief, May 5-6, 1987, 37 pp.

J. Goldblat, "The Third Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty", **Bulletin of Peace Proposals**, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1986, pp. 13-27.

S. Hobson, "USA, UK discuss Canadian SSN export restrictions", **Jane's Defence Weekly**, Vol. 8, No. 1, 11 July 1987, p. 3.

G. Hunt, "China's case Against the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty: rationality and morality", **Journal of Applied Philosophy**, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1986, pp. 183-99.

N. Kamal and N. Rafique, **Nuclear Non-Proliferation in South Asia**, statements and discussions at the International Conference on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in South Asia organised by The Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad on 1-2 September 1987 reprinted in a special issue of **Strategic Studies**, a Quarterly Journal from Pakistan, Vol. X, No. 4 and Vol. XI, No. 1, Summer and Autumn 1987.

N. Kamal, "Nuclear Free Zone in South Asia: Pakistan's Proposals and Problems", **Strategic Studies**, a Quarterly Journal from Pakistan, Vol. X, No. 3, Spring 1987.

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P. Lomas, "Valindaba: Lessons From South Africa's Nuclear Policy", **The World Today**, June 1987, pp. 95-7.

D. Lynch, "Warhead Tests Stun Scientists", **Defense Week**, Vol. 8, No. 8, 23 February 1987, p. 7.

C. Madison, "The Pakistan Conduit", *National Journal*, July 11, 1987, pp. 1773-5.

M. McIntosh, "A Nuclear-Free Pacific", *ADIU Report*, Vol. 9, No. 2, March/April, 1987, 5-6.

G. Milhollin, "Heavy Water Cheaters", *Foreign Policy*, No. 69, Winter 1987-88, pp. 100-118.

G. Milhollin, "Dateline New Delhi: India's Nuclear Cover-up?", *Foreign Policy*, No. 64, Fall 1986.

G. Milhollin, "Stopping the Indian Bomb", *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 81, July 1987, pp. 593-609.

M.M. Miller, "Stemming the Spread of Nuclear Weapons", *Technology Review*, August/September 1987, pp. 68-75.

J.D. Negroponte, *Nonproliferation and the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy*, (Washington DC: United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy No. 959, June 1987, 3 pp.

B. Palling, "Indians pressure for riposte to Pakistan 'bomb'", *The Independent* (United Kingdom), 3 March, 1987.

P. Power, "The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone", *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 17, No. 1, January/February 1987, pp. 8-10.

D. Segal, "Iran: In a hurry to Have Their Bomb", *International Herald Tribune*, 14 April 1987.

C. Smith, "A Policy of Ambiguity? Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia", *ADIU Report*, Vol. 9, No. 4, July-August 1987, pp. 1-4.

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V. Documentation

International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference

GC(XXXI)/825, 23 September 1987

Israeli Nuclear Capabilities and Threat

Draft resolution submitted by Algeria, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates

The General Conference,

- a) **Having considered** the agenda item "Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat",
 - b) **Having also considered** the Annual Report of the Agency for 1986, and in particular paragraphs 39, 40 and 41,
 - c) **Recalling** that the United Nations Security Council, in its resolution 487 of 1981, has called upon Israel to submit all its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards,
 - d) **Noting** that only Israel has been so called upon to comply with such an obligation by the Security Council,
 - e) **Recalling** United Nations General Assembly resolution 41/93 on Israeli Nuclear Armament, which, inter alia, called upon Israel to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and to renounce any possession of nuclear weapons,
 - f) **Recalling** the United Nations Secretary-General's reports on Israeli Nuclear Armament A/36/431 of 1981 and A/40/520 of 1985,
 - g) **Taking note** of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly on co-operation between Israel and South Africa, particularly in the nuclear field, and
 - h) **Deeply alarmed** by recent information regarding the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel,
1. **Demands** that Israel place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards in compliance with Security Council Resolution 487 of 1981;
 2. **Requests** the Director General to consider implementation by the IAEA of provisions in United Nations General Assembly resolutions 41/12 and 41/93 in relation to the IAEA;

3. **Requests** the Director General to report to the Board of Governors and the next session of the General Conference on Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat and on the implementation of this resolution;
4. **Further requests** the Director General to bring this resolution to the attention of the Secretary-General of the United Nations; and
5. **Decides** to include in the agenda for the thirty-second regular session of the General Conference an item entitled "Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat".

International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference

GC(XXXI)/827 24 September 1987

South Africa's Nuclear Capabilities

Draft resolution submitted by Algeria, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Egypt, Ghana, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamhuriya, Madagascar, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe

The General Conference,

- a) **Recalling** the recommendation of the Board of Governors to suspend South Africa from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership as contained in its report GC(XXXI)/807 pursuant to the General Conference resolution GC(XXX)/RES/468,
- b) **Having considered** the annual report of the

Agency for 1986 contained in document GC(XXXI)/800 and the report of the Board of Governors on South Africa's nuclear capabilities contained in document GC(XXXI)/807,

- c) **Stressing** that, despite the requests of the General Conference and the international community, South Africa has persistently violated international law as well as the purposes and principles of the United Nations, upon which the IAEA's activities are based in accordance with Articles III.B.1 and IV.B of the Statute, and
 - d) **Stressing** that the acquisition of nuclear weapons capability by the racist regime of South Africa constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security and in particular jeopardizes the security of African States and increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
1. **Resolves** to consider and take a decision on the recommendation of the Board of Governors contained in its report GC(XXI)/807 to suspend South Africa from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership in accordance with Article XIX.B of the Statute, at the thirty-second regular session of the General Conference;
 2. **Requests** the Director General to continue to take all possible measures to ensure the full implementation of resolution GC(XXX)RES/468 and report to the thirty-second regular session of the General Conference in this regard;
 3. **Requests** the Director General to bring this resolution to the attention of the Secretary-General of the United Nations; and
 4. **Decides** to include in the agenda of the thirty-second regular session of the General Conference an item entitled "South Africa's nuclear capabilities".

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