## October 9, 1963

#### Transcript of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Tanzan Ishibashi

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## Summary:

Premier Zhou speaks with former Japanese Prime Minister Tanzan Ishibashi about promoting Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. Zhou expresses concern over the U.S.-Japan security treaty and the Japan-Taiwan treaty. Zhou says that diplomatic relations between China and Japan can be normalized when Japan recognizes the CCP as the sole representative of China. Ishibashi raises that there are some Japanese people that still have feelings towards Taiwan. Zhou classifies and explains the "feelings" of the Japanese public towards Taiwan into three groups.

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Chinese

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# 以积累渐进的方式 推进中日邦交\*

(一九六三年十月九日)

石桥湛山先生<sup>(260)</sup>(以下简称石桥):今天我有许多问题想同周总理谈。其中最重要的问题就是中日和约问题。这个问题好象有希望,但具体做起来,困难又很多。周总理认为如何?

**周恩来总理**(以下简称周):美国搞了个单独对日"媾 和"<sup>[261]</sup>,日本又搞了个日台"条约"<sup>[262]</sup>,这就给中华人 民共和国和日本国签订和约造成了最大的障碍。

第一种方式,从我们这方面想,日本最好废除日台 "条约",和我们正式缔结和约,这是最好的方式。但是, 现在的日本政府这样做有困难。因为旧金山条约<sup>(82)</sup>是 在美国控制下签订的,美国对日本的压力很大,日本要废 除这个"条约",就牵涉到美国的问题,困难很多。

第二种方式,如果日本不废除日台"条约",另外又和

\* 这是同日本前首相石桥港山的谈话节录。

中华人民共和国签订和约,这对我们来说也有困难,会造 成"两个中国",而且比"两个中国"更坏。这里有个很大 的矛盾:台湾说它是代表整个中国的,我们说我们代表整 个中国,当然我们才是真正代表全中国人民的。怎么能 同时存在两个代表全中国人民的中国政府呢?这是极大 的矛盾,中国人民决不同意这样做,就是蒋介石也不同意 这样做。国际法上也找不出这种例子,这个道理是讲不 通的。

另外还有第三种方式,就是日本现政府的负责人,首 相或者外相,来访问新中国,并且发表声明,明确指出只 承认中华人民共和国政府代表中国。这样,两国之间虽 无和约,但可以友好相处,为促进亚洲的和平而努力,战 争状态也就等于不存在了。这是最勇敢的做法,但是日 本现政府的负责人没有这种勇气。

第四种方式就是前任首相来访问中国,发表声明,承 认新中国。前任首相第一个来中国访问的是前属社会民 主党、现属社会党的片山哲<sup>(263)</sup>先生。其次就是阁下两 次访问中国。阁下不仅是前首相,而且是执政党的议员, 代表着自由民主党的一个方面,只承认新中国而不承认 台湾,为恢复中日关系、推进两国邦交的正常化而努力。 这是间接的方式,也是积累、渐进的方式。现在我们实际 上是采取第四种方式,彼此采取第四种方式而争取第一 种方式。期待阁下也为此而努力。

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**石桥**: 日本国民当中,特别是在基层,有些人对台湾 有感情,反对和阻碍我们和中国友好。右翼势力就是这 些人的代表,杀害浅沼<sup>(170)</sup>先生的也是他们。当然我们 并不害怕这部分人,但是既然国民中间有这样一种感情, 我们就不能忽视。片山先生和浅沼先生主张中日友好, 但他们没什么力量。要真正形成一股力量,必须采取其 他方法。这样做虽有困难,但我有这种愿望。

周: 日本有一部分人对台湾有感情,这种感情要分 析,要看它是什么样的感情。冷静地分析,有三种感情。 第一种是过去的殖民主义的感情。他们认为台湾是日本 的殖民地,中国曾经把它割让给日本,同日本有五十年的 关系。今天日本仍有一部分人抱有这种殖民主义的思 想,希望台湾从属于日本,认为台湾既然没有直接在中华 人民共和国管辖之下,就应该仍然回到日本的手里。这 种想法是不正义的,是帝国主义思想,凡是有正义感的人 都不会赞成这种想法。廖文毅<sup>(264)</sup>一派所以能一直在日 本活动,就是因为有极少数的日本人在支持他们,当然主 要还是美国搞的。这种感情,不是大多数日本人的感情, 大多数日本人已经改变了过去的看法。中国人当然反对 这种感情,就是蒋介石也反对。美国人想利用,也有矛 盾。美国人并不想把台湾交给日本,而是想使台湾"独 立",实际变成美国的殖民地。

