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## **January 1999**

### **Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Newsbrief, Number 44**

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#### **Summary:**

A compilation of the latest news, events, and publications related to nuclear weapons and nuclear non-proliferation. The "Newsbrief" was produced by the PPNN and personally edited by Ben Sanders.

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# PROGRAMME FOR PROMOTING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

Number 44

NEWSBRIEF

4th Quarter 1998

## Editorial Note

The **Newsbrief** is published every three months, under the auspices of the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN). Its principal aim is to give information about the spread of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and about moves to deter that spread; where appropriate reference is also made to related developments with respect to other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The **Newsbrief** further contains references to relevant developments in the realm of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The contents of the **Newsbrief** are based on publicly available material.

This issue covers the period 1 October to 31 December 1998.

The limited size of the **Newsbrief** makes it necessary to choose among available items of information and present them in condensed form. Another reason for selectivity is that more than one publication may report on an event but do so in ways so different that at times items from the same source contradict each other. A further ground for cautious culling is the speculative nature of some media reports. Such reports are used only if there is reliable back-up information

or if the fact of their original publication is relevant in the framework of the **Newsbrief**.

Subheadings are used in the **Newsbrief** primarily to facilitate presentation; they should not be seen as judgments on the nature of the events covered. Related developments that might logically be dealt with under separate subheadings may be combined under a single one if doing so makes the text more readable.

Unless otherwise indicated, dates (day/month) refer to 1998. Where reference is made to an uninterrupted series of items in a daily newspaper, only the first and last dates of the series are given. For example, '6-25/12' following the name of a particular publication means that use has been made of items appearing there on each day from 6 to 25 December 1998. To save space, names of publications that are referred to repeatedly are abbreviated and are listed on the back page.

PPNN's Executive Chairman, Ben Sanders, is editor of the **Newsbrief**. He produces it and takes responsibility for its contents. The inclusion of an item does not necessarily imply the concurrence of the members of PPNN's Core Group, collectively or individually, either with its substance or with its relevance to PPNN's activities.

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Readers who wish to comment on the substance of the *Newsbrief* or on the way any item is presented, or who wish to draw attention to information they think should be included, are invited to send their remarks to the editor for possible publication.

## I. Topical Developments

### a. Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Limitation

- Opening the general debate of the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) of the fifty-third regular session of the **United Nations General Assembly**, on 12 October, the Secretary-General briefly reviewed events in the realm of disarmament and arms control and, *inter alia*, expressed concern at the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan and welcomed their declarations of intent to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; urged all concerned to work for the entry into force of that Treaty; called for universal adherence to all the key treaties on weapons of mass destruction, including the NPT; and recalled that the long-term sustainability of that Treaty depended on all parties working together to implement all its articles.

The two main issues in the debate in the First Committee were nuclear testing and nuclear disarmament. In the latter connection, First Committee Chairman, Ambassador Mernier of Belgium, said there was 'growing interest in accelerating the pace of nuclear disarmament' and there were 'new and innovative approaches'. This was true in particular in respect of A/RES/53/77 Y (Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda), which sought to give effect to the Joint Ministerial Declaration of 9 June by the Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa, and Sweden. Also for the first time, a resolution was adopted welcoming the establishment of a single-state nuclear-weapon-free zone (Mongolia).

The resolutions most closely relating to subjects referred to in the *Newsbrief* are listed below, with the votes cast in the General Assembly on 4 December; the full texts are reproduced under **IV. Documentation**.

- A/RES/53/77 G (Nuclear testing) introduced by Canada, was adopted by 118 votes in favour, nine against and 33 abstentions;
- A draft resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was introduced by New Zealand but disagreements over the nuclear tests in South Asia and a move by Pakistan to include reference to 'all forms of nuclear testing for the qualitative development of nuclear weapons' caused the text to be withdrawn. In the end, agreement was reached, by 164 votes in favour, none against, and six abstentions, on the following **Decision**: "The General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, recalling its resolution 50/245 of 10 September 1996, decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session the item entitled 'Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty'."
- A/RES/53/77 U (Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons) introduced by Japan, was adopted by 160 votes in favour, none against, and 11 abstentions;
- A/RES/53/77 W (Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of

the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons) introduced by Malaysia, was adopted by 123 votes in favour, 25 against, 25 abstentions;

- A/RES/53/77 X (Nuclear disarmament) introduced by Myanmar, was adopted by 110 votes in favour, 41 against and 18 abstentions;
- A/RES/53/77 Y (Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda) introduced by Ireland, was adopted by 114 votes in favour, 18 against, and 38 abstentions. The voting pattern departed markedly from traditional lines. US pressure was said to have prompted Slovenia, one of the signatories of the Ministerial Declaration, to abstain in the voting;
- A/RES/53/77 Z (Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament) introduced by the United States of America, was adopted by 166 votes in favour, none against and eight abstentions;
- A/RES/53/78 D (Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons) introduced by India, was adopted 111 votes in favour, 39 against, and 22 abstentions;
- A/RES/53/77 F (Reducing nuclear danger) introduced by India, was adopted by 108 votes in favour, 45 against, and 17 abstentions;
- A/RES/53/76 (Prevention of an arms race in outer space) introduced by Egypt, was adopted by 165 votes in favour, none against, and four abstentions;
- A/RES/53/77 I (The Conference on Disarmament decision to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament', an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices), introduced by Canada, was adopted without a vote;
- A/RES/53/74 (Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East) introduced by Egypt, was adopted without a vote;
- A/RES/53/77 A (Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia) introduced by Kyrgyzstan, was adopted without a vote;
- A/RES/53/77 D (Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status) introduced by Mongolia, was adopted without a vote;
- A/RES/53/77 Q (Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas) introduced by Brazil, was adopted by 154 votes in favour, three against, and ten abstentions;
- A/RES/53/80 (The risk of proliferation in the Middle East), introduced by Egypt, was adopted by 158 votes in favour, two against, and 11 abstentions;
- A/RES/53/83 (Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)) introduced by Mexico, was adopted without a vote;
- A/RES/53/75 (Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons — negative security assurances) introduced by Pakistan,

was adopted by 117 votes in favour, none against and 52 abstentions; and,

— **A/RES/53/77 AA** (Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament) introduced by South Africa, was adopted without a vote.

- With the year drawing to a close, the government of the **Russian Federation** intensified its pressure on the State Duma (the lower house of the Russian parliament) to approve the START II Treaty, which Prime Minister Primakov has called 'vital to Russia's security'. On 8 December, however, the Duma once again failed to put the matter on the agenda, pending completion of its review of legislation on Russia's nuclear weapons programme, at a time when the news that there had been a successful test flight of the new Topol-M ballistic missile was considered to have increased the chances of ratification. In mid-December, a decisive debate seemed imminent. At that moment, Gennady Zyuganov, the Communist Party leader, Roman Popkovich, Chairman of the Duma's Defence Committee, and Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, were seen to be among those supporting ratification. Following the British/American air attacks on Iraq, however, the majority led by Zyuganov decided to keep the matter off the agenda, reportedly for the remainder of the year. Duma speaker Seleznyov said that the actions in Iraq had raised 'a serious obstacle in the path of ratification'. As of the date this issue of the *Newsbrief* went to press, START II ratification was understood to be on the agenda for the 1999 Spring session, starting on 12 January; First Vice Prime Minister Maslyukov stressed the need for ratification at the earliest possible date. According to the Duma's Deputy Speaker Ryzhkov there was no guarantee that the matter would be discussed during the Spring session, however. Defence Committee Chairman Popkovich has been quoted as saying that the postponement was not linked in the first place to events in Iraq; rather, time had been needed to study documentation submitted by the government, and the ratification debate might well be held in February. It also appears that even before the military intervention in Iraq, some Duma members were seeking to make START II ratification conditional on guarantees against NATO expansion. Some members were also said to have taken NATO intervention in Kosovo as an argument against ratification.

It had been recognised for some time in the Duma that, with increased emphasis in Russian strategic planning on nuclear weapons and the deterioration of the country's nuclear arsenal, Russia would be better served by a small, reliable and low-maintenance nuclear arsenal than by its present, heavy, obsolescent weaponry. Russian strategists were said to have hoped for the early ratification of START II, permitting negotiations to begin on a START III agreement that would bring the number of both American and Russian warheads down to a much lower level, and would eliminate current US nuclear predominance. Minister Maslyukov has said that the country can no longer afford to maintain a large nuclear arsenal and must streamline and modernise its strategic nuclear forces; the most Russia could hope for, he said, was a level of several hundred nuclear warheads by 2007–2010. To preserve the nuclear balance with the US it was therefore essential to press on with the ratification of START II and the negotiation of START III. This view is said to be shared by the Chairman of the Duma's

Defence Committee and members of Russia's General Staff. According to Maslyukov's secretary, the operational life of many Soviet-made missiles will expire within two or three years.

In the view of Aleksey Arbatov, Deputy Chairman of the Duma's Defence Committee, by early December about 70 per cent of Duma members were against ratification but among them he saw only a small portion as 'irreconcilable opponents', particularly among the Communist members. Former Defence Minister Rodionov, for instance, has called START II a 'treacherous' document, which would 'strategically disarm' Russia. In the view of Vladimir Lukin, the majority of the others would accept the Treaty under conditions contained in draft legislation that was submitted to the President. This draft provides for conditions on the implementation and financing of START II and lists circumstances under which Russia would reserve the right to withdraw from the Treaty. Among these is the deployment of nuclear weapons in new NATO member states in Eastern Europe and the development of armaments in space that could damage Russia's early warning system for missile attacks. Duma members are also said to have raised a demand for a guarantee of US financial support for the dismantling of nuclear warheads, for parliamentary oversight of treaty implementation and for commitments by the Kremlin to provide funds to maintain Russia's nuclear arsenal.

One argument reportedly used by the government in urging ratification was that this would improve Russia's prospects of receiving financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund. The government also said that non-ratification could imperil the coalition government which all faction leaders had long sought. In Washington the hope was expressed that the news that the US was contemplating a unilateral reduction of the number of warheads to approximately START II level would help convince the Duma to ratify the Treaty. On the other hand, the US Administration has warned that it would not wish to do so until the Duma has completed its deliberations on START II ratification. See also below, under **f. Nuclear Policies and Related Developments in Nuclear-Weapon States**.

(**AP**, 10/11, 12/11, 16/11, 2/12, 4/12, 8/12, 15/12; **WT**, 9/11; **R**, 10/11, 12/11, 19/11, 20/11, 23/11, 3/12, 9/12, 15/12, 22/12, 28/12, 29/12; **IHT**, 11/11; **WP**, 17/11, 27/11, 23/12, 27/12; **Segodnya** [Moscow], 17/11; **Izv** 20/11; **X**, 4/12; **IT**, 9/12, 11/12, 28/12; **AFP**, 18/12)

- With the help of an American company, **Ukraine** is reported to have begun cutting up the 44 bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons that are still in the country. They are 25 Tupolev Tu-95 and 19 Tu-160 bombers which, under the START I Treaty, have to be eliminated. Previously, Ukraine shipped the 1,272 nuclear warheads deployed on 130 SS-19 and 46 SS-24 missiles back to Russia. The storage silos for the SS-24 ballistic missiles were destroyed by the summer of this year; elimination of the SS-19 missiles is said to be underway. (**R**, 13/11)
- The **United States** Congress has passed a 'Defense Authorization Act' which endorses the plutonium disposition programme of the Department of Energy (DoE) and authorises the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to license a plant for the fabrication of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel using surplus weapons plutonium.

In implementation of the Act the US Federal budget for 1999 provides \$442.4 million for Cooperative Threat Reduction work in the **Russian Federation**, as well as other parts of the former USSR. Of this, \$142.4 million is for strategic arms reduction in Russia; \$47.5 million for the elimination of the strategic arms infrastructure in Ukraine; and \$9.4 million for warhead dismantlement in Russia. Just before Congress adjourned, a bipartisan group of lawmakers from both Houses inserted an additional \$525 million into the budget, to assist Russia in the reduction of its plutonium stocks and to help realise the uranium sales programme. Of this sum, \$200 million are intended to help implement a plutonium disposition agreement with the Russian Federation as soon as this has been concluded. Negotiations on the agreement started in October, but it was found impossible to meet the deadline, set earlier this year at the meeting between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, of December 1998 for final agreement. Apparently the main problem is that the money made available is inadequate and Russia appears unwilling to go ahead with an agreement unless it has been assured of long-term funding. Under present conditions, there are some reports that Russian officials prefer storing excess plutonium for eventual use in breeder reactors. Another problem seems to be that there does not appear to be agreement on the reactors in which the MOX would be used, outside Russia and the US. Belgian and French nuclear companies seem to be less interested than initially expected; the former is reconsidering the use of MOX as a reactor fuel. German utilities are not expected to be in a position to participate. The Foreign Affairs Committee of Canada's House of Commons, in a recent report on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, has rejected as 'totally unfeasible' use of warhead plutonium as MOX fuel.

The US Senate has established a plutonium disposition task force of which the principal task is to advise the Administration on the steps it believes the latter should take to achieve progress on this matter with Russia. DoE has stressed that while Russia is anxious to move ahead with efforts to convert excess weapons-grade plutonium into MOX fuel, the \$200 million made available to help it do so are not nearly enough, and that assistance from other countries is urgently needed. DoE envisages a two-stage programme for the disposition of Russian plutonium in MOX fuel: a first stage when Russia would make 2 metric tons of MOX a year which it would burn in its seven existing VVER-1000 reactors and in the new BN-600, and a second stage when its capacity would be 5 metric tons annually, of which a great part would have to be used abroad.

Senator Domenici has called once again for faster action on the disposition of excess weapons-grade plutonium. He has also called for the appointment of a high-level Presidential envoy with inter-agency responsibility to oversee the disposition effort. Domenici has warned that 'the current window of opportunity' to secure large stocks of Russian weapons-grade materials so that they cannot be available for future weapons use may not remain open much longer.

Reportedly, a misunderstanding about the nature of the MOX contract has contributed to the rejection by DoE of a bid by a consortium of companies led by the US-based Siemens Power Corp., for the plutonium disposition contract. The bid was rejected on the grounds that the consortium did not have formal ties with utilities that had at least

three reactors in which MOX could be burned but the factor that seems to have been directly responsible for the rejection is said to have been the misconception that the material to be burnt included Russian plutonium. DoE also rejected Siemens' move for a reversal of the disqualification, and has notified the mainly-US consortium led by BNFL Inc. of the UK that it, too, would not be considered. As a result, Cogema of France is now the only remaining contender for the plutonium disposition contract but that does not automatically assure that it will be selected for the job. This reportedly has two phases: first, the design of the facilities, including the MOX fabrication plant, and secondly, the actual construction which will occur only once there has been significant progress in Russian-US negotiations on the issue of plutonium disposition.

MINATOM has announced that it has started manufacturing mixed-oxide fuel assemblies using plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons, and has already produced some tens of kilograms. According to an announcement from Russia's First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy, that country is developing a new technology to convert military plutonium into MOX fuel. The process is said to involve converting plutonium metal into plutonium dioxide granules through a pyrotechnical method in which the metal is heated to extremely high temperatures.

The French firm Framatome has asked the European Commission for support for research on the use of excess plutonium in MOX fuel in the modular high-temperature gas reactor (HTGR) which is under development.

Of the funds appropriated by the US Congress, the remaining \$325 million are for the purchase of the initial two-year output of blended-down uranium from highly-enriched uranium (HEU) derived from the Russian nuclear-weapons programme. Earlier, the deal by which the US would buy the Russian HEU, reprocess it and blend it down for use in nuclear power plants, with Russia retaining ownership of a portion, was threatened by the fall in price of uranium following the privatisation of US reprocessing capacity and natural uranium stocks. The result was that Canadian, French and German companies that had planned to buy Russian low-enriched uranium stepped back from that arrangement, as it was now more expensive than the uranium available from the newly-formed US company. A condition for the American purchase is that Russia should arrange with the companies from the three countries to buy its uranium output for the next ten years. Talks between Russia and the French and German companies involved do not so far seem to have led to agreement. Meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) is said to have held up shipments to the US, reportedly also because of disagreement about the price.

(*SF*, 5/10, 12/10, 19/10, 26/10, 23/11, 30/11, 21/12, 28/12; *NW*, 15/10, 22/10, 5/11, 26/11, 3/12, 14/12; **Nuclear Engineering International**, October, in *UINB*, 98.41; **Carnegie**, 27/10; **WP**, 1/11; **NF**, 2/11, 16/11, 30/11, 14/12; **Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade of the Canadian House of Commons**, December)

- Also in the **United States**, senior officials of the Department of Defense (DoD) are said to have recommended to the Administration to consider unilateral reductions in US strategic nuclear forces. Supposedly, drastic cuts in



the arsenal to the recommended level of well below the present 6,000 nuclear warheads permitted under START I would not affect nuclear deterrence. Maintenance of the present arsenal has apparently cost \$95 million more during the last two years than it would have under START II. This additional cost would rise to \$100 million in 1999 and \$1 billion in the year 2000. Reportedly, the US navy is keen to avoid the costs of refuelling nuclear reactors and installing new missiles on four Trident submarines that would otherwise be decommissioned. The Air Force would also be able to eliminate the stockpile of 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles for which it is now responsible. The recommendations, reputedly contained in a secret memorandum, include the idea that the President should seek Congressional permission to go ahead with the reductions in next year's budget even if Russia does not ratify START II.

The idea is being promoted in particular by Democratic Senator Bob Kerrey. In his proposal, the number of warheads would be reduced to the level proposed for an eventual START III treaty, of 2,000 or 2,500. This proposal is seen in the context of the Administration's search for possible nuclear disarmament moves, such as de-alerting nuclear forces and reducing warhead numbers, for inclusion in next January's Presidential State of the Union message. Kerrey has also proposed that all missiles over the suggested number should immediately be taken off alert status, by removing their warheads; he further suggests that Washington and Moscow should negotiate standing down all nuclear forces from alert status.

The Savannah River site of DoE has been chosen to host the facility that will take apart plutonium pits from nuclear warheads and convert them into a form suitable for disposition. The facility is to be designed and built in 1999-2004 and should start operating in 2005. Construction and operation is said to be contingent, however, on an agreement with Russia on parallel disposition of its excess weapons plutonium.

(WP, 17/11; NYT, 23/11; R, 23/11; NF, 28/12; SF, 28/12)

## b. Nuclear Testing

- **Japan's** Prime Minister, Keizo Obuchi, has proposed discussing the issue of subcritical nuclear tests at the international nuclear level. His proposal came after the US conducted a subcritical nuclear test in Nevada on 26 September. (Kyodo News, 27/9)
- A study report submitted to the United Nations General Assembly by a range of organisations within the UN family has concluded that Soviet nuclear tests in the region of Semipalatinsk, in **Kazakhstan**, are responsible for a 'dramatic increase of radioactive contamination on both a local and regional scale'. Reportedly, this has caused rising mortality rates and increasing numbers of cancer, leukemia and central nervous system disorders. The IAEA has carried out a preliminary study in which, except for very limited areas, it found little or no residual radioactivity in the region. It has said, however, that more study is needed to gauge the consequences of the tests. (NW, 5/11)
- The **Russian Federation** has denied reports supposed to have originated with the US DoD, that it was planning to

conduct an underground nuclear test at Novaya Zemlya. General Colonel Valynkin of the Defence Ministry has said that there were no present plans to resume nuclear tests but the site was kept in readiness so that tests could be resumed if other countries did so. Apparently, the preparations were for the five sub-critical nuclear tests which, as has since been revealed, Russia has conducted since the Autumn of 1998. Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Ryabev has said that his government was opposed to having Americans attend Russian sub-critical tests and would not send its people to attend US tests; the wording of his announcement implied that a proposal to this effect had been received. (DP, 16/9; AP, 9/10, 25/12; R, 9/12; RFE/RL Newslines, 28/12)

- Notwithstanding repeated requests by the Secretary of State for early hearings on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the **United States** Senate has recessed for the year without having done so. Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, persists in his refusal to bring the Treaty to the floor until the Administration submits for Senate approval changes in the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) of 1972 that had been agreed between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, on the ground that the ABM was concluded between the US and a state that no longer exists. The CTBT is said to have little or no support among the Republican majority in the Senate.

A subcritical nuclear test planned for 10 December has been postponed, reportedly for technical reasons.

(AP, 21/10; YS, 11/12)

## c. Nuclear Trade, International Cooperation and Nuclear Export Issues

- In the **United States**, the House of Representatives has completed an investigation of American exports of satellite technology to **China** (see PPNN Newsbrief no. 43, page 5), which was extended to include the export of supercomputers and precision machine tools. The report of the investigating committee, which began its work by looking into export policies of the current US Administration, is said to have concluded that for twenty years, i.e. starting under President Reagan and continuing under Presidents Bush and Clinton, China has been able to receive, by way of sale but also through wide-spread theft, a range of technical secrets beyond the satellite and missile-related technology that set off the investigation. The report, which is classified, is understood to say that the acquisition of technology has harmed American national security. The findings are said to agree with those of DoD, that information provided by the Hughes Corporation after the crash of a Chinese rocket that carried a Hughes satellite may have enabled China to improve the performance of its ballistic missiles. Hughes has denied that the information it provided could have been used for this purpose and has pointed to the difference between commercial rockets and ballistic missiles. American experts say, however, that the information may have taught China to analyse stresses on launch vehicles entering the upper atmosphere, which could be directly applicable to military systems.

