

November 26, 1982

**Excerpts of Talks between Leading Comrades and
Foreign Guests (Supplement No. 3)**

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Summary:

A Chinese Communist Party digest summarizing a recent meeting held between Deng Xiaoping and Pakistan's Zia-ul-Haq.

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Comrade Deng Xiaoping and President Haq Talks on the Soviet Union and Sino-Soviet Relations

Comrade Deng Xiaoping and President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq Talks on the Soviet Union and Sino-Soviet Relations

On January 1, Comrade Deng Xiaoping met with President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan. They discussed the Soviet Union and Sino-Soviet relations. Their talks are excerpted below:

Comrade Deng Xiaoping said to President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq that now we have resumed contacts with the Soviet Union. In the past, we had contacts and border negotiations. These were interrupted by the Afghan issue. The prerequisite for resuming contacts was to remove the obstacles between China and the Soviet Union and to eliminate the threat to China. One is that the Soviet Union has put a million troops on the Sino-Soviet border and stationed them in Outer Mongolia. The Soviet Union signed an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek that removed Outer Mongolia from Chinese territory. Naturally, we didn't raise the issue of sovereignty over Outer Mongolia. We want to restore our relations to the level they were in the Khrushchev era, when the Soviet Union had only a dozen divisions on the border. Now there are more than thirty. We also demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Outer Mongolia.

Another obstacle was the Soviet Union's support for the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Still another was the Soviet Union's direct aggression against Afghanistan, and we were asking these questions, which the Soviet Union considered to be prerequisites. We say that this is not a precondition, but a real problem, a direct threat to China, and an obstacle to the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. To improve and develop Sino-Soviet relations, these threats and conditions must be eliminated. It would be difficult for the Soviet Union to do all these three things at once. They could do one or two of them first or at least do one of them first. Once they have done the first, we could then talk about the second. If the Soviet Union does one of these things, that would mean that there is a gap in its global strategy and that a certain change has taken place in its hegemony.

These issues of removing obstacles we have raised from the perspective of bilateral relations between China and the Soviet Union - we share borders not only with the Soviet Union, but also with Vietnam and Afghanistan - but in fact these issues are also raised in close connection with South Asia, Southeast Asia and global strategy, and also with Pakistan. It seems to be very difficult to solve the problem, but we have to continue to engage. I say difficult because the Soviet policy of moving south will not change. We appreciate Pakistan's policy of strong support for the struggle of the Afghan people.

We can understand your dialogue and contacts with the Soviet Union, but a prerequisite should be a complete Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Afghanistan can have a regime that is neither pro-Soviet nor anti-Soviet. That would give you the political initiative, but it would be difficult to accomplish. Soviet strategy has not changed. What has changed is the approach. It is asking for dialogue with China because it is having great difficulties both internally and externally, their economy is in bad shape, and it is isolated internationally. But at some point, it will offer all kinds of attractive opportunities to achieve its strategic goals. So we should be vigilant when talking to the Soviet Union. Now there is a situation that is more favorable to the Soviet Union, that is the United States showing its teeth and claws in the Middle East and in particular the actions of Israel. Israel would not have been able to do what it has without the support of the United States. We criticized the United States

by name at the 12th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party for supporting Israel. This support is also a manifestation of hegemony. Our approach to the U.S. is to continue to develop relations with the U.S. You need to develop relations with the U.S., but always keep your distance. This is important for the Palestinians, otherwise it will be detrimental to their relations with other Islamic states.

Zia asked Comrade Deng Xiaoping what his assessment of the post Brezhnev Soviet Union was.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping said that it would not change. Some people in the international community say that Brezhnev is a moderate. We have always believed that this is not true. In the past, it was said that Khrushchev was a hardliner, but in fact he only talked more and acted less than Brezhnev, but was more moderate than Brezhnev. Relations between China and the Soviet Union broke down during the Khrushchev era, but at that time the Soviet Union had only a dozen divisions on the Sino-Soviet border, and the entire Soviet army was not as large as it is now. The entire Soviet army was not as big as it is now. After Brezhnev came to power, he deployed one-third of the strategic nuclear weapons and one million troops on the Sino-Soviet border. It was Brezhnev who sent troops to Czechoslovakia, invaded Afghanistan and the Middle East, and supported Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. Therefore it cannot be said that Brezhnev was a moderate.

After Brezhnev's departure, there may be some changes in the ways of those who come in, but the fundamental policy will not change. Soviet policy should not be judged by the fact that someone is in power, but from the perspective of global strategy. We need to look at the global strategy. As for whether the successor will be more moderate or tougher than Brezhnev, it is hard to say. Even if he is tougher, he could not be much tougher.