

July 28, 1985

**Cable No. 5689, Ambassador Matsunaga to the
Foreign Minister, 'Problem of the Release of the
American Hostages'**

Citation:

"Cable No. 5689, Ambassador Matsunaga to the Foreign Minister, 'Problem of the Release of the American Hostages'", July 28, 1985, Wilson Center Digital Archive, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, File No. 2017-0630. Translated by Stephen Mercado.

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Summary:

A telegram from Japanese Ambassador Matsunaga to the Foreign Minister summarizing a meeting between the Ambassador and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs McFarlane about the American hostages in Lebanon.

Original Language:

Japanese

Contents:

Original Scan

Translation - English

主管課緊急処理用

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Three empty rectangular boxes for administrative use.

総番号 R103250 主管
 年 月 28日 23時 30分 米 国 発
 60年 07月 29日 12時 31分 本 省 着 北米局長
 外務大臣殿 松永大使

米国人・人質釈放問題

第5689号 極秘 大至急

(限定配布)

1. 28日午後3時マックファーレンNSC担当補さ官が公ていに本使を来訪越し短時間会談したところその概要次のとおり。

(1) まず「マ」補さ官より次のとおり述べた。

今朝(当地時間9時ごろ)レーガン大統領よりナカソネ総理に電話して重なる総理の病気見まいに対する謝意を自ら伝えた際、レバノンにおける残された7人の米人人質釈放問題が話題になり、総理より米政府に対する同情を改めて表明すると共に、日本政府が本件救出につきできることあればよろこんでお役に立ちたい旨述べられ、これに対しレーガン大統領は是非よろしくお願ひしたい旨答えた。自分は本件の重要性にもかんがみ大統領の示さもあり東京よりもどられた直後の貴使に対し、米国政府として日本政府が動いていただけなのであれば誠に有り難い旨をお伝えし、今後の段取り等につき御相談すべく参上した次第である。幸い、最近安倍大臣がシリアを公式訪問され極めて有益な意見交換を行われ、更にラフサンジャニ議長の日招待の成功等にみられる如く日本はシリア及びイランに対し米国よりもよりクレディブルであるこ

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とは間違いなくそれだけに米国としても日本の御じん力に期待したい。

(2) よつて本使より日本政府として如何なることができるか具体案を今持ち合わせている訳ではないと思うが、シリア及びイラン両国を通じて情報を集収し、あらゆる可能性をたん求してみたいということになるのではないだろうかと思う。その為には東京も当該7人についてのデータを必要とすると思う。更に今まで米国政府の行われた救出の試みについて差し支えない範囲で情報を提供願えれば有益であろう旨述べたところ、「マ」補さ官は更に次のとおり述べた。

今まではある米国人を通じカマール派グループと接触を試み、少くとも7人の健こう状態は一応良好なる旨確認ができています。しかし、この接触のレベルは低く救出問題は進展していない。当然のことながら米国はシリア政府に救出援助方要請しており、同国政府は好意的な反応は示しているが、これもはかばかしい動きは見られていないようである。シリアはある一定時期テロリズムがシリアのレバノン及至イランとの関係でこう定的なインパクトがあると思っていたが最近かかる認識に変化が生じシリアがテロリズムを必ずしもかん迎しない状況が見られる。従つて日本政府がかかる状況をふまえて何か試みていただければ非常にアプリーシエイトする。7人の氏名その他のデータは明29日ホワイト・ハウスで貴使とお目にかかる際お渡ししたい。

(3) これに対し本使よりは日本政府として何ができるかは分らないし、それが必ず成功するかは判らないが、少しでも米国政府のお役に立つことができればと考えるのではないかと思う。いずれにするも貴補さ官御来訪の件は早速東京へ報告することと致したい旨述べておいた。

2. ついては何ら心得べきことあらば明29日マックファーレン補さ官との会談(当

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地時間午後13時30分の予定)までに回電願いたい。(了)

Number: R103250

Primary: North American Affairs Bureau Director-General

Sent: United States, July 28, 1985, 23:30

Received: MOFA, July 29, 1985, 12:31

To: The Foreign Minister □

From: Ambassador Matsunaga

Problem of the Release of the American Hostages

No. 5689 Secret Top Urgent

(Limited Distribution)

1. At three o'clock on the afternoon of the 28th, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs McFarlane called on me at the Ambassador's Official Residence and had a short meeting with me. A summary of the meeting's main points are as follows.

(1) First, Assistant to the President McFarlane spoke as follows:

This morning (around nine o'clock, local time), President Reagan made a telephone call to Prime Minister Nakasone, personally thanking the Prime Minister for the gracious inquiry about his health. The topic then turned to the problem of the release of the seven American hostages still in Lebanon. The Prime Minister said, together with again expressing his sympathy to the United States Government, that the Government of Japan would be happy to be of service if there were anything it could do in regard to rescuing the hostages. In reply, President Reagan requested that they please do so. In light of the importance of this matter, I have come here to inform you, who has just returned from Tokyo, of the President's suggestion. The United States Government would be truly thankful if the Government of Japan would make a move. I have come here to discuss with you arrangements. Fortunately, Minister Abe recently made an official visit to Syria and engaged in a very useful exchange of views. Furthermore, as seen in the success of Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani's visit to Japan, it is without a doubt that Japan is more credible than the United States for Syria and Iran. For that reason alone, the United States has hope for Japan's efforts.

(2) I then said that, while I did not at the moment have a concrete idea of what the Government of Japan could do, I thought that it may wish to try gathering information from Syria and Iran and exploring various possibilities. For that, I said that I thought Tokyo would need data on the seven persons concerned. I further said that it would be beneficial to ask for information - to the extent it posed no problem - on the attempts to date by the United States Government to rescue them.

Assistant to the President McFarlane further spoke as follows:

To date, we have been able to confirm at least, through an American who attempted to contact the Kamal [TN: sic, possible error for Amal] faction, that the seven persons were in good health for the time being. The level of this contact has been low, however, and there has been no progress in the problem of their rescue. The United States Government has, of course, requested the aid of the Syrian government to rescue the hostages. The government has given a positive response. Even so, there has been no perceptible movement. Syria for a time thought that terrorism had a positive impact on its relations with Lebanon and Iran, but recently there has been a change in this perception and there is visible a situation in which Syria does not

always welcome terrorism. Consequently, we would appreciate it if the Government of Japan were to attempt something on the basis of this situation. I would like to give you, Mr. Ambassador, the names and other data for the seven hostages when I see you tomorrow, the 29th, at the White House.

(3) I replied that I did not know what the Government of Japan was able to do or whether it would succeed, but that I hoped at least that it would be able to prove useful to the United States Government. In any case, I said that I wished to report to Tokyo immediately the matter of the Assistant to the President's visit here.

2. In this connection, if there is anything I should know, I request a reply by telegram by the time of the meeting tomorrow, the 29th (scheduled for 13:30 in the afternoon, local time), with Assistant to the President McFarlane. (End)