第二种感情是军国主义的感情。如冈村宁次<sup>(265)</sup>, 342 他本来是头号战犯,应该受国际法庭的制裁。但是蒋介 石却有意识地把他留在中国,后又放回日本。这些老军 国主义分子对蒋介石有好感,对中国人民没有好感,他们 要帮助蒋介石反攻大陆,蒋介石也想利用他们过去侵略 中国的战争经验。他们互相勾结在一起,至今仍有来往。 有这种思想的人只是日本极少数的右翼分子。他们仍想 复活军国主义。制造长崎国旗事件<sup>[266]</sup>的,暗杀浅沼先 生的,在你们来中国之前给你们写恐吓信的,都是这些 人。这种感情,中国人民当然反对。蒋介石反攻大陆,重 新回到大陆来,这是中国人民绝对不允许的。在日本,有 这种想法的也是极右派,在野党反对,劳动群众反对,自 由民主党内有见识的人也反对。这是把日本拖向战争灾 难的道路,日本人民绝不能接受。

第三种感情是经济来往的感情,日本和台湾有几十年的经济关系,贸易关系十分密切,日本从台湾进口糖,向台湾出口货物也很多。这种感情倒容易理解,我们并不反对。全世界都要做买卖,我们不反对日本和台湾做买卖,我们决不象台湾反对日本和中国做买卖那样。所以这种感情并不妨碍中日友好。但是做买卖,并不一定需要在政治上搞得那样密切。就是政治上不密切,台湾也要和日本做买卖。

上述三种感情中,前两种是对中国人民不友好的,正 象先生所说,那是极少数人,不是绝大多数。任何国家,

人们的感情不可能都百分之百正确,总会有一些不健康 的感情。拿中国来说,也有一小部分入觉得日本过去长 期侵略中国,看到和日本讲友好,也觉得接受不了。但 是,政府要区别多数和少数,特别是要区别绝大多数和极 少数。中国政府是能够区别的。十几年来,我们一直主 张,不仅中日两国人民要友好,两国政府也要逐步走向友 好。先生两次访华就可以证明这一点。日本的绝大多数 爱国志士也是愿意促进中日友好,促进两国邦交正常化 的。不仅在野党如此,执政党也如此。

先生说,在野党和民间团体虽然支持中日友好,但起 不了决定作用,这主要是因为他们没有执政。但是,在野 党和人民团体却代表了日本人民要和中国友好的愿望。 执政党能起决定作用,它有权力签订和废除条约,也有权 力搞相互往来。执政党有这种地位,问题要看领导人的 见解是否英明。比如鸠由<sup>(114)</sup>先生和石桥先生就想排除 万难,不顾少数人的反对,促进中日友好,促进中日邦交 正常化。遗憾的是,因为两位先生执政的时间短,愿望未 能实现。

还有一种相反的道路,它们不愿意促进中日友好,反 对中日邦交正常化,比如吉田茂<sup>(74)</sup>政府和岸信介<sup>(216)</sup>政 府。因而使我们不能不对它们采取批判的态度。

第三种是摇摆的态度。如池田勇人政府一方面容许 石桥先生、松村<sup>(267)</sup>先生和高荷<sup>(268)</sup>先生到中国来活动,

特别是这一年来,签订了廖承志——高碕达之助备忘录 贸易的议定书<sup>[269]</sup>,最近还决定要恢复民间渔业协定,并 且在中国举办了日本工业展览会。诸位作为执政党的代 表,为推进中日友好而努力,这是正义的行动。另一方 面,池田政府中也包括了执政党中反对中日友好,倾向台 湾,害怕美国,拖着池田后退的一部分人。当然,我们对 池田还是期待着和等待着的。但是,经常发生一些不愉 快的事,就会成为促进中日友好的障碍,就逼得我们不能 不说话。这是我的看法。阁下有什么办法?

**石桥**:这是国际关系上的一个复杂而难办的问题。 台湾问题本来是中国的国内问题。可是,它却给日本带 来了麻烦和困难。我们希望中国能用自己的力量解决这 个问题,也可以同美国商量。可以在中、美、台之间解决, 依靠中国自己的力量解决它。不知道中国对此有何方 案?

