

## **August 30, 1960**

# **Transcript of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Edgar Snow**

### **Citation:**

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### **Summary:**

Zhou Enlai talks with American journalist Edgar Snow about disputes between China and the U.S. Zhou refutes Western rumors that China has given up on peaceful coexistence with the West. Zhou says that China is willing to use peaceful settlements on disputes between China and the U.S. Zhou talks extensively about the Taiwan issue. Zhou believes that there are two main aspects to the Taiwan issue which needs to be addressed separately. The first is international dispute between the U.S. and China over Taiwan. The second aspect is the domestic dispute between CCP and Chiang Kai-shek over Taiwan. Lastly, Zhou says that the problems over principles needs to be solved before specific problems are addressed.

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### **Original Language:**

Chinese

### **Contents:**

Original Scan  
Translation - English

## 通过和平协商解决 中美之间的争端\*

(一九六〇年八月三十日)

**周恩来总理**(以下简称周): 我在瑞士驻华使馆国庆招待会上提的建议〔221〕并不是新建议, 是中国政府几年来一直提的。就在今年四月, 我在人大的报告〔222〕中也提到同样的建议。但是, 八月份再提这个建议, 就有了新的意义。西方舆论正在造谣说, 中国已经放弃和平共处的政策。因此, 我们再来重申这一主张就更能引起亚洲和世界人民的注意, 揭穿帝国主义的谎言。你作为注视一个国家政治事件发展的人, 不能不注意到我们今年已跟三个亚洲国家签订了和平友好条约。一月, 跟缅甸签订了友好和互不侵犯条约。四月, 我访问尼泊尔时, 跟尼泊尔签订了和平友好条约。八月, 陈毅副总理兼外交部长访问阿富汗时, 跟阿富汗签订了友好和互不侵犯条约。这已经是三个了, 还不算过去跟也门签订的友好条约, 跟

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\* 这是同美国作家埃德加·斯诺的谈话节录。

印度、印尼、柬埔寨、锡兰<sup>[104]</sup>等发表的共同声明。

今年签订的这三个条约都是根据我们历来的主张，以和平共处五项原则为基础。你知道，五项原则就是互相尊重主权和领土完整、互不侵犯、互不干涉内政、平等互利和和平共处。要在亚洲和太平洋沿岸地区这样一个大的范围内签订和平公约，就需要有更长的时间来为此而奋斗。这不象一个国家和另一个国家之间的问题那么简单，特别是其中包括了中美两国的关系。但是，使我们高兴的是，我们重新提出这个建议后，得到了广泛的支持，特别是得到了亚洲许多国家的支持。在东京召开的禁止原子弹、氢弹和争取全面裁军世界大会也很支持这个建议。这就说明，现在再提这个建议就有了新的意义。

（火车抵达怀柔水库后，总理和斯诺下车参观水库，回到车上后又继续交谈）

**周：**建议亚洲和太平洋沿岸地区各国缔结一个互不侵犯的和平公约，这牵涉中美两国的问题，也牵涉中、苏、日、美四国的问题。不能设想中美两国没有外交关系就会签订和平公约，也不能设想不解决中美在台湾地区的争端，两国就可以建交。这是两个重要的事实。所以说，要实现这个建议得经过长期的奋斗。既然需要长期奋斗，我们为什么又要不断地提出这个建议呢？这就说明，中国人民和政府愿意通过和平协商的办法来解决中美两国之间的争端，反对美国的侵略政策，反对以武力或武力

威胁来解决两国之间存在的问题。

你可能不同意说美国对中国采取了侵略政策，但是我首先要证明这一点。中国解放后，美国政府曾经声明不干涉中国内政，这是艾奇逊<sup>[11]</sup>在白皮书<sup>[95]</sup>中说的，杜鲁门<sup>[223]</sup>后来也说过。而台湾问题就是中国的内政，台湾确实是在一九四五年日本投降后归还了当时的中国政府，是被当时台湾省省长陈仪将军接管的。这位将军后来被蒋介石杀了。一九五〇年六月朝鲜战争<sup>[47]</sup>开始，杜鲁门改变了政策，对中国采取了侵略政策。在出兵朝鲜的同时，美国派遣第七舰队到台湾海峡，并对台湾实行了军事控制。从那时起，美国开始了对中国新的侵略，中国政府不得不发表声明谴责美国侵略台湾和陈兵台湾海峡。不久，我们又警告美国政府，如果美军越过三八线<sup>[21]</sup>，直逼鸭绿江，中国不能置之不理。这个警告是通过印度驻华大使转告美国的。美国政府不顾这个警告，中国人民只好采取抗美援朝<sup>[26]</sup>的行动。但那是在美国陈兵台湾海峡和对台湾实行军事控制的四个月以后，并且是在美军越过三八线，直逼鸭绿江之后才采取的行动。这四个月内，杜鲁门发表了好几次声明，为他的侵略行为辩解。但是，他无法为侵略台湾、陈兵台湾海峡的行为辩护，他也没有听我们经过印度大使转告的警告。

