

**October 28, 1966**

**J. A. Thomson (Head of Planning Staff, Foreign Office) to J.E.D. Street (Head of the Atomic Energy and Disarmament Department, Foreign Office),  
'German Views on Non-Proliferation'**

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**Summary:**

Before and after de Gaulle's November 1967 veto of Britain's second EEC application, Britain's position in Europe and its relationships with existing EEC states shaped the UK's role in the NPT negotiations. Prior to 1967, London canvassed opinion in EEC capitals, particularly in Bonn. As the NPT negotiations wound their way through the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (of which the United Kingdom was a member) in 1967, British representatives reported deep-seated concerns in Bonn, Brussels, the Hague, Luxembourg City, Paris, and Rome that a non-proliferation agreement might threaten the continued functioning of EURATOM, namely that its power might be subsumed into the IAEA, opening non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) up to commercial espionage conducted by inspectors representing the nuclear-weapon states (NWS).

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Transcript - English

CONFIDENTIALMr. StreetGerman Views on Non-Proliferation

I had a long talk about non-proliferation earlier this week with Herr Diehl, the Head of the German Planning Staff. He explained the German attitude in a way that was slightly different from anything which I have heard before. He said the Germans would accept a non-proliferation treaty provided that:-

(a) it permitted joint defence arrangements in the nuclear field on the lines recognised in the United Nations Charter;

(b) there was a satisfactory solution to the problem of the depositories and East Germany.

2. Herr Diehl was slightly hesitant in defining precisely what he meant by (a) above, but the impression I got was that the German Government would be satisfied if the treaty did not exclude collective nuclear defence, i.e. they would not insist that it should contain an explicit statement providing for it. The reference to the U.N. Charter is interesting and encouraging.

3. Herr Diehl said that an important but not decisive consideration in German minds was the connection which had often been drawn between the German signature of a non-proliferation agreement and some forward movement towards reunification. The tenor of his remarks was that it would be a sacrifice for the German Government not to make such a connection but this was a sacrifice which they would nevertheless make if their two provisos were met.

[signature]

(J.A. Thomson)

28 October, 1966.

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