

**December 24, 1962**

**Talking Paper for the Chairman, JCS, for Discussion  
with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 26  
December [1962]: 'Planning Requirements Resulting  
from the Nassau Pact and the JUPITER Decision'**

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**Summary:**

JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor was aware of Kennedy's Jupiter decision, but it is not clear when the other Chiefs learned of the "closely held decisions." This paper, approved by General Paul S. Emrick, director of Plans and Policy for the Joint Staff, gave an overall look at the "planning requirements" necessitated by the Jupiter decision and the recent Nassau conference between President Kennedy and UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. Among the issues presented by the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles were retargeting requirements, Sergeant missiles for Italy, the number of Polaris submarines patrolling the Mediterranean and their basing, and the speeding up of F-104G deliveries to Turkey.

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24 December 1962

Talking Paper for the Chairman, JCS, for discussion with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 26 December.

Subject: Planning Requirements Resulting From The Nassau Pact and the JUPITER Decision

Background - Recently the President decided, subject to agreement by the countries concerned and NATO, that the JUPITER missiles in Turkey and Italy would be withdrawn after being replaced by POLARIS submarines in the Mediterranean about 1 April 1963.

- On 20 Dec at Nassau the President concluded a far-reaching agreement with UK Prime Minister MacMillan concerning the early establishment of a NATO nuclear force and the later establishment of a NATO multilateral missile force.

- USCINCEUR, CINCLANT, and CINCSAC have been invited to submit comments to JCS on the manner in which the Nassau decision should be implemented.

Discussion - The military implications of these two decisions have not all been examined in terms of how they might be carried out.

- The JUPITER decision has been closely held. Hence the targeting implications have not been fully examined.

- It is desirable to take an early look at the implications of implementing these decisions, particularly the withdrawal of JUPITERS and the creation of the initial NATO nuclear force, and permit those responsible to begin their planning.

- Assuming that Gen Lemnitzer has been informed of the JUPITER decision, J-3 plans to ask the Director, Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) and USCINCEUR to report on the implications of withdrawing the JUPITERS about 1 April 63, and the problems of retargeting.

- It is to be noted that implementation of the JUPITER decision depends upon agreement of the countries concerned and of NATO itself (North Atlantic Council), since the JUPITERS fulfill a NATO requirement. The decision on the NATO nuclear force, on the other hand, can be implemented by the US and the UK, since there would be no problem with NATO approval.

- Attached is a discussion, following your outline of "Planning Requirements," of some of the problems connected with implementing the two decisions. Suggested planning responsibility assignments are shown for each item. Items in paragraphs 2 and 3 will be taken up at the JCS meeting on 26 Dec (J-5 report on JCS 2421/169).

Recommendations - That the attachment be used in your discussions with Mr. Gilpatric.

Approved by *Emwick* Director, J-5

Opinion as to Recommendation:

Director, Joint Staff \_\_\_\_\_ (Concur) (Nonconcur)

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## ENCLOSURE

PLANNING REQUIREMENTS RESULTING FROM THE  
NASSAU PACT AND THE JUPITER DECISION1. Retargeting to Compensate for Withdrawal of JUPITERS

Responsibility: JCS (DSTP and SACEUR) (USCINCEUR)

Problems: The Italians and Turks will have to be satisfied politically. The North Atlantic Council, whose requirement the JUPITERS fulfill, will want to be assured that the threat to NATO Europe will be covered adequately by quick-reaction weapons after the JUPITERS are withdrawn. The final retargeting will have to await the outcome of political discussions. Meanwhile, targeting priorities must be reexamined in the light of the reduced capability, and alternative courses of action identified, with their implications. Italy and Turkey have been assured that the POLARIS missile targeting will be handled by SACEUR in the same way as JUPITERS are now targeted. The Director Strategic Target Planning (DSTP), CINCEUR, CINCLANT and CINCSAC should be informed of the JUPITER decision so that the necessary retargeting can be planned.

2. (Initial NATO Nuclear Force). This item is being addressed by the JCS on 26 December. The report is in preparation. Some of the problems and factors being considered are listed briefly.

a. Composition of Initial NATO Nuclear Force

Responsibility: JCS

Problems and factors: In general: Should we stay equal with UK in contribution but not more than equal?

(1) POLARIS

(a) Reconciliation with previous commitment of five POLARIS subs to NATO.

