

## **January 3, 1963**

### **Steering Group on Implementing the Nassau Decisions, 'Minutes of 2nd Meeting Held January 3, 1963, at 5:00 P.M.'**

#### **Citation:**

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#### **Summary:**

The Nassau Steering Group devoted its January 3, 1963, session to Jupiter removal diplomacy. Ambassadors Finletter, Hare and Reinhardt were present as well as McGeorge Bundy and Defense Department General Counsel John McNaughton. While the papers on the Jupiter that the committee prepared remain classified, the discussion summarized here covered some of the key issues. One was to avoid the word "withdrawal" when discussing the Jupiters and to use the word "replace" instead, as in replace Jupiters with Polaris SLBMs. Moreover, because of concern about leaks, there would be no reference to an April 1, 1963, deadline in communications with the Italians and Turks. As April 1 would be six months after the Cuban crisis, State Department official Seymour Weiss wanted to "go to the mat" to keep any dates out of the official discussions because he worried that too much specificity would raise suspicions of a "deal" or would sound like an "ultimatum." Nevertheless, an April 1 date would be used for the timing of the stationing of Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean and some U.S. interlocutors would see it as a deadline.

The Steering Group also addressed the problems raised by the early deployment to Turkey of F-104Gs; making the fighter-bombers available by May 1963 would require the rerouting of planes that had already been assigned to the Republic of China (Taiwan), Denmark, Norway, and Greece. There would be a delay in deploying nuclear bombs for the F-104s until they were outfitted with Permissive Action Links (PALs), as required by President Kennedy, which was not likely to occur until later in the year.

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STEERING GROUP ON IMPLEMENTING  
THE NASSAU DECISIONSMinutes of Second Meeting  
Held January 3, 1963 at 5:00 p.m.

Present:	Mr. Kitchen, Chairman	Mr. Garthoff
	Mr. McNaughton, Vice Chairman	Mr. Klein
	Ambassador Hare	Mr. Spiers
	Ambassador Reinhardt	Mr. Orwick
	Ambassador Finletter	Mr. Weiss
	Mr. Meloy	Mr. Yarmolinsky
	Mr. McGeorge Bundy	Mr. Rowen
	Mr. Rostow	General Emrick
	Mr. Brubeck	Mr. Popper
	Mr. Chayes	Mr. Schaezel

Agenda Item 1 - Mr. Meloy's Planning and Objectives Paper on the  
Jupiter Missiles.

Mr. Kitchen opened the meeting by welcoming Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt who had been asked to participate in the discussion on Jupiter missiles. He then asked Mr. Meloy to comment on his Sub-Group's paper on this subject which had been distributed to Members at the meeting. Mr. Meloy pointed out they had avoided use of the word "withdrawal" and were using the word "replace" in respect to the removal of the missiles. At the end of the paper there was a proposed time schedule of actions which he thought would be realizable. There was an unresolved point, namely, although it was proposed most moves would be completed by mid-March, there was a question about the desirability of an April 1 deadline, particularly from the point of view of publicity resulting from leaks. As a result of the ensuing discussion, it was agreed:

1. that the April 1 deadline should be removed wherever it appeared in the paper;
2. that it should be fully understood by Members that it was a U.S. deadline for internal use only;
3. that it was not to be mentioned to either the Italians or the Turks.

Mr. McNaughton then related the deadline to the statement in the letter to the Italian Minister of Defense that the Polaris force would be on station by April 1. He believed meeting this deadline was not a problem. Mr. Rowen suggested it perhaps would be better to say "on station by April".

Ambassador

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Ambassador Reinhardt suggested that the vessels be shown to the Italians by paying calls at Italian ports before the Jupiters were dismantled. Mr. Rowen replied there would be no problem in their visiting Italy before going on station.

Mr. Meloy concluded his comment by pointing out that the letters to the MODs would go forward as soon as possible after approval and preceding the return of the Ambassadors. Future communication would be through the Ambassadors and their instructions would follow shortly. In respect to Tab E - Public Affairs Problems - the actual papers would be drafted after this paper as a whole had been approved. It was noted that Tabs I and J were not ready for submission.

Mr. McNaughton stated he wished to raise a problem. In moving back the deadline to supply F-104Gs to Turkey to May 1963, it would be necessary to take planes away from the Republic of China, Norway, Denmark and Greece. Ambassador Hare interjected a question on assisting the Turks on their public stance on the whole Jupiter replacement issue as soon as possible and mentioned he was planning to return on the 9th. Ambassador Reinhardt commented on this point that from the Italian view there were two serious aspects. First, the removal of the Jupiters would leave a gap in their weaponry. However, he thought the Polaris by being on station would solve this problem. Second, there would be a gap in Italian participation in the exercise. They have participated in manning the Jupiters. What would replace this cooperation? They will undoubtedly raise the issue of equipping the Garibaldi and two submarines with Polaris racks. There is also the question of nuclear propulsion for their submarines. This makes it imperative that we move on multilateral force and that within months we have men selected for training, otherwise the Italians may interpret our actions as moving backwards. In reply, Mr. Kitchen referred to the Nassau Communique, and Mr. Rowen stated that, in theory, Italian and Turkish officers participate in targeting in SHAPE. Ambassador Hare raised a question on the meaning of staged evolution. It was concluded that the Ambassadors could best answer questions on the points raised by referring to the Nassau Communique and to the statements which Mr. Ball will make at the forthcoming NAC meeting.

