

**March 16, 1955**

**National Intelligence Estimate Number 100-4-55,  
'Communist Capabilities and Intentions with  
Respect to the Offshore Islands and Taiwan through  
1955, and Communist and Non-Communist  
Reactions with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan'**

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The CIA on whether the PRC has the ability to seize Taiwan and/or the offshore islands.

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**COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS  
AND TAIWAN THROUGH 1955, AND  
COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST  
REACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO  
THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN**

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*Submitted by the*  
**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

*The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.*

*Concurred in by the*

**INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE**

*on 16 March 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; and the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC. The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of its jurisdiction.*

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# COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS AND TAIWAN THROUGH 1955, AND COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST RE-ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN<sup>1</sup>

## THE PROBLEM

- (a) To estimate Communist, particularly Chinese Communist, capabilities and probable courses of action with respect to territory occupied by the Republic of China;
- (b) To estimate Communist reaction to possible US courses of action in defense of territory occupied by the Republic of China; and
- (c) To estimate actions or reactions of the principal non-Communist powers with respect to possible future developments in the Taiwan-offshore island situation.

## CONCLUSIONS

1. The Chinese Communist regime appears firmly committed to the seizure ("liberation" as they call it) of the offshore islands and Taiwan. It regards as basic and continuing national objectives the final destruction of the Chinese National Government as a symbol of resistance to the Chinese regime, and the elimination of Taiwan as a potential base of attack against the mainland. The Chinese Communists almost certainly regard the eventual attainment of these objectives as essential. (Para. 14)

2. In view of the US commitment, the Chinese Communists do not have the capability to seize Taiwan, and will almost certainly not attempt an invasion in 1955. However, the Chinese Communists have the capability for air strikes and might undertake air raids against Taiwan either on their own initiative or in retaliation to military action elsewhere. (Para. 37)

<sup>1</sup> Wherever Taiwan appears in the text it should be taken as reference to Taiwan and the Penghus (Pescadores).

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3. We believe that the Chinese Communists with the forces now in place or readily available in the east China area have the capability to seize the Quemoy and Matsu groups<sup>2</sup> assuming that these islands were defended by the Nationalists alone and the Chinese Communists were willing to risk heavy casualties. Timely warning might not be available that final preparations for an assault on either Matsu or Quemoy had been completed. We believe that the Nationalists cannot absorb sufficient military end-items and training during 1955 to change this estimate of relative capabilities. (Paras. 22, 23)

4. The Chinese Communists will probably undertake air, naval, and artillery attacks against the Quemoy and the Matsu groups and will probably attempt to seize lightly defended island outposts within these groups. They will seek to erode Nationalist ability and determination to hold these islands, and, more importantly, to probe US intentions. If the Chinese Communists should become convinced that the US was determined to prevent the seizure and retention of these islands, taking whatever military action was necessary, including, if required, all-out attacks on any part of China, they would probably be deterred from attempting an outright seizure during 1955. However,

<sup>2</sup> In the context of this estimate the term "MATSU GROUP" or "MATSUS" denotes those Chinese Nationalist-held islands lying essentially between 25 and 27 degrees north latitude and consisting of Tung-yin Shan, Lang Tao, Kao-teng Hsu, Pei-kan Tang, Matsu Shan, Pai-chuan and Lieh Tao (White Dogs), Wu-chiu, and Hsia Wu-chiu. "MATSU" used singly applies only to Matsu-Shan proper.

Similarly, "CHINMEN GROUP" or "QUEMOY GROUP" denotes those Chinese Nationalist-held islands lying between 24 and 25 degrees north latitude and consisting of Chinmen Tao (Quemoy), Lieh Hsu (Little Quemoy), Ta-tan Tao, Erh-tan Tao, and Tung-ting Hsu. "QUEMOY" used singly applies only to Chinmen-Tao.

they would make every effort to render the Chinese Nationalist position on the offshore islands untenable by bombardment, interdiction of supplies, and subversion.<sup>3</sup> (Para. 38)

5. It may not be possible for the Chinese Communists, as a result of their probing actions alone, to ascertain the full extent of a possible US counteraction to an attempt at seizure of an offshore island. If the US did not respond to initial probing actions, the Chinese Communists might estimate that the US would not in fact commit its own forces to the defense of the island. Or, even though there was some US military reaction to a probing attack, the Chinese Communists might still estimate that US counteraction to an actual invasion of offshore islands would remain limited and localized. Or, the Chinese Communists might estimate that they could overrun an offshore island before effective US counteraction could be brought to bear and that the US would not subsequently initiate major

<sup>3</sup> The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, believes that this paragraph underestimates the willingness of the Chinese Communists, supported by the USSR, to assume the risks of war to attain their objectives and would substitute for paragraphs 4 and 5 the following text:

"The Chinese Communists will intensify air and artillery attacks and possibly minor naval operations against Quemoy and the Matsus. They will seek to erode Nationalist ability and determination to hold these islands, and to probe US intentions. If the Chinese Communists should not be able to ascertain the full extent of a possible US counteraction to an attempt at seizure, they might consider that they could overrun either, or both, of these island groups in spite of local US counteraction and that the US would not subsequently initiate major hostilities in order to regain the captured territory. Even though the Chinese Communists were convinced that the US is determined to prevent the seizure of these offshore islands, it is believed they will attempt to seize them, although not necessarily during 1955."

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hostilities in order to regain the captured territory. In any of these circumstances, we believe the Chinese Communists would probably attempt to seize or complete the seizure of the offshore islands.<sup>3</sup> (Para. 39)

6. If the US and Chinese Communist forces became engaged in hostilities, the Chinese Communists, while taking defensive measures which might include attacks on US and Chinese Nationalist forces and bases directly involved, would attempt to prevent the expansion of hostilities. Initially the USSR would almost certainly give the Chinese Communists political and military support but without open military intervention. (Paras. 42-45)

7. Ultimately, if Moscow and Peiping had come to believe that US military actions were gravely threatening the existence of the Chinese Communist regime, we believe that the USSR would openly intervene in the war in the Far East, but would still try to confine hostilities to that area.<sup>4</sup> (Para. 47)

8. The reaction of most non-Communist governments to US defense of Taiwan

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3 on previous page.

<sup>4</sup> The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and the Director of Naval Intelligence believe that this paragraph should read as follows:

"Should the conflict progress so far that the Communists believed the existence of the Chinese Communist regime was gravely threatened, we believe that the Soviet leaders would recognize that open intervention on their part against US forces sufficient to save the Chinese regime would involve grave risk of general war with the US. Their decision would probably be based on existing military, political, and economic strengths, with particular emphasis on the current disparities in nuclear stockpiles and delivery capabilities. We believe that the Soviet leaders would probably conclude that if they intervened the conflict could not be confined to the Far East, and that Soviet strengths were insufficient to risk their own regime in this manner."

would in general be favorable. The reaction of most non-Communist governments to US action in defense of the offshore islands, or to US attacks on Chinese Communist military concentrations prior to a Communist attack, would be unfavorable. If the US bombed military targets throughout east China, non-Communist reactions would be considerably more unfavorable, reflecting a fear of the immediacy of general war. Even in these circumstances, however, and despite increased strains between the US and its allies, we believe existing US alliances would remain intact. However, if the US became involved in defense of the offshore islands before the ratification of the Paris agreements, the ratification might be jeopardized. (Paras. 48-56, 58-60)

9. If the US used nuclear weapons against Communist China, the predominant world reaction would be one of shock. These reactions would be particularly adverse if these weapons were used to defend the offshore islands or destroy military concentrations prior to an all-out Communist Chinese attempt to take the offshore islands. However, certain Asian and European allies might condone the US use of nuclear weapons to stop an actual invasion of Taiwan.<sup>5 6</sup> The gen-

<sup>5</sup> The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that this sentence should read:

"Certain Asian and European allies would probably condone US use of nuclear weapons, particularly if used tactically, as firm evidence of US determination to put a halt to further Communist expansion wherever occurring."