周: 石桥先生的话有些矛盾。因为既然先生说台湾 问题是中国的国内问题, 问题就不复杂。日本政府如果 把台湾问题看成是中国的内部问题,和新中国建立关系, 让中国自己去解决台湾问题,问题就不复杂了。但是问题 并不那么简单,我们了解日本的处境。日本是战败国,旧 金山会议<sup>(34)</sup>是在美国控制下召开的, 日本不能不同美、 英和其他国家一起签订"和约"。但是这是不平等的,特别 是美国要控制日本,日本完全是被动的,因而也不得不同 345

受美国控制的台湾缔结了"和约",中华人民共和国却被 排除在外。当时去缔结"和约"的是吉田政府的代表,吉 田政府追随美国,对中国不友好。但是,我们理解日本的 处境,虽然日本和台湾建立了所谓外交关系,我们仍然愿 意和日本人民友好往来,不仅是人民之间,政府之间的非 正式来往也在进行。国际关系如此复杂是美国造成的, 是日本追随美国造成的,不是中国造成的。是我们难处, 不是你们难处。我们一直主张台湾问题是中国的国内问 题,是美国把它搞成了国际问题,并且有些国家追随美 国。也有另一些国家,它们不承认台湾而只承认新中国, 这样做问题就不复杂,这种国家有四十多个。另外还有 一些国家心里愿意承认新中国,现在还没有承认,因为要 敷衍美国。对于这些国家,我们希望它们逐渐摆脱美国, 寻找同中国解决外交关系问题的出路。中国的方针是公 开的,不是秘密的,记得在第一次见到阁下时也谈过,不 过没详细谈。我们的办法是:美国霸占台湾,干涉中国人 民解放台湾,作为国际问题来处理,中国人民如何解放 台湾则是国内问题。可是美国总想把这两个问题搅在一 起,我们坚决反对。中美之间的华沙会谈[168],已经谈 了八年多,我们的方针也是公开的。我们认为中美两国 人民要友好,中美两国之间的问题可以和平协商解决,不 要诉诸武力。这是符合联合国宗旨的。这句话美国代表 也赞成。我们的态度是,这句话也要适用于台湾海峡。 346

在台湾海峡,我们没有和美军冲突过。但是,美国要把台 湾和台湾海峡除外,其他地方可以和平解决。美国要保 留在台湾海峡的第七舰队,保留在台湾的军事基地。我 们说,美国应该撤走。他们说,因为和台湾有条约关系, 所以要"保护"。台湾问题本来是中国的国内问题,蒋介石 是被中国人民赶跑的,如果美国不"保护"蒋介石,我们可 以自己解决,美国插进来才把问题搞复杂了。美国人怕我 们和蒋介石谈判,怕蒋介石抛弃美国。同时美国也不愿 意支持蒋介石反攻大陆,怕打起仗来对美国不利。美国 的做法是要保留在台湾和台湾海峡的军队,保留军事基 地。蒋介石反对美国这种做法,他怕自己的军队、干部都 老了,不用反攻大陆来号召他们,总有一天自己要被遗 弃,美国人要自己控制台湾。在这一点上,蒋介石和我们 一样,都反对制造"两个中国"。这和东德、西德等其他国 家的情况不同,台湾的现状是由中国的内战形成的,后来 美国插了进来,问题才复杂化了。但是有些国家不理台 湾,它们在等待局势的发展,总有一天台湾会摆脱美国的 统治,回到祖国的怀抱里。日本朋友也应该有一种信念, 台湾问题不是什么了不起的问题,总有一天要解决,没有 美国扶持,台湾政权一天也存在不下去。日本政府、日本 执政党应该看到方才先生所说的那种感情是少数人的情 绪,是殖民主义,军国主义思想,不能把它当作重要因素。 日本和台湾的关系今后还要继续,我们可以理解。但是