经过两年半的谈判，朝鲜战争终于停止了。一九五八年，中国志愿军已经全部撤出朝鲜，而美军至今还留在

南朝鲜不撤，美国至今仍然以海陆空军控制着台湾和台湾海峡。这岂不是美国对中国继续采取侵略政策的最好证明吗？更不要说美国在亚洲建立了那么多的军事基地，签订了那么多以中国为主要目标的侵略性的军事集团条约了。中国在国外没有一兵一卒。我们和亚洲国家签订的都是和平友好条约。

既然美国对中国采取了这些侵略行动，我们是不是要用武力来解决中美争端呢？不是。我在一九五五年万隆会议<sup>[103]</sup>期间就说：中国人民同美国人民是友好的，中国政府愿意同美国政府坐下来谈判两国之间存在的争端，虽然我们两国还没有互相承认和建交。经过英国的斡旋，我们的提议导致了中美两国大使级会谈<sup>[188]</sup>一九五五年八月一日在日内瓦开始举行。

为了创造良好的气氛，在会谈前，经过印度的克里希纳·梅农<sup>[204]</sup>的斡旋，和哈马舍尔德<sup>[97]</sup>来北京的访问，我们释放了十一个所谓美国战俘。为什么叫所谓战俘呢？因为他们不是在朝鲜战场上被俘的。在朝鲜战场上俘虏的战俘，除了一些自愿要求留下的，在停战后已经全部遣返回去了，而要求留下的人中后来又回去了一些。这十一个所谓战俘是驾驶美国飞机侵犯中国领空，飞机被打下后被俘的。中美两国都曾宣称朝鲜战争只限于朝鲜，没有扩大到中国。这些侵华飞机是在中国被打下来的，我们不承认他们是战俘，但是为了给日内瓦大使级会谈

创造良好的气氛，我们释放了他们。

**埃德加·斯诺**（以下简称斯）：从那时候到现在，你们还释放过没有？

**周**：所谓战俘问题到此就结束了。中国监禁的其他美国犯人属于性质不同的范围。这些美国犯人分两种。一种是美国公民在中国搞破坏活动、间谍活动或在其他方面违反了中国法令而被捕的。还有一种是很特殊的，是美机空投下来的特务，如唐奈和费克图。你如有兴趣，我可以指定专人告诉你，他们如何和先前空投下来的中国特务进行联系，如何被捕，连飞机也被打下来了。这是个很有趣的事。

**斯**：我愿意知道。

**周**：我指定我办公室的人告诉你。

哈马舍尔德和梅农也不敢提这两个人的问题，因为这两个人跟朝鲜战争毫无联系，他们完全是特务。

**斯**：唐奈和费克图是在朝鲜战争时期被俘的吗？

**周**：是在朝鲜战争时期，但他们不是军方派的。艾伦·杜勒斯<sup>[224]</sup>大概知道这件事，他可以提供详细情况，但他也许不愿意象我们这样详细地告诉你。

自一九五五年八月到现在，中美会谈已经五年了，下一次会谈是第一百次。

**斯**：一百周年纪念。

**周**：第一百次。一百周年太长了，你愿意中美关系

问题等那么久才解决吗？

从会谈开始，我们就提出应以和平谈判解决中美之间的争端，包括两国在台湾地区的争端，而不诉诸武力或武力威胁。美国拒绝了这项建议。一般人不能理解杜勒斯<sup>(51)</sup>为什么不能接受这个建议。你记得这个建议吗？你懂得为什么杜勒斯要拒绝吗？