<sup>6</sup> The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that this sentence should read as follows:

"However, certain Asian and European allies might condone the tactical use of nuclear weapons by the US provided that they were convinced such weapons were necessary to stop an actual invasion to Taiwan and that the US was exercising the utmost restraint and attempting to spare civilians."

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eral reaction of non-Communist Asians would be emotional and would be extremely critical of the US. In the case of Japan, the Government would probably attempt to steer a more neutral course. (Paras. 62-66)

10. If, however, the US succeeded in curbing Chinese Communist aggression in the Taiwan area without becoming involved in protracted, full-scale hostilities, and without employing nuclear weapons, US prestige and the confidence of the non-Communist world in US leadership would be enhanced.<sup>7</sup> (Paras. 57, 61, 67)

11. In the event the Nationalists, with or without US assistance or pressure, evac-

uated the Matsu and Quemoy Groups prior to a large-scale Communist attack, there would probably be a deterioration of morale on Taiwan and great disappointment in the ROK. In the Philippines such an evacuation would stimulate concern that the US was not prepared to commit its forces in forward areas. To a lesser extent this reaction would occur in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. However, the dominant reaction among other interested non-Communist states would probably be one of relief followed at least for some time by increased support for US policies with respect to the defense of Taiwan.<sup>8</sup> (Para. 50)

<sup>7</sup> The Deputy Director of Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that the following additional sentence should be added to paragraph 10:

"Even though the US had used nuclear weapons to achieve the result noted above, the non-Communist world's adverse reaction to the use of nuclear weapons would in time be modified."

<sup>8</sup> The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and the Director of Naval Intelligence believe that the last three sentences should read:

"Such an evacuation would stimulate concern in the Philippines, Thailand, Laos, Cam-

bodia, and South Vietnam that the US would in the future also withdraw from other forward areas. Elsewhere in the non-Communist world, the dominant reaction would probably be one of relief that threatened hostilities had not occurred, but with undercurrents of concern of varying strength in different countries at this further instance of Communist expansion. Particularly in non-Communist Asia, the net impression of an evacuation, whether manifest or latent, would be one of further growth of Chinese Communist prestige and power, with a commensurate decrease in US prestige."

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## DISCUSSION

## I. INTRODUCTION

12. The Chinese Communists have been attempting to complete the destruction of the Nationalist government ever since it was driven from the mainland in 1949. An unsuccessful attack was made against Quemoy in that year, and large-scale preparations for an assault on Taiwan were well underway when the Korean War began in 1950 and the 7th Fleet was given the mission of maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Straits. Between 1950 and the summer of 1954, harassing actions by both sides continued in the Taiwan Straits area, and numerous small islands changed hands. During this same period, the Chinese Communists increased their military capabilities by: (a) modernizing their armed forces; (b) gradually redeploying combat-experienced forces from Korea; and (c) restoring some of the lines of communication.<sup>9</sup> Following the Korean armistice, the Chinese Communists began the rehabilitation of air bases in the east China area,<sup>10</sup> and intensified their efforts to improve lines of communication.

13. Since the Geneva Conference, Peiping has increased its military pressure against the Nationalist-held offshore islands, has greatly intensified its propaganda effort against the Nationalist government and the US, and has reaffirmed in categorical terms its determination to seize all Nationalist-held islands and destroy the Nationalist government. Most recently Peiping has hailed its conquest of Ichiang and its occupation of the evacuated Tachens and Nanchi as steps leading to the armed liberation of Taiwan. It has also rejected proposed UN cease-fire discussions.

<sup>9</sup> For Chinese Nationalist capabilities, see NIE 43-54, "Probable Developments in Taiwan through Mid-1956," dated 14 September 1954.

<sup>10</sup> The "east China area" as used in this paper includes the area south of the Yangtze River and east of the Hankow-Canton railroad.

## II. FACTORS AFFECTING COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION

## Chinese Communist Objectives

14. The Chinese Communist regime appears firmly committed to the eventual seizure ("liberation" as they call it) of the offshore islands and Taiwan. It regards as basic and continuing national objectives the final destruction of the Chinese National Government as a symbol of resistance to the Communist regime, and the elimination of Taiwan as a potential base of attack against the mainland. The Chinese Communists almost certainly regard the eventual attainment of these objectives as essential. Consequently, they almost certainly will not agree to any negotiated settlement which in their opinion would preclude the ultimate achievement of their objectives. At the present time, the Communist Chinese probably recognize that the seizure of Taiwan is beyond their capabilities. However, they are probably less clear concerning their capability to take the offshore islands because of their uncertainties as to US policy. In any case, their policy is almost certainly to press constantly toward their ultimate objective.<sup>11</sup>

15. The Chinese Communists probably consider that constant psychological pressure on Taiwan and military pressure on the offshore islands tend to serve several of their sub-

<sup>11</sup> The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that this entire paragraph overemphasizes the degree of threat posed to the Chinese Communists by continued retention by the Chinese Nationalists of Taiwan and the offshore islands. The Chinese Communists undoubtedly seek to gain control of all Chinese Nationalist-held territory but not necessarily because the forces on this territory are a grave military threat to the security of Communist China. The Chinese Communists almost certainly estimate that the seizure of Taiwan is beyond their present capabilities in view of US commitments to defend Taiwan. While they are uncertain of US intentions with respect to the offshore islands, they probably believe that these islands could be seized even if the US should assist in their defense.

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subsidiary objectives. They probably assume that such pressures confront the US with the dilemma of choosing between: (a) active military intervention in defense of the offshore islands, probably at great cost in terms of its relations with other important powers, and (b) giving way, with a consequent lessening of US prestige. Peiping probably also believes that such pressures will undermine Nationalist morale, thus making Taiwan more vulnerable. The Taiwan issue serves to rally internal support for the Peiping regime and provides justification for continuing controls and austerities. Finally, the regime probably considers that as long as these pressures stop short of large-scale fighting with the US, the pursuit of its objectives in the Taiwan area will not prejudice and may in fact further such other Communist Chinese objectives as: domestic industrialization, world recognition as a great power, and creation of divisions within the non-Communist world.<sup>12</sup>

16. We believe that the USSR shares in general Peiping's objectives in the Taiwan area. The USSR has supported its ally's military and political activities in the belief that it can use the Taiwan crisis to enhance its solidarity with Peiping and to isolate the US by demonstrating US "aggressiveness" and exacerbating differences between the US and its allies. Moscow has expressed its "approval and support" of Peiping's position and has endorsed Chinese Communist statements on the need to "liberate" Taiwan and other islands and continues to provide Peiping with materiel and military advice. We believe that Moscow might see certain advantages in clashes between Chinese Communist and US forces, at least as long as it believed that the clashes would be limited and localized.

