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Radio Liberty Policy Manual: Annex: Ukrainian Broadcasts

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Summary:

Radio Liberty outlines its approach to broadcasts in Ukraine, emphasizing the importance of providing alternative perspectives to Ukrainians.

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RADIO LIBERTY POLICY MANUAL

ANNEX

UKRAINIAN BROADCASTS

The provisions of the main text of the Policy Manual are generally applicable to all language services of Radio Liberty. Within that broad framework, this annex deals with specific aspects of broadcasts in Ukrainian. It adds to the provisions of the main text but in no way supersedes or alters their importance in determining the content of Ukrainian broadcasts.

The Role of the Ukrainian Service

The Ukrainian broadcasts of Radio Liberty endeavor to:

1. Provide Ukrainians in the USSR with full and free information in their own language;
2. Give expression to and encourage those trends within Ukraine specifically, as well as the USSR in general, which can lead to democratization, social justice and national self-determination;
3. Preserve and stimulate the growth of Ukrainian cultural values and national identity, reflecting in its broadcasts a continuity in the history and life of the Ukrainian nation which antedates the Soviet era and will persist and flourish in the future. ✓

The Ukrainian Service endeavors to speak from the viewpoint of Ukrainians within the USSR. The content of its broadcasts is determined by the existing situation within the USSR and specifically the Ukrainian SSR, the attitudes, needs and interests of Ukrainians and the Ukrainian nation.

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In reporting trends and developments within the Soviet Union and the world at large the Ukrainian Service is particularly concerned with those of significance to Ukraine and the lives of Ukrainians within the USSR.

At the same time, Radio Liberty Ukrainian broadcasts do not presume to make final judgments which can only be made by Ukrainians now living in the USSR or which can only be arrived at through genuinely democratic processes. Ukrainian broadcasts attempt to stimulate Ukrainians to think about their national problems and to provide them with information which may assist them in finding their own solutions. They do not incite group action by Ukrainians or espouse specific courses of action for the solution of Ukrainian problems.

The Ukrainian Audience

There are over 37 million Ukrainians in the USSR, over 32 million live within the Ukrainian republic, constituting an overwhelming majority of its total population of almost 42 million (figures from 1959 census). Thus, there are at least 5 million Ukrainians living in other areas of the USSR. No reliable estimate can be made of the number of Ukrainian listeners to Radio Liberty among this potential audience. The listening audience for RL's Ukrainian broadcasts also includes many Ukrainians living outside the Soviet Union, particularly in adjacent areas of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania; some of these listeners are undoubtedly in contact with their compatriots in the Soviet Union and provide an indirect channel for information and ideas heard in RL broadcasts.

Those elements of the potential audience which are of most concern to RL's Ukrainian broadcasts are the Ukrainians living within the USSR who are in a real or potential position to influence the courses of events or to influence attitudes through their position as real or potential leaders of opinion. The specific target audiences of Ukrainian broadcasts are those described in Section IIB of the Policy Manual: the real or potential decision-making elements of the Ukrainian population. These include particularly the younger age-groups which have reached maturity after the Stalin era and who have received a Soviet education and upbringing; thinking members of the Ukrainian Communist Party and Komsomol; the scientific, technological and creative intelligentsia; lower ranking party and state officials and elected members of the legislative bodies of the Ukrainian SSR; and finally, skilled workers and their supervisors in Ukrainian industries.

While these audiences tend to be primarily urban, present information on the actual Ukrainian listening audience indicates that it may be largely rural. However, it is not known to what extent people located in the more heavily jammed urban centers actually do listen either there or in outlying areas where jamming is less heavy; or to what extent people in more responsible positions are reluctant to give evidence of their listening. The Ukrainian Service therefore puts primary emphasis on attempting to reach these urban audiences. While not neglecting to include in its broadcasts regular treatment of Ukrainian agriculture and other rural problems, it is

most concerned with those aspects which have significance to Ukraine as a whole, and among rural listeners it attempts to reach the rural leadership and intelligentsia, especially its younger elements.