The China Aerospace Corp. has denied that it obtained any sensitive satellite technology from American firms. Chinese authorities have said that the Congressional investigation has a negative impact on trade relations be-

tween the two countries and claim that the US has benefited more from the cooperation than China; the Foreign Ministry in Beijing has said that the Pentagon report reflects a 'Cold War mentality'. A high-level US delegation visited China in mid-November to discuss Washington's concerns about reputed transfers to Iran and Pakistan of missile technology; reportedly, the latter country is building, on the basis of Chinese blueprints, a facility to produce a version of the Chinese M-11 ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead over 185 miles (300 km). Former President Rafsanjani of Iran has said that his country has largely reached self-sufficiency in the production of missiles and the US is no longer in a position to curb Iran's missile industry. The US delegation, headed by acting Under-Secretary of State John Holum, was also said to have discussed with its Chinese counterparts the issue of China joining the missile technology control regime (MTCR).

Members of Congress are also disturbed about reports that scientists from the Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and Sandia national laboratories have shown Chinese scientists and government officials the latest US techniques for safeguarding nuclear facilities and fissionable materials, as part of an exchange programme. According to a senior official from the General Accounting Office counterintelligence experts believe that the laboratories are targets of foreign espionage efforts and that security has been jeopardised. The head of Sandia, however, has told the relevant subcommittee of the House of Representatives that 'programs on threat reduction, non-proliferation and arms control, safe and secure dismantlement, nuclear materials protection [and] proliferation prevention ... require the cooperation of foreign nations if they are to be successful'.

(WSJ, 7/10, 15/12; WP, 8/10, 13/11, 9/12; NYT, 19/10, 9/12, 12/12, 31/12; AP, 12/11; R, 12/11, 17/11, 10/12; IHT, 13/11; USIA, 13/11; China Daily, 19/11; Aviation Week, 14/12)

- An agreement is said to be in the making between the **Russian Federation** and the **European Union** for the export from Russia of up to 600 kg HEU for the 45 MW thermal high-flux reactor at Petten, the **Netherlands**. The US had tried to persuade all European reactor operators to convert to fuel enriched to less than 20 per cent U<sup>235</sup> but the Joint Research Center of the European Community which operates Petten had resisted conversion as too long and too costly, and potentially affecting performance. The amount of HEU under discussion would supposedly cover the remaining lifetime of the reactor. (NF, 5/10)
- **Russia's** Deputy Minister for Atomic Energy, Valentin Iwanow, has announced that Moscow hopes to build a nuclear power station in the far eastern part of the country, jointly with the **Democratic People Republic of Korea**. The station would be jointly owned and the electric power generated there would benefit both states. Iwanow has said, however, that for now the necessary funds are not available. (DP, 7/11)
- Western intelligence agencies believe that **Iran** is engaged in the development of uranium enrichment technology, by means of molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS) and by the atomic vapour laser isotope separation (AVLIS) process. To this end, Iran is said to have embarked on a campaign of purchasing equipment abroad.

Iranian radio has said that the country's Supreme Economic Council has authorised the expense of \$140 million for the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power station. There has been a report that some member states of the European Union (EU) had proposed resuming cooperation with Iran in the field of nuclear energy, on condition that Tehran sign and implement the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. This would presumably have allowed Siemens AG to complete the Bushehr reactors. Apparently, however, Iran did not react to informal soundings on the matter. Reportedly, the US would have been less concerned about this form of cooperation than it was before, but not all EU states were said to be happy with the suggestion; there is at any rate now thought to be little chance that the new, anti-nuclear German government will follow up on the suggestion.

In November, Russia's Minister for Atomic Energy, Yevgeni Adamov, visited Bushehr, where 600 Russian technicians are working on the construction of two VVER-1000 reactors. Adamov stressed that his country was determined to continue its nuclear cooperation with Iran and would not yield to pressure by 'third countries' that want it to end this cooperation; he also said that Russia may supply up to three additional reactors to be sited at Bushehr, at a cost below that charged by Western firms for comparable units. The visit ended with the signing of a new agreement extending nuclear cooperation between the two countries. One provision of the new agreement apparently calls for speeding up the work at Bushehr.

US Secretary of State Albright, in a meeting on 9 December with Russia's Foreign Minister Ivanov, was said to have urged her colleague to make a maximum effort to restrain nuclear cooperation with Iran; she was quoted as saying that in the absence of progress it would be 'very hard' for the US to sustain its economic assistance to the Russian Federation. The Russian response, however, was that Moscow would go ahead with the project but would not supply any weapons technology, but recent American reports claim that Russia had already given Iran advice on the production and use of heavy water and nuclear-grade graphite and was providing it with uranium-conversion technology, all of which also has weapons applications. The controversy has been fuelled by reports that Iran had recruited Russian germ warfare experts and was trying to get further weapons specialists from the former Soviet Union to join them.

Russo-Iranian cooperation in missile development also provokes US anger. In mid-December Washington issued a warning that it would impose fresh sanctions and close its space-launch market to Russia if that country does not immediately halt cooperation with Iran's nuclear and missile programmes. Reportedly, US Deputy Secretary of State Talbot was told in Moscow that Russia would be willing to restrict exports of missile technology if Washington provided proof of illicit transfers.

(NF, 5/10; NW, 8/10; R, 12/10, 20/11, 9/12, 10/12, 16/12; Interfax [Moscow], 16/11, in BBC, 16/11; NYT, 24/11, 25/11, 17/12; IT, 22/11, 25/11; NN, 25/11; SF, 7/12; AP, 9/12, 21/12; IHT, 10/12; 12-13/12; WP, 10/12; WSJ, 15/12)

- There is a report that **Morocco** has concluded an agreement with **China** under which the latter will supply a 10 MW nuclear power plant. The facility, said to be the first

nuclear power plant to be erected in North Africa, is to be built at Tan-Tan, on the Atlantic Coast and will be used mainly to desalinate water for agriculture. (R, 26/11, in UINB 98.48; CNN, 26/11; SDZ, 28/11)

#### d. IAEA Developments

- A search has been conducted at the **International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)** for a successor to Bruno Pellaud as Deputy Director General for Safeguards; Pellaud is resigning at the end of the year. So far, the names of candidates from Finland, France and the Netherlands have been mentioned, as well as a member of the Secretariat from Sweden; there has also been talk of interest from Brazil and South Africa, and of possible interest from additional Secretariat members. (NW, 15/10; direct information)

#### e. Peaceful Nuclear Developments

- The director of the Metsamor-2 VVER-440 power reactor in **Armenia** has denied a report that the reactor would be shut down in 2004; he has said that, on the contrary, the plant will continue operating for another seventeen years. The report is said to have appeared after negotiations between Armenia and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which had linked a grant for safety improvements at the plant with its closure in six years. (NW, 15/10)
- **Austria** has resumed its efforts to stop further work on the Temelin nuclear power station in the **Czech Republic**, with the argument that the funds now being sought for the completion of the station would suffice for the construction of gas-fired power stations. Reportedly, the price of electricity would have to be raised, which the new Czech Social Democratic government hesitates to approve. Reportedly as a result of pressure from the government in Vienna two Austrians will be part of the commission to investigate the efficiency of the nuclear facility.

Also in Austria, nuclear liability legislation was about to enter into force, which includes provision for transboundary nuclear civil liability under which vendors, consultants and engineering companies in other countries can be sued in Austria for damages to Austrian citizens even if they have adhered completely to the international regime. This means, among other things, that western firms doing safety upgrades on reactors in Central Europe might be sued in Austrian courts for damages presumed to be caused by the operation of such facilities.

(DP, 1/10, 9/12; SN, 1/10; NW, 17/12)

- **Belgium** is reported to have cancelled its reprocessing orders and to have postponed for a year further debate on spent fuel management. An expert commission is to assess Belgium's future electricity supply, including the feasibility of reorienting energy supply away from nuclear. (NN, 8/12; NW, 10/12)
- **Cuba** has announced that work on the Juragua nuclear power station has been suspended indefinitely. (Miami Herald, 30/9, in UINB, 98.40)
- In **Germany**, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Alliance '90 Greens announced in November that they would seek to open talks in 1999 with utility companies

on a timetable for shutting down the 19 nuclear power plants that provide 40 per cent of Germany's electricity and that they were planning to introduce legislation reflecting the principle of a nuclear-free Germany. There has been disagreement about modalities and timing, however: the Greens are understood to want an almost immediate shut-down of some plants, while the SPD is talking of an overall period of 30 years and hopes to gain the agreement of industry, so that the phase-out could occur on the basis of 'consensus'. The Minister of Economics in the Schroeder cabinet has warned that a phase-out must not economically penalise industry, but Green Environment Minister Jurgen Tritten has said that the first reactor closing could occur before 2002 and that, if necessary, power reactors must be shut down whether or not a consensus has been reached. The government had earlier rejected industry's plea to delay legislation on the nuclear phase-out and had announced that it would introduce a bill 'by January at the latest'; under current conditions, however, agreement is not expected within the German cabinet until sometime in Spring 1999. The industry is said to be gearing up to resist the early phase-out; one utility has threatened to take the government to court over the matter. Labour unions are expected to join the resistance in an effort to preserve jobs. Objections have also been raised by investment groups that expect a drop in the value of some securities.

At the time this issue of the **Newsbrief** went to press, the issue seemed to be close to causing a split in the coalition. Either upon his own initiative or because he was deliberately left out, Environment Minister Tritten did not attend discussions with utility companies which the Prime Minister called in mid-December, and his involvement in coming work on the phase-out legislation was said to be in doubt. The next inter-ministerial meeting is called for mid-January.

Earlier, the two parties had agreed in principle that the transport of irradiated nuclear fuel should be stopped and there would be no more reprocessing of irradiated fuel of German origin. It is thought that this may mean that the country cannot participate in international projects to use excess plutonium in MOX fuel. It is also expected to bring large claims for compensation from utilities and from reprocessing companies abroad, with which contracts are currently in force; the British Secretary for Trade and Industry has already warned Germany to respect its contracts for nuclear-waste reprocessing in the UK over the next 15 years, at a cost of over £1 billion. The French nuclear industry has also called on German utilities to stick to their reprocessing commitments. Exports of nuclear equipment by Siemens AG and other German firms are thought to be in jeopardy, because the government is not expected to provide the customary export credits and credit insurance.

Nuclear utility operators have complained about 'needling' by the new government, which keeps introducing novel requirements. As reported in the American trade journal *Nucleonics Week*, the head of one utility, spokesman for Germany's nuclear plant operators, has said that the phase-out would threaten 40,000 jobs. Germany's economics minister has said that his government will have to link shutting down nuclear power stations with the building of new coal and gas power stations.

(NW, 8/10, 29/10, 5/11, 19/11, 3/12, 10/12, 17/12, 24/12; DW, 16/10, 27/11, 17/12; FT, 16/10; IHT, 16/10; NYT,



16/10, 15/12; **NZZ**, 16/10; **SDZ**, 16/10, 20/11; **NF**, 19/10; **R**, 3/11, 4/11, 29/11, 30/11, 5/12, 7/12; **DT**, 5/11; **I**, 5/11; **NNN**, 27/11, 14/12; **FAZ**, 15/12; **LT**, 15/12)

- It has been reported that **India** has started construction of two new 500 MW power reactors at Tarapur, near Bombay. The units are based on a Canadian design. Four smaller reactor units that have been under construction since 1989-1990 have not yet been commissioned. The head of India's Atomic Energy Commission has said that Indian-built nuclear reactors will not be submitted to international safeguards. (**NN**, 372/98; **AP**, 16/10)
- In **Japan**, the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute (JNC) was launched on 1 October. JNC is a successor to the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp. (PNC) which was disbanded following disclosures of mismanagement that surfaced after an incident involving a sodium leak at the Monju fast-breeder reactor in January 1996. JNC will concentrate on fast-reactor development reprocessing and high-level waste disposal.

Japan's novel High Temperature Test Reactor (HTTR) achieved first criticality on 10 November. HTTR is a 30-MW (thermal) graphite-moderated and helium-cooled reactor, more compact than conventional light-water reactors and thought to be suitable for smaller sites and developing countries.

(**NN**, 367/98; **Kyodo News**, 30/9; **Nihon Keizai Shimbun**, 1/10; **Tokyo Shimbun**, 1/10; **Atoms in Japan**, November; **NW**, 12/11)

- The competent authorities in the **Slovak Republic** have given the Mochovce-1 power reactor a 30-year operating license. The newly elected Slovak government has said that it is deferring a decision about the completion of the station's third and fourth units. The Austrian daily *Standard* claims that while Austria does not have any real technical objections to the completion of Mochovce, it uses the issue to bully a weaker neighbour. (**UX Weekly**, 2/11, in **UINB** 98.44; **SN**, 11/11)
- In **Sweden**, the ruling Social Democratic Party is reported to have reached agreement with the former Communist and Green parties to cooperate on a number of issues, including the environment. There had been indications earlier that decommissioning of the country's nuclear power stations, which provide about half of Sweden's electricity, would be so spaced as to allow economical replacement of generating capacity, but it now seems that the left-wing parties are pressuring the government to go for earlier shut-downs. The Prime Minister has confirmed that Barsebäck I will be the first facility to be decommissioned. In its negotiations with Sydkraft AG, owners of the Barsebäck station, the government is said to have raised its compensation offer to a level thought acceptable to that company. Agreement on a deal was expected before the end of the current year, but the government has called a halt in the talks pending a decision from the country's Supreme Administrative Court about the legality of the forced shut-down. (**NYT**, 6/10; **NW**, 8/10, 15/10, 5/11, 19/11, 24/12)
- In October, it was reported from **Switzerland** that the federal government, following the examples of Germany and Sweden, had decided to phase out the five nuclear power stations that currently supply 40 per cent of the country's electric power. In several neighbouring

countries the news was received with unconcealed satisfaction, but it turned out to have been based largely on an incorrect press release from Switzerland's Energy Ministry. In fact, the decision by the Swiss Federal Executive Council was said to include several measures assisting the nuclear industry, such as a 15 per cent uprate for the largest power station, and the renewal for another ten years of the operating license of the oldest station. Contrary to published reports, the decision did not include a general limitation of the lifetime of nuclear power stations. It also did not exclude the possibility of the construction of new nuclear power stations, as suggested in the press, but it asked the Energy Ministry to propose a new atomic law that would allow the permit for a new nuclear plant to be subject to a referendum if opponents gather a set percentage of signatures. (**NNN**, 22/10, 26/10; **DP**, 23/10; **SDZ**, 23/10, 24/10; **StV**, 23/10; **Tribune de Genève**, 23/10; **LM**, 28/10; **NW**, 29/10)

- Ukraine's Chernobyl-3 reactor — which had been restored to full power on 24 September — was ordered to shut down by 15 December for a safety upgrade. A request by the Ministry of Energy to postpone the shut-down until the spring of 1999 was refused but the extension of the shut-down until mid-December, to supply additional power during a cold period, was the result of a last-minute compromise. According to Ukrainian officials, all conditions set by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development for a loan to complete the Khmel'nitski-2 and Rovno-4 (K2/R4) reactors would have been met by end December. Apparently the Ukrainian authorities are now prepared to shut the entire station down even though they had complained that financial aid was not being provided fast enough and that of the \$640 million promised, only one fifth had been received so far. Kiev authorities have begun to issue licenses for the decommissioning of the various units. The Ukraine parliament has also adopted a series of measures for the re-enforcement of the sarcophagus over the ruins of Chernobyl-4. Here, too, there are complaints that of the \$750 million needed to strengthen the structure, only \$400 million has been collected.

(**UNIAN News Agency** [Kiev], 24/9, in **BBC** 20/10; **Ux**, 2/11 and 9/11, in **UINB** 98.44 and 45, respectively; **NW**, 5/11, 19/11, 26/11, 3/12, 17/12; **NN**, 4/12)

#### f. Nuclear Policies and Related Developments in Nuclear-Weapon States

- A daily newspaper in Washington reports that US intelligence based on satellite photography had indicated that **China** was about to test a new solid-fuel intercontinental missile with a range of 5,000 miles (8,000 km). The missile was said to be road-mobile and carry a thermonuclear warhead with a yield of 500 kilotons. The US State Department has said that the event concerned was not a flight test. China is also said to be working on the development of laser-based anti-satellite technology (**WT**, 12/11; **USIA**, 13/11; **ST**, 6/12)
- Senior officials of the new coalition government in **Germany** have been quoted as saying that at the 50th-anniversary NATO summit to be held in Washington in April 1999, Germany might seek to have that organisation adopt a no-first-use commitment for nuclear weapons. It is noted that this issue forms part of the coalition accord of October between the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Alliance '90 Greens. US sources, in-

cluding Defense Secretary William Cohen and the spokesman for the State Department, have said that the US would resist any attempt to depart from the present policy, which was integral to NATO's strategic doctrine. On 24 November, in a press conference after a meeting with Germany's Defence Minister, US Defense Secretary Cohen quoted his colleague as promising that Germany had no intention of questioning core elements of NATO strategy and remained prepared to contribute to NATO's nuclear element. Publicly, however, the German Minister only said that nuclear forces played a fundamental political role but his government also cherished 'the vision of a nuclear-weapons free world'. Yet a few days later, the country's Federal Chancellor was quoted as saying that Germany had the right to suggest that NATO should renounce first-use of nuclear weapons, and Foreign Minister Fischer announced he would raise the matter in the NATO Foreign Ministers conference in Brussels, where a new 'Strategic Concept' for the 21st century was discussed. At that conference, American proposals for a broad new mission for NATO, to counter the global threat from chemical, nuclear and biological weapons, were reported to have been received with skepticism by the European allies, who were said to have agreed that many more intensive discussions would be needed before a new strategic concept could be adopted. Reportedly, these discussions will include the issue of the role of nuclear weapons but the likelihood that Germany will formally insist on a strategy change is deemed to be small. (UPI, 19/11; WT, 20/11; R, 23/11, 3/12; NYT, 24/11, 25/11, 2/12, 9/12; DW, 25/11; WP, 3/12; E, 5/12)

- **Russian Federation:** an old RS-18 intercontinental ballistic missile was successfully fired from a launching site in Kazakhstan. The launch had the purpose of studying the possibility of extending the lives of the RS-18, which reportedly will have to remain in service until it can be replaced by the new single-warhead Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile.

The failure of a fifth test-launch of the Topol-M missile in October was briefly seen as a serious set-back for the Russian strategic missile programme but a sixth attempt has been successful. Ten of the new solid-fuelled, single-warhead missiles, which are known at NATO as SS-27 and have a range of 6,200 miles (10,000 km), are said to have been deployed so far in silos of the RF Strategic Purpose Missile Forces in the Saratov region, 450 miles South-East of Moscow. They can also be deployed in mobile mode. Plans call for the deployment of 35 to 40 new Topol-M missiles annually after the turn of the century, but there is concern that if technical or financial factors further delay large-scale deployment, already two years behind schedule, the older, multiple-warhead SS-25s may have to remain in place; this would be an argument against early ratification of START II. The Chairman of the State Duma's Security Committee has said that START II should not be ratified unless the government guarantees to replace the old RS-18 and RS-20 missiles by a new generation of nuclear missiles within two years.

(AP, 5/10, 8/10, 24/10, 3/11, 28/12; R, 6/10, 9/10, 9/12; FT, 7/10; LT, 7/10; WP, 24/10; Segodnya, 30/10)

- According to a Russian magazine, many of the strategic missiles displayed publicly in the old USSR were dummies or had been unsuccessfully tested and were in fact useless. (AP, 17/11)

- A **United Kingdom** newspaper claims that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) of that country plans to retarget its strategic missiles at states that might attack it with chemical or biological weapons. Among the states mentioned in what the paper says is a 'confidential study' by the MoD are the DPRK, Libya and Iraq. (ST, 25/10)

- In the **United States**, Energy Secretary Richardson has issued the annual certification of the safety, security and reliability of the US nuclear stockpile, without underground testing. The Secretary has decided to use three existing civilian reactors of the Tennessee Valley Authority to produce tritium; an approach earlier considered was using an unfinished power reactor that would be completed for the purpose. The arrangement, which reflects a departure from the long-standing rule not to use commercial installations for military purposes, will need Congressional approval. Still under consideration is the use of an accelerator, which would have to be constructed for the purpose. Initially, the Energy Secretary was said to be thinking of buying tritium from France or Russia, which have ample supplies of tritium that might be available at a relatively low price. Purchasing abroad, however, was thought to have undesirable political consequences. There has been word of disagreement between the Departments of Energy and of Defense on the amount of tritium needed. DoE apparently assesses the need by assuming that for the time being only START I will be in force; DoD is said to assume that the Russian Duma will ratify START II, which would mean a considerably lower need for tritium. If the US should unilaterally reduce its nuclear arsenal this would also have an effect on the amount of tritium needed.

(NF, 5/10, 14/12, 28/12; NYT, 29/11, 23/12; NW, 10/12)

- Also in the **United States** the Congress has authorised DoD to spend \$1 billion more on the development of anti-missile defence than the \$4 billion it had asked for. Apparently, senior Pentagon officials had advised against the increase. A spokesman for the Department has said uses will be found for the money, although not all of it will go into THAAD (Theater High Altitude Anti-Missile Defense), because there 'we have sort of reached a technological barrier for the time being...'