17. At the same time, we believe that Moscow almost certainly does not regard the Taiwan question as directly involving its vital na-

<sup>12</sup> The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that this sentence is incomplete without mention that an essential objective for the Chinese Communists which these pressures also serve is the eventual elimination of US influence from the Far East.

tional interests. Soviet spokesmen have avoided statements on Taiwan that might be taken as military commitments under the Sino-Soviet alliance. Moscow has appeared more ready than Peiping to suggest international discussions on Taiwan, but has thus far been prepared to discuss only Communist terms and has not hinted at any solution that would prejudice Peiping's aspirations in the area. We believe that the USSR will continue to support Peiping's activities, but will seek to prevent a situation from arising which in its view would carry grave risks of major hostilities between the US and Communist China.

### Chinese Communist Strengths and Capabilities for Operations in the Taiwan Area

#### *Chinese Communist Forces Available in the Taiwan Area*<sup>13</sup>

18. *Ground Forces.* The Chinese Communists have at least 487,000 ground troops in the area between Shanghai and Canton, organized in 8 armies, 5 artillery divisions, and miscellaneous units. (See Map at end of text facing Annex "A".) Four of the armies served in Korea, and the others are also considered to be first-class units. Portions of most of these armies have undergone elementary amphibious training but, with the exception of the regiment that assaulted Ichiang Island, these units have not engaged in combined operations. We believe the Chinese Communists have two and possibly three parachute divisions. We believe that approximately 30,000 troops have undergone rudimentary paratroop training; they probably do not as yet possess a capability for more than small unit operations. In any case, available Chinese Communist air lift would limit a single operation to about 2,600 men.

<sup>13</sup> See annexes for more detailed information of: (A) Chinese Communist aircraft performance; (B) Chinese Communist aircraft strength; (C) Estimated CCAF and CNAF sortie rates; (D) Nationalist Chinese artillery on offshore island groups; (E) Chinese Communist artillery strength in the Matsu and Quemoy areas; (F) Chinese Communist naval strength; (G) Capacity of ports of embarkation; and (H) Weather conditions in the Taiwan Straits.

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19. *Naval forces.* We estimate the Chinese Communist Navy operates the following vessels: 2 destroyers, 5 submarines, 23 large patrol vessels, 55 motor torpedo boats, 13 mine vessels, 56 landing craft (LST, LSM, LSIL),<sup>14</sup> and some 250 small patrol craft, about half of which are believed to be armed junks. Some elements of the navy, particularly the motor torpedo boats and the amphibious forces employed at Ichiang, have demonstrated a high degree of effectiveness. The tactical doctrine in that operation was sound and the employment of joint sea-air-land forces excellent. It is probable, however, that this degree of competency does not exist throughout the entire navy.

20. *Air Forces.* The total actual strength of the Chinese Communist Air and Naval Air Forces is currently estimated to be about 1,600 tactical aircraft, approximately 60 percent of which are jet types. There are 11 operational jet airfields in the area between Shanghai and Canton. With one exception (Chuh-sien), all are at or slightly beyond extreme MIG-15 combat radius from Taiwan but all are within light bomber combat radius. In the same area there are at least 11 additional airfields, six of which are within 160 miles of Amoy. (See Map.) The absence of railroads and the inadequacy of roads in this area would limit the speed with which these additional fields could be stocked and made suitable for sustained conventional or jet operations. However, such preparations could probably be completed on some of these fields within a few weeks and on all by the end of 1955. Use of these airfields would increase greatly the time over target of all types of CCAF planes in the Quemoy and Taiwan area.

21. The Chinese Communist air defense system utilizes the fighter aircraft described above, Soviet and old Japanese antiaircraft artillery concentrated around key cities and industrial areas, and old and inefficient early-warning radar sited along the entire coast. The air defense system is probably inade-

<sup>14</sup> In addition there are some 25 landing craft of these types operating in the Chinese Communist merchant marine.

quate to provide an integrated and coordinated defense against strong attacks by modern aircraft.

*Chinese Communist Capabilities for Operations in the Taiwan Area Against Nationalist Forces Alone*<sup>15</sup>

22. *Communist Capabilities for Action against the Offshore Islands.* The Chinese Communists now have sufficient ground forces in the Foochow area (estimated at 57,000) for an assault on Matsu. Little redeployment of existing air and naval forces would be required to support such an assault. An assault on Quemoy would probably require a minimum of 150,000 troops. There are now about 60,000 troops in the Amoy area opposite Quemoy, and an additional 110,000 troops could be moved in within four days. Considerable artillery to provide cover for an assault is already emplaced. No aircraft redeployment would be necessary to provide jet high cover. Extensive redeployment would be necessary to provide jet close support. Sufficient amphibious lift can readily be assembled for either operation. The Chinese Communist air and naval forces and artillery could make the resupply of any of the offshore islands by the Nationalists difficult and costly. Timely warning might not be available that final preparations for an assault on either Matsu or Quemoy had been completed. Should the Communists achieve local air superiority timely warning would be even less likely.

23. We believe that the Chinese Communists with the forces now in place or readily available in the east China area have the capability to seize the Quemoy and Matsu Groups assuming that these islands were defended by the Nationalists alone and the Chinese Communists were willing to risk heavy casualties. We believe that the Nationalists cannot absorb sufficient military end-items and training during 1955 to change this estimate of relative capabilities.

<sup>15</sup> It is assumed that the Nationalists are continuing to receive US military supplies on Taiwan. However, the Nationalists are assumed to have the sole responsibility for the delivery of supplies and reinforcements to the offshore islands and for their actual defense.

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24. *Communist Capabilities for an Assault against Taiwan Assuming Taiwan is Defended only by Chinese Nationalists.* The Chinese Communists, during the period of this estimate, can achieve the capability to launch and support logistically a large-scale joint assault against Taiwan. Before undertaking this operation, however, the Communists would have to stockpile additional quantities of materiel, provide for the deployment of additional troops to east China, and concentrate most of the required troops in the immediate vicinity of embarkation points. They would also have to complete the improvement of additional airfields in east China and concentrate their entire naval and amphibious strength in the area from Shanghai to Canton. In addition, they would probably feel it necessary to conduct intensive amphibious training and perhaps to gain additional experience through smaller operations against defended positions. A Communist invasion of Taiwan would be facilitated if the ports of Amoy and Foochow were available for staging and supply purposes. These ports, however, are not essential for such an operation.<sup>16</sup> The final preparations for a major assault on Taiwan probably could not be concealed.