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日本不要台湾一恐吓就照顾。台湾驻在日本的"大使"张 厉生,是我的同学,我和他很熟,一道去法国留过学。台 湾只管叫得凶,实际上台湾的立法院已经承认他们没有 办法。美国管的事太多,全世界的事它都要管。我相信, 具有独立传统的日本人民和日本政府摆脱美国的日子肯 定会逐步接近。我们不要管其他方面,只要逐步推进中 日关系,关系就可以改善。但是,自由民主党内有一部分 人士想利用这个问题做买卖,压我们。譬如,日本在联 合国的代表主张不把恢复中国在联合国合法席位问题作 为程序问题,而提议作为重要事项,要有三分之二的多数 来通过。这种做法是给美国当先锋,对我们是不友好的。 自由民主党内的一些有识之士也对此提出批评,他们认 为至少应该弃权。更坏的是使新中国和台湾互相牵制, 忽而和新中国好,忽而和台湾好,这种做法不会有好结 果,对双方都不利。我们欢迎石桥、松村、高碕等先生的 那种单刀直入的态度,有问题应该全部谈出来,我们诚 恳地交换意见。中日两国恢复邦交是要经过一段曲折的 道路的,不可能一下子解决,但是只要我们推进,采取积 累方式,就可以解决。大平外相到美国去说,中日两国有 亲近感,日本不能参加美国遏制中国的政策。我们欢迎 他这种话。

USING THE METHOD OF STEADY ACCUMULATION TO ADVANCE SINO-JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS\*[1]

(October 9, 1963)

Mr. Ishibashi Tanzan (hereafter shortened to Ishibashi): Today I have quite a few questions that I'd like to discuss with you, Premier Zhou. The most important of these questions is that of a Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. There seems to be some hope for this issue, but there are also many difficulties when it comes to the implementation of specifics. What does the Premier think?

Premier Zhou Enlai (hereafter shortened to Zhou): The U.S. has cooked up a one-on-one "peace treaty" with Japan, and Japan has also cooked up a Japan-Taiwan "treaty"; both of these have created the biggest obstacles to the People's Republic of China and Japan concluding a peace treaty.

The first method, from our perspective, would be for Japan to get rid of the Japan-Taiwan "treaty" and formally conclude a peace treaty with us. This the best way. However, at present the Japanese government has difficulty doing this. Because the San Francisco Treaty was concluded under U.S. control, and the U.S. exerts great pressure on Japan, if Japan wants to get rid of this "treaty," that would lead to problems with the U.S., and many difficulties.

The second method, if Japan doesn't get rid of the Japan-Taiwan "treaty", and just signs another treaty with the People's Republic of China, would mean a lot of difficulties for us. It could create "two Chinas," or even worse than "two Chinas." There is a serious contradiction here; Taiwan says that it represents all of China, and we say we represent all of China, of course we are the true representatives of all of the Chinese people. How could it be possible that two governments representing all of the Chinese people could exist at the same time? This is an enormous contradiction, and not only the Chinese people would absolutely not agree to do this, but Chiang Kai-shek [Jiang Jieshi] wouldn't agree to do it either. And you can't find any precedents in international law, it just wouldn't make sense.

There is also a third method, which would be for a responsible member of the Japanese government, the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister to visit New China and issue a statement that clearly indicates that [Japan] recognizes the government of the People's Republic of China as the one representing China. This way, although there would not be a treaty between the two countries, we could still have friendly relations, be able to strive for peace in Asia, and effectively we would no longer be in a state of war. This would be the most courageous way of dealing with the issue, but the responsible persons in the current Japanese government do not have this kind of courage.

The fourth method would be for a former Prime Minister of Japan to visit China and issue a statement recognizing New China. The first former Prime Minister to visit China was a former member of the Democratic Socialist Party, now member of the Socialist Party, Mr. Katayama Tetsu. The second is Your Excellency, who has visited China twice. Your Excellency is not merely a former Prime Minister, but also is a Diet member of the ruling party, representing one aspect of the Liberal Democratic Party, which only recognizes New China and does not recognize Taiwan, and has endeavored to restore Sino-Japanese relations, and advance the normalization of bilateral diplomatic relations. This is an indirect method, and also a cumulative, gradual method. Right now we have practically adopted this fourth method, and by adopting this fourth method, we will both strive to achieve the first method. It's my hope that Your Excellency will also make this effort.

Ishibashi: Among the citizens of Japan, particularly at the grassroots, there are some people who have feelings for Taiwan, and who oppose and block our friendship with China. The right-wing forces represent these people, the same ones who have assassinated Mr. Asanuma. Of course, we don't fear these people, but inasmuch as there exists this feeling among our citizens, we can't ignore it. Mr. Katayama and Mr. Asanuma both advocated Sino-Japanese friendship, but they didn't have much power. To truly form [sufficient] power, we have to do things differently. Although it won't be easy, nevertheless we have this wish.