Among Radio Liberty's target audiences, the younger, "takeover," generation is particularly important to Ukrainian broadcasts. Not only do audience research data indicate that the majority of RL's actual union-wide audience is below the age of 40, but also the population structure of the Ukrainian SSR is such that over forty percent of the total population is between the ages of 15 and 40. Therefore, RL's Ukrainian broadcasts presumably reach primarily a young audience. This orientation is desirable and further efforts should be made to expand the youthful Ukrainian audience and meet its interests and needs.

Present audience research data indicate that three-fourths of RL's Ukrainian listeners are male and only one-fourth female, contrasted with a nearly 50-50 division of the Republic's population itself. Although not a primary target group, women constitute an important sociological group, and therefore the Ukrainian Service will endeavor to plan programming which will increase the proportion of female listeners.

Ukrainian Attitudes: National Consciousness

The most significant individual characteristic of Ukrainian attitudes, apart from those assumed in the Policy Manual for the Soviet Union as a whole, is that the Ukrainian people, despite the policies of Russification, have a fully developed national consciousness. They not only possess a

community of language, customs, religion, and a common territory, but also the similar institutions and sense of historic tradition, social homogeneity and mutual interest which constitute a nation.

The Ukrainian Republic and population is second only to the Russian Republic within the USSR, and it is larger in territory and wealth of resources than all other European countries, of which only four (West Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy and France) exceed its population. In fact, only seven countries in the rest of the world have more people. Its industrial and agricultural output are of major significance. All of these facts provide a solid basis for the development of national consciousness.

There is a long tradition of national awareness and separate political development in the Ukraine. However, modern nationalism--the doctrine that persons of a distinct culture should constitute an independent state--came late to the area, developing perceptibly during the last part of the 19th century and the early years of the 20th to the point that several successive Ukrainian governments declared and attempted to maintain national independence during the chaotic struggles on Ukrainian territory in the aftermath of the 1917 Revolution. World War II was the occasion for another resurgence of Ukrainian nationalism and stubborn partisan opposition to the Soviet regime continued until well after the end of the war itself. While Ukrainian national feeling is noted for its intensity and persistence, the political forms in which it has been expressed have varied from semi-fascist

to democratic, from demands for national independence to a search for realization of national rights within the Soviet system.

While it is impossible to measure the present strength of sentiment for national independence per se, there has been a strong current of actively expressed dissent which appears to be aimed at the strengthening of national consciousness, preservation of the Ukrainian culture, and the guaranteeing of national rights within the Soviet system. This demand for recognition of national rights is linked with insistence on respect for the rights of other Soviet nationalities and the rights of individuals, or human rights.

Specific grievances with regard to Soviet policy stemming from Ukrainian national consciousness are: discrimination against the Ukrainian language and culture; the deporting of Ukrainians from the Ukraine and the deliberate settling of Ukrainian cities with non-Ukrainians, usually Russians. Apart from these immediate grievances, there are deeper resentments among many Ukrainians arising from the feeling that the Ukraine is exploited economically and politically and is not the master of its own destiny.

Some Ukrainian dissenters are convinced Communists and are primarily motivated in their dissent by these national grievances. In other respects, however, expressions of dissent within the Ukraine and by Ukrainians appear to be highly similar to those within the Russian Republic with their present focus on literary, artistic and intellectual freedom, the abolition of censorship, and the observance of legality. Many Ukrainians

have participated in the dissent movement at the all-Union level.

The General Content of Ukrainian Broadcasts

The Ukrainian Service, taking into account the strong national consciousness of Ukrainians, assumes that listeners to RL's Ukrainian broadcasts prefer if possible to obtain all their information in the Ukrainian language and are likely to be more impressed by information broadcast in their own language. Hence, RL's Ukrainian broadcasts seek to become a reliable source of any and all information in which Ukrainian listeners are interested.

RL's Ukrainian broadcasts attempt to provide a broad and balanced picture of world events and substantive information on varied areas of human activity, with particular attention to those which are of immediate and real concern to Ukrainians in the USSR.