25. At the present time the Chinese Communist Navy has available conventional landing craft with a lift capacity of 40,000-70,000 troops. In addition, they have merchant vessels available to carry up to 200,000 fully armed troops plus supplies. However, considering the special problems of phasing, coordination, control, and protection of forces peculiar to an amphibious operation, the necessity for logistic resupply, and the impracticability of allocating the entire merchant marine for invasion purposes, we estimate that the Chinese Communist initial assault force would be limited to about 100,000 troops and equip-

<sup>16</sup> The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and the Director of Naval Intelligence believe that the two preceding sentences should read:

"Finally, seizure or neutralization of both Quemoy and Matsu would be a logical preliminary step from the military point of view, since free use of Amoy and Foochow as assembly and staging areas would greatly facilitate an assault on Taiwan."

ment. Up to 900,000 reinforcements and reserves could also be made available.

26. Communist capabilities to support an invasion will increase somewhat during the year as roads and railroads in east China are improved. Communist naval strength could be increased by the transfer of some vessels from the USSR. Several more airfields within range of Taiwan will probably be made operational during 1955.

27. *Chinese Communist Capabilities for Subversion and Infiltration.* There are indications of limited Chinese Communist efforts to carry out subversion and infiltration in the offshore islands, which efforts are facilitated by the island's proximity to the mainland. The effectiveness of Communist efforts would almost certainly increase, however, if the troops and civilians on these islands came to believe that they would not continue to receive adequate support from Taiwan and ultimately from the US. Although there is probably some Chinese Communist covert activity on Taiwan, there is little likelihood of extensive Communist subversion and infiltration during 1955 because of the extensive internal security and counter-espionage efforts of the Nationalist government, and because of the strong anti-Communist sentiments of the population. However, if prospects for an eventual return to the mainland were further reduced by military or political developments during 1955, Nationalist morale, especially that of the leaders, would probably decline, with a consequent prospect for an increase in Communist subversive capabilities.

#### Communist Estimate of US Intentions

28. We believe that the principal determinant of Chinese Communist courses of action in the Taiwan Straits area is Peiping's estimate of US capabilities and intentions.<sup>17</sup> Moscow and Peiping almost certainly consider that the

<sup>17</sup> The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that the Chinese Communist over-all policy is the principal determinant of Chinese Communist courses of action and would have this sentence read as follows:

"We believe that a current determinant of Chinese Communist courses of action with regard to the Taiwan area is Peiping's estimate of US capabilities and intentions."

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US will not withdraw its support of the Nationalist government, at least for the next several years, and that the US will fight, alone if need be, to defend Taiwan. They probably believe that US counteraction in this case would include attacks on mainland China, possibly with nuclear weapons.

29. We believe Moscow and Peiping are much less sure concerning US intentions with respect to the offshore islands. They almost certainly consider that an attempted seizure of the offshore islands would involve a risk of provoking US military action. They also may believe that a threatening military concentration in the east China area would involve some risk. But we believe the Communists are uncertain as to which, if any, of the offshore islands the US would defend with its own forces, the circumstances under which the US would defend them, or the extent to which the defense would be carried.

#### Communist Estimate of the Nationalist Position

30. The Chinese Communists probably estimate that the Chinese Nationalist armed forces have a low capability and that Chinese Communist forces could seize during 1955 any position which was defended by the Nationalists alone.

31. The Chinese Communists probably estimate that the Nationalist government, over the long term, will be beset with serious problems: continuing US disinclination to underwrite Nationalist aspirations in full; increasing frictions in US-Nationalist relations; decreasing world support for the Nationalist government as the legitimate ruler and UN representative of China; maintenance of stability when Chiang Kai-shek retires from the scene; and a general deterioration in Nationalist morale. Peiping is probably confident that in time it can induce considerable Nationalist defections at all levels. Nevertheless, the Communists probably consider that so long as the US supports Nationalist China, the final collapse of the Nationalist position cannot be achieved by subversion alone.

#### Communist Estimate of Non-Communist Attitudes other than those of the US and Nationalist China

32. Peiping and Moscow probably believe in the short term that the views of other non-Communist countries will not greatly influence the US policy of defending and supporting the Nationalist government. Peiping and Moscow probably believe, however, that non-Communist pressure may have substantial influence on US intentions with respect to defending the offshore islands. Over the long run, they probably believe that the influence of allied and other non-Communist states is likely to reduce present US determination to support and defend the Nationalist government.

### III. PROBABLE COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THE TAIWAN ISSUE THROUGH 1955

#### General Courses

33. We believe the Chinese Communists will continue their present pattern of pressure against Taiwan and the offshore islands. The Chinese Communists may undertake military courses of action during 1955 involving somewhat greater risks of war with the US than they have hitherto chanced, but they will almost certainly continue to refrain from courses which they estimate would result in widespread and heavy attack by US air and naval forces against the Chinese mainland.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that paragraph 33 underestimates the willingness of the Chinese Communists to assume risk of war to obtain their objectives and believes it should read as follows:

"The Chinese Communists probably will not attempt to invade Taiwan during 1955. We believe that any considerations favoring such an assault are outweighed in the Chinese Communist mind by their doubt as to their capability to succeed in such an attack, and the very great losses they would suffer in national and international prestige coupled with the losses sustained in counterattacks on the mainland. However, the Chinese Communists may undertake air raids against Nationalist-held territory and may assault the offshore islands."

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34. Peiping will almost certainly continue to refuse to participate in UN discussions as long as Nationalist China retains its Security Council seat, or to enter into any formal negotiations outside the UN in which the Nationalists would participate as equals. However, Peiping appears to be willing to continue informal discussions through the agency of third parties. In such discussions, Peiping would almost certainly not agree to a settlement which established "two Chinas." Eventually, however, and particularly if the Chinese Communists had come to believe that further pursuit of their objectives would result in widespread and heavy attack by US air and naval forces, they might acquiesce in a cease-fire, providing that they believed such an arrangement did not preclude their ultimate acquisition of Taiwan.<sup>19 20</sup>

35. In any case Peiping will continue its attempts to reduce international support for Nationalist China, to embarrass and discredit the Nationalist government, to demonstrate that US aggression is responsible for the Taiwan crisis, and to widen existing differences between the US and other non-Communist countries. It will continue efforts at infiltration and subversion.

<sup>19</sup> The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that the last sentence of paragraph 34 underestimates the willingness of the Chinese Communists to assume risks of war to attain their objectives and gives the impression that the Communists are more amenable to negotiations than the G-2 would estimate. For complete discussion of this see G-2 footnote to paragraph 42.

<sup>20</sup> The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, believes that this paragraph gives the impression that the Communists are more amenable to negotiations than appears to be the case. Substitute for the last three sentences of the paragraph the following:

"However, Peiping appears to be willing to continue informal discussions through the agency of third parties, probably designed to suggest that Peiping is willing to negotiate. In any event, Peiping would almost certainly not agree to a settlement which established "two Chinas," but might temporarily desist from offensive military operations in the Taiwan Straits, providing that they believed this would not preclude their ultimate acquisition of Taiwan."

36. The USSR would almost certainly support the Chinese Communists in the above courses of action through diplomacy and propaganda and provide Peiping with military materiel and advice. The USSR would attempt to limit and localize any hostilities that might develop between Communist China and the US. If hostilities threatened to expand, the USSR would probably exert diplomatic efforts to obtain a cease-fire.