Zhou: If certain people in Japan have feelings for Taiwan, these feelings should be analyzed, we need to find out what kind of feelings these are. Calm analysis shows there are three kinds of feeling. The first kind is a feeling rooted in the colonialism of the past. They think of Taiwan as a Japanese colony, which was once cut off and ceded to Japan by China, and which had a fifty year connection to Japan. Today in Japan there are still some people who maintain this sort of colonial ideology, who wish that Taiwan would be part of Japan, who think that since Taiwan has never been under the direct rule of the People's Republic of China, it ought then to be given back to Japan. This kind of thinking is unjust, it is an imperialist ideology, and anyone with a sense of justice will not approve of this kind of thinking. The reason that Liao Wenyi's group\*[2] has been able to stay active in Japan is exactly because they have the support of a very small minority of Japanese, although needless to say the most important [support] comes from the U.S. This type of feeling is not held by the majority of Japanese people, the majority of Japanese have already changed their past way of thinking. The Chinese people are of course against this kind of feeling, so is Chiang Kai-shek. The U.S. wants to take advantage of it, but there's a contradiction. The U.S. certainly doesn't want to give Taiwan to Japan, but would like to see an "independent" Taiwan, which in practice would turn into an American colony.

The second type of feeling is a militarist feeling. Like Okamura Yasuji\*[3]\* who was originally a class A war criminal, and who ought to be sanctioned by the International Court of Justice. But Chiang Kai-shek deliberately kept him in China, and later released him to Japan. These old militarists are favorable towards Chiang Kai-shek, but not favorable towards the Chinese people; they want to assist Chiang Kai-shek in retaking the mainland, and Chiang Kai-shek also wants to use their past military experience of invading China. They are in cahoots with each other, and even now still remain in contact. People with this kind of ideology are a small minority of Japan's rightwing elements. They still hope to revive militarism. These are the same people that instigated the Nagasaki Flag incident,\*[4]\*\* assassinated Mr. Asanuma, and wrote threatening letters to you prior to your visit to China. Of course, the Chinese people are against this type of feeling. The Chinese people absolutely will not permit Chiang Kai-shek to retake the mainland or return to the mainland. In Japan such thinking is opposed by the opposition party, by the laboring masses, as well as some smart people in the Liberal Democratic Party also oppose them, except for the extreme right. Such thinking would drag lapan down the path of disastrous war and will absolutely not be accepted by the people of Japan.

The third type of feeling has to do with economic interaction; Japan and Taiwan have had decades of economic relations and a very close trade relationship. Japan imports sugar from Taiwan and exports many products to Taiwan. This kind of feeling is easy to understand and we certainly don't oppose it. The whole world wants to do business with each other, and we don't oppose business dealings between Japan and Taiwan, unlike Taiwan which objects to business dealings between Japan and China. So this kind of feeling is certainly no obstacle to Sino-Japanese friendship. But business relations by no means requires close political relations. Even if they are not close politically, Taiwan would still want to do business with Japan.

Of the three aforementioned types of feelings, the first two are unfriendly towards the Chinese people, just as you said, they are a tiny minority, not the vast majority. In

any country, the people's feelings cannot all be one hundred percent correct, there will always be some unhealthy feelings. Take China for example: there is also a small number of people who feel that given the long term Japanese invasion of China in the past, they find it hard to accept any talk of friendship with Japan. However, a government must distinguish between the majority and the minority, and especially between the vast majority and a tiny minority. The Chinese government is able to make this distinction. For over ten years now, we have consistently upheld not only friendship between the Japanese and Chinese people, but that both governments need to move gradually towards friendship. Your two visits to China are proof of this. The vast majority of Japanese patriots also wish to advance Sino-Japanese friendship and the normalization of diplomatic ties. Not only the opposition party, but the ruling party as well feels this way.

You have said that although the opposition party and non-governmental organizations support Sino-Japanese friendship, they cannot play a decisive role, primarily because they are not in power. However, the opposition party and popular organizations still represent the desire of the Japanese people for friendship with China. The ruling party can play a decisive role, it has the power to accede to and abrogate treaties, and it has the power to engage in mutual interaction. Although the ruling party has this power, the question remains whether its leaders can make wise decisions. For instance, Mr. Hatoyama\*[5] and Mr. Ishibashi tried to overcome all difficulties to advance Sino-Japanese friendship, and advance normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, despite the opposition of a tiny minority of people. It's a pity that these two gentlemen's time in power was short, and they were unable to realize their wishes.