The main emphasis of Ukrainian broadcasts, however, is placed upon the existing situation in the Ukrainian SSR and the needs and interests of the Ukrainian nation and Ukrainian citizens. Trends and developments within the USSR as a whole are also of major concern to Soviet Ukrainians to the extent that they have immediate or future significance for the lives of Ukrainians.

The Ukrainian Service makes a particular effort to cross-report to Ukrainians significant trends and developments toward national self-expression and democratization which occur in other Republics of the Soviet Union, in other Communist-ruled countries, particularly those in Eastern Europe, as

well as in world communist parties, with particular attention to those matters which are pertinent to the situation of Ukrainians in the USSR.

In developing programming materials, the Ukrainian Service proceeds from the most authoritative and comprehensive information available on the basic views and moods of RL's Ukrainian listeners and their degree of knowledge or understanding, and from a careful study of events and trends within the Ukrainian SSR and the Soviet Union.

Soviet and foreign newspapers, periodicals, scholarly journals, and books provide sources of information which may be used in RL's Ukrainian broadcasts. Additional sources are RL's audience research and unofficial channels which often add a dimension to the one-sided picture in the Soviet press and the inevitably limited coverage of the foreign press. Moreover, RL's research facilities provide analysis in depth about Ukrainian affairs which will be utilized in Ukrainian broadcasts to the maximum extent. Increased contact with Soviet Ukrainians traveling abroad and with emigre Ukrainians who have visited the Ukraine often provide interesting information concerning internal developments. Before such information can be used as the basis for modification in programming policy or practice, it must be evaluated by responsible RL policy officers and tested against other available data.

Language and Terminology in Ukrainian Broadcasts

Ukrainians are strongly attached to their language, which has been discriminated against or repressed by both the Tsarist and Soviet governments.

While Ukrainian is fully formed as a language, as a result of historic vicissitudes, including the division of Eastern and Western Ukraine during the period between the two World Wars, there are variations in usage and pronunciation in the spoken language and between written and spoken forms of the language.

Ukrainian has been subjected to constant pressure from the Russian language. Going back to Tsarist times Russian has been in use among a large part of the population. Official language policies have primarily emphasized the substitution of Russian for Ukrainian, but both language policies and the practice of using Russian as the lingua franca of the centralized Soviet regime have been aimed at influencing the evolution of the Ukrainian language in the direction of adopting Russified forms.

National sentiment is directed mainly at guaranteeing the use of Ukrainian as the official national language, its use by governmental and educational institutions and by mass media of Ukraine, and at opposing the encroachment by Russian language signs, texts, publications, films, posters, etc. At the same time, attempts are being made to preserve and restore the purity of the Ukrainian language by eliminating russified forms, and to overcome the inertia in language usage, especially by mass media, and in the teaching and writing of Ukrainian.

RL's Ukrainian broadcasts recognize that language is a strong indicator of national sentiment, and that the language question constitutes one of the principal grievances of many Ukrainians concerning Soviet policy toward Ukraine. These broadcasts are aimed at helping the Ukrainian

people to preserve their language as a prime element of their culture and to evolve their own language patterns and expand the usage of Ukrainian, while resisting Soviet efforts to assimilate them. The Ukrainian Service attempts to encourage and sustain indigenous pressures on behalf of the Ukrainian language by reporting back and cross-reporting significant or parallel developments affecting language usage and policies, and by its own broadcasts of Ukrainian literary texts.

While following closely any evolutionary trends in the Ukrainian language, the Ukrainian Service does not attempt to set itself up as arbiter of good Ukrainian language or to lead the campaign for purification of the Ukrainian language. It does not support Russification and sympathizes with indigenous efforts for purification of the language, but at the same time it recognizes that all languages incorporate words from other languages as part of a natural process. In its own output, the Ukrainian Service reflects an awareness of the distinction between such natural changes and the unnatural, arbitrary consequences of official policies. The main emphasis of the Ukrainian Service is on the right of the Ukrainian people to use and develop their own language. The Ukrainian people themselves must, through changes in accepted usage, determine the kind of Ukrainian language they prefer.