**斯：** 我不记得了。

**周：** 这是个最重要的建议，美国封锁了它，后来我们公布了。为什么杜勒斯要拒绝呢？因为他知道，达成这样的协议就意味着下一步要讨论美国武装力量如何和何时撤出台湾和台湾海峡的问题。

**斯：** 我想起来了，美国没公布这个建议，报上没发表，后来我听说了，我在《当代历史》杂志上看到了，后来又在《人民中国》上看到。我在作关于中国问题的报告时提到过建议中的几句话。

**周：** 后来，我们在华沙大使级会谈时又提出一项新的建议，保留了原有建议的原则，但进一步具体化了。美国当然更不同意，美国不愿意撤出台湾和台湾海峡。因此会谈拖了这么久。

我们认为，中美之间在台湾地区的争端是国际问题，新中国的中央政府和台湾蒋介石集团之间的军事行动则是内政问题。美国说两者不能分，我们说可以分开，必须分开。既然中美两国可以在日内瓦、华沙进行大使级会

谈,那么,中国的中央政府和蒋介石集团也可以同时进行谈判。一是国际问题,一是国内问题,两者可以平行进行,分别解决。

中美谈判总要先达成原则协议才能解决具体问题。原则协议应当包括两点:第一,中美两国之间的一切争端,包括两国在台湾地区的争端,应当通过和平协商求得解决,而不诉诸武力或武力威胁。第二,美国必须同意将武装力量从台湾和台湾海峡撤走。至于什么时候撤以及如何撤的具体步骤是下一步讨论的事。只要美国政府不采取侵略中国的政策和不以武力相威胁,就必然会得出这个合乎逻辑的结论。

**斯:** 撤走武装力量,是否包括自沿海岛屿撤出?

**周:** 美国政府根本不承认它有军队在沿海岛屿上。

美国武装力量是否从台湾和台湾海峡撤走,这是中美之间争端的关键。美国的对华政策和活动方针是为了制造“两个中国”,不管是共和党还是民主党都是这样。鲍尔斯在一九六〇年四月《外交季刊》上发表了一篇题为《重新考虑中国问题》的文章。文章发表后,不仅引起大陆中国人民的反对,而且也引起了在台湾的中国人的反对。受台湾影响的香港报纸说,对“两个中国”的问题,共和党采取消极等待的态度,民主党则采取积极主动的态度。这话有一定道理。鲍尔斯自己也说,他这个建议大概不仅会受到大陆中国的反对,而且会受到在台湾的国



民党的反对，还会受到在台湾的中国人的反对。可见这种做法是没有前途的，而且是在解决中美关系问题上打了个死结。

**斯：**也许可以说是个试探气球，这比说死结更为合适。

**周：**应该这么说：如果只是试探，不行就改，那就可以叫试探气球；如果试探不行，还要坚持，那就是死结。

如果美国坚持侵华政策，不去解决中美两国在台湾地区的争端，中美两国之间的问题如何能得到解决？这就使问题复杂化、长期化了。我们相信，中美两国之间的问题总是要得到解决的，只是个时间问题。但是有一点，美国如不放弃侵华政策，不放弃战争威胁，问题就不能得到解决。我们不相信美国人民会允许美国政府的这种政策永远继续下去。中美两国人民没有根本的利害矛盾，他们终究是要友好起来的。

**斯：**刚才提到的两个原则问题，在华沙谈判中是否谈了很久了？

**周：**很久了。第一个原则是一九五五年底在日内瓦提出的，第二个原则是一九五八年秋天在华沙提出的。

**斯：**第二点是否也包括什么时候和如何撤出台湾？

**周：**美国必须首先同意撤军的原则，才好谈具体的问题。

**斯：**一九五八年以来，中美谈判就一直讨论这个问题

题吗？美国政府坚持说，中国政府如果不宣布不在台湾地区使用武力，就不能达成协议。

**周：**美国政府坚持美国和蒋介石在台湾地区有“单独和集体自卫的固有权利”〔225〕。

**斯：**换言之，这是承认台湾是一个政府。

**周：**换言之，也就是要使美国侵占台湾和台湾海峡合法化，并造成“两个中国”的客观现实。这是全体中国人民都反对的。如果中国侵占檀香山而且派军舰到檀香山和美国大陆之间的海洋上去，或者中国去侵占长岛并派军舰到长岛和纽约之间的海峡中去，美国人将如何感觉？这样你就可以想象得到中国人的情感了。