The Defense Secretary has announced a revised strategy for the National Missile Defense System under which a 'deployment readiness review' would be held in 2001 to determine if the 'technical maturity' of the programme allowed it to move forward. Initial operation capability would be postponed from 2003 to 2005.

It is expected in Washington that DoD will shortly authorise the US Navy to turn its fleet of Aegis cruisers and destroyers into mobile platforms for launching high-altitude anti-missile interceptors. Congressional supporters of the proposal are said to believe that it would obviate the need for land-based missile defence, but it is noted that using interceptors aboard ship would violate the ABM Treaty.

On 5 November, a missile was launched from a base near Alaska to the Pacific Ocean, 300 miles off the port of Seattle, mimicking the trajectory a missile would follow if fired from the DPRK; reportedly, the launch had the purpose of seeing whether US military radar could spot the approach of such a missile.

(USIA, 21/10; Carnegie, 27/10; Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 4/11; WP, 30/11; Defense Daily [Washington], 11/12; DoE News Release, 22/12)

### g. Proliferation-Related Developments

- There has been much concern in Washington and Seoul, recently, about the purpose of large-scale excavations under way in the **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** (DPRK), at Kumchangri, reportedly about 25 miles from Yongbyon. American intelligence sources claim to have evidence that the site is being prepared for the construction of major nuclear facilities. South Korean sources have been quoted as saying that one of the facilities under construction was already 'producing plutonium', and that a large plutonium-production reactor would go on-line in three or four years and be capable of producing enough plutonium for up to ten bombs [a year? — Ed.]; another report from Seoul alleged that there were 'at least' two more underground nuclear establishments in the DPRK beside those said to be under construction Kumchangri; one of these was supposed to house a reactor as well as a reprocessing plant, which allegedly could be operational in the early years of the next century. On 20 November, at the time the US President visited Seoul, a South Korean newspaper alleged that American and South Korean scientists had found traces of plutonium in soil and water samples taken near the suspected underground sites. In the US, intelligence officers were said to be the source for the contention that one large excavation was meant to house a 'Chernobyl-style graphite-uranium reactor' for the production of plutonium, but that so far no reactor parts seemed to have been moved to the site. A visiting US Congressman has reported that the site contained several new tunnels.

Pyongyang has denied all this. It initially said it was ready to open the disputed site to inspection, but added that if [*sic*] the structures proved to be non-military the US 'must compensate for its aspersions on the DPRK'. The matter was discussed after a new round of four-nation talks in Geneva in October (see below). The US Administration has told the Congress that technically the excavations did not violate the Agreed Framework and there was no evidence that any cement had been poured yet. It seems, however, that a 'confidential minute' attached to that document does prohibit new nuclear-related construction, so that unless there is clear proof that the new site is not to be used for nuclear ends, there would be grounds to consider Pyongyang in violation of the Agreed Framework. Senior US officials said that Washington might have to 'walk away' from that instrument unless the DPRK could allay American suspicions that the underground construction site is intended for the development of nuclear weapons. The answer from Pyongyang has been that if it is US policy to break the Agreed Framework, they would not keep it from doing so.

A third round in the four-party peace talks for the Korean Peninsula was held in Geneva on 21–24 October. As reported, the meeting dealt mainly with procedural matters. Participants agreed to set up two working parties to explore possibilities of a peace treaty, which will start meeting after the next round of talks, set for 18–22 January 1999. The DPRK was said to have reiterated its demand for a separate peace treaty with the US; the latter said this was 'not on the agenda'. It also called for discussion of troop withdrawals which the ROK and the US

have said they would be willing to have, but outside the official agenda.

In bilateral talks after the four-party meeting the DPRK once again stated that the excavations were not meant to house nuclear facilities, and spoke of 'civilian underground structures'. Pyongyang's delegation was said to have repeated its suggestion that American officials would be allowed to visit the complex if they wished, but the subsequent confirmation by the US that it did wish to inspect the site was met with indignation, as 'wanton interference with ... internal affairs' and as a 'brigandish [*sic*] demand' for 'a house search'.

The matter was discussed further in Pyongyang on 16–18 November, by the US Special Envoy for the Korean Peace Talks, Ambassador Charles Kartman. Again, the US side was said to have called for full access to the excavation site, to find out what was going on there and to make sure the DPRK was not in breach of the Agreed Framework. According to one report from Washington, the US Administration would wish the IAEA to carry out the inspection; another report spoke of the need for 'a team of dozens of American inspectors'. Reportedly, the DPRK representatives sought to assure the US delegation that the construction activities were not part of a nuclear-weapons programme, but the US side said that verbal assurances were not enough.

As expected, the discussion did not produce agreement on the issue of access. One point of apparent disagreement was the DPRK's demand for compensation amounting, reportedly, to several hundreds of millions of dollars (the figure mentioned most often was \$300 million), while the US side stated that it did not intend to spend money to see whether Pyongyang was living up to its agreement. According to a report from Seoul, once the US would have established the innocent nature of the site, the DPRK might also demand payment to compensate it for the indignity; the sum of \$250 million was mentioned.

During the last few days of November, the tone of the North's statements grew more bellicose; DPRK officials spoke of their readiness for war and warned that not only the US but Japan and the Republic of Korea would be targets of their attacks. Pyongyang said that Washington's insistence on seeing the underground facility 'while having no idea of making compensation' was jeopardising the Agreed Framework. The DPRK Foreign Ministry claimed that there were many underground facilities and tunnels in the North but that the underground facility suspected by the US had nothing to do with any nuclear activity; reports to the contrary were slanders and slurs. South Korean press reports said that DPRK forces were being deployed for conflict. American military sources spoke of a new strategic plan which, in the case of hostilities, provided for an invasion of the North intended to topple the present regime at Pyongyang. In Washington the belief was expressed that the Agreed Framework might well unravel unless full access was granted to the suspected sites. At the same time there appeared to be recognition that if the Agreed Framework was abrogated, Pyongyang would be able to recreate its former nuclear-weapons programme virtually overnight.

At the same time, amidst official denials from Pyongyang that it was building underground nuclear facilities and its warnings of grave consequences to the US for claiming otherwise, there were unconfirmed rumours from Seoul

that the DPRK might be willing to allow US inspectors into the area around Kumchangri; one report said that if access was provided, it would be strictly limited to that particular site. Reportedly, however, there are indeed thousands of underground sites in the country with a total length, according to the RoK Ministry of Defence, of several million miles [*sic*]. Also according to that Ministry, the DPRK recently moved 180 armament factories underground and there are persistent rumours of the existence, or ongoing construction, of several underground nuclear facilities besides those known to be at Yongbyon and suspected at Kumchangri. One is said to be sited under an artificial island in a reservoir in Taechong county; this facility is supposed to be used for high-explosives testing of nuclear triggers.

From 4 to 11 December, the DPRK and the US held three rounds of talks, principally on the issue of access to the construction site at Kumchangri. Reportedly, this time some progress was made. Washington said the talks had been 'serious'; the sides had agreed to meet again. There were hints that the US might follow suggestions from Seoul and consider a *quid pro quo*, possibly easing sanctions. On 14 December, news came that the DPRK had dropped its demand for money to allow the underground site to be inspected, and would accept food aid and other assistance instead. Unnamed Washington sources expressed the view that its agreement meant that 'there probably isn't anything there', and that plans the North might have had for the facility appeared to have been scrapped.

In parallel with the bilateral meetings in New York and Washington, DPRK Policy Co-Ordinator William J. Perry travelled to Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo to collect views about the situation in the DPRK. According to an earlier announcement from Washington, Dr. Perry was to make 'a full and complete interagency review of U.S. policy and objectives toward North Korea'. His appointment is seen as a response to criticism of the Administration's policy towards the DPRK, and particularly of the Agreed Framework, from the Republican majority in Congress, which views that arrangement as a bribe to a country that should be punished rather than rewarded for its non-compliance with the NPT and its IAEA safeguards agreement. Opposition to the Administration's policy has increased as a result of Pyongyang's announcement that it would continue selling ballistic missiles abroad, and in the wake of its test of a long-range missile, as well as of suspicions about the unexplained excavations.

In late November, the IAEA's Director General visited South Korea, reportedly for talks about the issue of the suspected underground nuclear site in the DPRK. The IAEA has let it be known that it would be prepared to inspect the site and carry out environmental sampling there. Pyongyang has criticised the Agency for this move and accused it of 'helping the US obstruct the implementation of the Agreed Framework'. Earlier, IAEA safeguards officials had yet another round of unproductive discussions in Pyongyang about the implementation of the DPRK's safeguards agreement. Pyongyang's Permanent Representative in New York has said that his country will not cooperate with the Agency until the US has met all aspects of the Agreed Framework, supplied the two light-water reactors, delivered the promised heavy fuel oil and lifted sanctions.

Japan, which had frozen its funding for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in the aftermath of the overflight of the DPRK's long-range missile with which it supposedly attempted to launch a satellite (see **Newsbrief 43**, pages 12 and 13), has lifted the suspension and has accepted the cost-sharing agreement under which it will provide \$1 billion of the \$4.6 billion for the Agreed Framework. Under the agreement, which was approved by the Executive Board of KEDO in November, the Republic of Korea will pay 70 per cent of the costs, or \$3.2 billion, and the European Union is understood to have committed itself to contribute \$87.8 million (ECU 75 million). The US confirmed its commitment to seek funding to continue supplying heavy fuel oil and for other KEDO needs 'as appropriate from the US Congress and all other possible sources'. An offer by Taiwan to join KEDO is opposed by the People's Republic of China (PRC), which holds that as a province of the PRC Taiwan is not qualified to participate. The (South) Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), which is building the foundations for the reactors and whose contract ran out in mid-October, was reported to be going on with groundwork on the site at Shinpo, pending final settlement of the distribution of costs. KEPCO is said to have extended credit to ensure uninterrupted work, so that full-scale construction can start early in 1999 if the necessary funds are available.

While President Clinton has invoked special powers to use \$15 million of foreign aid funds to buy 150,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, this is said still to leave a shortfall of 134,000 tons for which no funds appear to be readily available. It had been expected that the \$35 million which the Congress appropriated for 1998 would have sufficed, but this expectation has been disappointed by the hesitation of other countries to provide funds for the remainder. The DPRK has repeatedly threatened to scrap the Agreed Framework if not all of the promised oil is supplied.

During the third of a series of talks in New York about the DPRK's testing and export policies with respect to long-range missiles, the latter is reported to have told the US that it is the 'inalienable right of any sovereign nation' to engage in these activities. The DPRK's negotiators told reporters after the meeting on 2 October that there had been 'disagreement on almost all matters'. Reportedly, in 1997 as a package of incentives for Pyongyang to reduce production and sale of missiles the US offered a gradual move towards full political and economic normalisation of relations, if the DPRK adopted genuine constraints on its activities in the field, but Pyongyang's representatives said they would not negotiate on the issue. In a counterproposal the DPRK is understood to have made demands, including financial rewards, which were described in Washington as 'pure fantasy'. The conviction is said to be growing in Washington that little can be done to persuade the DPRK to curb its missile programme. There is a report ascribed to American intelligence sources that the DPRK is building at least two new launch facilities for the Taipodong-1 and has stepped up production of short-range missiles.

Tokyo, too, has reported that the DPRK is building several missile bases with underground storage facilities. There were expectations in Japan that Pyongyang would stage another missile test-launch before the end of the year; the Japanese government has asked Pyongyang to refrain from doing so. However, apparently contradicting earlier press reports that American satellite observation

had noted increased activity around the launching sites, the US State Department has since said there was no basis for reports of an impending launch. The (North) Korean Central News Agency said it was 'foolish' of the US to expect any change in its plans for further missile tests. There is concern in Washington that a second test of a long-range missile would put an end to any further funding by the US Congress for the Agreed Framework; Japan, too, would be likely to end its cooperation. US officials have been quoted in the American press as saying they had asked China to advise the DPRK to this effect.

A report from Pyongyang says that 160 scientists and technicians who had contributed to the supposed placing into orbit of a satellite, on 31 August, had received decorations. According to the DPRK the satellite is still in orbit, broadcasting patriotic songs. US sources claim it either never achieved orbit or dropped out of it after several hours. An American expert, reacting to concern that DPRK missiles might soon be able to reach outlying parts of the US, has said that even if the DPRK could put a satellite into low-earth orbit, this would not give it an intercontinental ballistic capability.

Japan and the US have discussed cooperation on a missile defence system in the region of North-East Asia; the Japanese government is seeking a budget appropriation equivalent to \$8.4 million for joint research on the matter. China and the Russian Federation have both criticised the plan. Japan is currently considering the construction of up to four observation satellites of its own. There is a report from Seoul that South Korea is developing a surveillance satellite which should be in orbit by 2005.

Naval authorities in South Korea say that on 20 November their forces chased a DPRK 'spy ship' out of RoK territorial waters. It is thought that the vessel was capable of carrying four or five agents which it was either sent to drop off or pick up after a mission. A DPRK official source called the news the 'product of premeditated anti-North smear campaign'. In December there was a report of a similar incident, again involving a 10-ton submersible vessel, supposedly launched from a larger ship for the purpose of depositing infiltrators onto the South Korean coast. An exchange of fire is said to have taken place in which the small craft was sunk. Pyongyang again denied involvement in the event.

The current agricultural situation in the DPRK is said to be almost as bad as last year's, when the grain harvest was 2.8 million tons against a need of 5 million tons. The UN-related World Food Programme has said that the North must import 1.35 million tons of extra food to meet its population's minimal nutritional requirements. A US Congressman who was reported to have visited remote parts of the DPRK has said that people there were eating 'twigs and leaves', and described a critical health situation. Similar reports have come from the President of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Some media reports indicate, however, that in areas where international food aid is distributed under foreign supervision the health of the population seems to be improving.

(AP, 2/10, 10/10, 19/10, 20/10, 22/10, 23/10, 27/10, 3/11, 10/11, 12/11, 13/11, 17/11, 20-24/11, 27/11, 29/11, 30/11, 1/12, 3/12, 7-11/12, 14/12, 17-19/12, 23/12; IHT, 5/10, 17/10, 10/11, 16/12; R, 9/10, 14/10, 16-20/10, 23/10, 28/10, 30/10, 31/10, 9/11, 10/11, 12/11, 13/11,

15/11, 17-19/11, 21/11, 22/11, 24/11, 25/11, 1-5/12, 7/12, 8/12, 10/12, 14/12, 17/12, 19/12; Joong Ang Ilbo [Seoul], 12/10, 23/10, 24/11, 30/11, 1/12, 4/12, 8/12, 16/12; YOS, 22/10; NYT, 23/10, 25/10, 29/10, 11/11, 15/11, 19/11, 20/11, 25/11, 6/12, 8/12, 15/12, 18/12, 26/12; WP, 24/10, 20-22/11, 12/12; Y, 23/10, 30/10; Power in Asia, 2/11, in UINB 98.44; ChI, 3/11, 11/11, 21/11, 24/11, 2/12, 6/12, 18/12; KT, 5/11, 9/11, 23/11; USIA, 9/11, 10/11, 16/11, 18/11, 19/11, 24/11, 25/11, 1/12, 3/12, 7-9/12, 11/12, 18/12, 22/12; UPI, 10/11, 10/12; NW, 12/11, 24/12; San Jose Mercury News, 17/11; ABC News, 23/22; Munhwa Ilbo [Seoul], 23/11, in BBC, 24/11; WSJ, 23/11; WT, 23/11, 3/12, 8/12; G, 26/11; People's Daily [Pyongyang], 3/12, 21/12; Korean Broadcasting System Seoul, 28/11, in BBC, 30/11; SCMP, 29/11, 12/12; Yonhap [Seoul], 30/11, 2/12; KH, 3/12; AFP, 4/12; KCNA, 4/12, in BBC, 4/12; NG, 5/12; E, 12/12)

- In late September, a political advisor to President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt was cited in an Arab newspaper as suggesting that Arab countries cannot be assured about their security as long as Israel has nuclear weapons and they do not. Arab countries, he said, may find themselves compelled to develop other unconventional weapons. Shortly after, the President himself was quoted in an interview with an Arab newspaper appearing in London as saying, 'if the time comes when we need the nuclear weapon we would not hesitate'. He also said that 'We do not at present think of entering the nuclear club ... Still, peace needs power to protect it'. The statement has incited comment, as Egypt is a party to the NPT and a signatory of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty and has long championed the denuclearisation of the Middle East. (Al-Arab al Yawm [Cairo], 27/9, in BBC, 29/9; UPI, 5/10)
- India's Prime Minister has rebutted allegations that the test of a thermo-nuclear device on 11 May was a failure. According to US intelligence analysts, the second or fusion stage of the device had failed to ignite and there were reports that the Indian government was under pressure from the scientific establishment to allow a further test to be staged.

Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee has told Parliament that India is determined to maintain a credible minimum nuclear deterrent. He has stated that the current dialogue with the US is based on a set of comprehensive Indian proposals, including a voluntary moratorium on underground nuclear tests, willingness to move towards a *de jure* formalisation of this commitment, a decision to join negotiations on a treaty for a ban on future production of fissile material for weapons purposes, and to make more stringent the existing system of export controls over sensitive materials and technology. He repeated that India was committed to the entry-into-force of the CTBT by September 1999 and also said that it was willing to work for the early conclusion of a 'non-discriminatory' cut-off treaty, but he added that it would not be possible at this stage to adopt a moratorium on fissile material production. The Prime Minister has also said that he would not 'negotiate away' his country's nuclear arsenal and that India would not accept any restraints on developing missiles to carry nuclear warheads.

Discussions were reported not to have led to progress in the US's attempt to keep India from deploying nuclear weapons. Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh was quoted as



saying that the US has an agenda for his country which was not acceptable and that there was no question of India reversing its nuclear programme. US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott is said to have urged India as well as Pakistan to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict, by signing and ratifying the CTBT, tightening export controls on sensitive materials, holding talks to resolve their territorial disputes, halting the production of weapons-grade fissile material and adopting restraints on the development and deployment of missiles and aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. While there is concern in Washington that the publication of the list of entities with which US firms are prevented from trading may have a negative effect on efforts of India's Prime Minister to convince the populace to accede to the CTBT, the recent electoral set-backs for the main ruling party, the BJP, were already thought to have reduced the likelihood that the Prime Minister will be able to sign the CTBT any time soon.

President Clinton has waived for one year some sanctions in regard to both India and Pakistan, in recognition of their promise to maintain their moratorium on nuclear testing, by allowing them to take part in American investment and trade promotion programmes. The prohibition on India's access to high-technology exports and dual-use equipment remains in force, however. The measure is thought to be especially relevant in connection with India's interest in laser research on ways of separating plutonium-239 from spent fuel and also to purify heavy water, since apparently India hopes to obtain some of the relevant equipment abroad. In November, the US Administration released a list of more than 300 government agencies and private companies in India (240) and Pakistan (90) that are thought to be involved in nuclear and missile programmes and other military efforts. American companies wishing to trade with these entities must apply for licenses from the US Commerce Department, which in most cases will be denied.

The Indian government has announced that it has inducted the 'Prithvi' short-range (150 mile/250 km) missile into the army. Prithvi can carry a one MT warhead. There are said to be plans also to deploy Prithvi on naval vessels, including submarines. Reportedly, India plans to build five nuclear submarines with Russian assistance and with 190-MW reactors based on those used in the Severodvinsk-class submarine.

India's Defence Ministry has announced that the intermediate-range (1,500 mile/2,500 km) ballistic missile Agni II is in an advanced stage of production; it is due to be tested next year. Agni, like Prithvi, is said to be nuclear-capable. Also part of India's integrated missile programme are two short-range surface-to-air missiles, 'Trishul' and 'Akash', and the anti-tank missile 'Nag'. The last three missiles are said to be available for export.

On 15-18 October, the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan met in Islamabad, mainly to discuss security issues. Reportedly, the two sides proposed various confidence-building measures but, as expected at this stage, no specific agreements were reached. Among proposals India was said to have made was, once again, an agreement on no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan, for its part, proposed a non-aggression pact with the possibility of third-party mediation for the resolution of disputes. It has since also said that it would refrain from deploying nuclear weapons if India does. Talks in New Delhi in

early November, devoted mainly to border disputes, were said to have been unproductive. As reported, discussions over the use of water of the Jhelum River, which runs through Kashmir, ended in deadlock and there was no progress in the border dispute involving the Siachen Glacier. On the other hand the two countries have agreed to hold a meeting of technical experts to discuss the possible provision by Pakistan of surplus electrical power to India.

The planned visit by US President Clinton to India and Pakistan (as well as Bangladesh) that was to have taken place in late Autumn is still on hold.

(**NYT**, 1/10, 3/10, 15/10, 19/10, 6/11, 7/11, 14/11, 21/11, 28/11, 5/12, 16/12; **E**, 3/10; **NF**, 5/10; **AP**, 6/10, 16/10, 18/10, 22/10, 9-12/11, 21/11, 12/2, 15/12, 17/12; **WP**, 14/9, 19/10, 7/11; **R**, 16/10, 18/10, 20/10, 21/10, 29/10, 10/11, 20/11, 30/11, 12/2, 8/12, 9/12, 24/12; **FR**, 5/11; **IHT**, 9/11; **NW**, 12/11, 26/11, 24/12; **FT**, 16/11, 10/12; **USIA**, 20/11, 16/12)

- At the start of the period covered by this issue, a ministerial-level delegation from **Iraq**, under Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, was in New York for discussions about a review of the UN's policy towards Iraq. The delegation was reported to have come with the message that pending such a review Iraq did not intend to resume full cooperation with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) or the IAEA and would maintain the ban it had imposed on 5 August on any but routine verification activities by these organisations.