The language and terminology used in RL's Ukrainian broadcasts is determined primarily by the need to assure clear communication with the audience, especially its main target audiences which are essentially young and urban.

Since even the Western areas of the Ukraine have been under Soviet rule for nearly twenty-five years since the Second World War, the Ukrainian Service assumes that its actual and potential audience is Soviet-educated and accustomed to language and terminology (and to a lesser extent, pronunciation) generally accepted in the Ukrainian SSR, as reflected in its use by mass media and/or by the Ukrainian intelligentsia in published books and articles, speeches and broadcasts. Where differences in usage occur, the Ukrainian Service will be guided in determining the best usage by literary works and articles of Soviet Ukrainian authors who are known for their conscientious and careful fostering of the mother tongue, and by the standards of language in all serious Soviet Ukrainian journals.

Attempting to employ the best language consistent with a Soviet audience, the Ukrainian Service endeavors to use, as a general rule, the language and terminology familiar to its audience and to avoid unfamiliar forms used by non-Soviet Ukrainians, even though these may in some respects be purer than those used by educated people in the Ukrainian SSR. Even if a word or expression would be comprehensible to this audience, it should not be employed if it will sound strange or different to the listener and cause him to think that he is being addressed by a radio station or an announcer not belonging to his world.

However, in view of existing divergences in language, terminology and pronunciation, the Ukrainian Service permits a certain latitude and does not attempt to impose its own standards of usage on occasional guest

speakers. Regular free-lance contributors who are identified by name and who read their own scripts may be permitted to deviate in diction and pronunciation, but will be expected to write standard Kiev Ukrainian. Staff writers and speakers as well as free-lance speakers will be expected to adhere to the Kiev form.

On the other hand, the use of certain Soviet terminology is unavoidable when there is no substitute for this terminology which would be readily understandable to the Ukrainian audience, as in the case of the names of Soviet organizations, and the like. The Ukrainian Service uses this kind of terminology in its broadcasts; it also adopts accepted Soviet Ukrainian translations of the names of foreign organizations, treaties, laws, resolutions, titles, etc. as well as Soviet Ukrainian pronunciation of foreign place names and proper names (unless this pronunciation favors Russian rather than accepts Ukrainian usage). In other cases, it may be necessary for the Ukrainian Service to use Soviet terminology of a propagandistic nature (such as "peaceful co-existence"), if such expressions possess an accepted meaning for the audience which can only be rendered with difficulty in any other way.

The Ukrainian Service's Approach to Specific Issues

1. Democratization and Self-Determination

The Soviet government of the Ukraine was originally imposed by force upon the Ukrainian people. Ukrainians were not allowed to exercise their right of self-determination in regard to the issue of joining the USSR, and

do not now have a free and representative voice in the central regime. Both the All-Union and Republic governments do not allow the Ukrainian people, as they do not allow other peoples of the USSR, a free and representative voice in electing their leaders or making decisions affecting the political, economic, social or cultural affairs affecting the Ukrainian Republic. Nevertheless, the Republic already possesses some authority and its officials have a natural interest in expanding this authority through decentralization of the All-Union government. Moreover, Republic authorities do make some decisions which are in the interest of the Ukrainian people. They should be supported in RL broadcasts to the extent that their efforts directly or indirectly accord with the aspirations of the Ukrainian people.

In its efforts to encourage democratization in the Ukraine, the Ukrainian Service provides ideas and information and stimulates thinking individuals to work for their individual and national rights. RL's Ukrainian broadcasts emphasize not only the ultimate aim of truly representative government, but also stress the importance of achieving political, economic and social reforms in the present system which increase the voice of the people and enhance their interests. ✓

The Constitution and laws of the Ukrainian SSR, as those of the Soviet Union itself, embody rights which are more honored in the breach than in the observance.

The Constitution of the USSR guarantees the right of union republics to secede from the USSR. Another article of this constitution guarantees school instruction in the native language. The Ukrainian Constitution proclaims the sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR. The Ukrainian SSR is a member of the United Nations. Nevertheless, many constitutional rights of the Ukraine itself and the legal rights of its citizens are either ignored or violated.