**斯：**长岛的例子更恰当。

**周：**当日本人进攻珍珠港时，美国人不是都起来反对了吗？

这是我要答你提的问题的主要部分，你还可以问，看完水库回来再谈。

（午饭后参观了密云水库，回到火车上吃晚饭时继续交谈）

**斯：**今天不可能谈完所有问题了。

**周：**不限于今天一次谈话，你从西北回来还可以谈。

**斯：**那时候我提的问题也许会聪明些。

**周：**中美关系方面，你还有什么要问的？

**斯：**关于中美关系问题，大体上都谈到了，只是有些

不具体之感。我想了解，在实现亚洲和太平洋地区缔结和平公约的具体做法上，总理是否有什么新建议？从午餐谈话来看，有些问题你们认为是属于具体外交谈判范畴的。

**周：**总要根据形势的发展，才能决定具体外交政策，今天只是跟你谈原则问题。

**斯：**我大胆地设想，当前总理不打算提出新的具体建议。

**周：**首先要就原则问题达成协议。原则问题达不成协议，就很难谈具体问题。美国人有一种想法，原则问题达不成协议，先解决具体问题也好。谈判初期，我们也试过这个办法，先解决具体问题，然后引导到主要问题的解决。但是行不通，不解决原则问题，具体问题达成协议也无效。例如，关于提早释放在监狱里的双方侨民的问题。中国监狱里现在只有五个美国人，其中包括唐奈、费克图。但是在美国监狱中的中国侨民有多少，美国政府从来没有将数目和名字通知过我们。表现良好的，他们也没有提前释放。美国的借口是，这些人愿意回台湾，不愿意回大陆，有的人不属于大陆，而属于台湾。这样，问题就复杂了。据我们了解，这些人绝大多数是从大陆去的。如果让美国按自己的意愿将中国人分成大陆的和台湾的，这就造成了“两个中国”的局面，把具体问题又引导到原则问题上来了。这就证明，原则问题不先解决，具体

问题就无法解决。即使解决了，也解决不好。留学生的  
问题也是如此。留学生绝大多数是从大陆去的，家也在  
大陆，但他们很多人回不来。因此，我们得出结论：必须  
先解决原则问题，然后才能解决具体问题。

## RESOLVING SINO-AMERICAN CONTENTION THROUGH PEACEFUL CONSULTATION\*[1]

(August 30, 1960)

Premier Zhou Enlai (hereafter shortened to Zhou): At the Swiss Embassy in China's National Day reception I offered a proposal, which was not a new proposal, but one that the Chinese government has been steadily making for the past several years. Just this April, I also made the same proposal in my report to the National People's Congress. However, repeating this proposal in August has a new significance. Western media right now is spreading rumors saying China has already abandoned its peaceful coexistence policy. Because of this, reiterating this idea now will likely attract more attention from the people in Asia and the [rest of the] world, exposing the lies and slanders of imperialism. As a person who has been following the development of political affairs in this country, you cannot have failed to notice that this year we have already signed peace and friendship treaties with three Asian countries. In January we signed a friendship and mutual non-aggression treaty with Burma. In April, during my visit to Nepal, we signed a treaty of peace and friendship with Nepal. In October, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Chen Yi visited Afghanistan, where he signed a treaty of friendship and mutual non-aggression with Afghanistan. This is three already, not counting the friendship treaty with Yemen which we previously signed, and the joint communiques which we have issued with India, Nepal, Cambodia and Sri Lanka.

□

These three treaties which we signed this year were all based on our long-standing position, with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as their foundation. As you know, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. To sign treaties throughout such a large area as the Asia-Pacific coastal region will require us to strive for an even longer period. This is not as simple as issues between two individual countries, particularly because it will involve Sino-American bilateral relations. However, what makes us happy is that after we reiterated our proposal, we received widespread support, especially support from many Asian countries. The World Conference on Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs and for Comprehensive Disarmament held in Tokyo was also very supportive of this proposal. This shows there is new significance in reintroducing this proposal now.

□

(After the train reached the Huairou Station, the Premier and Snow got out of the train to inspect the reservoir; after getting back on the train they resumed their conversation.)

