

## **February 22, 1967**

### **Non-Proliferation and Our Entry into E.E.C.**

#### **Citation:**

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#### **Summary:**

The Harold Wilson government was continually focused on the issue of demonstrating that Britain should be seen as a "European" power with interests compatible with the existing EEC membership. This high-level Foreign Office note queried what the UK could do when pulled in different directions by the need to finalize a non-proliferation treaty while avoiding unnecessary damage to its European interests. This memorandum was drafted against a background of rumblings from EEC capitals that by tacitly supporting NPT proposals put forward by U.S. officials the Wilson government was being anti-European.

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#### **Contents:**

Transcript - English

CONFIDENTIALPermanent Under-SecretaryNon-Proliferation and our entry into E.E.C.

Mr. Palliser spoke to me about UKDIS telegrams Nos. 9 and 10 to which we have now replied (copies attached). He feared there was a danger of our getting into contradictory positions on EURATOM and the non-proliferation treaty. On the one hand in his speeches, and in what he was saying during visits to the capitals of the Six, the Prime Minister was making much of what British entry could do to revivify EURATOM. On the other hand members of EURATOM, and in particular the Germans and the Italians, held that the non-proliferation treaty as drafted would spell the end of EURATOM. This situation could obviously be extremely damaging.

2. He asked us to consider whether we should not draft a short paper to answer the following question:

What could we do, without damaging our overall policy of securing a non-proliferation treaty, to demonstrate our concern, as a European power, that the interests of EURATOM should be safeguarded?

3. Such a study would of course have to answer the question whether in fact the treaty would prejudice the interests or standing of EURATOM and its members. Mr. Palliser wondered whether we had really studied this question as deeply as it deserved.

4. Generally Mr. Palliser asked us to consider whether this issue has not now assumed political aspects of a dimension which was too great to be removed merely by discussions at a technical level - no matter how distinguished the scientist involved would be.

[signature]

22 February 1967

Copies to:

Lord Hood

Sir C. O'Neill

Sir J. Rennie

Mr. O'Neill

Mr. Alexander

A.E.D.D.

W.O.C.D.

[handwritten] *A paper dealing with this is at P/A*

*[illegible signature]*