### Specific Courses

37. In view of the US commitment the Chinese Communists do not have the capability to seize Taiwan, and will almost certainly not attempt an invasion in 1955. However, the Chinese Communists have the capability for air strikes and might undertake air raids against Taiwan either on their own initiative or in retaliation to military action elsewhere.

38. *Offshore Islands.* The Chinese Communists will probably undertake air, naval, and artillery attacks against the Quemoy and the Matsu Groups and will probably attempt to seize lightly defended island outposts within these Groups. They will seek to erode Nationalist ability and determination to hold these islands, and, more importantly, to probe US intentions. If the Chinese Communists should become convinced that the US was determined to prevent the seizure and retention of these islands taking whatever military action was necessary, including, if required, all-out attacks on any part of China, they would probably be deterred from attempting an outright seizure during 1955. However, they would make every effort to render the Chinese Nationalist position on the offshore islands untenable by bombardment, interdiction of supplies, and subversion.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup> The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that this paragraph underestimates the willingness of the Chinese Communists, supported by the USSR, to assume the risks of war to attain their objectives and would substitute for paragraphs 38 and 39 the following text:

"*Offshore Islands.* The Chinese Communists will intensify air and artillery attacks and possibly minor naval operations against Quemoy and the Matsus. They will seek to erode Nationalist ability and determination

Footnote Continued on Page 11

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39. It may not be possible for the Chinese Communists, as a result of their probing actions alone, to ascertain the full extent of a possible US counteraction to an attempt at seizure of an offshore island. If the US did not respond to initial probing actions, the Chinese Communists might estimate that the US would not in fact commit its own forces to the defense of the island. Or, even though there was some US military reaction to a probing attack, the Chinese Communists might still estimate that US counteraction to an actual invasion of offshore islands would remain limited and localized. Or, the Chinese Communists might estimate that they could overrun an offshore island before effective US counteraction could be brought to bear and that the US would not subsequently initiate major hostilities in order to regain the captured territory. In any of these circumstances, we believe the Chinese Communists would probably attempt to seize or complete the seizure of the offshore islands.<sup>21</sup>

40. Beyond the period of this estimate, as their capabilities increase, and especially if world and US opinion appears unfavorable to strong US counteraction, the Chinese Communists will probably become increasingly impatient to acquire the offshore islands and less cautious in their actions.

### Contingent Developments

41. *Evacuation of Offshore Islands.* We believe it is unlikely that the Communists would deliberately attack US forces engaged in the evacuation of Nationalist garrisons from the

<sup>21</sup> See footnote 21 on previous page.

Footnote continued from Page 10

to hold these islands, and to probe US intentions. If the Chinese Communists should not be able to ascertain the full extent of a possible US counteraction to an attempt at seizure, they might consider that they could overrun either, or both, of these island groups in spite of local US counteraction and that the US would not subsequently initiate major hostilities in order to regain the captured territory. Even though the Chinese Communists were convinced that the US is determined to prevent the seizure of these offshore islands, it is believed they will attempt to seize them although not necessarily during 1955."

Quemoy and the Matsu Groups in circumstances similar to the Tachen evacuation, but the possibility of a serious incident cannot be excluded.

42. *In the event the US attacked the local areas from which the Chinese Communists had initiated military aggression, the Chinese Communists would attempt to defend the area under fire and would probably attempt to attack US bases. If the Communists estimated that the US did not intend to expand the area or scale of its attacks, Peiping would probably continue efforts to gain its local military objective but would seek to keep hostilities from spreading. On the other hand, if the Communists estimated that the US was prepared to engage in an unrestricted effort to halt Communist aggression, Peiping would probably desist in its military efforts to gain its local objective and would seek to end the hostilities.*<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup> The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that the conclusions in paragraphs 42-46 underestimate the willingness of the Chinese Communists, supported by the USSR, to assume risks of war to obtain their objectives. They also underestimate their determination, once hostilities have been initiated, to retaliate to the full extent of their capabilities against US and Nationalist forces in the Taiwan-Okinawa area. Attacks against Chinese Communist territory will almost certainly evoke positive reaction. The degree of risk of provoking a large-scale war will increase as the area and nature of the attacks is enlarged. It is believed that the conditions outlined in paragraph 42 involve the least degree of risk, but that attacks as outlined in paragraphs 43, 44, and 46 greatly increase the risk of full-scale war in the Far East. The Chinese Communists would not remain passive if the US bombed concentrations of armed forces prior to initiation of a Communist attack and certainly would not take the initiative to obtain a cease-fire under such conditions but would immediately take action to brand the US as an aggressor. If the US attacked military targets throughout east China, the Communists would almost certainly accept such acts as a *casus belli*. Any cease-fire that might later develop as a result of such attacks would not result from Chinese Communist initiative. It is possible that a nuclear attack would be met in kind and that if nuclear warfare developed, full-scale warfare in the Far East would soon follow. G-2 believes that the

Footnote continued on page 12.

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43. *In the event the US bombed menacing concentrations of armed forces on the east coast of China prior to the imminent initiation of a Communist attack, Communist China would initially seek to defend its territory to the full extent of its capabilities but would limit its retaliatory attacks to actions estimated not to result in widespread and heavy attacks by US air and naval forces against the Chinese mainland. It would seek, and probably gain Soviet support, on the Korean model, for the air defense of China. It would seek with Soviet support to gain the maximum possible advantage throughout the world from this example of US "unprovoked aggression." At the same time, Communist China would probably either take the initiative to obtain a cease-fire or accept the intercession of third powers to this end provided they could do so without appearing to succumb to intimidation.*<sup>23</sup>

44. *If at any stage of the hostilities US forces attacked military targets throughout the east China area, Peiping would probably be seriously concerned with regard to ultimate US intentions. It would seek to defend itself to the full extent of its remaining capabilities, including, if possible, attacks upon US and Nationalist targets in the Taiwan-Okinawa area. It would probably seek to obtain increased Soviet assistance and participation. The USSR and Communist China would probably attempt to obtain a cease-fire. If these efforts failed, Peiping would take such military and political actions as it thought might best cause the US to cease its attacks. Such actions might include the renewal of hostilities in Indochina and possibly in Korea.*<sup>23</sup>

Footnote continued from page 11.

Chinese Communists, assisted by the Soviets, are not bluffing and that they are willing to accept the risks involved in seizing the offshore islands.

<sup>23</sup> The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that this paragraph underestimates the willingness of the Chinese Communists to assume risks of war to attain their objectives and gives the impression that the Communists would be more amenable than would be the case. See G-2 footnote to paragraph 42.

45. In the event of US attacks on military targets as noted in paragraph 42, the USSR would probably commit increased forces to the defense of Communist China, but, at least initially, would probably restrict the area of their counteraction to Chinese territory and adjacent waters, and would not acknowledge its participation. Meanwhile it would probably make all possible efforts to promote a cease-fire and prevent the US-Chinese hostilities from expanding into general war.