Prior to the delegation's arrival, the UN Secretary-General discussed with members of the Security Council proposals for a comprehensive review of UN policy towards Iraq, which, as reported, would shift the burden of evidence so that rather than expecting Iraq to prove it did not possess weapons of mass destruction or means of producing them, the verifying organisations would have the burden of proving that Iraq still had such items, so that sanctions would have to be sustained. Reactions of members of the Council varied, but there seemed to have been agreement that no review could be undertaken until Iraq had resumed full cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA. The Iraqi delegation, however, insisted it would not make concessions in order to bring about a review which, it stated, should be held right away; apparently it believed that a review would show it had made great progress to meeting the Security Council's requirements, so that the latter was due to modify the sanction regime. The delegation left New York after two weeks, during which there does not seem to have been any change in the positions. In Baghdad, Iraq's vice-president repeated that there would be no cooperation with the UN until the Security Council set a timetable for the lifting of sanctions.

On 6 October, UNSCOM and the IAEA submitted their semi-annual reports to the Security Council. UNSCOM's report noted that as for ballistic missiles and chemical weapons the disarmament phase of the Security Council's requirements was possibly near its end, but this was not so in regard to biological weapons. It further said that full disclosure by Iraq remained crucial for the completion of the disarmament process and for future monitoring, but Iraq was permitting the monitoring work to be done only at a less than satisfactory level. In a related development, the French laboratory which, to meet

Iraqi objections, had been asked, together with a Swiss chemical institution, to analyse samples of Iraqi ordnance for the presence of chemicals linked to the VX nerve agent which an American laboratory earlier claimed to have identified, was said also to have found degradation products of a nerve agent on one missile fragment, that could be from VX or from another agent, but could also have originated from other compounds such as detergents. The Swiss laboratory apparently also found traces of decontamination compound. A subsequent meeting of experts, held at UN Headquarters, to discuss all analytical results found that the existence of VX degradation products conflicted with Iraq's declarations regarding its use of that agent, while the findings by all three laboratories of degradation products of decontamination compound did not support Iraq's claim that the warheads in question had not been in contact with such compounds.

The IAEA, for its part, reported that it had 'found no indication of Iraq having achieved its programme goal of producing nuclear weapons or having retained physical capability for the production of weapons-usable nuclear material or having clandestinely obtained such material'. It also said, however, that it could not guarantee that all readily concealable items had been found, and that Iraq had not disclosed some information on foreign assistance for its past programmes and had not produced some documentation the IAEA required. As Director General ElBaradei put it, there were 'credible assurances but no absolute assurances'. The IAEA said that most of its work could be done through a programme of 'ongoing monitoring and verification' (OMV) which, in ElBaradei's words must be 'vigorous and comprehensive', but added that the suspension of Iraq's cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA, by which IAEA inspectors were prevented from visiting new sites, had significantly reduced 'the level of assurance the IAEA can give that prohibited activities are not taking place in Iraq'.

In this context, US media, political opponents of the Clinton Administration and some non-governmental organisations that tend to disparage the IAEA's verification abilities kept referring to claims by former UNSCOM official William S. ('Scott') Ritter, who resigned in August (see *Newsbrief* 43, page 24), that Iraq possessed several 'implosion devices': complete sets of components of nuclear weapons, lacking only the highly-enriched uranium needed to make them into functioning weapons. Ritter has claimed that he passed this information, supposedly obtained from three 'credible' Iraqi defectors, on to UNSCOM, the IAEA and US authorities, but that there was no follow-up; the IAEA has called the report unsubstantiated and lacking credibility. In late October, the IAEA advised the Security Council that it had no evidence to back up Mr. Ritter's assertions. Independent experts have also said they were unable to substantiate his claims. UNSCOM's Executive Chairman, Richard Butler, has reprimanded Mr. Ritter in writing for publicising confidential information and violating his contract by maintaining unauthorised contacts with the press; he ordered Ritter to desist. Ritter has nevertheless aired further allegations with specifics about Iraq's supposed nuclear-weapon programme which, he claimed, were unknown to the IAEA.

Under its original schedule, on 13 October the Security Council would have held one of its periodic reviews to determine whether sanctions might be lifted. However,

since at its meeting on 9 September it had decided to suspend such reviews as long as Iraq refused to allow the two monitoring organisations the unrestricted and unconditional access demanded in its resolution 707 (1991), the Council, after hearing statements from UNSCOM and the IAEA on Iraq's compliance with the relevant resolutions, merely called on Iraq to resume cooperation with these organisations. A statement by the Council's President said that members of the Council had noted the IAEA's contention that should Iraq recommence full cooperation with that body, there would be no impediment to the full implementation of its plan for ongoing monitoring and verification. Regarding UNSCOM's report, members felt that on chemical weapons and missiles there were not many items still to be resolved if Iraq's full cooperation with the UN was forthcoming. On biological weapons more work was needed, which depended crucially on full disclosure by Iraq. Reportedly, the Statement, which was seen as holding out prospects for the easing of some sanctions, reflected the readiness of most Council members to move to a long-term monitoring approach with regard to chemical weapons, missiles and nuclear items once outstanding matters were settled, but the US was said to insist that there should be no change. The UN Secretary-General was quoted as saying, in a meeting with the staff of the *Washington Post* on 16 October, that he believed it would never be possible for Iraq to be fully disarmed; the Security Council would finally have to decide whether Iraq was disarmed to the extent that it was not a threat to its neighbours; this would be a political judgment. He also said that getting Iraq to cooperate with UNSCOM might require the latter to take a more flexible and conciliatory approach in the way it operates.

Meanwhile, support for UNSCOM's intrusive verification activities was feared to be eroding, in part as a result of disclosures by Mr. Ritter, that during his UNSCOM career he had worked closely with Israeli intelligence services, with whom he claimed he had shared information on Iraq's weapons efforts. Subsequent complaints by Iraq that American UNSCOM officials were spying for the US and for Israel intensified when another UNSCOM official, since dismissed, was found to be using his own camera to take pictures of an Iraqi weapons site. Similar accusations were made against other, mainly British and American, inspectors, and against an UNSCOM official of Chilean nationality.

On 30 October, the Security Council adopted unanimously the text of a letter to the Secretary-General outlining how it would proceed with a comprehensive review of Iraq's relations with the UN. In contradiction to the demands Iraq had made for the way a review should be conducted, the Council, essentially insisting that Iraq should resume its cooperation with the United Nations before a review could be undertaken, set out plans for a two-phased approach: one in which it would concentrate on Iraq's compliance with disarmament requirements and future monitoring, and the other dealing with its other obligations under the 1991 armistice conditions. Iraq was asked to contribute its own accounts of its compliance with its obligations, in written reports and oral presentations, with a clear explanation of its reasoning. The letter is understood also to have included a reference to a time frame for steps towards the eventual lifting of sanctions.

A day later, following a meeting of the Revolutionary Command Council, chaired by President Saddam Hussein, and of the regional command of the Ba'ath Party,

Iraq announced that it was suspending all cooperation with UNSCOM, calling it a cover for international espionage and forbidding it to carry out any activity in the country until the Security Council decided to lift the sanctions. In Baghdad, the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate clarified to representatives of UNSCOM's Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre that the Iraqi authorities had decided to suspend, stop or cease all activities of the Special Commission, including monitoring; that the monitoring teams would not be allowed to conduct any activities; that UNSCOM cameras and other monitoring equipment would remain in place but could not be visited; and that the IAEA was allowed to continue its monitoring activities provided they were independent from UNSCOM. No written text of the announcement was provided. Apparently, monitoring team members — of whom there were said to be about 100 in Iraq — were not asked to leave the country, but in New York Iraq's Permanent Representative said that Baghdad assumed they would do so. In a letter to the President of the Security Council, Ambassador Richard Butler said that UNSCOM now was no longer able to carry out any meaningful operations.

In immediate reaction, the Security Council unanimously condemned Iraq's action as a 'flagrant violation' of its resolutions, and demanded that it 'resume immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation'. Iraq's Vice President responded by reiterating that there would be 'no cooperation [with UNSCOM] before Iraq's demands are met'. Iraq's parliament, unanimously backing the government's decision, called for the dismissal of UNSCOM's Executive Chairman. However, Baghdad did allow UNSCOM to maintain surveillance (mainly air sampling) equipment and change films in monitoring cameras at some sites; this was depicted by UNSCOM as an attempt by Iraq to create the illusion that some sort of monitoring was still going on. Routine monitoring visits by IAEA teams were permitted to continue, but the IAEA said that its plans to cease intrusive inspection activities and begin implementing its Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (OMV) scheme had been set back by Iraq's imposition, in August, of restrictions on its verification activities. As the Agency's Director General stated in the UN General Assembly, OMV 'must incorporate a robust detection and deterrence capability so as to provide substantial assurance of the absence of prohibited activities and material in Iraq'; he said that a restriction on site visits would make it harder to give such assurances.

On 5 November, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1205 (1998), in which it condemned Iraq's decision to cease cooperating with UNSCOM as a 'flagrant violation' of relevant resolutions, demanded that Iraq rescind that decision and reaffirmed its full support for UNSCOM and the IAEA. The full text of the resolution is reproduced below under **IV. Documentation**. In Baghdad the resolution was received with scorn and the statement that Iraq would not back down on its decision until sanctions were lifted, even if this meant military conflict.

The likelihood of conflict increased steadily. The US Administration intensified its efforts to gain support for the use of force against Iraq, encouraged, it was said, by the widespread criticism of that country's actions and the strong tone of the Security Council resolution. While this did not explicitly authorise the use of force, Washington reportedly did not think additional authorisation was

needed and moved ahead with preparations for air strikes against Iraq, both from the UK air base at Diego Garcia and from the one aircraft carrier already on station in the area and soon to be joined by a second, and for attacks with cruise missiles launched from naval vessels and heavy bombers; more than 300 cruise missiles were said to be deployed on the naval vessels in the area alone. On 5 November, President Clinton suggested that the US was prepared to use force if Saddam Hussein did not reverse the decision to end cooperation with UNSCOM, but he did not set a deadline for action. Several members of the Security Council, including Brazil and Russia, while critical of Iraq's obstinacy, said this did not by itself justify the use of force.

Reports from Washington at the time said that the Administration was nearing the conclusion that the UN inspection regime was no longer an effective instrument for restraining Iraq. Rather, it seemed that Washington was thinking of relying exclusively on sanctions and military force. Officials said America would lay down clear lines which Iraq could cross only at the risk of massive retaliation. A senior official was quoted as saying, 'If [Saddam Hussein] tries to use weapons of mass destruction he should know that we will obliterate Iraq'. Reportedly, the Administration had by then lost faith in Iraq's willingness to cooperate with UNSCOM; the view in the White House was said to be that Saddam Hussein was more interested in maintaining his ability to produce weapons of mass destruction than in having the sanctions lifted.

By 9 November, tensions had increased further. The US Administration was seen as still seeking to avoid precipitous action and retain as much support as possible; it made clear that force would be used only in support of UN resolutions and against 'the sources of the regime'. Western media, meanwhile, reflected growing concern about Iraq's continuing ability to produce weapons of mass destruction; the US Central Intelligence Agency was quoted as saying that Iraq had the capacity to produce biological weapons overnight, mustard gas and sarin within a few months, and VX nerve agent within two years. A report by BBC news said that Iraq was thought still to have 16 operational ballistic missiles, 4,000 metric tons of precursor chemicals for nerve agents and 17 metric tons of biological warfare agents.

The next day, the US strengthened its threats and reinforced its air force in the region. Saudi newspapers were quoted as warning Iraq that Arab states would not be able to block US military action and there was a report that officials in Riyadh had indicated that the country might assist a US action. Reports from Washington had it that the Pentagon envisaged starting action against Iraq with a first-stage air campaign to knock out military systems, suspected weapons laboratories and elite military forces, with the purpose of shaking the Iraqi regime and deterring further production of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The initial campaign would be followed by sorties against specific installations and anti-aircraft weapons. Washington said it was not prepared to have any further negotiations with Iraq until that country complied fully with its obligations under the various Security Council resolutions to give complete and unconditional access to inspectors of UNSCOM and the IAEA.

On 11 November, these organisations announced they were withdrawing their personnel from Iraq. The White House was now said to be poised for an open-ended

bombing campaign that would ensure, in the absence of UNSCOM's verification and dismantling activities, that Iraq would no longer have the means to develop missiles or weapons of mass destruction.

On 12 November, President Clinton issued a warning to Iraq to accept the resumption of UNSCOM's activities, failing which the US was ready without any further warning to strike from the air and from the sea. Substantial new forces, including B-52 and B-2 bombers, stealth strike planes and ground troops, were ordered to the area and expectations in Washington were that a strike was imminent. It was assumed that air strikes would be more effective than before because they would be based on improved intelligence information that permitted greater accuracy. Western officials were quoted as saying that sustained air strikes against sites where it was suspected biological and chemical weapons were developed and produced had become essential in the process of disarming Iraq, because it would no longer be possible for UNSCOM to complete its inspections, since those had reached the point where they had begun disrupting the intelligence apparatus maintained by Iraq's Special Forces, which procured the weapons and were the basis of its regime. Reportedly, US forces targeted about 100 sites, including hiding places for clandestine arms, weapon production facilities, and offices, personnel and infrastructure of Iraq's Special Security Services. That day it was announced that all 230 UN personnel had been evacuated from Baghdad. Russia complained that the withdrawal had taken place without consultation with the Security Council; UNSCOM's Executive Chairman said he had to pull out his people because he had been warned of impending air-strikes.

Reactions from Baghdad a day later reflected a further hardening of the Iraqi position. Iraqi authorities and press excoriated the US and called UNSCOM a tool of American policy and a hotbed of Israeli and US spies. At the same time, Baghdad suggested it would welcome a diplomatic effort by Kofi Annan and said it would 'accept positively any initiative that meets these just and balanced demands'. At a meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council, six of its members: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, issued a declaration that Iraq would be solely responsible for all repercussions from its decision to block UNSCOM's activities. The declaration was also signed by Egypt and Syria. In the Security Council, no members were seen to rise to the defence of Iraq. The latter, however, rejected the Arab warning and again blamed the US and UNSCOM for the crisis.

In the morning of 14 November, orders were given in Washington to start military action. Reportedly, while the American strike force had already been alerted (CNN Breaking News reported that B-52 bombers were within an hour of launching their missiles) UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan received a letter from Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, written on orders of Iraq's Revolution Command Council and the Ba'ath Party, which announced that 'the Iraqi leadership [had] decided to resume cooperation with the UN Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency and to allow them to carry out their ordinary tasks in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and based on the principles that have been agreed upon in the Memorandum of Understanding signed with you on 23 February 1998'. The letter contained an annex listing

principles that would make a comprehensive review of the sanctions on Iraq, 'serious, fair and fruitful'. This is reproduced below under **IV. Documentation**. It comprised several conditions for a review, such as the demand that this should take place very soon after UNSCOM and the IAEA had resumed their normal activity (the annex gave seven days as an example), and without any conditions, and that the Security Council should seriously 'look into' the 'issue of Butler and the makeup and practices of UNSCOM'. It also implied there should be a shift in the burden of evidence so that UNSCOM would have to prove that Iraq was hiding information rather than Iraq being forced to produce information in the first place.

Upon receipt of the news that Iraq had expressed its willingness to let UNSCOM and the IAEA resume their work, the US called off the attack, although the Administration's initial reaction to the letter was sceptical. National Security Advisor Berger called it 'neither unequivocal nor unconditional' and said it was 'unacceptable'; he made clear that the US had stopped its military action as a result of a last-minute plea to Iraq made by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to which the Iraqi letter had been a response. Reportedly, Mr. Clinton had felt it would have been difficult for him to order an attack when the Secretary-General seemed so close to a deal. Berger also said that the US remained 'poised to take military action', reflecting a view held also in other capitals that Iraq's cooperation might not last long, so that eventually the use of force would be called for.

Many members of the Security Council, on the other hand, appeared to consider the Iraqi letter as resolving the immediate crisis. The Secretary-General said it 'made at least a step in the right direction'. Iraq's Permanent UN Representative moved to settle matters with the statement that the annex contained 'the views and the preferences' of Iraq on the comprehensive review, but that the nine points in the annex were not conditions for compliance. Later that evening he submitted a letter to the Council confirming that the annex was 'not connected to the decision of Iraq to resume its relations with UNSCOM and with the IAEA'. Apparently the White House still considered this as insufficient and demanded 'a clear public and authoritative statement of compliance — no conditions'. Shortly after, another letter from Iraq's Permanent Representative reaffirmed that the annex to the letter of Tariq Aziz contained the views and preferences of the Iraq government with regard to the comprehensive review but were 'not linked to the clear and unconditional decision of the Iraqi government to resume cooperation' with UNSCOM and the IAEA. Reportedly, this persuaded the White House that the most obvious shortcomings in Iraq's undertakings had been met. In a nationwide statement President Clinton announced Iraq's decision, describing it as the best outcome because unfettered inspection remained the most effective tool to 'uncover, destroy and prevent Iraq from rebuilding its weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them'. While, in the President's words, Iraq had 'backed down', he said that it would now 'have to resolve all outstanding issues raised by UNSCOM and the IAEA; give inspectors unfettered access to inspect and to monitor all sites they choose with no restrictions or qualifications'; turn over all relevant documents; accept all weapons-of-mass-destruction-related resolutions; and refrain from interfering with the independence or the professional expertise of the weapons inspectors. The President added

that the UN Secretary-General shared these understandings of Iraq's obligations.

In New York, the Secretary-General said it appeared that a satisfactory diplomatic solution had been reached, adding that Iraq 'must move swiftly to ensure complete and unconditional compliance.' In a statement to the press, the President of the Security Council underlined that Iraq had decided, clearly and unconditionally, to cooperate fully with UNSCOM and the IAEA. The full text of the press release is reproduced below under **IV. Documentation**. A last-minute obstacle is reported to have arisen when members of the Security Council noted that Tariq Aziz, in a television interview from Baghdad, had said that Iraq was committed only to what he had stated in his letter to the Secretary-General. As this seemed to contradict or override assurances given subsequently by Iraq's Permanent Representative, Mr. Annan asked Baghdad to clarify; the response, reportedly, was that the Permanent Representative's letters were to be regarded as part of the original letter.

With both Iraq and the US claiming the results of the stand-off as a victory, on 17 November UNSCOM and IAEA personnel returned to their posts in Iraq. UNSCOM's first job was to service and reestablish its monitoring infrastructure; according to Ambassador Richard Butler it might take four weeks before he would be able to certify that Iraq had resumed full cooperation with UNSCOM. The IAEA said that it would immediately commence 'an intensive programme of facility inspections in order to re-establish the status of Iraq's relevant technical assets'. US and UK forces remained at a high stage of readiness to intervene if, once UNSCOM personnel called for the documentation they had previously been denied and wished to inspect sensitive sites, the Iraqi authorities should again refuse to cooperate. According to reports in the US media, the returning UNSCOM weapons inspectors were greeted with fresh denunciations in the official Iraqi press. While this was thought to have been intended primarily for domestic consumption, it did seem to set the scene for new confrontations.

Initial reports about the inspectors' activities indicated that for the first two days these had gone 'quite normally'; no intrusive inspections had taken place. A report from Baghdad said that a surprise inspection of an Iraqi missile site had taken place without incident. On the fourth day, however, Iraqi officials refused to hand over documents said to pertain to the chemical and biological weapons and missiles Iraq had before the 1991 Persian Gulf War; UNSCOM claimed these were critical to help it determine what weapons had not yet been accounted for. Reportedly, the documents included one indicating what munitions were loaded, used or destroyed during the war with Iran, which would help determine if Iraq had more chemical and biological weapons than it said it had when that war ended. Iraq's Deputy Foreign Minister wrote to Ambassador Butler that the request for these documents overstepped the bounds and was provocative. Mr. Butler advised the President of the Security Council that Iraq declined to furnish any information on its biological weapons programme, pending the review of its relations with the UN. Iraq was said also to deny UNSCOM access to the archives of a number of government offices where, according to UNSCOM, access would provide the most effective and least controversial way of obtaining the necessary evidence, while avoiding seeking

such documents through intrusive inspection. In his letter to the Council President Mr. Butler listed several other sources, to which the Iraqi authorities had denied access.