There is also the opposite path, taken by those who are unwilling to advance Sino-Japanese friendship and oppose the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, like the administrations of Yoshida Shigeru and Kishi Nobusuke.\*[6] Consequently we have to condemn to their positions.

The third type is a swinging attitude. For example, the Ikeda Hayato government, which on one hand permitted you, Mr. Matsumura, and Mr. Takasaki to come to China and carry on activities, in particular this past year, signing the Liao Chengzhi—Takasaki Tatsunosuke aide-memoire for trade, and most recently deciding to renew the non-governmental fisheries agreement, as well as holding the Japan Industrial Exhibition in China. All of you, as representatives of the ruling party have exerted yourselves on behalf of Sino-Japanese friendship, which is an honorable act. On the other hand, there are those in the Ikeda government, including some members of the ruling party who oppose Sino-Japanese friendship, incline towards Taiwan and fear the U.S., who keep dragging Ikeda backwards. Of course, we still have hopes and are waiting on Ikeda. However, unpleasantness frequently happens, which can interfere with the advancement of Sino-Japanese friendship, and which makes it hard for us to not speak up. This is my view; does Your Excellency have any suggestions?

Ishibashi: This is a complicated and difficult issue in international relations. The Taiwan issue is fundamentally an internal affair of China. However, it has brought trouble and difficulties for Japan. We hope that China can rely on its own resources to resolve this issue, and it could also consult with the U.S. It can be solved among China, the U.S., and Taiwan, relying on China's own resources. Has China given any thought to doing something like that?

Zhou: There's some contradictions in what you have said. Because, as you said, the Taiwan issue is an internal affair of China, then the issue is not complicated. If the Japanese government treats the Taiwan issue as China's internal affair, establishes relations with New China, and allows China to resolve the Taiwan issue on its own, then the issue is not complicated. But the issue isn't so simple, and we understand Japan's dilemma. Japan is a defeated nation, the San Francisco Conference was held

under U.S. control, and Japan had no choice but to conclude a "peace treaty" with the U.S., the UK and other countries. But this is not equal, especially since the U.S. wants to control Japan, Japan is completely reactive, and so it had no choice but to conclude a "peace treaty" with U.S. controlled Taiwan, which excluded the People's Republic of China. At the time, it was the representatives of the Yoshida government who concluded this "peace treaty" and the Yoshida government followed the U.S. and was unfriendly towards China. However, we understand Japan's situation, so even though Japan has established so called diplomatic relations with Taiwan, we still wish for friendly contacts with the Japanese people and have been carrying out not just people-to-people, but also unofficial government-to-government contacts. Such complications in international relations have been created by the U.S., as well as by Japan as a follower of the United States, but were not created by China. This is our difficulty, not your difficulty. We have always maintained that the Taiwan issue is China's internal affair, it is the United States that has turned it into an international issue, along with certain countries that follow the U.S. There are also some other countries, which do not recognize Taiwan and only recognize New China; in that case, the issue is not complicated; there are over forty such countries. There are also some countries which in their hearts would like to recognize New China, but so far haven't, because they want to appease the U.S. As for those countries, we hope that they will gradually free themselves from the U.S. and find a solution to the problem of establishing diplomatic relations with China. China's policy is known to all, it's not a secret; I recall that I spoke of it when I first met with Your Excellency, though I didn't discuss it in detail. Our solution is this: the U.S. occupies Taiwan, interferes in the Chinese people's liberation of Taiwan, this should be treated as an international issue. However, how the Chinese people are going to liberate Taiwan is an internal affair. We firmly oppose the U.S. trying to keep mixing these two issues together. The Sino-U.S. Warsaw talks have already gone on for more than eight years, and our policy is also well known. We believe that the Chinese and American people want friendship, and that Sino-American issues can be resolved through peaceful consultations, there's no need to resort to arms. This is consistent with the United Nations Charter. The U.S. representatives also approve of this language. Our attitude is that this language ought to be suitable for the Taiwan Straits. We have not clashed with the U.S. military in the Taiwan Straits. However, the U.S. wants to exclude Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits from other places which can be peacefully resolved. The U.S. wants to maintain the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits, and to maintain its military bases on Taiwan. We say that the U.S. must leave. They say, because they have a treaty relationship with Taiwan, therefore they need to "protect" it. The Taiwan issue fundamentally is a Chinese domestic issue, Chiang Kai-shek was chased away by the Chinese people, and if the U.S. hadn't "protected" Chiang Kai-shek, we could have settled it ourselves. It was U.S. interference that made the issue so complicated. The U.S. is afraid we will negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek, afraid that Chiang Kai-shek would abandon the U.S. At the same time, the U.S. doesn't want to support Chiang Kai-shek retaking the mainland, it fears that starting a war would not be beneficial to the U.S. The U.S. approach is to retain its forces in Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits, to retain its military bases. Chiang Kai-shek opposes this U.S. approach, he fears that his own troops and officials are getting old, and if he can't motivate them with his call to retake the mainland, there will come a day when he is left behind, and the Americans will control Taiwan without him. On this point we and Chiang Kai-shek are the same, we both oppose creating "two Chinas." This is different from the circumstances of East and West Germany or other countries, Taiwan's present situation was caused by the Chinese civil war, and only became complicated due to later U.S. interference. In any case, there are some countries which pay no attention to Taiwan, they are waiting for the situation to develop, when soon enough Taiwan will break free of American domination and return to the bosom of the motherland. Our Japanese friends should also have this belief that the Taiwan issue isn't so extraordinary, one day it will be resolved, and that without U.S. support, the Taiwan regime will not last even one day. The Japanese government and the ruling party in Japan ought to see that the kind of feeling you just mentioned are only the sentiments of a few, a colonialist and militarist ideology, and can't be treated as a significant factor. We can understand how Japan and Taiwan want their current relationship to continue. But Japan shouldn't be so ready to accommodate Taiwan at

