

## **February 12, 1963**

### **American Embassy Rome Telegram 1612 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC**

#### **Citation:**

"American Embassy Rome Telegram 1612 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC", February 12, 1963, Wilson Center Digital Archive, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 84, Rome Embassy Classified General Records 1946-1964, Box 125, 430.1 Italy and IRBM and NATO 1962 1963 1964. Contributed by Bill Burr and Leopoldo Nuti. <https://wilson-center-digital-archive.dvincitest.com/document/300435>

#### **Summary:**

Detailed records of the conversations between Gilpatric and top Italian officials have yet to surface. The sole source is a telegram from the Rome Embassy summing up the talks with Fanfani. On February 11, Gilpatric and Ambassador G. Frederick Reinhardt met with Prime Minister Fanfani. Gilpatric reviewed U.S. plans for three Polaris submarines assigned to SACEUR to patrol the Mediterranean and the projected visit to Rome by Ambassador Livingston Merchant to discuss the multilateral force proposal. In that connection, Fanfani said that Italy had given up the proposal to equip the Garibaldi with Polaris missiles. Gilpatric discussed some of the negative implications of French President Charles De Gaulle's 14 January 1963 press conference, which included statements critical of NATO. This raised concerns in Washington that if the American people felt "unwanted" in Europe, there might be pressure to take a "more restrictive" position on the U.S. military presence in Europe. Fanfani agreed that it was "more important than ever for ... the alliance to strive for greater unity."

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Original Scan

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# TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the  
United States of America

OUTGOING Amembassy ROME

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Control: 132

Date: February 12, 1963  
1100

DIST:  
RU-2  
RGILPATRIC  
AMB-2  
DCM-2

Sent: SECSTATE WASHINGTON 1612

Info: Amembassy PARIS 349

7/fd

Dept pass Defense. Paris also for USRO.

Yesterday Feb 11 Deputy Secdef Gilpatric and I called on  
Primin Fanfani.

During first part of meeting which lasted over an hour  
Gilpatric referred to US plans for deployment to Mediterranean  
between end of March and mid-May of three RA POLARIS submarines  
to be assigned to SACEUR. Gilpatric also referred to possible  
call at an Italian port by one of these submarines later in  
spring if desired by Italian Govt. Fanfani expressed satisfaction  
with these arrangements and indicated that a visit to an Italian  
port by a POLARIS submarine might be in order after the election.

430.1

Gilpatric then spoke of projected visit to Rome, probably  
early in March, of Amb Merchant and his group to discuss Italian  
participation in integrated element of NATO nuclear force. In  
this connection Fanfani stated that based on advice he had  
received while last in Washington, from President and Secy  
McNamara, Council of Ministers had decided against pushing idea  
of equipping GARIBALDI with POLARIS missiles.

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Gilpatric then mentioned developments in US Govt thinking in regard to NATO since Fanfani's talks in Washington, with particular reference to reflections on possible consequences of President de Gaulle's press conference of Jan 14. These possibilities included first, loss of momentum toward unity in the alliance gained following Berlin crisis of 1961 and Cuban crisis in fall of 1962; second, risk that an apparent division in alliance might lead to more intransigent and adventuresome attitude on part of Soviet, as exemplified by recent hardening of its position in ~~xxx~~ test ban negotiations and withdrawal of forces from Cuba; and third, concern lest American people, if left with feeling of being unwanted in Europe, might take more restrictive attitude towards ~~maintaining~~ maintaining large US forces in Europe. Fanfani responded that he agreed with this analysis of dangers attendant upon de Gaulle position regarding NATO and endorsed view that it was more important than ever for rest of alliance to strive for greater unity.

Throughout conversation Fanfani displayed a most cordial and forthcoming attitude and an evident desire to associate himself with U.S. views and positions.

RGilpatric:ejf

REINHARDT

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