In the days following, Baghdad seemed to revert to its previous defiance. Its Foreign Minister stated publicly that his country had already produced over two million pages of documents and had no more to give. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz suggested that in demanding unobtainable papers, Mr. Butler was either creating a pretext to justify American aggression or trying to avoid a comprehensive review. The initial impression in Washington appeared to be that Iraq had reverted to a position where it accepted routine monitoring but would not hand over sensitive documents or allow intrusive inspections. On a visit to South Korea, President Clinton warned that military forces were still standing by to intervene if this was considered opportune. Richard Butler, in a television interview, warned against the assumption that Iraq's failure to produce documents should lead automatically to enforcement; he did say, however, that the documents were important to determine 'what weapons they did have and where are they now'. Washington was seen to be taking a patient approach, trying to gauge Iraq's current readiness to cooperate on the basis of actions such as its production of classified documents and the access it gave to suspected production sites and individuals. The Security Council's American President added that his country was prepared to give Iraq time to demonstrate cooperation 'on all fronts'. At a Council meeting on 24 November, Ambassador Butler reported about the newest developments; the Council was said to agree generally that Iraq should have time to demonstrate how it intended to proceed before it could be punished or rewarded for its behaviour. Apparently as a demonstration of its willingness to cooperate, although continuing to complain about UNSCOM's rigorous requirements and repeating that it had no biological weapons, Iraq reportedly sent UNSCOM answers to some questions the latter had posed earlier.

By late November, all sides had begun to consider the possibility of an early review of Iraq's compliance with UN resolutions, which had long been supported by China and Russia who expected that this would hasten the lifting of the embargo. The UK and the US were said to believe that there would be more to gain by a review than by a confrontation for which support seemed to be dwindling, and that a review was likely to show that Iraq was still seriously in default of its obligations. To help prepare for a decision by the Security Council, UNSCOM set out to conduct a full-range of inspection activities including, reportedly, 20 no-notice inspections. Its Executive Chairman once again cited the areas in which Iraqi cooperation was essential: access to documents, monitoring, interviews with officials, visits to sites listed as places where weapons-related work may be done, and disarmament inspections. Work was said to resume in the first four areas. On 9 December there was yet another instance of inspectors being refused admission, when Iraqi officials prevented inspectors from entering an office of the Ba'ath Party where significant documentation was believed to be present. That day, Ambassador Butler delivered a report to the Security Council, in which he described obstructions Iraq had raised, notably preventing UNSCOM personnel from photographing bombs and refusing to explain why and where equipment and micro organisms had been moved during the recent break in the inspections. At that time a decision by the Security Council



cil on the possibility of a review was still expected to be taken in December; the review itself would not begin until mid-January 1999.

While, reportedly, the IAEA said that the level of cooperation received since 17 November had been satisfactory, Ambassador Butler, on 15 December, made yet another report in which he listed a series of Iraqi refusals to cooperate with UNSCOM in terms of access and the provision of documentation. Referring to the announcement of a month earlier that Iraq had decided, clearly and unconditionally, to cooperate fully with UNSCOM and the IAEA, he pointed out that Iraq had not provided the full cooperation promised. His report concluded with the statement that:

during the period under review, Iraq initiated new forms of restrictions upon the Commission's work. Amongst the Commission's many concerns about this retrograde step is what such further restrictions might mean for the effectiveness of long-term monitoring activities.

In spite of the opportunity presented by the circumstances of the last month, including the prospect of a comprehensive review, Iraq's conduct ensured that no progress was able to be made in either the fields of disarmament or accounting for its prohibited weapons programmes.

Finally, in the light of this experience, that is, the absence of full cooperation by Iraq, it must regrettably be recorded again that the Commission is not able to conduct the substantive disarmament work mandated to it by the Security Council and, thus, to give the Council the assurances it requires with respect to Iraq's prohibited weapons programmes.

At this time, UNSCOM and the IAEA announced that they had decided to temporarily relocate their personnel to Bahrain.

On 16 December, without, reportedly, further formal consultations with permanent members of the Security Council, the US and the UK launched what President Clinton called 'a strong, sustained series of air strikes' against Iraq, against that country's production and storage facilities of weapons of mass destruction and its anti-aircraft installations. The action received little overt international support; Russia recalled its ambassadors from Washington and London in protest and the State Duma shelved its consideration of START II. France expressed disappointment. Germany endorsed the action; attitudes of other NATO members ranged from lukewarm support to scepticism. Reactions from Arab states were largely negative; US forces were said to have been prevented from using their bases in Saudi Arabia. The campaign was halted at the onset of Ramadan, after several days of what was described as 'a very limited air campaign', in which, according to official US sources, Iraq's capability of producing weapons of mass destruction had been set back by up to a year, but had as a whole been left more or less intact. American military sources called the operation an 'unalloyed success'; press reports spoke of the existence of 97 primary targets, of which fewer than one third were thought to have been destroyed or severely damaged; among the latter were said to be some military communication centres and installations for research and development on delivery vehicles for chemical and biological weapons. Relatively little damage was seen to have been done to storage and production sites of such

weapons, in part, it was said, because Iraq had removed sensitive equipment and stocks and British and American forces, acting on outdated intelligence, had hit the wrong targets. US media claim that President Saddam Hussein's personal position within Iraq does not seem to have been weakened by the action.

Opinion in Washington was that with the likely end of UNSCOM's involvement, the opportunity for on-the-ground verification and interdiction would henceforth be closed, and as there did not seem to be signs that the regime had modified its behaviour, the only way of preventing Iraq from developing and producing weapons of mass destruction would be through further use of military force. At the time this issue of the *Newsbrief* was to go into print, US forces in the area were being trimmed, although both London and Washington spoke of their readiness to resume military operations as soon as a need arose. Iraq said that it would never again admit arms inspectors into the country. In Vienna, there was said to be concern that, in the absence of IAEA inspectors, Iraq would make an extra effort to obtain clandestine nuclear material and use its supposed know-how to produce nuclear weapons.

At a meeting on 23 December, the UN Security Council, unable to agree on a statement outlining further action with respect to Iraq, decided to defer the matter until the end of the year. A point of contention was said to be Ambassador Butler's future; China and Russia called for his removal. The US stated that unless there was a means of containing Saddam Hussein, sanctions would not be loosened. There were reports that Baghdad wished United Nations relief workers of British and American nationality to leave the country. Iraqi media also began to denounce some former friends, including France and a number of Arab countries, for not having supported it more actively in the recent conflict.

Meanwhile, in Washington and in London, as well as in the public media of several other western states, calls for the ouster of President Saddam Hussein intensified. In October, the US Congress had adopted legislation to provide funds for overt military aid to Iraqi rebel groups, for the purpose of bringing down President Saddam Hussein. The legislation, the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, was duly signed into law by the President, who said that the best way to avoid another crisis with Iraq was by a change in its government, and announced that his Administration would do more to support 'forces of change' in Iraq. This was seen as a startling change of policy, since it had been the stated view of the Administration that direct aid to the Iraqi opposition could involve the US in further obligations, and might make it harder for Washington to persuade its allies to maintain sanctions on Baghdad. A senior military source in Washington called the law an 'idiocy', and compared it with the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, in 1961. Members of the Administration were said to doubt that Iraqi opposition groups, which they saw as divided and weak, could form a united front capable of bringing about President Saddam Hussein's downfall; an American Marine Corps general commanding forces in the Persian Gulf area said he knew of no 'viable' opposition in Iraq to President Saddam, and any attempt to remove him by force could dangerously fragment the country and destabilise the region. Some dissidents let it be known they did not wish to join US-led attempts to overthrow President Hussein. The UN Secretary-General also criticised the American decision

The coincidence of the 14 November letter from Iraq, promising renewed cooperation with international inspections, and the timing of the British and American raids has led to speculation that Baghdad had previous knowledge of the plans. The conjecture by a US senator that a French tip-off might explain the timing of the letter was received by France's Foreign Minister with outraged denial. Administration sources have confirmed that there was 'no evidence whatsoever' that Iraq had been tipped off by anyone.

A former senior member of Iraq's nuclear-weapon team, US-trained physicist Khidhir Abdul Abas Hamza, who defected in 1994 (see *Newsbrief* 43, page 21) has said that Iraq has continued to buy components abroad for nuclear and other weapon systems and has moved to produce such components itself overseas. According to Hamza, there are front companies in Jordan, Libya, Sudan and Yemen through which sensitive equipment is smuggled into Iraq, for use in any of dozens of small centres where components are made. Specific items mentioned by Mr. Hamza include triggers for nuclear weapons and parts for military radar installations. According to an Austrian newspaper, that country has supplied Iraq with means of producing biological and chemical weapons and blueprints for missile launchers. It has also been reported that Iraq tried to buy guidance equipment for long-range missiles in Romania. Allegedly, American, Israeli and Romanian intelligence agencies, with the cooperation of UNSCOM, monitored the contacts and prevented the deal.

Another defector, Abbas Al-Janabi, supposedly former private secretary to the President's eldest son Uday, is said to have given US intelligence detailed information about a network of companies in Europe, the Middle East and South-East Asia used by Iraq's leading family to evade UN sanctions. In a newspaper interview he has told of stocks of biological and chemical weapons held by Saddam Hussein and controlled by special forces under the direct command of the President's son.

An Arabic-language newspaper appearing in the UK claims that sources at UNSCOM have spoken of the existence of two Iraqi dual-use projects that might be used for the delivery of chemical and biological warfare agents. One is the technique of ostensibly producing rain by spraying clouds of molecules of silver iodide; the other is the development of a flying drone or cruise missile. The *Sunday Times*, referring to information from British Foreign Office sources, claims that Iraq had been working on a radiological weapon in the form of a shell filled with irradiated zirconium metal and conventional explosives, which was to have been fired in the 'Supergun' that had previously been deployed. Reportedly, the project was discovered in 1995 by an UNSCOM team looking for chemical and biological agents.

Karl-Heinz Schaab, the German expert who sold Iraq advanced centrifuge technology and escaped to Brazil after being convicted in Germany for export control violation and given a suspended sentence, has returned to his country. Since 1995 the Bonn government had sought his arrest and extradition on grounds of espionage and high treason. Schaab is free on bail, awaiting trial (see also *Newsbrief* no. 43, page 25).

(*FT*, 24/9, 29/9, 8/10, 12/11, 14-15/11; *IHT*, 29/9, 3/10, 8/10, 19/10, 23/10, 4/11, 9-15/11, 12-14/12, 22/12; *NYT*,

29/9, 3/10, 7-9/10, 11/10, 14/10, 23/10, 24/10, 27/10, 31/10, 1-5/11, 8-24/11, 2/12, 7-10/12, 15-24/12, 28/12, 31/12; *R*, 30/9, 4/10, 8/10, 9/10, 21/10, 23/10, 31/10, 2/11, 4/11, 5/11, 7/11, 10-12/11, 17/11, 19/11, 21/11, 23/11, 3/12, 23/12; *X*, 30/9; *NW*, 1/10, 8/10, 24/12; *AP*, 2/10, 3/10, 5/10, 6/10, 21-23/10, 31/10, 4/11, 30/11, 3/12, 5/12, 10/12; *CNN on internet*, 5/10, 30/11; *UN website*, 7/10, 9/10; *IAEA Press Release* PR 98/24, 7/10, PR 98/26, 11/11, PR 98/27, 16/11, PR 98/28, 16/12; *WP*, 8/10, 11/10, 12/10, 17/10, 18/10, 28/10, 3/11; *E*, 10/10, 7/11; *USIA*, 13/10; *JDW*, 14/10; *IAEA Document* GOV/INF/1998/22, 16/10; *Iraq News Agency*, 16/10, 23/10, 2/11, 12/11; *G*, 21/10, 2/11, 3/11, 16/11, 17/11; *letters from UNSCOM to Security Council President*, 26/10, 31/10; *State Department Briefing* 27/10; *Security Council Press Statement*, 31/10; *White House Press Secretary*, 31/10, 14/11, 17/11; *EP*, 2/11, 15/11; *WSJ*, 2/11, 16/11, 4/12; *FAZ*, 3/11; *LM*, 3/11, 12/11, 13/11, 20/11, 22/11; *BBC Radio*, 8/11, 11/11, 14/11; *AFP*, 9/11, 10/11, 10/12; *UPI*, 10/11; *IT*, 11/11; *DP*, 12/11, 15/12; *I*, 12/11, 10/12; *UN Security Council Press Release* PR 6596, 15/11, PR 6611, 16/12; *UN Secretary-General Press Release* PR 6796/257, 15/11, PR 6841 16/12, 6842, both 16/12; *UNSCOM Report*, 17/11; *SN*, 18/11, 19/11; *Newsweek*, 23/11; *DW*, 24/11; *LT*, 29/11, *ST*, 29/11; *DT*, 8/12; *SDZ*, 9/12; *MSNBC*, 13/12; *K*, 17/12)

- In **Israel**, where the July test flight of Iran's medium-range *Shahab-3* missile is said to have caused concern which the more recent success of the *Arrow-2* ground-to-space missile in hitting a computer-simulated target was unable to compensate for, voices are raised in favour of creating a deterrent by publicly proclaiming the country's nuclear capability. Reputedly in an attempt to avert such a move, the **United States** has signed a 'memorandum of agreement' with Israel in which it promises to 'enhance Israel's defensive and deterrent capabilities' and upgrade the US-Israeli 'strategic and military relationships as well as technological cooperation' (presumably in particular with regard to missile defence). Reportedly, the memorandum also commits the US to consult with Israel as to the assistance, diplomatic or otherwise, which it can lend that country in the face of 'direct threats ... arising from the regional deployment of ballistic missiles of intermediate range or greater'. (*E*, 26/9; *AP*, 31/10; *NYT*, 2/11)
- **Pakistan** is reported to have started a procurement effort to obtain western equipment for a laser enrichment programme. Research on laser enrichment is said to be going on at the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) at Kahuta, which also handles centrifuge enrichment, and at the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology.

As reported, the American waiver, on 2 December, of part of the sanctions imposed on Pakistan after its nuclear tests of last May does not extend to the ban on sales of military hardware. However, the US has allowed the resumption of training programmes for Pakistani military personnel. Restrictions on the sale of high-technology exports and on the export of dual-use equipment and technology also remain in force. As it has done with respect to India, the US Administration has released a list of approximately 90 Pakistan entities with which US firms may not normally do business as long as the sanctions stay in place. The list is said to include about a dozen

Pakistani companies and 15 government departments, as well as subdivisions.

Although Pakistan which, according to recent reports in the domestic press, has already built up a stock of medium-range Ghaury missiles, has not agreed to refrain from deploying nuclear weapons or to join a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed on 25 November to resume assistance to Pakistan which it had suspended after the country's nuclear tests, last May. This will allow the transfer of \$1.3 million in aid and will permit the country to make further payments on its \$32 billion foreign debt. The decision still needs to be approved by the board of the IMF.

Abdul Qadeer Khan, the former head of KRL, and reputed to be the main man behind Pakistan's nuclear-weapons programme, has denied that China helped his country develop nuclear devices. According to Khan, some parts of the weapons were imported from Europe. Khan has also claimed that one of the tested devices could be deployed on the intermediate-range (935-mile/1,500 km) surface-to-surface missile 'Ghaury'. An advanced, solid-fuelled short-range (470-mile/750 km) missile, 'Shaheen', is reported to be ready for test launch. Recent reports claim that Pakistan now has enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for 20 to 25 weapons, and is still producing enough HEU to manufacture at least two nuclear weapons a year.

A book published on the occasion of the retirement of A.Q. Khan from Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme claims, among other things, that work on constructing the two tunnels in which Pakistan's nuclear tests took place started in January 1979 and was completed in 1995, after several interruptions. The book asserts that the tests had been planned for 29 May but were advanced by a day because of the threat of a pre-emptive strike by Indian and Israeli aircraft.

According to a report in the British press, the wife of a DPRK diplomat in Islamabad was assassinated, supposedly because she had given Western intelligence authorities details of missile deals between the DPRK and Pakistan. Allegedly, the murder was carried out by DPRK agents working at KRL. It is also reported that British customs have seized a consignment of maraging steel that was on its way from Moscow to the representative of the Chaggwang Sinyong Corporation, a North Korean company known to supply missile components to Pakistan. As indicated in *Newsbrief* 43, Insert, page 6, it is thought that the 'Ghaury' missile is based on technology obtained from the DPRK, through the same firm.

- While President Clinton's visit to South Asia has been deferred indefinitely (the possibility has been raised that it might be made in early 1999), Pakistan's Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, visited Washington in December. In preparation for the visit, US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott had talks in Islamabad in which he once again urged Pakistan to sign the CTBT, tighten export controls, stop producing fissile material and agree to restraints on development, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Although reportedly, progress was made in respect of the first two items, the Prime Minister's visit to Washington does not seem to have brought Pakistan's accession to the CTBT any

closer; Sharif was quoted in press agency reports as saying that he would not be coerced into signing the Treaty and that sanctions must first be removed. Opposition leader Benazir Bhutto had earlier charged the Prime Minister with planning to surrender the country's nuclear capability during that visit, allegedly by not only joining the CTBT but also the NPT [*sic*] and the FMCT, thus 'giving India a permanent edge in the nuclear stockpile'. The chief designer of Pakistan's first indigenous (40-MW heavy-water/natural uranium) reactor and director of the Khushab Nuclear Power Project has gone into what is described as 'forced retirement' for opposing the decision to sign the CTBT. That reactor is now said to have started producing plutonium.

- Japan has said that it will resume bilateral assistance to Pakistan when Islamabad has acceded to the CTBT and adopted legislation on the control of nuclear exports.

(NYT, 1/10, 3/10, 7/11; NF, 5/10; R, 21/10, 3/11, 2/12; I, 27/10; DT, 1/11; SCMP, 2/11; JDW, 4/11; NW, 12/11, 26/11, 3/12; Nature, 19/11; UPI, 25/11; AP, 2/12, 3/12. See also above: **India**)

- The Greek Foreign Minister has said his country opposes **Turkey's** plans to build a nuclear power reactor because of the technology chosen for the plant and 'the valid suspicion' that Turkey could use it to begin producing nuclear weapons. (AP, 26/11)

#### h. Nuclear Material Trafficking and Physical Security

- The failure of a transformer in the Kozloduy nuclear power plant in **Bulgaria** has been blamed on sabotage. The event occurred on 5 November but only became known four days later. Government officials deny reports that a police investigation is underway but the country's Deputy Prime Minister has said that the incident might have been staged to create political tension. (BTA news agency [Sofia], 9/11, in BBC, 9/11; SDZ, 10/11; NZZ, 11/11)
- Police in **China** are reported to have arrested two persons in possession of a container of 'radioactive material', which turned out to be radium. A further small quantity of radium was found in a rubbish bin. (Xinjian Ribao, 11/11, in BBC, 3/12)
- The head of the Atomic Energy Authority of **Turkey** has denied a report that was said to have reached Interpol and the IAEA in September, about the capture of a substantial amount of plutonium in that country. The first report was that Turkish police had seized 20 kg of uranium and up to 10 kg of plutonium; in later accounts the amount of plutonium seized was given as a quarter ounce. The individuals involved were said to be Kazakh nationals. (NF, 19/10)
- The **United States** plans to work with the **Russian Federation** in training customs officers in the identification and capture of smugglers of nuclear material. As part of the cooperation between the two countries under the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme (see below, page 21) the US Customs Service will train Russian customs personnel at the DoE's nuclear reservation at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in Pasco, Wash. The US also plans to give Russia x-ray detection vans. Two working groups have been set up to develop

strategies for stopping attempts at smuggling nuclear material out of the former Soviet Union.

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) has announced that it has prevented the theft of 18.5 kg of radioactive material from a nuclear facility at Chelyabinsk. The only indication about the nature of the material was that it 'might have been used for production of components for nuclear weapons'; it appears that facility personnel were involved.

(US Customs Service Press Release, 4/11; NYT, 5/11; IT, 18/12)

- A German radiation health specialist employed by a reactor-safety consulting firm was detained in **Ukraine** when he was trying to take a small amount of radioactive material out of the country in his luggage. There was a suggestion that the material came from inside the Chernobyl sarcophagus. After a detention of several weeks, the man was allowed to proceed to Germany when it turned out that the material in question was a very small quantity of slightly radioactive zirconium and the transport did not constitute a violation of Ukrainian safety standards. (NW, 5/11, 19/11)

#### i. Environmental Issues

- Suggestions made in the US that **Australia** should make desert land available for the safe and long-term storage of nuclear material from dismantled weapons have given rise to strongly negative reactions in that country's media. (*Australian*, 8/12, 9/12).
- In **France**, two new cases were reported of radioactive contamination of fuel casks. Apparently, the casks involved had been waiting for several months and had not been subjected to the newly introduced cleaning procedures. (NW, 1/10)
- In the **Russian Federation**, court proceedings were resumed against former naval captain Aleksandr Nikitin, who was accused of high treason after he gave the Norwegian environmental organisation 'Bellona' information on nuclear pollution in the Kola peninsula, caused by the disposal of nuclear submarine fuel. Nikitin has been the object of persistent harassment by law enforcement authorities and his legal defence is frustrated by the fact that neither he nor his lawyers have been allowed to see the charges against him. At the start of the proceedings — said to be the seventh court action brought against Nikitin — foreign reporters were removed from the court room at gunpoint. This time the court rejected the charges on the ground that the evidence presented was not sufficient to support the accusation, but it allowed the investigation into the allegation that Mr. Nikitin has betrayed state secrets to continue. He remains under house arrest.

Another Russian environmental activist, former naval officer Grigori Pasko, who informed Japanese TV about dumping of nuclear waste by the Russian navy, has been in a Vladivostok jail for over a year, also on charges of treason; his defence is organised by groups seeking greater press freedom in Russia.