46. While there is a slight chance that the Communists would counter with nuclear weapons if the US were to employ such weapons against Communist China, we believe they probably would not. In any event, before retaliating in kind the Communists would first violently condemn the US action and exploit its adverse effects world-wide. In any event, we believe the Communists would intensify their political efforts to end hostilities.<sup>23 24</sup>

47. Ultimately, if all efforts to end the war had failed, and if Moscow and Peiping had come to believe that US military actions were gravely threatening the existence of the Chinese Communists regime, we believe that the USSR would openly intervene in the war in the Far East, but would still try to confine hostilities to that area.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup> The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that this paragraph should read as follows:

"Should the US employ nuclear weapons in any of the above circumstances, we believe that the USSR would estimate that response with similar weapons would at once broaden the hostilities, precipitate unacceptable punitive action by the US, and create grave risk of general war. In view of existing disparities in nuclear stockpiles and delivery capabilities, we believe the USSR would estimate it could not take the risks. We therefore believe that the Communists would not reply with nuclear weapons in response to their use by the US."

<sup>25</sup> The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and the Director of Naval Intelligence believe that this paragraph should read as follows:

"Should the conflict progress so far that the Communists believed the existence of the Chinese Communist regime was gravely threatened, we believe that the Soviet leaders would recognize that open inter-

Footnote continued on page 13.

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#### IV. NON-COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO US AND COMMUNIST POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO THE TAIWAN AREA

48. The attitudes of most non-Communist states with an interest in the Far East are strongly conditioned both by fear of war and by a belief that the offshore islands belong rightfully to Peiping and are not essential to the defense of Taiwan. Many of these governments, despite their lack of respect for the Nationalists, are sympathetic to the US commitment to defend Taiwan because they feel it is necessary to limit Communist expansion. However, these governments are uncertain as to US intentions with respect to the defense of the offshore islands and fear that full-scale war in the Far East may develop if the Communists launch attacks. Many of these nations would welcome an arrangement for the evacuation of these islands, particularly if a *modus vivendi* over the future status of Taiwan could be reached.

49. On the other hand, the ROK and Nationalist China desire that the US exploit every opportunity to engage and reduce Communist power, and are concerned over any indication that the US is willing to withdraw from any position. The Philippine government supports US policy in the Taiwan area. Both approval and concern have been evident in the governments of Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand, with approval apparently predominating.

50. *In the event the Nationalists, with or without US assistance or pressure, evacuated the Matsu and Quemoy Groups prior to a large-scale Communist attack, there would*

Footnote continued from page 12.

vention on their part against US forces sufficient to save the Chinese regime would involve grave risk of general war with the US. Their decision would probably be based on existing military, political, and economic strengths, with particular emphasis on the current disparities in nuclear stockpiles and delivery capabilities. We believe that the Soviet leaders would probably conclude that if they intervened, the conflict could not be confined to the Far East, and that Soviet strengths were insufficient to risk their own regime in this manner."

be a deterioration of morale on Taiwan and great disappointment in the ROK. In the Philippines such an evacuation would stimulate concern that the US was not prepared to commit its forces in forward areas. To a lesser extent this reaction would occur in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. However, the dominant reaction among other interested non-Communist states would probably be one of relief followed at least for some time by increased support for US policies with respect to the defense of Taiwan.<sup>26</sup>

51. *If the US did not counter Communist attempts to invade and seize the Matsu and Quemoy Groups while large Nationalist forces remained on these islands, there would be a serious deterioration in Nationalist morale. Most interested non-Communist governments would probably condemn Communist China for the use of force. They would be relieved that the US had not become involved in hostilities with Communist China over the offshore islands. Asian governments allied with or friendly to the US while sharing these sentiments, would nevertheless be seriously concerned over the failure of the US to defend friendly forces, and might prove less willing to take strongly anti-Communist stands in the future. US prestige would decline and Peiping's prestige would rise, especially in Asia, where this development would be interpreted as a successful defiance of US power.*

<sup>26</sup> The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and the Director of Naval Intelligence believe that the last three sentences should read:

"Such an evacuation would stimulate concern in the Philippines, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam that the US would in the future also withdraw from other forward areas. Elsewhere in the non-Communist world, the dominant reaction would probably be one of relief that threatened hostilities had not occurred, but with undercurrents of concern of varying strength in different countries at this further instance of Communist expansion. Particularly in non-Communist Asia, the net impression of an evacuation, whether manifest or latent, would be one of further growth of Chinese Communist prestige and power, with a commensurate decrease in US prestige."

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52. *In the event of a Chinese Communist attack against Taiwan*, the non-Communist countries would in general condemn Communist China as the aggressor and would approve US defense of Taiwan. Certain of these countries would seek through diplomatic channels and the UN to end or at least to restrict the area of fighting. Although the Government of India might publicly criticize the Chinese Communists it would not abandon its neutralist position.

53. *Non-Communist reaction to the employment of US air and naval forces in the defense of the offshore islands still occupied by Nationalist forces*, would vary greatly. The ROK and Nationalist China would welcome US defense of the offshore islands. They would hope that US action against China would lead to the destruction of the Communist regimes in China and North Korea. The Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand probably would approve the US decision to defend the offshore islands but would be apprehensive that the hostilities would expand.

54. The reactions of India, Indonesia, and Burma would be influenced by the circumstances in which the hostilities developed. Should the Chinese Communist attack at a time when these countries considered the US to be seriously seeking a peaceful solution, and should the US military reaction be restricted to the immediate area of the islands attacked, they would probably deplore both the Communist attack and the US defense of the offshore islands. US attacks against the mainland in reaction to Communist attacks against the offshore islands would be condemned as provocative and aggressive. One or more of the neutralist states might introduce a resolution into the UN charging that the US action was a threat to the peace.

55. Predominant opinion in Japan would be strongly critical of the US action, based on a belief that the offshore islands were not of sufficient importance to justify US measures which could involve Japan in general war.

56. Elsewhere in the non-Communist world, the reaction to a US defense of an offshore island against a Chinese Communist attack

would be mixed. If the US reaction were restricted to the immediate area of the island attacked, most non-Communist governments, although gravely concerned over the increased danger of war in the Far East, would not denounce the US action but would condemn the Chinese Communists for aggressive acts.

57. In any case, if the US had succeeded in halting Communist military moves without becoming involved in protracted or expanded hostilities with Communist China, adverse reactions to US action in defense of the offshore islands would probably be moderated in time, and US prestige would probably be enhanced in most non-Communist countries.

58. *If the US should attack menacing concentrations of Chinese Communist military forces prior to an imminent initiation of a Communist attack* most major non-Communist countries would deplore such action. India and the other Asian neutrals would believe that a major war had already begun and would probably introduce a resolution in the UN denouncing the US as an aggressor. Japan would be extremely critical, and would seek so far as possible to dissociate itself from the US action. The UK and some other non-Communist states would probably bring strong pressure against the US to end its attacks. Although the general attitude within the NATO countries would be strongly critical of the US, the NATO governments would probably not support a UN resolution which condemned the US as an aggressor. The UK and India in particular would seek through diplomatic channels to end the fighting.