The Ukrainian Service seeks to encourage indirectly those elements in the Ukraine working for the substance contained or implicit in present provisions for the government and social organization of the Ukrainian SSR. The Ukrainian Service calls attention to existing laws and urges that public and social organizations adhere to their own charters by carrying out the functions for which they were supposedly created. These broadcasts stress the necessity for observance of the rule of law, within the context of the Constitution of the USSR, All-Union laws, the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR. In particular, the Ukrainian Service supports efforts within the country aimed at the realization of civil liberties and cultural freedoms which are guaranteed in Soviet laws, and of the open knowledge which guarantees justice. The Ukrainian Service also views these laws in the larger context of international law, the UN's Declaration of Human Rights, and decisions or declarations of international legal institutions.

The Ukrainian Communist Party as presently constituted is undemocratic, not responsive to the needs of the people of the Ukraine but

to direction from Moscow. The Ukrainian Service assumes that it is possible for the role of the Ukrainian Communist Party to change, as it has in certain instances in Eastern Europe, through circumstances which permit the Communist Party of Ukraine to assert greater independence and cause it to seek the support of the Ukrainian people by representing national interests and instituting domestic reforms desired and supported by the people. The Ukrainian Service approves local initiative and attempts to stimulate independent thinking which would lead the Ukrainian leadership to undertake local and republic reform and to promote the real interests of the Ukrainian people rather than to follow slavishly the instructions of the CPSU leadership and apparatus.

The Ukrainian Service expresses approval of those policies and actions of the Ukrainian leadership which promote the real interests of the Ukrainian people. On the other hand, it assists the Ukrainian public by voicing the latter's opposition to/or pressure against policies or actions detrimental to the interests of the Ukraine and Ukrainians and by informing RL's audience about such policies and actions. In doing so, the Ukrainian Service draws a clear distinction between the CPSU and the CPU, and it focusses on issues, policies and acts, while refraining from vilification of individual communists.

The Ukrainian Service views these efforts to promote the evolution of a more democratic system in Ukraine as part of a broader historical trend toward democracy and self-determination, a process which is also

reflected in the entire USSR. It regards the realization of these rights by Ukrainians as interdependent with and conditioned on the recognition of similar rights for all nationalities of the USSR as well as minority group in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Service reports fully to its listeners on developments affecting other nations and nationalities both within and outside the USSR. While recognizing the essential right of each individual to democracy and self-determination, it does not attempt to prejudge the question of whether it is feasible to achieve this within a communist system, or the ultimate outcome of exercise of the right to self-determination, whether it be independence, federation or alliance.

2. The Issue of Russification

The Ukrainian Service encourages among listeners the realization that they share with the Russians and other nationalities of the USSR the burden of centralized dictatorship by an authoritarian regime, and that freedom from such central control can be most effectively achieved by cooperation among all Soviet nationalities on certain questions of common concern, such as human rights, literary repression, and localism ("mestnichestvo") condemned by Moscow.

The Ukrainian Service approaches the issue of Russification--which may be defined in this context as the replacement of Ukrainian values by Russian ones, or, ultimately, the assimilation of Ukrainians by the Russian nation--in specific terms only; loose and indiscriminate application

of the label of Russification to broad trends and general developments in the Ukraine can easily be faulted by the aware listener. Specific, clearly defined examples of Russification which are well supported by facts, as well as by objective research and analysis, are discussed by the Ukrainian Service in a calm, factual tone that allows the details to speak for themselves.

The Ukrainian Service avoids overplaying the issue of Russification, and treats it only as warranted by available, verified facts; overemphasis of the issue, particularly in ways which might imply continued success of the center's nationality policy, could cause listeners to despair of the preservation of their national distinctiveness and may lead them to believe that RL has little faith in their own ability to maintain their heritage. In judging the suitability for broadcast of materials on this question, precedence will be given to statements and assessments emanating from within the Ukraine and, secondly, to reports on the situation by concerned segments of free-world communist parties, individuals communists and the like. Provided their tone and content is consonant with the Ukrainian Service's own station policy, statements by other Western organizations of Ukrainians may be acceptable.