(StV, 8/10; G, 21/10, 30/10; IHT, 21/10; NW, 22/10; FT, 30/10; R, 3/11; NS, 7/11; FR, 12/11; *Moscow Times*, 27/11)

- In **Russia**, there are said to be about 170 former Soviet submarines awaiting dismantling. This is to be done by MINATOM, which is already responsible for defuelling. The costs of disposing of one submarine is said to be the equivalent of \$5-to- \$7 million, and MINATOM is reportedly looking for the equivalent of \$2 billion to do most of the job. The US government has promised to finance the dismantling of 30 strategic submarines.

Trials have begun on the Pacific coast of Russia of a floating processor of liquid nuclear waste from naval reactors. The facility is constructed as a joint Russian and American project. Currently, 15,000 tons of liquid waste from Russian atomic submarines is said to be stored at Pacific fleet ports. A similar facility is nearing completion at Murmansk; this is also sponsored by the US government.

The Russian military are reported to deny access to western civilians who are supposed to work with Russian technicians on the clean-up of spent nuclear fuel and waste at a military base in the Kola peninsula. At present, the work is said to be done by Russians and monitored by Norwegians through video and still photography.

(NF, 16/11; NW, 26/11, 24/12)

- **United Kingdom:** the specially built and reinforced nuclear transport ship *Pacific Crane* demonstrated its ability to withstand injury, when it was rammed by a ship twice its size and weight while moored; it sustained only minor superficial damage above the water line. (SF, 2/11)

#### j. Miscellaneous

- **Russia's** Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, has reappointed Yevgeny Adamov as Minister for Atomic Affairs. (NF, 5/10)
- **Russia:** A report in the US press alleges that in August 1985, a nuclear incident occurred during the refuelling of a Soviet submarine in the Pacific port of Chazma. Apparently, as a result of a bow wave created by a passing torpedo boat, a reactor core fell from its hoist and exploded, causing ten fatalities and radiation injuries to 290 sailors. The event, which had not been divulged until recently, is seen as a warning for the consequences that might arise from explosions on board of the many decommissioned nuclear submarines of the Soviet fleet in ports around the country. (StV, 18/11)
- On 1 October, the **United States** DoD set up a Defense Threat Reduction Agency, combining the Defense Special Weapons Agency, the On-Site Inspection Agency, and the Defense Technology Security Administration. The main task of the new agency is understood to be to deal with threats of new weapons of mass destruction and to streamline the work of the various bodies that were set up in the past to do so, in particular with regard to the former USSR and its allies. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency will also deal with the DPRK, Iran and Iraq, as well as with terrorism. (AP, 1/10)
- The **United States** budget appropriation for fiscal year 1999 provides for the abolition by 1 April 1999 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the United States Information Agency (USIA) as independent agencies, and their absorption into the State Department. The move, which was long expected, is seen



as a triumph for Republicans, in particular Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Helms, who sought a reduction of the government bodies dealing with foreign affairs. Washington sources are quoted, however, as saying that although some lay-offs may be expected, the move is more a reorganisation than a downsizing. ACDA Director John Holum has been nominated to become Under-Secretary of State. (NYT, 23/10; **Carnegie**, 27/10; **direct information**)

## II. PPNN Activities

- PPNN's Core Group held its twenty-fourth semi-annual meeting at the Pocantico Conference Center of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Pocantico Hills, New York, from Thursday 29 October to Sunday 1 November. All were present, except Grigori Berdennikov, Martine Letts and Sverre Lodgaard.

The Core Group devoted the afternoon of Friday 30 October to a discussion on the nuclear situation in South Asia following the nuclear tests. Invited participants included Munir Akram (Pakistan's Ambassador to the CD in Geneva), Nazir Kamal, (Visiting Research Scholar from Pakistan, Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque), Savitri Kunadi (India's Ambassador to the CD in Geneva) and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, India (Visiting Fellow from India, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University).

From Friday 30 October to Sunday 1 November the PPNN Core Group convened a small international workshop for senior government officials on **Prospects for the 1999 PrepCom Session for the 2000 NPT Review Conference**. This was a follow-up to the meeting organised jointly by PPNN and the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute of International Studies at the Chilworth Conference Centre of the University of Southampton, UK during 29-31 May 1998 to analyse the consequences of the 1998 PrepCom Sessions and the nuclear tests in South Asia. The workshop was chaired by Ben Sanders, Executive Chairman of PPNN, and attended by 28 diplomats, officials and researchers from 22 countries.

The workshop was divided into six main sessions. Session 1, on **Recommendations from the 1999 PrepCom Session to the 2000 NPT Review Conference: Procedural and Organisational Issues** was opened by a series of short introductory comments from Hannelore Hoppe, Peter Goosen and Tariq Rauf. Session 2 on **Recommendations from the 1999 PrepCom Session to the 2000 NPT Review Conference: Peaceful Uses, Safeguards and Export Controls** started similarly with short interventions from Raja Adnan, Jiri Beranek and Hamid Baidi-Nejad. Session 3 covered **Recommendations from the 1999 PrepCom Session to the 2000 NPT Review Conference: Disarmament**, and was initiated by short introductory comments from John Campbell and Fan Guoxiang. The final session on the first day, Session 4, **Recommendations from the 1999 PrepCom Session to the 2000 NPT Review Conference: The Middle East, Universality, Security Assurances and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones** was introduced by short presentations from Mohmoud Kareem, Lewis Dunn and Olu Adeniji.

On the final day, two further sessions were held. **Session 5, The 1999 PrepCom: how should it be organised?** was introduced by short statements by Akira Hayashi, Markku Reimaa and Eugeniusz Wyzner. Finally **Session 6, on The Way Forward: Some Conclusions** started with brief presentations from Harald Müller, Hazairin Pohan and Norman Wulf.

- PPNN plans to hold its twenty-fifth Core group meeting at the Chauncey Conference Center, near Princeton, New Jersey, from Thursday 11 to Sunday 15 March 1999. This will be combined with a Briefing Seminar for government officials likely to participate in the 1999 session of the PrepCom for the 2000 NPT Conference.

## III. Recent Publications

### Books

Samina Ahmed and David Cortright, Eds., with contributions by Zahid Hussain, Zia Mian, Perves Hoodbhoy, *Pakistan and the Bomb*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 158 pp.

James Brown, [ed.] with contributions by Alexei G. Arbatov, Eric Arnett, José M. Bustani, Joseph Cirincione, Thérèse Delpech, Ralph Earle II, Vignleik Eide, Gerald L. Epstein, Nabil Fahmy, Richard A. Falkenrath, Harold A. Feiveson, Camille Grand, John D. Holum, Steve Kádner, Stephen Ledogar, Michael Nacht, Alessandro Politi, Brian Rees, John C. Reppert, Amy Sands, Elizabeth Turpin, Sha Zukang, *New Horizons and New Strategies in Arms Control*, Eighth International Arms Control Conference, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, April, 388 pp.

Stephen J. Cimbala, *The Past and Future of Nuclear Deterrence*, London, 234 pp.

Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, Columbia University Press, New York, 470 pp.

George L. Rueckert, *On-Site Inspection in Theory and Practice: A Primer on Modern Arms Control Regimes*, Praeger, London, 275 pp.

Ramesh Thakur, [ed.], with contributions by Izhar Ibrahim, Kanti Bajpai, Tariq Rauf, Brad Roberts, J. Soedjati Djiwandono, Masao Takoma, Andrew Mack, Ralph A. Cossa, John Simpson, *Keeping Proliferation at Bay*, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, 132 pp.

### Articles

Victor Alessi and Ronald F. Lehman II, 'Science in the Pursuit of Peace: The Success and Future of the ISTC', *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 28, No. 5, June/July, pp. 16-22.

'Ambassador Richard Butler: Keeping Iraq's Disarmament on Track', An Interview with UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler, *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 28, No. 6, August/September, pp. 3-7.

Asher Arian, 'Public Opinion and Nuclear Weapons', *Strategic Assessment*, Vol. 1, No. 3, November, pp. 8-11.

Dipankar Banerjee, 'Evolving a Nuclear Policy', *Journal of the United Service Institution of India Journal*, Vol. 128, No. 533, July-September, pp. 382-393.

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Nicola Butler, 'Disarmament Issues in the UK Parliament', *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No. 31, October, pp. 15-19.

Jacqueline Cabasso, 'Nuclear Hypocrisy: New Weapons Development and Anti-Disarmament Policies in the US', *INESAP Information Bulletin*, No. 16, November, pp. 37-39.

Joseph Cirincione, 'Nuclear Free Fall?', *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 1, Winter 1999, pp. 17-22.

Jonathan Dean, 'Step-By-Step Control Over Ballistic and Cruise Missiles', *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No. 31, October, pp. 2-11.

'Dividing the Atom: Essays on the History of Nuclear Sharing and Nuclear Proliferation', *Storia Delle Relazioni Internazionali*, (Special Issue), January, 271 pp.



EC/IAEA/NEA, Compendium of papers presented at Sixth Advanced Training Seminar on Nuclear Law, 'The Rules Governing International Transfers of Nuclear and Nuclear-Related Material, Equipment and Technology, and the Transport of Radioactive Materials', Tallin 24-28 August, unnumbered pages.

Richard L. Garwin, 'The Rumsfeld Report: What we did', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 54, No. 6, November/December, pp. 40-45.

Lisbeth Gronlund and David Wright, 'The Rumsfeld Report: What they didn't do', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 54, No. 6, November/December, pp. 46-51.

Harold Hough, 'Israel Reviews Its Nuclear Deterrent', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 10, No. 11, November, pp. 11-13.

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Nazir Kamal and Pravin Sawhney, 'Missile Control in South Asia and the Role of Cooperative Monitoring Technology', *Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper*, Sandia National Laboratories, No. 4, October, 66 pp.

Bharat Karnard, 'Going Thermonuclear: Why, with What Forces, at What Cost', *Journal of the United Service Institution of India Journal*, Vol. 128, No. 533, July-September, pp. 310-337.

Daryl G. Kimball, 'Holding the CTBT Hostage in the Senate: The 'Stealth' Strategy of Helms and Lott', *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 28, No. 5, June/July, pp. 3-9.

Lawrence Korb, 'The Quiet Bomb', Review of Avner Cohen's *Israel and the Bomb*, in *New York Times*, 1/11.

Michael Kraig, 'The Bug in the Bomb: The Impact of the Year 2000 Problem on Nuclear Weapons', *Basic Research Reports*, March, No. 98/6, 32 pp.

Andrew F. Krepnevich and Steven M. Kosiak, 'Smarter bombs, fewer nukes', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 54, No. 6, November/December, pp. 26-32.

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Zia Mian, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Descent', *inesap Information Bulletin*, No. 16, November, pp. 10-11.

Tom Milne and Henrietta Wilson, 'Aldermaston and nuclear disarmament', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 54, No. 6, November/December, pp. 24-25.

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K. Nair, 'National Security: Strategic Command and Control Structures', *Journal of the United Service Institution of India Journal*, Vol. 128, No. 533, July-September, pp. 348-359.

Thomas L. Neff, 'Privatizing US National Security: The US-Russian HEU Deal At Risk', *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 28, No. 6, August/September, pp. 8-14.

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R. Sharma, 'The National Security Environment and Nuclearisation', *Journal of the United Service Institution of India Journal*, Vol. 128, No. 533, July-September, pp. 338-347.

Jaswant Singh, 'Against Nuclear Apartheid', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 5, September/October, pp. 41-52.

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## IV. Documentation

### a. Security Council resolution 1205 (1998) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait

[Adopted by the Security Council at its 39th meeting, on 5 November 1998]

*The Security Council,*

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the situation in Iraq, in particular its resolution 1154 (1998) of 2 March 1998 and 1194 (1998) of 9 September 1998,

Noting with alarm the decision of Iraq on 31 October 1998 to cease cooperation with the United Nations Special Commission, and its continued restrictions on the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),

Noting the letters from the Deputy Executive Chairman of the Special Commission of 31 October 1998 (S/1998/1023) and

from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission of 2 November 1998 (S/1998/1032) to the President of the Security Council, which reported to the Council the decision by Iraq and described the implications of that decision for the work of the Special Commission, and *noting also* the letter from the Director General of the IAEA of 3 November 1998 (S/1998/1033, annex) which described the implications of the decision for the work of the IAEA,

*Determined* to ensure immediate and full compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 and the other relevant resolutions,

*Recalling* that the effective operation of the Special Commission and the IAEA is essential for the implementation of resolution 687 (1991), *Reaffirming* its readiness to consider, in a comprehensive review, Iraq's compliance with its obligations under all relevant resolutions once Iraq has rescinded its above-mentioned decision and its decision of 5 August 1998 and demonstrated that it is prepared to fulfil all its obligations, including in particular on disarmament issues, by resuming full cooperation with the Special Commission and the IAEA consistent with the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the Secretary-General on 23 February 1998 (S/1998/166), endorsed by the Council in resolution 1154 (1998), *Reiterating* the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Condemns* the decision by Iraq of 31 October 1998 to cease cooperation with the Special Commission as a flagrant violation of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions;

2. *Demands* that Iraq rescind immediately and unconditionally the decision of 31 October 1998, as well as the decision of 5 August 1998, to suspend cooperation with the Special Commission and to maintain restrictions on the work of the IAEA, and that Iraq provide immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation with the Special Commission and the IAEA;

3. *Reaffirms* its full support for the Special Commission and the IAEA in their efforts to ensure the implementation of their mandates under the relevant resolutions of the Council;

4. *Expresses* its full support for the Secretary-General in his efforts to seek full implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding of 23 February 1998;

5. *Reaffirms* its intention to act in accordance with the relevant provisions of resolution 687 (1991) on the duration of the prohibitions referred to in that resolution, and *notes* that by its failure so far to comply with its relevant obligations Iraq has delayed the moment when the Council can do so;

6. *Decides*, in accordance with its primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, to remain actively seized of the matter.

**b. Annex to Letter from Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz of Iraq to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 14 November**

[Source: text as broadcast by the official television station of the Iraqi Government.]

The objective that Iraq sought to achieve through its two decisions on 5 August and on 31 October was not to sever ties with UNSCOM and the IAEA, or to stop fulfilling its commitments as stipulated in Section C of Resolution 687 and in Resolution 715.

Iraq's objective is to end the suffering of its people, who are facing an embargo, and to implement Paragraph 22 of Resolution 687 as first step toward lifting the other embargoes.

I. Iraq has demonstrated its readiness to enter the comprehensive review proposed by the secretary general; however, the results yielded by the deliberations of the Council, under US pressure, do not guarantee a fair and objective review, whose objective is to implement Paragraph 22.

II. Iraq's position of the issue of the comprehensive review is as follows:

i. That the review should take place within a very short period of time, seven days for example, after the UNSCOM and IAEA

resume their normal activity. This should take place without any conditions, as those that were mentioned in the past on the so-called verification of Iraq's cooperation.

ii. That the review should principally be based on Paragraph Three of the UN secretary general's concept on 15 October, the three Iraqi questions on 3 August, and underlining the issue of evidence.

iii. The UNSC should be ready to implement Paragraph 22 if proved that the requirements of Section C of Resolution 687 had been met.

iv. Should the UNSC decide, based on an objective examination that something needs to be done, a short period of time will be specified to do that. Until the said work is achieved, the UNSC will implement measures to lift or reduce the sanctions-measures that are commensurate with what has been achieved of the requirement of Paragraph 22. After the achievement of the required work, the UNSC should start the implementation of Paragraph 22.

v. The UNSC should adhere to the legal interpretation of Section C of Resolution 687. None of the UNSC's members should impose additional conditions or restrictions to the implementation of Paragraph 22.

The UNSC should not start the second revision until after reaching the conclusion regarding the first revision.

1. The second revision should be restricted to the obligations stipulated in clear texts in the resolutions. No issues other than the legal interpretation of the resolutions should be raised.

2. The UNSC members, particularly the five permanent ones, should abide by the international law and the UNSC's resolutions pertaining to all of Iraq's issues.

3. The issue of Butler and the makeup and practices of UNSCOM is very important. The UNSC should look into this issue seriously in order to guarantee good relations in the future. We hope that this will be done as soon as possible.

4. It is necessary that these assurances be directly relayed to the leadership in Baghdad either by the secretary general or a UNSC delegation.

The meeting was attended by the speaker of the National Assembly, the head of the Presidential Office, and the ministers of foreign affairs and culture and information.

**c. Press Release SC/6596, IK/258: 'Security Council notes agreement of Iraq to rescind earlier decisions, allow resumption of UNSCOM and IAEA activities', 15 November**

This is the text of a statement to the Press this evening by the President of the Security Council, Peter Burchick (United States), following consultations among Council members:

Members of the Council noted the statements contained in the letter of 14 November to the Secretary-General from the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, as clarified by the subsequent letters of 14 November to the President of the Council from the Ambassador of Iraq, that Iraq has decided, clearly and unconditionally, to cooperate fully with the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that this decision constitutes a rescinding of the decisions of 5 August and 31 October, and that Iraq's cooperation with the Special Commission and the IAEA will allow the return of inspectors to resume all their activities on an immediate, unconditional and restricted basis, in accordance with the relevant resolutions and with the Memorandum of Understanding of 23 February 1998.

Council members expressed their profound appreciation to the Secretary-General for his efforts, which has been fully supported by the statements and actions of the Security Council and of Member States.

Taking note of past experience with Iraq, Council members underlined that their confidence in Iraq's intentions needs to be established by unconditional and sustained cooperation with the Special Commission and the IAEA in exercising the full range of their activities provided for in their mandates in accordance with the relevant resolutions and the Memorandum of Understanding of 23 February 1998.

Council members expressed support for a full, immediate and effective implementation of the humanitarian programme in Iraq.

Council members reaffirmed their readiness to proceed with a comprehensive review, once the Secretary-General has confirmed, on the basis of reports from the Special Commission and the IAEA, that Iraq's has returned to full cooperation, on the basis of resolution 1194 (1998) and the Council President's letter of 30 October to the Secretary-General.

The Security Council remains actively seized of this matter.

#### d. General Assembly Resolutions

##### **A/RES/53/77 G — Nuclear testing**

*The General Assembly,*

*Reaffirming* that the cessation of all nuclear testing will contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament leading to the ultimate objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and therefore to the further enhancement of international peace and security,

*Also reaffirming* its commitment to and the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and as essential foundations for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament,

*Convinced* that all States that have not yet done so should adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions,

*Sharing the alarm* expressed internationally, regionally and nationally, at recent nuclear tests,

*Recalling* Security Council resolution 1172 (1998), adopted unanimously on 6 June 1998,

1. *Expresses* grave concern over and strongly deplores the recent nuclear tests conducted in South Asia;

2. *Notes* that the States concerned have declared moratoriums on further testing and have said that they are willing to enter into legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear tests, and reiterates the need for such legal commitments to be expressed in legal form by signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

##### **A/RES/53/77 U — Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 49/75 H of 15 December 1994, 50/70 C of 12 December 1995, 51/45 G of 10 December 1996 and 52/38 K of 9 December 1997,

*Bearing in mind* the recent nuclear tests which pose a challenge to international efforts to strengthen the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

*Looking forward* to the early entry into force of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), and welcoming the joint statement on parameters for the future reduction of nuclear forces, issued by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation,

*Welcoming* the efforts of other nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals, most recently that of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

*Welcoming also* the accession by Brazil to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

*Reaffirming* the conviction that further advancement in nuclear disarmament will contribute to consolidating the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation ensuring international peace and security,

*Welcoming* the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee which shall negotiate on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

1. *Reaffirms* the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and calls upon States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it without delay and without conditions;

2. *Reaffirms also* the importance for all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty;

3. *Calls* for the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control;

4. *Recognizes* that, in order to achieve the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, it is important and necessary to pursue such actions as:

(a) The early signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by all States with a view to its early entry into force, and cessation of nuclear tests pending its entry into force;

(b) The early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator and the mandate contained therein;

(c) Multilateral discussions on possible future steps on nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation;

(d) The early entry into force of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) and the early commencement and conclusion of negotiations for START III by the Russian Federation and the United States of America;

(e) Further efforts by the five nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally and through their negotiations;

5. *Invites* the nuclear-weapon States to keep the States Members of the United Nations duly informed of the progress or efforts made towards nuclear disarmament;

6. *Welcomes* the ongoing efforts in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, and notes the importance of the safe and effective management of the resultant fissile materials;

7. *Calls upon* all States to redouble their efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, *inter alia*, nuclear weapons, confirming and strengthening if necessary their policies not to export equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to the proliferation of those weapons;

8. *Also calls upon* all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to make their best efforts for the success of the next Review Conference, which will be held in 2000;

9. *Encourages* continued serious discussions on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament in appropriate forums.