(b) Possibility of equating with Mediterranean commitment made to replace JUPITERS.

(2) Tactical Nuclear Forces in Europe

(a) Tac Air only? Army tactical weapons should remain under commanders they support.

(b) Desirability of keeping tactical units intact.

(3) Element of SAC

(a) B-47's in Spain?

(b) Desirability of keeping tactical units intact.

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b. Multilateral Features

Responsibility: JCS

Problems: (1) Difficulty with doing much under this heading under present law.

(2) Multilateral manning of single unit theoretically possible but not desirable.

c. Targeting

Responsibility: JCS (USREP MC/SGN)

Problems and factors: NATO Target Planning Group limited to contributor nations?

d. Command and Control

Responsibility: State (White House, OSD, JCS).

Problems and factors: (1) US forces must remain under US control unless the law is changed.

(2) National governments exercise veto on NATO use of own forces.

(3) Should force consist of earmarked units?

3. NATO Multilateral Missile Force. This item is being addressed by the JCS on 26 December. The report is in preparation. Some of the problems and factors being considered are listed briefly.

a. Conditions of Sale to UK of POLARIS Missiles and Related Equipment

b. Same for France

Responsibility: OSD (Navy)

c. Conditions of Admission to Nonnuclear Countries Who Contribute Personnel and Resources

Responsibility: State, OSD (JCS)

Problems and factors: (1) Difficulty in finding way to make it worthwhile for nonnuclear powers to contribute - without being able to allow their fingers on the trigger, or give them command of US nuclear forces.

(2) Possible change in US law when political climate favorable.

(3) Perhaps privilege of participating in targeting may induce contribution.

(4) Establishing guidelines for acceptable progress in conventional forces as prerequisite for participation in nuclear force could be major headache.

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Responsibility: JCS (USREP MC/SGN)

Problems and factors: NATO Target Planning Group limited to contributor nations?

e. Command and Control

Responsibility: State (White House, OSD, JCS)

Problems and factors: (1) US forces must remain under US control until the law is changed.

(2) National governments exercise veto on NATO use of own forces.

(3) Should force consist of earmarked units?

4. Arrangements with Turkey and Italy for Withdrawal of JUPITERS

Responsibility: State (OSD, JCS, AF)

Problems: Political considerations in the host countries; US military personnel, with their dependents, assigned to JUPITERS.

a. Provision of SERGEANTS for Italy

Responsibility: OSD (JCS, Army)

Problems: Army at present considering question of how many SERGEANTS. From a military standpoint, scarce SERGEANTS should all be assigned to the central European front (recommendation of USCINCEUR). However from a political standpoint, consideration is being given to assigning some to Italy - to replace obsolescent CORPORALS. We should try to satisfy the Italians at lowest price in scarce SERGEANTS.

b. POLARIS Submarines in the Mediterranean

Responsibility: OSD (JCS, Navy, State)

Problems: (1) The number of POLARIS submarines to be on station in the Mediterranean to replace the JUPITERS will depend on the outcome of political discussions with the Turks and the Italians.

(2) The efficiency of use of available POLARIS submarines will be degraded when they are deployed in the Mediterranean before the ROTA POLARIS base is completed. Hence it will be to our over-all advantage to keep the number of submarines so deployed to a minimum.

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(3) The Navy would be able to advise on the operational aspects of the problem, including possible interim arrangements to base POLARIS submarines at ROTA before the base arrangements are completed, to cut down on transit time to and from station. In this connection, the Italians have been interested in the possibility of our establishing a POLARIS base in Italy, and we have discouraged them.

(4) We have already committed ourselves to the Turks to provide a POLARIS submarine (16 missiles) on station in the Eastern Mediterranean to replace the 15 JUPITERS. A one-for-one replacement of JUPITERS in Italy would call for two more POLARIS submarines on station in the Mediterranean. However, our approach to the Italians on this point was not clear, and therefore open to interpretation.

(5) Presumably the arrangements for operational control of the submarines (same as SIXTH Fleet) and targeting of POLARIS (same as JUPITERS) would not cause a problem.

c. Speeding of 104-G Program for Turkey

Responsibility: OSD (AF)

Problems: This was urgently requested by the Turks at the time of the Cuba crisis, and we gave them assurances. It is a matter of production schedules and priorities.

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