Zhou: Proposing that every country in the Asia Pacific region conclude a treaty of peace and mutual non-aggression involves U.S.-China bilateral issues, and it also involves issues among China, the Soviet Union, the U.S., and Japan. One cannot imagine that the U.S. and China could sign a peace treaty in the absence of diplomatic relations, nor assume that the two countries could establish diplomatic relations without resolving the dispute between the U.S. and China over the Taiwan region. These are two important facts. So, that's why I say this proposal can only be realized through a long period of endeavor. Since it will require long-term endeavor, why do we then keep bringing up this proposal? It shows that the Chinese people and government wish to resolve the bilateral disputes between the U.S. and China through peaceful consultation, and oppose the U.S.'s policy of aggression, and oppose the use of force or the threat of force to resolve the existing issues between the two countries.

□

You may not agree that the United States has adopted a policy of aggression towards China, but I want to first of all prove this point. After China's liberation, the U.S. government had at one time declared that it would not interfere in China's internal

affairs; this is what Acheson said in the "White Paper," which was repeated by Truman. But the Taiwan problem is China's internal affair. It is true that Taiwan was returned to the Chinese government of that time after the Japanese surrender in 1945, and taken over by General Chen Yi, then governor of Taiwan province. This general was later killed by Chiang Kai-shek [Jiang Jieshi]. In June 1950, when the Korean War began, Truman changed his policy, adopting an aggressive policy towards China. At the same time that it sent troops to Korea, the U.S. sent the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Straits, and implemented a policy of military control over Taiwan. From that time onwards, the U.S. began new aggression against China, and the Chinese government had no choice but to issue a statement condemning U.S. aggression against Taiwan and deployment of troops in the Taiwan Straits. Not long after that, that we again warned the U.S. government that, if its troops crossed the 38th Parallel and approached the Yalu River, China could no longer ignore it. This warning was relayed to the United States through the Indian Ambassador in China. The U.S. government paid no heed to this warning, so the Chinese people had no choice but to take action to resist American aggression and aid Korea. However, this action was taken four months after the United States had deployed troops in the Taiwan Straits and instituted military control of Taiwan; and only after the U.S. military had crossed the 38th Parallel and approached the Yalu River. During these four months, Truman issued many statements justifying this aggressive behavior. However, his aggression against Taiwan and deploying forces in the Taiwan Straits is indefensible, and he paid no heed to the warning which we had passed to him through the Indian Ambassador.

□

After two and half years of negotiations, the Korean War finally ended. In 1958, the Chinese People's Volunteers had all been withdrawn from Korea, but the U.S. military, even to this day, has not withdrawn and remains in Korea, and the U.S. still maintains military control of air, sea and land in Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. Isn't this the best evidence that the U.S. continues to adopt an aggressive policy towards China? Not to mention that the U.S. has established numerous military bases throughout Asia, and concluded so many military alliance treaties of an aggressive nature, with China as their principal target? China has not a single soldier overseas. All the treaties we have signed with Asian countries are peace and friendship treaties.

□

Since the U.S. has taken these aggressive actions against China, shouldn't we also use military means to resolve this Sino-American contention? Not at all. In 1955 during the Bandung Conference I said the Chinese people are friendly towards the American people, and the Chinese government wishes to sit down with the U.S. government to negotiate the existing disputes between the two countries, even though the two countries have yet to recognize each other or establish diplomatic relations. Through British mediation, our proposal led to U.S.-China Ambassadorial level talks which began on August 1, 1955 in Geneva.

□

In order to create a good atmosphere, prior to the talks, through the mediation of India's Krishna Menon, who visited Beijing with Hama Sheerde, we released eleven so-called American POWs. Why do I say "so-called POWs"? Because they were not captured on the battlefield in Korea. The POWs captured on the battlefield in Korea, other than a few who wanted to remain, were all repatriated after the armistice. Even among the one who asked to remain, some also returned after a while. These eleven so-called POWs were pilots of American airplanes that violated Chinese airspace and captured after their planes were shot down. The U.S. and China had both declared that the Korean War should be restricted to Korea, and not extend to China. These invading aircraft were shot down over China, so we did not acknowledge them as POWs. Nevertheless, we released them anyway, in order to create a favorable climate for the Ambassadorial-level talks in Geneva.

Edgar Snow (Hereafter shortened to Snow): Since then, have you released any more prisoners?

Zhou: The so-called POW issue is all finished. The other American criminals jailed in China belong to a different category. There are two types of these American criminals. One type are American citizens who have been arrested because they engaged in sabotage, espionage or have broken Chinese law in some other way. The other type is more special, that includes American agents who parachuted into China, like Jack Downey and Dick Fecteau. If you are interested, I can direct you to someone who can tell you how they communicated with Chinese spies who had already been airdropped, how they were arrested, and even how their plane was shot down. This was a fascinating story.