##### **A/RES/53/77 W — Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 49/75 K of 15 December 1994, 51/45 M of 10 December 1996 and 52/38 O of 9 December 1997,

*Convinced* that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all humanity and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for all life on Earth, and recognizing that the only defence against a nuclear catastrophe is the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the certainty that they will never be produced again,

*Reaffirming* the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free world,

*Mindful* of the solemn obligations of States parties, undertaken in article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, particularly to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,

*Recalling* the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the objective of determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons,

*Recalling also* the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in its resolution 50/245 of 10 September 1996, and expressing its satisfaction at the increasing number of States that have signed and ratified the Treaty,

*Recognizing with satisfaction* that the Antarctic Treaty and the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba are gradually freeing the entire southern hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those treaties from nuclear weapons,

*Noting* the efforts by the States possessing the largest inventories of nuclear weapons to reduce their stockpiles of such weapons through bilateral and unilateral agreements or arrangements, and calling for the intensification of such efforts to accelerate the significant reduction of nuclear-weapon arsenals,

*Recognizing* the need for a multilaterally negotiated and legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons,

*Reaffirming* the central role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, and regretting the lack of progress in disarmament negotiations, particularly nuclear disarmament, in the Conference on Disarmament during its 1998 session,

*Emphasizing* the need for the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time,

*Desiring* to achieve the objective of a legally binding prohibition of the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, threat or use of nuclear weapons and their destruction under effective international control,

*Recalling* the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, issued on 8 July 1996,

*Taking note* of the relevant portions of the report of the Secretary-General relating to the implementation of resolution 52/38 O,

1. *Underlines once again* the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control;

2. *Calls once again upon* all States to immediately fulfil that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations in 1999 leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination;

3. *Requests* all States to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the present resolution and nuclear disarmament, and requests the Secretary-General to apprise the General Assembly of that information at its fifty-fourth session;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session the item entitled 'Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*'.

#### **A/RES/53/77 X — Nuclear disarmament**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 49/75 E of 15 December 1994 on a step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat, and its resolutions 50/70 P of 12 December 1995, 51/45 O of 10 December 1996 and 52/38 L of 9 December 1997 on nuclear disarmament,

*Reaffirming* the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world,

*Bearing in mind* that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 1972 and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on

Their Destruction of 1993 have already established legal regimes on the complete prohibition of biological and chemical weapons, respectively, and determined to achieve a nuclear weapons convention on the prohibition of the development, testing, production, stockpiling, loan, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, and to conclude such an international convention at an early date,

*Recognizing* that there now exist conditions for the establishment of a world free of nuclear weapons,

*Bearing in mind* paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, calling for the urgent negotiation of agreements for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, and for a comprehensive and phased programme with agreed time-frames, wherever feasible, for the progressive and balanced reduction of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time,

*Reiterating* the highest priority accorded to nuclear disarmament in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and by the international community,

*Recognizing* that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and any proposed treaty on fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices must constitute disarmament measures, and not only non-proliferation measures, and that these measures, together with an international legal instrument on the joint undertaking of no first use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States and on adequate security assurances of non-use and non-threat of use of such weapons for non-nuclear-weapon States, respectively, and an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, should be integral measures in a programme leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time,

*Welcoming* the entry into force of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, to which Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America are States parties,

*Welcoming also* the conclusion of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms by the Russian Federation and the United States of America and the ratification of that Treaty by the United States of America, and looking forward to the full implementation of the START I and START II Treaties by the States parties, and to further concrete steps for nuclear disarmament by all the nuclear-weapon States,

*Noting with appreciation* the unilateral measures by the nuclear-weapon States for nuclear arms limitation, and encouraging them to undertake further such measures,

*Recognizing* the complementarity of bilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, and that bilateral negotiations can never replace multilateral negotiations in this respect,

*Noting* the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the multilateral efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to reach agreement on such an international convention at an early date,

*Recalling* the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, issued on 8 July 1996, and welcoming the unanimous reaffirmation by all States to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,

*Mindful* of paragraph 114 and other relevant recommendations in the Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, held at Durban, South Africa, from 29 August to 3 September 1998, calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee to commence negotiations in 1998 on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time,

*Bearing in mind* the proposal of twenty-eight delegations to the Conference on Disarmament that are members of the Group of



21 for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and expressing its conviction that this proposal will be an important input and will contribute to negotiations on this question in the Conference,

*Commending* the initiative by twenty-six delegations to the Conference on Disarmament that are members of the Group of 21 proposing a comprehensive mandate for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, which includes negotiations for, as a first step, a universal and legally binding multilateral agreement committing all States to the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, an agreement on further steps required in a phased programme with time-frames leading to the total elimination of these weapons and a convention on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices taking into account the report of the Special Coordinator on that item and the views relating to the scope of the treaty,

*Taking note* of the declaration issued on 9 June 1998 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, entitled 'Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda', supported and responded to by a number of States including some members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries,

1. *Recognizes* that, in view of recent political developments, the time is now opportune for all the nuclear-weapon States to undertake effective disarmament measures with a view to the total elimination of these weapons with a specified framework of time;

2. *Recognizes also* that there is a genuine need to de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons and to review and revise nuclear doctrines accordingly;

3. *Urges* the nuclear-weapon States to stop immediately the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems;

4. *Also urges* the nuclear-weapon States, as an interim measure, to immediately de-alert and deactivate their nuclear weapons;

5. *Calls* for the conclusion, as a first step, of a universal and legally binding multilateral agreement committing all States to the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons;

6. *Reiterates its call upon* the nuclear-weapon States to undertake the step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and to carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures with a view to the total elimination of these weapons with a specified framework of time;

7. *Calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States, pending the achievement of a total ban on nuclear weapons through a nuclear-weapons convention, to agree on an internationally and legally binding instrument of the joint undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and calls upon all States to conclude an internationally and legally binding instrument on security assurances of non-use and threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States;

8. *Welcomes* the establishment in the Conference on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prohibition of the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons and other Nuclear Explosive Devices and urges a speedy conclusion of a universal and non-discriminatory convention thereon, and also welcomes the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and urges the pursuit of efforts in this regard as a matter of priority;

9. *Expresses its concern* at the continuing opposition by some nuclear-weapon States to the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament, as called for in General Assembly resolution 52/38 L;

10. *Reiterates its call upon* the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations early in 1999 on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time through a nuclear weapons convention;

11. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to take into account in this regard the proposal of the twenty-eight delegations for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons, as

well as the mandate for the ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, proposed by the twenty-six delegations;

12. *Calls* for the convening of an international conference on nuclear disarmament at an early date with the objective of arriving at an agreement on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time through a nuclear weapons convention;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

14. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session the item entitled 'Nuclear disarmament'.

#### **A/RES/53/77 Y — Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda**

*The General Assembly,*

*Alarmed* by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons,

*Concerned* at the prospect of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons,

*Concerned also* at the continued retention of the nuclear-weapons option by those three States that are nuclear-weapons capable and that have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

*Believing* that the proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used accidentally or by decision defies credibility, and that the only complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and the assurance that they will never be produced again,

*Concerned* that the nuclear-weapon States have not fulfilled speedily and totally their commitment to the elimination of their nuclear weapons,

*Concerned also* that those three States that are nuclear-weapons capable and that have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have failed to renounce their nuclear-weapons option,

*Bearing in mind* that the overwhelming majority of States entered into legally binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that these undertakings have been made in the context of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament,

*Recalling* the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice in its 1996 advisory opinion that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,

*Stressing* that the international community must not enter the third millennium with the prospect that the possession of nuclear weapons will be considered legitimate for the indefinite future, and convinced that the present juncture provides a unique opportunity to proceed to prohibit and eradicate them for all time,

*Recognizing* that the total elimination of nuclear weapons will require measures to be taken firstly by those nuclear-weapon States that have the largest arsenals, and stressing that these States must be joined in a seamless process by those nuclear-weapon States with lesser arsenals in the near future,

*Welcoming* the achievements to date and the future promise of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks process and the possibility it offers for development as a plurilateral mechanism including all the nuclear-weapon States, for the practical dismantling and destruction of nuclear armaments undertaken in pursuit of the elimination of nuclear weapons,

*Believing* that there are a number of practical steps that the nuclear-weapon States can and should take immediately before the actual elimination of nuclear arsenals and the development of requisite verification regimes take place, and, in this connection, noting certain recent unilateral and other steps,

*Welcoming* the agreement recently reached in the Conference on Disarmament on the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee under item 1 of its agenda entitled 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament', to negotiate, on the basis of the



report of the Special Coordinator and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and considering that such a treaty must further underpin the process towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons,

*Emphasizing* that, for the total elimination of nuclear weapons to be achieved, effective international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is vital and must be enhanced through, *inter alia*, the extension of international controls over all fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

*Emphasizing* the importance of existing nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and of the signature and ratification of the relevant protocols to these treaties,

*Noting* the Joint Ministerial Declaration of 9 June 1998 and its call for a new international agenda to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world, through the pursuit, in parallel, of a series of mutually reinforcing measures at the bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral levels,

1. *Calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to the speedy and total elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and, without delay, to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to the elimination of these weapons, thereby fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

2. *Calls upon* the United States and the Russian Federation to bring the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) into force without further delay and immediately thereafter to proceed with negotiations on START III with a view to its early conclusion;

3. *Calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States to undertake the necessary steps towards the seamless integration of all five nuclear-weapon States into the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons;

4. *Also calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States to pursue vigorously the reduction of reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons and negotiations on their elimination as an integral part of their overall nuclear disarmament activities;

5. *Further calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States, as an interim measure, to proceed to the de-alerting of their nuclear weapons and, in turn, to the removal of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles;

6. *Urges* the nuclear-weapon States to examine further interim measures, including measures to enhance strategic stability and accordingly to review strategic doctrines;

7. *Calls upon* those three States that are nuclear-weapon capable and that have not yet acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to clearly and urgently reverse the pursuit of all nuclear weapons development or deployment and to refrain from any action which could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation;

8. *Calls upon* those States that have not yet done so to adhere unconditionally and without delay to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to take all the necessary measures which flow from adherence to this instrument;

9. *Also calls upon* those States that have not yet done so to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the Model Protocol approved by the Board of Governors of the Agency on 15 May 1997;

10. *Further calls upon* those States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify, unconditionally and without delay, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and, pending the Treaty's entry into force, to observe a moratorium on nuclear tests;

11. *Calls upon* those States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to work towards its further strengthening;

12. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to pursue its negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee established under item I of its agenda entitled 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and

nuclear disarmament', on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator and the mandate contained therein, of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into consideration both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament objectives, and to conclude these negotiations without delay, and, pending the entry into force of the treaty, urges States to observe a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

13. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to establish an appropriate subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament and, to that end, to pursue as a matter of priority its intensive consultations on appropriate methods and approaches with a view to reaching such a decision without delay;

14. *Considers* that an international conference on nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, which would effectively complement efforts being undertaken in other settings, could facilitate the consolidation of a new agenda for a nuclear-weapon-free world;

15. *Recalls* the importance of the decisions and resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and underlines the importance of implementing fully the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty;

16. *Affirms* that the development of verification arrangements will be necessary for the maintenance of a world free from nuclear weapons, and requests the International Atomic Energy Agency, together with any other relevant international organizations and bodies, to explore the elements of such a system;

17. *Calls* for the conclusion of an internationally legally binding instrument to effectively assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

18. *Stresses* that the pursuit, extension and establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at, especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia, represent a significant contribution to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world;

19. *Affirms* that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments;

20. *Requests* the Secretary-General, within existing resources, to compile a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

21. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session the item entitled 'Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda', and to review the implementation of the present resolution.

#### **A/RES/53/77 Z — Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its previous relevant resolutions,

*Recognizing* the fundamental changes that have taken place with respect to international security, which have permitted agreements on deep reductions in the nuclear armaments of the States possessing the largest inventories of such weapons,

*Mindful* that it is the responsibility and obligation of all States to contribute to the process of the relaxation of international tension and to the strengthening of international peace and security and, in this connection, to adopt and implement measures towards the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

*Appreciating* a number of positive developments in the field of nuclear disarmament, in particular the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, and the treaties on the reduction and limitation of strategic arms,

*Appreciating also* the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and acknowledging the importance of the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon

States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

*Welcoming* the steps that have already been taken by the Russian Federation and the United States of America to begin the process of reducing the number of nuclear weapons and removing such weapons from a deployed status, and bilateral agreements on detargeting strategic nuclear missiles,

*Noting* the positive climate of relations between the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which permits them to intensify their cooperative efforts to ensure the safety, security, and environmentally sound destruction of nuclear weapons,

*Recalling* the Moscow Summit Declaration on Nuclear Safety and Security of April 1996,

*Urging* early action to complete the ratification of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and further intensification of efforts to accelerate the implementation of agreements and unilateral decisions relating to nuclear arms reduction,

*Appreciating* the joint statement on future reductions in nuclear forces and the joint statement outlining the elements of an agreement for higher-velocity theatre missile defence systems, both issued on 21 March 1997 by the Russian Federation and the United States of America, as well as their joint statement of 10 May 1995 in connection with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,

*Welcoming* the joint statement issued at Helsinki on 21 March 1997, in which the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America reached an understanding that, after the entry into force of START II, their two countries would immediately commence negotiations on a START III agreement, which would include the establishment, by 31 December 2007, of lower aggregate levels of 2,000 to 2,500 deployed warheads,

*Noting with satisfaction* the Protocol to START II, the Joint Agreed Statement, and the Letters on Early Deactivation, agreed to by the Russian Federation and the United States of America in New York on 26 September 1997, which are intended to take further concrete steps to reduce the nuclear danger and strengthen international stability and nuclear safety,

*Welcoming* the signing on 26 September 1997 by Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America of a number of significant agreements that contribute to ensuring the viability of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,

*Welcoming* the significant reductions made by some of the other nuclear-weapon States, and encouraging all nuclear-weapon States to consider appropriate measures relating to nuclear disarmament,

1. *Welcomes* the entry into force of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, including the Protocol to that Treaty signed at Lisbon on 23 May 1992 by the parties thereto, and the exchange of documents of ratification between Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America on 5 December 1994 at Budapest;

2. *Also welcomes* the signing of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms in Moscow on 3 January 1993, and urges the parties to take the steps necessary to bring that Treaty into force at the earliest possible date;

3. *Expresses its satisfaction* with the reductions of strategic offensive arms being carried out in accordance with the 1991 Treaty as well as the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States of America to the 1993 Treaty in January 1996, and expresses its hope that it will soon be possible for the Russian Federation to take corresponding steps to ratify that Treaty and for the United States Senate and the State Duma of the Russian Federation to approve the Protocol to the 1993 Treaty and other documents signed on 26 September 1997, so that START II can enter into force;

4. *Expresses further satisfaction* at the continuing implementation of the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, in particular at the completion by the parties of the destruction of all their declared missiles subject to elimination under the Treaty;

5. *Welcomes* the removal of all nuclear weapons from the territory of Kazakhstan as from 1 June 1995, from the territory of Ukraine as from 1 June 1996, and from the territory of Belarus as from 30 November 1996;

6. *Encourages* Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America to continue their cooperative efforts aimed at eliminating strategic offensive arms on the basis of existing agreements, and welcomes the contributions that other States are making to such cooperation as well;

7. *Welcomes* the participation in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as non-nuclear-weapon States, which thereby provided notable enhancement of the non-proliferation regime;

8. *Welcomes* the initiative signed by Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton on 2 September 1998, contained in the joint statement on the exchange of information on missile launches and early warning, to exchange information on the ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles derived from each side's missile launch warning system, including the possible establishment of a centre for the exchange of missile launch data operated by the Russian Federation and the United States of America and separate from their respective national centres, and takes note of the initiative to examine bilaterally the possibility of establishing a multi-lateral ballistic missile and space launch vehicle pre-launch notification regime in which other States could voluntarily participate;

9. *Welcomes* the September 1998 pledge by the Russian Federation and the United States of America to remove by stages approximately fifty metric tons of plutonium from each of their nuclear weapons programmes, and to convert this material so that it can never be used in nuclear weapons;

10. *Urges* the Russian Federation and the United States of America to commence negotiations on a START III agreement immediately after ratification by the Russian Federation of START II, thereby fulfilling the commitments they undertook in the joint statement issued in Moscow on 2 September 1998;

11. *Encourages and supports* the Russian Federation and the United States of America in their efforts aimed at reducing and eliminating their nuclear weapons on the basis of existing agreements and to continue to give those efforts the highest priority in order to contribute to the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons;

12. *Invites* the Russian Federation and the United States of America to keep other States Members of the United Nations duly informed of progress in their discussions and in the implementation of their strategic offensive arms agreements and unilateral decisions.

#### **A/RES/53/78 D — Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons**

*The General Assembly,*

*Convinced* that the use of nuclear weapons poses the most serious threat to the survival of mankind,

*Bearing in mind* the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*,

*Convinced* that a multilateral, universal and binding agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would contribute to the elimination of the nuclear threat and to the climate for negotiations leading to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, thereby strengthening international peace and security,

*Conscious* that some steps taken by the Russian Federation and the United States of America towards a reduction of their nuclear weapons and the improvement in the international climate can contribute towards the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Recalling that, in paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it is stated that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and that would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming that any use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, as declared in its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979, 35/152 D of 12 December 1980 and 36/92 I of 9 December 1981,

Determined to achieve a universal nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons, leading to their ultimate destruction,

Stressing that an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would be an important step in a phased programme towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, with a specified framework of time,

Noting with regret that the Conference on Disarmament, during its 1998 session, was unable undertake negotiations on this subject as called for in General Assembly resolution 52/39 C of 9 December 1997,

1. Reiterates its request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances;

2. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly on the results of those negotiations.

#### A/RES/53/77 F — Reducing nuclear danger

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that the use of nuclear weapons poses the most serious threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Reaffirming that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would constitute a violation of the Charter of the United Nations,

Convinced that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Considering that until nuclear weapons cease to exist, it is imperative on the part of the Nuclear-Weapon States to adopt measures that assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering also that the hair-trigger alert of nuclear weapons carries unacceptable risks of unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons, which will have catastrophic consequences for all mankind,

Conscious that limited steps relating to detargeting have been taken by the nuclear-weapon States to address this concern and that further steps are necessary to contribute to the improvement in the international climate for negotiations leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons,

Mindful that reduction of tensions brought about by a change in nuclear doctrines would positively impact on international peace and security and improve the conditions for the further reduction and the elimination of nuclear weapons,

Reiterating the highest priority accorded to nuclear disarmament in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and by the international community,

Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons that there exists an obligation for all States to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,

1. Calls for a review of nuclear doctrines and in this context, immediate and urgent steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons;

2. Requests the five nuclear-weapon States to undertake measures towards the implementation of paragraph 1 of the present resolution;

3. Calls upon Member States to take the necessary measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects and to promote nuclear disarmament, with the ultimate objective of eliminating nuclear weapons;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session an item entitled 'Reducing nuclear danger'.

#### A/RES/53/76 — Prevention of an arms race in outer space

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Reaffirming the will of all States that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be for peaceful purposes and shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development,

Reaffirming also provisions of articles III and IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,

Recalling the obligation of all States to observe the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the use or threat of use of force in their international relations, including in their space activities,

Reaffirming paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that in order to prevent an arms race in outer space further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty,

Recalling its previous resolutions on this issue and taking note of the proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session and at its regular sessions, and of the recommendations made to the competent organs of the United Nations and to the Conference on Disarmament,

Recognizing that prevention of an arms race in outer space would avert a grave danger for international peace and security,

Emphasizing the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space, including bilateral agreements, and with the existing legal regime concerning the use of outer space,

Considering that wide participation in the legal regime applicable to outer space could contribute to enhancing its effectiveness,

Noting that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, taking into account its previous efforts since its establishment in 1985 and seeking to enhance its functioning in qualitative terms, continued the examination and identification of various issues, existing agreements and existing proposals, as well as future initiatives relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and that this contributed to a better understanding of a number of problems and to a clearer perception of the various positions,

Noting also that there were no objections in principle in the Conference on Disarmament during its 1997 session to the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee, subject to re-examination of the mandate contained in the decision of the Conference on Disarmament of 13 February 1992,

Emphasizing the mutually complementary nature of bilateral and multilateral efforts in the field of preventing an arms race in outer space, and hoping that concrete results will emerge from those efforts as soon as possible,

Convinced that further measures should be examined in the search for effective and verifiable bilateral and multilateral agreements in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, including the weaponization of outer space,

Stressing that the growing use of outer space increases the need for greater transparency and better information on the part of the international community,

Recalling in this context its previous resolutions, in particular resolutions 45/55 B of 4 December 1990, 47/51 of 9 December 1992 and 48/74 A of 16 December 1993, in which, *inter alia*, it reaffirmed the importance of confidence-building measures as



means conducive to ensuring the attainment of the objective of the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

*Conscious* of the benefits of confidence- and security-building measures in the military field,

*Recognizing* that negotiations for the conclusion of an international agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space remain a priority task of the Ad Hoc Committee and that the concrete proposals on confidence-building measures could form an integral part of such agreements,

1. *Reaffirms* the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space, and the readiness of all States to contribute to that common objective, in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies;

2. *Reaffirms its recognition*, as stated in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, that the legal regime applicable to outer space by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space, that this legal regime plays a significant role in the prevention of an arms race in that environment, that there is a need to consolidate and reinforce that regime and enhance its effectiveness, and that it is important strictly to comply with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral;

3. *Emphasizes* the necessity of further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space;

4. *Calls upon* all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to refrain from actions contrary to that objective and to the relevant existing treaties in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation;

5. *Reiterates* that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

6. *Invites* the Conference on Disarmament to finalize the examination of the mandate contained in its decision of 13 February 1992, with a view to updating it as appropriate, thus providing for the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee during the 1999 session of the Conference on Disarmament;

7. *Recognizes*, in this respect, the growing convergence of views on the elaboration of measures designed to strengthen transparency, confidence and security in the peaceful uses of outer space;

8. *Urges* States conducting activities in outer space, as well as States interested in conducting such activities, to keep the Conference on Disarmament informed of the progress of bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the matter, if any, so as to facilitate its work;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session the item entitled 'Prevention of an arms race in outer space'.