59. *Should the US at any stage of hostilities attack military targets throughout the east China area*, many governments would probably estimate that US policy was changing from defense of Taiwan to destruction of the Communist regime in China. In this case, with the exception of the ROK and Nationalist China, the reactions of most governments would reflect a fear of the immediacy of general war.

60. If it appeared that the above action would result in protracted or expanded war, the confidence of most non-Communist states in US

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leadership would decline. A major shift in Japanese opinion against the US would probably occur, and the Japanese government would probably attempt to steer a more neutralist course. The USSR, by threats and inducements, might be able to exploit fears of general war to weaken the NATO alliance. Public pressure within the NATO countries might lead to changes in some of their governments and their replacement by governments of more neutralist persuasion, but we believe these governments would remain allied with the US even though they disapproved of its actions.

61. If, however, the US succeeded in curbing Chinese Communist aggression in the Taiwan area without becoming involved in protracted, full-scale hostilities, the adverse reactions of the non-Communist nations described above in paragraphs 58-60 would probably be moderated in time.<sup>27</sup>

### Nuclear Weapons

62. *If in the course of reacting to Communist moves, the US used nuclear weapons against Communist military targets, we estimate that the predominant world reaction would be one of shock.*

63. The reactions of most governments would be particularly adverse if the US were to use

such weapons to defend the offshore islands or to destroy Communist concentrations prior to a Communist amphibious assault on these islands.<sup>28</sup>

64. It is possible that the governments of our Western allies and of Thailand, the Philippines, Pakistan, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, would condone the tactical use of nuclear weapons by the US provided that they were convinced that such weapons were necessary to stop an actual Communist invasion of Taiwan and if they were convinced that the US was exercising the utmost restraint and attempting to spare civilians.

65. The ROK and the government of National China would almost certainly approve the use of nuclear weapons, in any case.

66. The general reaction of non-Communist Asians to the US action would be based on emotional grounds and would probably be extremely critical of the US, no matter what the circumstances or degree of provocation. The Governments of India, Burma, and Indonesia would almost certainly strongly condemn the US for again using nuclear weapons against Asians. The Japanese government would be under strong popular pressure to denounce the action, and, if it felt that general war was imminent, would almost certainly attempt to move toward a neutral position.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>27</sup> The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that paragraph 61 should read as follows:

"If, however, the US succeeded in curbing Chinese Communist aggression in the Taiwan area without becoming involved in protracted, full-scale hostilities, US prestige and the confidence of the non-Communist world in US leadership would be greatly enhanced."

<sup>28</sup> The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff believes that this paragraph should read as follows:

"The reaction of world governments would range from apathy to extreme criticism if the US used such weapons to defend the offshore islands or destroy Communist concentrations

prior to attack on these islands. The predominant reaction would be adverse, but there would be some who approved the US action as a firm indication of US determination to halt Communist aggression wherever occurring."

<sup>29</sup> The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and the Director of Intelligence, USAF, believe that a final paragraph should be inserted to read as follows:

"If the US military action involving the use of nuclear weapons forced the Communists to seek a cease-fire, and if fighting were terminated short of full-scale or protracted war in Asia, the adverse reaction of the non-Communist world toward the US action would probably in time be moderated."


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# TAIWAN AND THE EASTERN CHINA AREA

## ARMED FORCES

AS OF 15 MARCH 1955



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## ANNEX "A"

## Chinese Communist Aircraft Performance

<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>Maximum Speed/ Altitude (knots-feet)</u>	<u>Service Ceiling (feet)</u>	<u>Bomb Load (pounds)</u>	<u>Radius/ Range (nautical miles)</u>
<u>Fighter</u>					
Jet MIG-15	Escort	523/40,000	52,000	None	360/940 (with external fuel)
	Escort	523/40,000	52,000	None	225/670
	Ground Attack w/bombs	582/sea level	not app.	2x250	105/200
Piston LA-9/11	Escort	335/25,000	33,000	None	440/950
	Ground Attack	325/sea level	not app.	None	240/500
<u>Ground Attack</u>					
Piston IL-10	Ground Attack	270/5,000	23,400	880	170/360
<u>Light Bomber</u>					
Jet IL-28	High level	440/30,000	41,000	4,400	590/1,165
		440/30,000	41,000	4,400	690/1,365 (with external fuel)
		460/15,000	41,000	6,600	570/1,100
	Ground Attack	450/sea level	not app.	4,400	595/1,165 (with external fuel)
Piston TU-2	Bomber	278/15,500	29,000	3,300	400/850
		278/15,500	29,000	2,200	500/1,040
<u>Medium Bomber</u>					
Piston TU-4	High level	350/30,000	39,550	10,000	1,700/3,100

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## ANNEX "B"

## Chinese Communist Aircraft Strength

	Chinese Communist Air Force		Chinese Communist Naval Air Force		Aircraft Not in Operational Units	
	Estimated TO&E	Estimated Actual	Estimated TO&E	Estimated Actual	Military Use	Civil Use
<u>Fighter</u>						
Jet MIG-15	962	750			90	
Piston LA-9/11	280	190	80	40	60	
<u>Ground Attack</u>						
Piston IL-10	200	150			30	
<u>Light Bomber</u>						
Jet IL-28	160	120	32	30		
Piston TU-2	240	210	40	40	70	
<u>Medium Bomber</u>						
Piston TU-4	10	10				
<u>Transport</u>						
(C-47 type)	120	110	10	10	20	50
TOTAL	1,972	1,540	162	120	270	50

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## ANNEX "C"

Estimated CCAF and CNAF Sortie Rates  
(Combat Aircraft)

NOTE: The CCAF sortie rates given below represent the total gross capabilities of the CCAF. It is unlikely that the CCAF will be so redeployed as to permit the mounting of the total given in the area of the Taiwan Straits.

<u>CCAF</u>	<u>Estimated Actual Strength</u>	<u>Average Daily Sorties First 5-7 Days</u>	<u>Average Daily Sorties Sustained Combat</u>
Fighter (Jet)	750	764	382
Fighter (Piston)	230	194	97
Ground Attack	150	152	76
Light Bomber (Jet)	150	126	63
Light Bomber (Piston)	250	212	106
Medium Bomber (Piston)	10	4	2
<u>CNAF</u>			
Fighter (Jet)	117	118	59
Fighter (Piston)	231	196	98
Light Bomber (Piston)	16	12	6
Medium Bomber (Piston)	46	18	9

Note: The figures for both air forces were calculated as follows:

(1) An 85 percent serviceability rate was used against the estimated actual strength of each aircraft type.

(2) The result of (1) was multiplied by an established figure for sorties per aircraft per month in sustained combat (18 for jet fighters and ground attack; 15 for piston fighters and light bombers, jet and piston, and 7 for medium bombers).

(3) The result of (2) for each aircraft type was divided by 30 to obtain the average daily sortie rate in sustained combat.

(4) The result of (3) for each aircraft type was doubled to obtain the average daily sortie rate for the first 5-7 days (5 days for medium bombers only).