the slightest hint of intimidation. Taiwan's "Ambassador" in Japan, Zhang Lisheng, was my classmate, we know each other well, having studied in France together. Taiwan just acts tough, but in fact their Legislature has already admitted there is nothing they can do. The U.S. tries to manage too many things, they want to manage the entire world. I believe that the day when the traditionally independent Japanese people and Japanese government will be able to shake free of the U.S. is steadily approaching. We are not interested in anything other than steadily advancing Sino-Japanese relations, and to make it possible for the relationship to improve. However, there are some people in the Liberal Democratic Party who want to use this issue as a bargaining chip and keep us down. For instance, Japan's representative at the United Nations supports treating the restoration of China's legally rightful seat at the United Nations not as a procedural question, but as an important matter, thus requiring at two-thirds majority to pass. This is serving as a spearhead for United States and is unfriendly to us. There are some people in the Liberal Democratic Party who have been critical of this, who consider that at least [Japan] ought to abstain. Even worse [are those] who play New China and Taiwan against each other, sometimes favoring New China, sometimes favoring Taiwan. Such an approach won't end well and is detrimental to both sides. We welcome Messrs. Ishibashi, Matsumura, Takasaki and others' straightforward attitude. Any issue should be discussed openly and fully, and we should sincerely exchange views. The road to restoration of diplomatic relations between China and Japan will have twists and turns, it isn't possible to solve this in one stroke, but if we just keep pushing forward, adopting a cumulative method, then it will be solved. When Foreign Minister Ohira\*[7] went to the U.S. he said China and Japan feel close to each other, so Japan cannot join in the U.S. policy of containing China. We welcome that kind of language.

\* This is an excerpt from the transcript of a conversation with former Japanese Prime Minister Ishibashi Tanzan (1884-1973).

\* Liao Wenyi, aka Thomas Liao (1910-1986) Taiwanese independence activist.

\*\* Okamura Yasuji (1884-1966), Japanese general, last commander of Japanese forces in China. He was acquitted of all war crimes by the Tokyo Tribunal.

\*\*\* In May 1958 Japanese rightists destroyed a publicly displayed PRC flag.

\* Hatoyama Ichiro (1883-1959), Japanese politician, Prime Minister from 1954 to 1956.

\* Yoshida Shigeru (1878-1976), Japanese politician, Prime Minister from 1948 to 1954. Kishi Nobusuke (1896-1987), Prime Minister from 1957 to 1960.

\* Ohira Masayoshi (1910-1980), Japanese politician; Foreign Minister in the Ikeda cabinet (1962-64) and again, later, in the Tanaka cabinet.