**A/RES/53/77 I — The Conference on Disarmament decision to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament', an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 48/75 L of 16 December 1993,

*Convinced* that a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would be a significant contribution to nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects,

*Noting* the report of the Conference on Disarmament, in which, *inter alia*, the Conference records that in proceeding to take a decision on this matter, that decision is without prejudice to any further decisions on the establishment of further subsidiary bodies under agenda item 1 and that intensive consultations will be pursued to seek the views of the members of the Conference on Disarmament on appropriate methods and approaches for dealing with agenda item 1, taking into consideration all proposals and views in that respect,

1. *Welcomes* the decision by the Conference on Disarmament to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament', an ad hoc committee which shall negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that this ad hoc committee has already engaged in the first step in the substantive negotiations;

3. *Encourages* the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish its ad hoc committee at the beginning of the 1999 session.

**A/RES/53/74 — Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977, 33/64 of 14 December 1978, 34/77 of 11 December 1979, 35/147 of 12 December 1980, 36/87 A and B of 9 December 1981, 37/75 of 9 December 1982, 38/64 of 15 December 1983, 39/54 of 12 December 1984, 40/82 of 12 December 1985, 41/48 of 3 December 1986, 42/28 of 30 November 1987, 43/65 of 7 December 1988, 44/108 of 15 December 1989, 45/52 of 4 December 1990, 46/30 of 6 December 1991, 47/48 of 9 December 1992, 48/71 of 16 December 1993, 49/71 of 15 December 1994, 50/66 of 12 December 1995, 51/41 of 10 December 1996 and 52/34 of 9 December 1997 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

*Recalling also* the recommendations for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, and in particular paragraph 63 (d), of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

*Emphasizing* the basic provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions, which call upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and, pending and during the establishment of such a zone, to declare solemnly that they will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, to agree to place their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to declare their support for the establishment of the zone and to deposit such declarations with the Security Council for consideration, as appropriate,

*Reaffirming* the inalienable right of all States to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

*Emphasizing* the need for appropriate measures on the question of the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities,

*Bearing in mind* the consensus reached by the General Assembly since its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security,

*Desirous* of building on that consensus so that substantial progress can be made towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,

*Welcoming* all initiatives leading to general and complete disarmament, including in the region of the Middle East, and in particular on the establishment therein of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons,

*Noting* the peace negotiations in the Middle East, which should be of a comprehensive nature and represent an appropriate

framework for the peaceful settlement of contentious issues in the region,

*Recognizing* the importance of credible regional security, including the establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone,

*Emphasizing* the essential role of the United Nations in the establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone,

*Having examined* the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 52/34,

1. *Urges* all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

2. *Calls upon* all countries of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

3. *Takes note* of resolution GC(42)RES/43, adopted on 25 September 1998 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its forty-second regular session, concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East;

4. *Notes* the importance of the ongoing bilateral Middle East peace negotiations and the activities of the multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security in promoting mutual confidence and security in the Middle East, including the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

5. *Invites* all countries of the region, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, to declare their support for establishing such a zone, consistent with paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council;

6. *Also invites* those countries, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices;

7. *Invites* the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action that runs counter to both the letter and the spirit of the present resolution;

8. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General;

9. *Invites* all parties to consider the appropriate means that may contribute towards the goal of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region of the Middle East;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to pursue consultations with the States of the region and other concerned States, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 46/30 and taking into account the evolving situation in the region, and to seek from those States their views on the measures outlined in chapters III and IV of the study annexed to his report or other relevant measures, in order to move towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;

11. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

12. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session the item entitled 'Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East'.

#### **A/RES/53/77 A — Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 52/38 of 9 December 1997,

*Further recalling* paragraphs 60, 61, 62 and 64 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 5 and 6 of the decision entitled 'Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and

disarmament' in the Final Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones,

*Convinced* that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones can contribute to the achievement of general and complete disarmament,

*Emphasizing* the importance of internationally recognized agreements on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world and on the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime,

*Considering* that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States within the region and taking into account the special characteristics of the region, can enhance the security of the States involved and strengthen global and regional security and peace,

*Recalling* the Almaty Declaration of the heads of State of the Central Asian States of 28 February 1997 on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, and the statement issued at Tashkent on 15 September 1997 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia,

*Welcoming* the Communiqué of the Consultative Meeting of Experts of the Central Asian Countries, the Nuclear-Weapon States and the United Nations held at Bishkek on 9 and 10 July 1998, with a view to elaborating acceptable ways and means for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia,

*Reaffirming* the generally recognized role of the United Nations in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones,

1. *Calls upon* all States to support the initiative aimed at the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia;

2. *Commends* the first concrete steps taken by the States of the region in preparing the legal groundwork for their initiative;

3. *Encourages* the five Central Asian States to continue their dialogue with the five nuclear-weapon States on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General, within existing resources, to provide assistance to the Central Asian States in the preparation of the form and elements of an agreement on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia;

5. *Decides* to consider the question of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia at its fifty-fourth session under the agenda item entitled 'General and complete disarmament'.

#### **A/RES/53/77 D — Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

*Recalling also* the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

*Welcoming* the decision of Mongolia to declare its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

*Taking note with satisfaction* of the separate statements made by the nuclear-weapon States in connection with Mongolia's declaration of its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

*Bearing in mind* the Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Durban, South Africa, from 29 August to 3 September 1998, in which the Conference welcomed and supported Mongolia's policy to institutionalize its single State nuclear-weapon-free status,

*Proceeding* from the fact that nuclear-weapon-free status is one of the means of ensuring the national security of States,

*Bearing in mind* its resolution 49/31 of 9 December 1994 on the protection and security of small States,

*Welcoming* Mongolia's active and positive role in developing peaceful, friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the States of the region and other States,



*Convinced* that the internationally recognized status of Mongolia will contribute to enhancing stability and confidence-building in the region as well as promote Mongolia's security by strengthening its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders and the preservation of its ecological balance,

1. *Welcomes* the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status;

2. *Endorses and supports* Mongolia's good-neighbourly and balanced relationship with its neighbours as an important element of strengthening regional peace, security and stability;

3. *Invites* Member States, including the five nuclear-weapon States, to cooperate with Mongolia in taking the necessary measures to consolidate and strengthen Mongolia's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders, its economic security, its ecological balance and its nuclear-weapon-free status, as well as its independent foreign policy;

4. *Appeals* to the member States of the Asia and Pacific region to support Mongolia's efforts to join the relevant regional security and economic arrangements;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General and relevant United Nations bodies to provide the necessary assistance to Mongolia, within existing resources, to take the necessary measures mentioned in paragraph 3 above;

6. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the present resolution at its fifty-fifth session;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fifth session an item entitled 'Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status'.

#### **A/RES/53/77 Q — Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 51/45 B of 10 December 1996 and 52/38 N of 9 December 1997,

*Determined* to continue to contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects and to the process of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, in particular in the field of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, with a view to strengthening international peace and security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

*Recalling* the provisions on nuclear-weapon-free zones of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, as well as of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

*Stressing* the importance of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, and Pelindaba, establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as the Antarctic Treaty, to, *inter alia*, the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons, and underlining also the value of enhancing cooperation among the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty members by means of mechanisms such as joint meetings of States parties, signatories and observers to those treaties,

*Recalling* the applicable principles and rules of international law relating to the freedom of the high seas and the rights of passage through maritime space, including those of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,

1. *Welcomes* the continuing contribution that the Antarctic Treaty and the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba are making towards freeing the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those treaties from nuclear weapons;

2. *Calls* for the ratification of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba by all regional States, and calls upon all concerned States to continue to work together in order to facilitate adherence to the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties by all relevant States that have not yet done so;

3. *Welcomes* the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and calls upon all States to consider all relevant proposals, including those reflected in its resolutions on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and South Asia;

4. *Reiterates* the important role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and in extending the areas of the world that are nuclear-weapon-free, and, with particular reference to the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States, calls upon all States to support the process of nuclear disarmament, with the ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons;

5. *Calls upon* the States parties and signatories to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba, in order to pursue the common goals envisaged in those treaties and to promote the nuclear-weapon-free status of the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, to explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation among themselves and their treaty agencies;

6. *Encourages* the competent authorities of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties to provide assistance to the States parties and signatories to such treaties so as to facilitate the accomplishment of these goals;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session the item entitled 'Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas'.

#### **A/RES/53/80 — The risk of proliferation in the Middle East**

*The General Assembly,*

*Bearing in mind* its relevant resolution,

*Taking note* of the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the latest of which is GC(42)RES/43 adopted on 25 September 1998,

*Cognizant* that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region of the Middle East would pose a serious threat to international peace and security,

*Mindful* of the immediate need for placing all nuclear facilities in the region of the Middle East under full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

*Recalling* the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1985 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 11 May 1995, in which the Conference noted with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty and called upon all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place all their nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards,

*Recalling* the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 11 May 1995, in which the Conference urged universal adherence to the Treaty as an urgent priority and called upon all States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities,

*Noting* that, since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 51/48 of 10 December 1996, Israel remains the only State in the Middle East that has not yet become party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

*Concerned* about the threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the security and stability of the Middle East region,

*Stressing* the importance of taking confidence-building measures, in particular the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in order to enhance peace and security in the region and to consolidate the global non-proliferation regime,

*Noting* the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its signature by 187 States, including a number of States in the region,

1. *Calls upon* the only State in the region that is not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accede to the Treaty without further delay and not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, and to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy safeguards as an important confidence-building measure among all States of the region and as a step towards enhancing peace and security;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session on the implementation of the present resolution;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session the item entitled 'The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East'.

**A/RES/53/83 — Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* that in its resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963 it expressed the hope that the States of Latin America would take appropriate measures to conclude a treaty that would prohibit nuclear weapons in Latin America,

*Recalling also* that in the same resolution it voiced its confidence that, once such a treaty was concluded, all States, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would lend it their full cooperation for the effective realization of its peaceful aims,

*Considering* that in its resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965 it established the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between nuclear-weapon States and those which do not possess such weapons,

*Recalling* that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was opened for signature at Mexico City on 14 February 1967,

*Noting with satisfaction* the holding on 14 February 1997 of the eleventh special session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean in commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco,

*Recalling also* that in its preamble the Treaty of Tlatelolco states that military denuclearized zones are not an end in themselves but rather a means for achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage,

*Recalling further* that in its resolution 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967 it welcomed with special satisfaction the Treaty of Tlatelolco as an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security,

*Recalling* that in 1990, 1991 and 1992 the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean approved and opened for signature a set of amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, with the aim of enabling the full entry into force of that instrument,

*Recalling also* resolution C/E/RES.27 of the Council of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, in which the Council called for the promotion of cooperation and consultations with other nuclear-weapon-free zones,

*Noting with satisfaction* that the Treaty of Tlatelolco is now in force for thirty-two sovereign States of the region,

*Also noting with satisfaction* that on 27 March 1998 the Dominican Republic deposited its instrument of ratification of the amendment to the Treaty of Tlatelolco approved by the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean in its resolution 290 (E-VII) of 26 August 1992,

*Further noting with satisfaction* that on 21 August 1998 Guatemala deposited its instrument of ratification of the amendment to the Treaty of Tlatelolco approved by the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

in Latin America and the Caribbean in its resolution 267 (E-V) of 3 July 1990,

*Noting with satisfaction* that the amended Treaty of Tlatelolco is fully in force for Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela,

1. *Welcomes* the concrete steps taken by some countries of the region during the past year for the consolidation of the regime of military denuclearization established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco);

2. *Urges* the countries of the region that have not yet done so to deposit their instruments of ratification of the amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco approved by the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean in its resolutions 267 (E-V), 268 (XII) and 290 (E-VII);

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session the item entitled 'Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)'.

**A/RES/53/75 — Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (negative security assurances)**

*The General Assembly,*

*Bearing in mind* the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

*Convinced* that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

*Welcoming* the progress achieved in recent years in both nuclear and conventional disarmament,

*Noting* that, despite recent progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, further efforts are necessary towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

*Convinced* that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

*Determined* strictly to abide by the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations on the non-use of force or threat of force,

*Recognizing* that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

*Considering* that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures and arrangements to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

*Recognizing* that effective measures and arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can contribute positively to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

*Bearing in mind* paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document,

*Recalling* the relevant parts of the special report of the Committee on Disarmament submitted to the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, and of the special report of the Conference on Disarmament submitted to the Assembly at its fifteenth special session, the third special session devoted to disarmament, as well as the report of the Conference on its 1992 session,

*Recalling also* paragraph 12 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its

resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, which states, *inter alia*, that all efforts should be exerted by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

*Noting* the in-depth negotiations undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, with a view to reaching agreement on this item,

*Taking note* of the proposals submitted under that item in the Conference on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention,

*Taking note also* of the relevant decision of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Durban, South Africa, from 29 August to 3 September 1998, as well as the relevant recommendations of the Organization of the Islamic Conference,

*Taking note further* of the unilateral declarations made by all nuclear-weapon States on their policies of non-use or non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States,

*Noting* the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the difficulties pointed out in evolving a common approach acceptable to all,

*Noting also* the greater willingness to overcome the difficulties encountered in previous years, as manifested in the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the issue by the Conference on Disarmament during the 1998 session and the recommendation of the Conference to establish the Ad Hoc Committee at the beginning of its 1999 session,

*Taking note* of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995 and the views expressed on it,

*Recalling* its relevant resolutions adopted in previous years, in particular resolutions 45/54 of 4 December 1990, 46/32 of 6 December 1991, 47/50 of 9 December 1992, 48/73 of 16 December 1993, 49/73 of 15 December 1994, 50/68 of 12 December 1995, 51/43 of 10 December 1996 and 52/36 of 9 December 1997,

1. *Reaffirms* the urgent need to reach an early agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that in the Conference on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out;

3. *Appeals* to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to work actively towards an early agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character;

4. *Recommends* that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including, in particular, those considered in the Conference on Disarmament, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties;

5. *Recommends also* that the Conference on Disarmament should actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session the item entitled 'Conclusion of effective interna-

tional arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons'.

#### **A/RES/53/77 AA — Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 49/75 I of 15 December 1994, 50/70 F of 12 December 1995, 51/45 C of 10 December 1996 and 52/38 F of 9 December 1997,

*Recalling also* that, there has been a consensus to do so in each case, three special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament were held in 1978, 1982 and 1988, respectively,

*Bearing in mind* the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, adopted by consensus at the first special session devoted to disarmament, which included the Declaration, Programme of Action and Machinery for disarmament,

*Bearing in mind also* the objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

*Welcoming* the recent positive changes in the international landscape, characterized by the end of the cold war, the relaxation of tensions at the global level and the emergence of a new spirit governing relations among nations,

*Taking note* of paragraph 145 of the Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Durban, South Africa, from 29 August to 3 September 1998, which supported the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which would offer an opportunity to review, from a perspective more in tune with the current international situation, the most critical aspects of the process of disarmament and to mobilize the international community and public opinion in favour of the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and of the control and reduction of conventional weapons,

*Taking note also* of the report of the 1998 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission on the item entitled 'Fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament',

*Desiring* to build upon the substantive exchange of views on the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament during the 1998 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission,

*Reiterating its conviction* that a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament can set the future course of action in the field of disarmament, arms control and related international security matters,

*Emphasizing* the importance of multilateralism in the process of disarmament, arms control and related international security matters,

*Noting* that, with the recent accomplishments made by the international community in the field of weapons of mass destruction as well as conventional arms, the following years would be opportune for the international community to start the process of reviewing the state of affairs in the entire field of disarmament and arms control in the post-cold-war era,

1. *Decides*, subject to the emergence of a consensus on its objectives and agenda, to convene the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

2. *Endorses* the report of the Disarmament Commission on its 1998 substantive session, and recommends that an item entitled 'Fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament' be included in the agenda of the Commission at its 1999 session, which should promote agreement on the agenda and timing of the special session;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session the item entitled 'Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament' and, subject to the outcome of the deliberations at the 1999 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission, to set an exact date for and to decide on organizational matters relating to the convening of the special session.

## ANNEX — Abbreviations of Sources

<b>AFP:</b>	<i>Agence France Presse</i>	<b>LP:</b>	<i>La Prensa</i>
<b>AP:</b>	<i>Associated Press</i>	<b>LT:</b>	<i>Times[London]</i>
<b>ASS:</b>	<i>Asahi Shimbun</i>	<b>N:</b>	<i>Nature</i>
<b>BBC:</b>	<i>BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts</i>	<b>NEI:</b>	<i>Nuclear Engineering International</i>
<b>CN:</b>	<i>La Correspondence Nucléaire</i>	<b>NF:</b>	<i>NuclearFuel</i>
<b>CNN:</b>	<i>Cable News Network</i>	<b>NG:</b>	<i>Nezavisimaya gazeta</i>
<b>Carnegie:</b>	<i>Proliferation Brief of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace</i>	<b>NN:</b>	<i>Nuclear News</i>
<b>CdS:</b>	<i>Corriere della Sera [Italy]</i>	<b>NNN:</b>	<i>NucNet News</i>
<b>ChI:</b>	<i>Chosun Ilbo</i>	<b>NPR:</b>	<i>National Public Radio News</i>
<b>CSM:</b>	<i>Christian Science Monitor</i>	<b>NS:</b>	<i>New Scientist</i>
<b>DJ:</b>	<i>Dow Jones Newswires</i>	<b>NW:</b>	<i>Nucleonics Week</i>
<b>DP:</b>	<i>Die Presse</i>	<b>NYT:</b>	<i>New York Times</i>
<b>DS:</b>	<i>Der Spiegel</i>	<b>NZZ:</b>	<i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i>
<b>DT:</b>	<i>Daily Telegraph</i>	<b>O:</b>	<i>Observer</i>
<b>DW:</b>	<i>Die Welt</i>	<b>PBS:</b>	<i>Public Broadcasting System News Hour (TV)</i>
<b>E:</b>	<i>Economist</i>	<b>R:</b>	<i>Reuters</i>
<b>EP:</b>	<i>El Pais</i>	<b>SCMP:</b>	<i>South China Morning Post [Hongkong]</i>
<b>FAZ:</b>	<i>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</i>	<b>SDZ:</b>	<i>Süddeutsche Zeitung</i>
<b>fF:</b>	<i>freshFUEL</i>	<b>SF:</b>	<i>SpentFUEL</i>
<b>FR:</b>	<i>Foreign Report [UK]</i>	<b>SG-Sp:</b>	<i>Secretary-General's Spokesman Daily Press Briefing</i>
<b>FT:</b>	<i>Financial Times</i>	<b>SN:</b>	<i>Salzburger Nachrichten</i>
<b>G:</b>	<i>Guardian</i>	<b>ST:</b>	<i>Sunday Times [London]</i>
<b>IHT:</b>	<i>International Herald Tribune</i>	<b>StL:</b>	<i>Standard [London]</i>
<b>IT:</b>	<i>Itar-TASS</i>	<b>StV:</b>	<i>Standard [Vienna]</i>
<b>Izv:</b>	<i>Izvestia</i>	<b>UPI:</b>	<i>United Press International</i>
<b>JDW:</b>	<i>Jane's Defence Weekly</i>	<b>USIA:</b>	<i>United States Information Agency Transcript</i>
<b>JFR:</b>	<i>Jane's Foreign Report</i>	<b>UINB:</b>	<i>Uranium Institute News Briefing</i>
<b>JoC:</b>	<i>Journal of Commerce</i>	<b>Ux:</b>	<i>Ux Weekly</i>
<b>JP:</b>	<i>Jerusalem Post</i>	<b>VoA:</b>	<i>Voice of America</i>
<b>KH:</b>	<i>Korea Herald</i>	<b>WP:</b>	<i>Washington Post</i>
<b>KCNA:</b>	<i>Korean Central News Agency [Pyongyang]</i>	<b>WP/NWE:</b>	<i>Washington Post National Weekly Edition</i>
<b>KT:</b>	<i>Korea Times</i>	<b>WT:</b>	<i>Washington Times</i>
<b>KV:</b>	<i>Kourier [Vienna]</i>	<b>WSJ:</b>	<i>Wall Street Journal</i>
<b>LAT:</b>	<i>Los Angeles Times</i>	<b>YOS:</b>	<i>Yomiuri Shimbun</i>
<b>Lib:</b>	<i>Libération</i>	<b>X:</b>	<i>Xinhua [Beijing]</i>
<b>LM:</b>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<b>Y:</b>	<i>Yonhap [Seoul]</i>

### The Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the Newsbrief

The **Newsbrief** is part of the outreach effort which constitutes a major element of the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN). It is addressed to an audience interested in the subject of nuclear (non-)proliferation, to inform and help them alert their respective environments to the issue of nuclear non-proliferation.

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10016, USA (Tel. 1 (212) 532-3153; Fax. 1 (212) 532 9847). Those relating to production and distribution should be addressed to John Simpson, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton, Southampton, SO17 1BJ, United Kingdom (Tel. 01703 592522; Fax. 01703 593533; international code +44/1703).

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