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## ANNEX "D"

Nationalist Chinese Artillery and AAA  
on Offshore Island GroupsMatsu Group

<u>Units</u>	<u>Number of Weapons</u>
1 Bn 75mm Pack How	12 — 75mm Pack How
3 Bn 105mm How	12 — 105mm How (M-2) 24 — 105mm How (M-3)
2 AAA Btrys	4 — 75mm AAA Gun (Jap) 5 — 25mm AAA Gun (Jap)

Quemoy Group

4 Bn 75mm Pack How	48 — 75mm Pack How
3 Bn 105mm How (M-3)	36 — 105mm How (M-3)
3 Bn 105mm How (M-2)	41 — 105mm How (M-2)
1 Bn 155mm How	12 — 155mm How (M-1)
1 Btry 155mm Gun (GPF)	5 — 155mm Gun (GPF)
1 Btry 155mm Gun (M-2)	4 — 155mm Gun (M-2)
3 Btrys AAA	9 — 20mm Gun (Foreign) 16 — 40mm Gun (US)

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## ANNEX "E"

Chinese Communist Army Artillery Opposite  
Chinese Nationalist-Held Offshore  
Islands

## QUEMOY GROUP

All of the islands in the Quemoy Group are within range of Communist artillery. Shells landing on the islands in the Quemoy Group have been identified as 76.2, 122, and 152mm. It is estimated that there are between 160 and 200 field artillery pieces in positions capable of firing on one or more of the Quemoy Group. The 31st Army, accepted in that area adjacent to the Quemoy Group, would have 144 artillery pieces as follows:

- 8 battalions of 12x75/76mm guns or howitzers each
- 3 battalions (equivalent) of 12x70/75/76mm howitzers each
- 1 battalion of 12x105mm howitzers

The presence of 122 and 152mm artillery in the area opposite the Quemoy Group is accepted; however, the number of such weapons is unknown. It is possible that the 105mm battalion of the 31st Army has been replaced by the 122mm. It is also possible that 122mm artillery is organic to the infantry divisions of the 31st Army. Presence of the 152mm artillery strongly indicates that at least one artillery regiment (independent or subordinate to an artillery division) containing 36x152mm, or a combination of 122mm and 152mm, is in the area.

It is estimated that a minimum of 72 medium AAA and 108 AAAW pieces are located

adjacent to the Quemoy. The 521st AAA Regiment, with an estimated 24x37mm AAAW and 12x76/85mm AAA, is accepted on Amoy Island. Elements of the 64th AAA Division, with an estimated 108x76/85mm AAA and possibly 36x37mm AAAW, which is accepted at Hui-an, Fukien, are possibly opposite Quemoy. The 31st Army has four AAAW battalions with a total of 48x37mm AAAW.

## MATSU GROUP

No artillery fire has been delivered on these islands by the Communists; however Kao-teng, Pei-kan Tang and Matsu Islands are within artillery range of Peiling Peninsula. Kao-teng Hsu is within range of the 76.2mm gun, Pei-kan Tang within range of the 122mm gun and 152mm gun/how, and Matsu within range of the 122mm gun and the 152mm gun. Four occupied artillery (type unknown) and three AA positions have been reported on the Peiling Peninsula. The 28th Chinese Communist Army, located in the Foochow area, is estimated to have the following artillery and antiaircraft pieces:

- 8 battalions of 12x75/76mm guns of hows each
- 3 battalions (equivalent) of 12x70/75/76mm hows
- 1 battalion of 12x105mm hows
- 4 battalions of 12x37mm AAAW each.

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## ANNEX "F"

## Chinese Communist Navy—Strength

	Number
<b>1. MAJOR COMBATANT VESSELS</b>	
Destroyer (DD) (Note a)	2
Submarine	
Ocean Patrol (Note b)	2
Short Range (Note a)	3
<b>2. PATROL VESSELS</b>	
Frigate/Gunboat (PF/PG)	17
Old Gunboat (OPG)	2-3
Motor Torpedo Boat (PT)	55-56
River Gunboat (PR)	14-15
Auxiliary Gunboats (AKL/PG)	4-5
<b>3. MINE VESSELS</b>	
Coastal Minelayers (CMC) (Note c)	
Minesweeper (AM) (Note a)	2
Motor Minesweeper (AMS) (Note d)	4
Coastal Minesweeper (AMC)	7
<b>4. AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS</b> (Numbers in parentheses are additional units in merchant service)	
Landing Ship Tank (LST)	20-22 (12)
Landing Ship Medium (LSM) (Note c)	13 (11)
Landing Ship Infantry, Large or Landing Ship Support, Large (LSIL/LSSL) (Note d)	16 (?)
Landing Craft Utility (LCU)	7 (?)
<b>5. SERVICE CRAFT</b>	
Patrol Craft (YP)	250-300
Motor Launches: 100-150 (Note e)	
Armed Motor Junks: 150-200	

- (a) Two GORDIY Class DD, two T-43 Class AM, and two M-V Class short range SS at Tsingtao since 12 October 1954. Of this group, only the two DD and the two SS are accepted as having been transferred to the CCN; the AM are probably still USSR units.
- (b) Probable that a third USSR long-range SS has been or will shortly be transferred to the CCN.
- (c) Eight LSM are fitted for minelaying.
- (d) Five-six LSIL are fitted as minesweepers and additional ex-Japanese trawlers and other small craft may be fitted with minesweeping gear.
- (e) Includes small landing craft (LCC, LCS), ex-Japanese auxiliary submarine chasers and minesweepers, and newly constructed motor launch types (70-90, 50-70 tons) such as the "SC types."

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## ANNEX "G"

## Ports of Embarkation

The following Chinese mainland ports are considered suitable for staging an amphibious operation against Taiwan.

<u>PORT</u>	<u>PORT CAPACITY (LONG-TERM 20-HR. DAY)</u>
LAO TAO (Lien-yun)	2,500
TSINGTAO	20,000
FOOCHOW	750
SHANGHAI	35,000
AMOY	2,700
SWATOW	600
<u>CANTON</u>	<u>6,000</u>
TOTAL ESTIMATED PORT CAPACITY	67,550

Some 16 additional minor ports might also be utilized. Their average capacity is 300-400 LT/20-hr. day.

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## ANNEX "H"

## Weather Conditions in the Taiwan Straits

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>GENERAL CONDITIONS</u>	<u>FEASIBILITY OF LARGE-SCALE SEA OPERATIONS</u>
October thru March	Strong northeast monsoons, currents setting southwesterly through the Straits and reaching maximum drift of 60 to 65 miles per day in December and January.	Weather unsuitable for large-scale operations over open sea.
April thru June	Transition period between northeast and southwest monsoon, variable winds light and variable currents setting generally northeast; high seas and swells observed 6-10 percent of time in April and May. Typhoon may occur in June.	April and May are best months for large-scale sea operations; there is risk of encountering typhoons in June.
July thru August	Southwest monsoon, average velocities low and calms frequent; sea and surf moderate. Typhoons move from the Pacific due west across Taiwan into China.	Average conditions, better than in April and May, but danger of typhoons makes this period less suitable.
September	Transitional period between southwest and northeast monsoons; typhoons may occur, winds are variable.	Period from late September through early October after typhoon danger is over and before strong northeast monsoon begins may not be too unfavorable for sea operations.

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