The Ukrainian Service does not, either through the tone of its broadcasts or the views expressed in them by its own broadcasters, attempt to incite or encourage among Ukrainians hostility to Russians as a people. We emphasize that the regime's nationality policy is an instrument of central,

authoritarian control that may in fact have the support of some Ukrainians; we avoid suggesting that Russification has the active support of the Russian people as a whole. The Ukrainian Service's policy on this matter is based on the realization that cooperation among concerned segments of all nationalities is essential to modification of the Soviet system.

3. The Issue of Colonialism

The Ukrainian Service avoids describing the Ukraine as a colonial area, thereby possibly offending listeners in the Ukraine who, whatever their grievances, do not regard themselves as colonials. The Ukrainian Service does not apply the label of colonialism to the situation there, since generalities of this nature are not likely to impress thinking listeners. The same limitations pertain to other parts of the Soviet Union.

Instead, the Ukrainian Service discusses specific issues involved in Moscow-centralized control over the Ukraine and other areas in terms of verified facts and sound analysis. Comparisons may be made with conditions existing in Asia and Africa under colonial administration on the basis of concrete facts and information. Broadcasts related to this subject must not sound propagandistic, but should be calm and factual.

4. The Treatment of Territorial Problems

The Ukrainian Service does not raise territorial issues either directly or indirectly in its broadcasts. Where objective developments which relate to territorial issues have to be reported in order to maintain the station's credibility as a source of reliable news reporting, the Ukrainian

Service's tone and treatment will reflect the position that all such questions must be settled on the basis of the expressed will of a representative Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian people aimed at the achievement of peaceful understandings with the Ukraine's neighbors. This applies both to the Ukraine's own conceivable claims to territories not now a part of the USSR and to other territories added to the Ukraine as a result of the Second World War and other events. The Ukrainian Service defends the right of Crimean Tatars to return to their old homeland in the Crimea without involving itself in questions of political administration connected with the return of the Tatars.

Finally, the Ukrainian Service urges the Ukrainian SSR to undertake measures aimed at defending the cultural rights of the estimated five million Ukrainians in the USSR outside the borders of the Ukrainian SSR, broadcasting in Ukrainian to these people, providing published Ukrainian materials for them, arranging for visits by Ukrainian cultural groups, etc. Moreover, the Ukrainian Service supports the right of large groups of Ukrainians outside the Ukrainian SSR to have their own schools, to publish newspapers in their own language and to organize a Ukrainian cultural life in their new areas of settlement.

The Ukrainian Service's Approach to Historical and Cultural Questions

I. Themes Connected with History in Ukrainian Broadcast.

The Ukrainian Service assumes that Ukrainians in its audience are well aware of their long and ancient history. Where present Soviet

historiography distorts or maintains silence on aspects of pre-Soviet history, the Ukrainian Service attempts to draw attention to these omissions and to correct distortions. RL's Ukrainian broadcasts do not over-emphasize the period of the 1917 revolution and the events of the immediate pre-Soviet period, since Radio Liberty must not become identified in the minds of listeners with the aim of restoring an old order in the Ukraine. For example, the establishment of the Ukrainian National Republic in January 1918 is viewed by the Ukrainian Service not as an event committing the Ukraine for all time to a particular government, but as a political development which should be examined in terms of the lessons it may provide for the future of Ukrainian democracy and self-determination. In the treatment of this era, the Ukrainian Service takes care not to identify Radio Liberty with any particular party, coalition, movement, or government prominent during this time.

The history of Soviet rule in the Ukraine is prominently featured in RL's Ukrainian broadcasts because much of this history is suppressed or distorted in contemporary Soviet historical works. These historical lacunae or outright distortions apply particularly to the period of collectivization, mass deportation, and purges in the Ukraine. Since the Soviet leadership cannot avoid the responsibility for the events that occurred during the half century of Soviet rule, the Ukrainian Service makes every effort to illuminate the dark pages of Soviet history, but its treatment should be aimed not so much at indicting the leadership as it is at pointing

the way toward reforms which would prevent such crimes and abuses in the future. Moreover, this stress on the past should not be so consuming a preoccupation that the Ukrainian Service becomes vulnerable to charges of being anachronistic and reactionary.