Ambassador Hare asked if a non-nuclear country could in any way contribute to a mixed-manned force. Mr. Bundy replied affirmatively and commented that the Turks might participate in a mixed-manned force sooner than the French if the French do not react positively to our approach on this matter.

Mr. Kitchen

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Mr. Kitchen asked General Emrick for his comments from the JCS view on the paper. General Emrick noted that in the letter to the Italian MOD submarines were to be "assigned" to SACEUR rather than "earmarked" for SACEUR and that Secretary McNamara had approved this designation. He continued by saying we should remove any implication under the modernization of SETAF that we are replacing the Corporals one for one with Sergeants. It was generally agreed that the insertion of the phrase "furnishing a suitable force" should remove this implication. He also commented that in the last paragraph of both letters the words "this proposal" should be plural.

Mr. McNaughton questioned support of SETAF "for at least an interim period" and related it to the problem of Italianization. Ambassador Reinhardt commented that support of SETAF should be left vague with an option for Italianization.

Returning to the letter to the Turkish MOD, General Emrick commented that the JCS wished to maintain the present schedule of deliveries of F-104Gs. Advancing delivery of the planes to the Turks would not mean they would be effective militarily, because the Turks would not be trained to either fly or to maintain them. It was pointed out that Secretary McNamara wanted the planes there in May. Mr. Kitchen commented we would prefer this for political reasons. It was agreed that Mr. McNaughton would clarify this point with Secretary McNamara.

On the question of nuclear bomb dispersal, it was stated that four MK 28s would be in Turkey by July and the remainder by the end of the year. Dispersal would require Presidential approval. Mr. Bundy stated the President was against new deployment of nuclear bombs without permissive links. It was suggested that the problem could be avoided by transferring the bombs to igloos, with the links supplied as soon as possible. Mr. Rowen said he would work out a schedule on delivery of the links and we could merely inform the Turks that nuclear bombs would be delivered by the end of 1963. He was asked to hedge the assurance so no extensive deliveries would be made before the links were available. Mr. Bundy commented that he thought Presidential approval could be obtained under the circumstances, i.e., with some links to be delivered by the end of 1963, but that the President would also wish to know whether provision to the Turks would defer installation of links on weapons scheduled for other recipients. Mr. Rowen agreed to obtain a comprehensive report on the permissive link picture.

Mr. Bundy

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Mr. Bundy pointed out that presentation of the Jupiter package to the President was scheduled for Saturday morning in Palm Beach. It was agreed that Mr. Kitchen and Mr. McNaughton would coordinate any revisions and the amendments to the package (being carried by courier on Friday) would be wired.

Agenda Item 2 - Mr. Rostow's Paper and Summary on Post-Nassau Strategy (Sub-Group V)

Mr. Kitchen asked Mr. Rostow to comment briefly on his Basic Strategy paper. Subsequent discussion revealed that Defense had not received copies of the basic paper. Mr. Yarmolinsky suggested that Defense prepare a written comment on Mr. Rostow's paper and Mr. Rowen accepted responsibility for preparing this. It was agreed that Mr. Rostow's paper would be discussed at a later meeting.

Mr. Bundy brought the attention of the members to the President's backgrounder and commented that the press had not made as good use of it as they should have. He asked that there be wide distribution of the backgrounder within both the Departments of State and Defense.

Agenda Item 3 - Progress Reports by the Chairmen of the Sub-Groups I, II, III, and VI.

Mr. Kitchen referred to the reports from Chairmen of Sub-Groups which had been attached to the Agenda. There were no comments in addition to the written reports.

Mr. Kitchen referred to the appointment of Mr. Armstrong within Sub-Group I to consider all alternatives in making arms deliveries to the British.

Mr. Weiss referred to Mr. Rostow's paper and raised the question of whether its treatment of the "NATO Executive Committee" concept should not be picked up by Sub-Group II. After some discussion, Mr. Popper agreed to work up a paper on the subject although it would, as a matter of priority, have to follow his Sub-Group II paper. He also noted it would probably require a different approach and, therefore, require different membership within his Sub-Group.

General Emrick reported that JCS was working on a paper considering what could be done to establish a nuclear force. Its concept was divided into two stages: First, what can be done with material available now for the experience for future use? Second, what could possibly be done under a multilateral force?

Mr. Schaetzel

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Mr. Schaetzel commented that in Sub-Group III they were attempting to determine where the French could begin in order to gain parity with the UK. He stated he would expect a series of flash communications from Ambassador Bohlen on what we intend to offer the French. He stated the Defense Department would have a first cut at this problem, the AEC would refine it, then the Sub-Group would expand and refine on these papers. Mr. McNaughton commented that as a mode of operation it was acceptable to DOD to proceed as Mr. Schaetzel had suggested, i.e., papers would be exchanged until the problem required more comprehensive treatment in a full Steering Group or Sub-Group forum.

Note was taken of Sub-Group IV's meeting at 10 o'clock on Monday and of the Sub-Group VI paper which would be available shortly for the Steering Group.


Other Business

Mr. Kitchen said he has asked INR to prepare papers on the reaction to Nassau in other NATO countries.

Mr. Schaetzel asked that Mr. Dutton be cut in on the work of the Steering Group because of eventual Congressional consideration of some aspects of its work.

Mr. Schaetzel added that Mr. Ball, in going to Paris for the NAC presentation, would also visit London and Bonn and possibly Rome.

Mr. Brubeck asked all members to keep as much material as possible out of the "Eyes Only" category, using "Limit Distribution S/S" as much as possible as an alternative, in order to ease distribution of papers.



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