Snow: I'd like to know.

Zhou: I'll have my staff contact you.

□

Hama Sheerde and Menon were also afraid to mention these two agents, because they had nothing to do with the Korean War, they were just plain spies.

Snow: Were Downey and Fecteau captured during the Korean War?

Zhou: It was during the Korean War, but they were not sent by the military. Allen Dulles probably knows this matter, he could give you the details, but maybe he wouldn't want to tell you in as much detail as we will.

□

From August 1955 to now, U.S.-China talks have already lasted five years; the next session will be the 100th.

Snow: The Centennial.

Zhou: The hundredth [session]. A hundred years is too long. Do you want to take that long to resolve U.S.-China relations?

□ Since the start of the talks, we have always proposed resolving the disputes between China and the U.S., including the dispute between the two countries over the Taiwan region, through peaceful negotiation and not by resorting to force or the threat of force. The U.S. has rejected this proposal. People in general cannot understand why Dulles cannot accept this proposal. Do you recall this proposal? Do you understand why Dulles has rejected it?

Snow: I don't recall.

Zhou: This was the most important proposal, which the U.S. blocked and which we later publicized. Why did Dulles reject it? Because he knew that such an agreement would mean that the next step would be to discuss the question of how and when to withdraw U.S. military forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits.

Snow: I remember now, the U.S. never publicized this proposal, which never appeared in the newspapers, but later I heard of it, read it in the journal "Contemporary History," and later also read it in "People's Daily." I quoted a few lines from the proposal in talks I gave on issues about China.

Zhou: Later, we made a new proposal in the Ambassadorial-level talks in Warsaw, which maintained the principles of the original proposal, but made it more specific. Of course, the U.S. was even less in agreement since the U.S. does not want to withdraw from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. Because of this, these talks have dragged on for such a long time.

□

We believe that the dispute between China and the U.S. over the Taiwan region is an international question, but the military actions between the central government of New China and the Chiang Kai-shek clique on Taiwan is a domestic issue. The U.S. says that the two cannot be separated, we say they can, and must, be separated. Since the U.S. and China are able to hold Ambassadorial-level talks in Geneva and Warsaw, the Chinese central government could also hold talks at the same time with the Chiang Kai-shek clique. One is an international problem, one is a domestic problem, the two can proceed in parallel and resolved separately.

□

U.S.-China negotiations must first reach agreement on principles and only then can the specific problems be solved. Agreement on principles must include two points: first, all disputes between the U.S. and China, including the dispute between the two countries regarding the Taiwan region, must be resolved through peaceful consultation, not resorting to force or the threat of force. Second, the U.S. must agree to withdraw its military forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. As for when to withdraw and how to withdraw, these specific steps would be discussed in the next stage of negotiations. If only the U.S. government doesn't adopt an aggressive policy towards China and doesn't threaten it with military force, it will inevitably reach this logical conclusion.

Snow: Withdrawing military forces - does this include withdrawing from coastal islands?

Zhou: The U.S. government simply doesn't acknowledge that it has troops on the coastal islands.

□

Whether or not the U.S. armed forces withdraw from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits is the key to the dispute between the U.S. and China. The U.S. policies and actions towards China are for the purpose of creating "two Chinas," this goes for both Republicans and Democrats. [Chester] Bowles in the April 1960 "Foreign Affairs" published an article titled "The 'China Problem' Reconsidered". After the article was published, it not only drew opposition from the Chinese people on the mainland, it also drew opposition from the Chinese on Taiwan. A Taiwan-influenced Hong Kong newspaper said, regarding the "two Chinas" problem, the Republican Party has adopted a passive, wait-and-see attitude, while the Democratic Party has adopted a proactive attitude. There is definitely some sense to that. Bowles himself has said, his proposal would probably be opposed not only by mainland China, by the Nationalist Party on Taiwan, and furthermore would also be opposed by the Chinese people on Taiwan. So you can see that there is no future in this approach, all it does is tie up the solution to the problem of U.S.-China relations in a dead knot.

Snow: Maybe one could call it a trial balloon, which would be more fitting than a dead knot.

Zhou: We can put it this way, if it was only a trial, which can be changed if it doesn't work, then you may call it a trial balloon; but if the trial doesn't work, but you still stick with it, then it's a dead knot.