2. Themes Connected with Religion in Ukrainian Broadcasts

The Ukrainian Service supports freedom of conscience and religious belief. In this context RL's Ukrainian broadcasts may provide regular religious services for Orthodox, Uniate Catholic, and other believers. At the same time the Ukrainian Service is aware that many, if not the majority of listeners are non-believers and it therefore does not identify Radio Liberty with religion generally or with any specific faith. However, even non-believers, particularly young people born under a system which professes and advocates atheism, may be interested in the content of religion. Aside from satisfying their curiosity about religious forms, the Ukrainian Service also offers information about a variety of philosophical and religious beliefs which could assist listeners in their search for independent ideas and convictions.

3. Themes Connected with Ukrainian Literature

The Ukrainian Service stresses both achievements and short-comings of Ukrainian literature, recognizing, when appropriate, its ties with classical Russian and other foreign literature as well as their interdependence. The Ukrainian Service points out, as circumstances require, the elements of discrimination existing in the Ukrainian SSR with regard to both the

literature in the Ukrainian language and in minority languages, and advocates the right of all to be disseminated and developed on Ukrainian territory. An important aim of RL's Ukrainian broadcasts is to preserve and advance Ukrainian literature, and in accordance with this aim the Ukrainian Service urges the publication of more books and periodicals in the Ukrainian language and in languages of minority groups in the Ukraine. Since Ukrainian writers are seeking the same freedom of expression and abolition of censorship sought by other writers under communist rule, Ukrainian broadcasts devote particular attention to the cross-reporting of developments concerning the creative intelligentsia in the USSR, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere.

When Radio Liberty broadcasts the text, in whole or in part, of literary works originally written in Ukrainian, the Ukrainian Service does not alter this text in any way to correct or change language and terminology, regardless of whether it emanates from internal or emigre Ukrainian sources.

The Ukrainian Service's Approach to the Ukrainian Emigration

Several million emigres and descendants of emigres from the Ukraine are spread throughout Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere. They are organized, especially in the United States and Canada, in politically influential and relatively well-to-do national associations whose leaders tirelessly strive to develop support outside of the USSR for Ukrainian freedom and independence.

While Radio Liberty shares with most of the Ukrainian emigration objectives which seek freedom and democracy in the Ukraine, its position supports self-determination for the Ukrainian nation and people and leaves to them the decision as to independence, the Ukraine's future form of government, etc. Therefore Radio Liberty cannot be a medium for advocating the political goals of the Ukrainian emigration or Ukrainian organizations which would pre-judge these issues. Similarly, Radio Liberty cannot permit itself to become identified with any particular Ukrainian organization which has such political goals.

The Ukrainian Service may report news of emigre political activities and events and may also quote politically responsible portions of speeches by prominent Ukrainians abroad or of documents and statements issued abroad of interest to the listener. Reporting of this nature must not tend to be limited to or favor certain organizations, thereby indirectly identifying Radio Liberty with the political goals of this or that organization. Nor should it violate common sense or good taste. Interviews may not be conducted with representatives of political organizations speaking in this capacity, although they are permissible if these persons are appearing as individuals and are not identified as political representatives.

On the other hand, the Ukrainian Service seeks to forward its objective of preserving the Ukrainian culture and the language in the USSR by giving extensive coverage to Ukrainian emigre culture, religious,

sports and other non-political organizations and activities. It may also conduct interviews with representatives of non-political organizations speaking on behalf of these organizations. Obviously this coverage must be consistent with Radio Liberty's basic policies both in respect to the emigration and other matters set forth in the Policy Manual, this Annex, and other basic policy papers; consequently, emigre views that are contrary to the policy positions of Radio Liberty may be broadcast only when they fall within the intent and provisions of these papers.