□

If the U.S. persists in a policy of aggression against China, and does nothing to resolve the U.S.-China bilateral dispute over the Taiwan region, how will it ever be possible to resolve the problems between the U.S. and China? This just complicates and prolongs the issue. I believe that the issues between the U.S. and China will eventually be settled. It's just going to take time. But still, if the U.S. doesn't abandon its policy of aggression towards China, doesn't abandon threats of war, the issues will never be solved. We don't believe that the American people will permit the U.S. government to continue with such a policy forever. There is no fundamental conflict of interests between the Chinese and American people, when all is said and done, they want to be friends with each other.



Snow: These two principles that you just mentioned, have they been discussed for long in the Warsaw talks?

Zhou: For a long time indeed. The first principle was presented at the end of 1955 in Geneva, and the second was presented in Warsaw in the autumn of 1958.

Snow: Did the second principle include at what time and in what manner [the U.S. would] withdraw from Taiwan?

Zhou: The U.S. must first agree with the principle of withdrawal of forces, only then can we discuss the specific issues.

Snow: Have the U.S.-China talks been debating this issue continuously ever since 1958? The U.S. government insists that unless the Chinese government declares that it will not use armed force in the Taiwan region, there will be no agreement.

Zhou: The U.S. government insists that in the Taiwan region the United States and Chiang Kai-shek have the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.

Snow: In other words, this acknowledges that Taiwan is a government.

Zhou: In other words, it is legalizing the U.S. occupation of Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits, and creating an objective reality of "two Chinas". This is something that the entire Chinese people are against. If China occupied Hawaii and sent naval warships to the oceans between Hawaii and the U.S. mainland, or if China had occupied Long Island and sent warships to the straits between New York and Long Island, how would the American people feel? From this you can imagine how the Chinese people feel.

Snow: The Long Island example is more appropriate.

Zhou: When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, didn't all the American people rise up in opposition?

This is the main part of my answer to your questions; you may ask more questions, and we can continue to talk after we have toured the reservoir.

(After lunch they visited the Miyun Reservoir, and continued talking at dinner once they were back on the train.)

Snow: It isn't possible to finish discussing all questions today.

Zhou: We don't have to finish our talk today, we can talk more once you get back from the Northwest.

Snow: By then maybe my questions will be a little smarter.

Zhou: What else do you want to ask regarding U.S.-China relations?

Snow: We have covered most of the U.S.-China relations issues, I just feel some of it was not very specific. I'd like to know whether the Premier has any new proposals for specific measures to conclude a peace treaty for the Asia-Pacific region? From our discussion at lunch, it seemed that there are some issues which you believe belong within the scope of specific diplomatic negotiations.

Zhou: One can only talk about specific diplomatic policies according to how the situation develops. Today I am only talking to you about principles.

Snow: I'll be bold and assume that the Premier doesn't plan to make any new specific proposals at this time.

Zhou: First of all it's necessary to reach agreement on questions of principle. If there's no agreement on principles, it is hard to discuss specific issues. Americans seem to think that it's fine to talk about specific issues first, even when there's no agreement reached on principles. In the early stages of the negotiations, we also tried it this way, resolving specific problems first, which afterwards could lead to solving the main problems. But it didn't work; without solving the issues of principle, any agreement on specific problems will have no effect. For example, there's the question of an early release of imprisoned citizens of both sides. There are only five Americans in Chinese prisons, including Downey and Fecteau. But as for how many Chinese citizens are imprisoned in America, the U.S. government has never given us any numbers or names. Despite good behavior, none have been given early release. The U.S. excuse is that these people want to return to Taiwan and don't want to return to the mainland; some of them don't belong to the mainland but belong to Taiwan. This makes the problem more complicated. From what we have learned, the majority of these people came from the mainland. If we let the U.S. willfully divide these Chinese into mainlanders and Taiwanese that would be creating a "two Chinas" situation, turning a specific issue into an issue of principle. This proves that if you don't settle issues of principle first, there's no way to solve specific problems. Even if you solve them, the solution will not be good. The issue of overseas students is also like this. The vast majority of the overseas students came from the mainland, and their families are on the mainland, but many of them can't come back. Therefore, we've reached the conclusion: first one must settle questions of principle, and only then can specific problems be solved.

\* This is an excerpt from the transcript of a conversation with American author Edgar Snow.