

June 11, 1989

China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan], 'The Situation in China (Moves to Bring the Situation Under Control)'

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Summary:

Written on June 11, 1989, by Japan's China Division, this document summarizes the activities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after the Tiananmen Square incident. It evaluates the CCP's apparent change in party leadership, problems in domestic affairs, problems in promoting reform and opening, and effect on external relations.

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波線部

送信先(○印)	短縮番号
ファックス設置全幹部	
総理秘書官	01
官房長官秘書官	02
官房副長官秘書官	03
内閣外政審議室長	04
大臣秘書官	05
事務次官	06
次官秘書官	07
外務審議官	08
外務審議官	09
国際経済担当大使	10
官房長	11
総括審議官	12
総務課長	13

	外務報道官	14
	報道課長	15
	領事移住部長	16
○	アジア局長	17
	北米局長	18
	中南米局長	19
	欧亜局長	20
	中近東アフリカ局長	21
	経済局長	
	経済協力局長	23
	条約局長	24
	国連局長	25
	科学技術審議官	26
	情報調査局長	27
⊗	情報課長	28

中国情勢（事態收拾への動き）

平成元． 6．11

中国 課

1. 事実関係

- (1) 鄧小平は5月16日、訪中したゴルバチョフと会見して以来その動静が報道されなかったが、6月9日、軍幹部と会見し、重要講話を行う様子がTVで放映された。同席者は楊尚昆、李鵬、喬石、姚依林、万里、李先念、彭真、王震、薄一波（趙紫陽、胡啓立は姿を見せず。陳雲は軍に敬意を表明と文中に出現）。
- (2) 鄧小平はその重要講話の中で今次動きを「極めて少数の者が動乱を起し、その後反革命暴乱に発展させた。彼らの目的は共産党を倒し、社会主義制度を覆し、中華人民共和国を転覆させ、ブルジョア共和国を樹立することにあつた」と極めて厳しく批判するとともに、軍による武力鎮圧を正当化した。
- (3) 他方、11期3中全会以後の基本方針である4つの基本原則（注）の堅持及び改革と開放の推進は正しく、今後も変わることなく貫徹する旨表明。

（注）①社会主義の道②プロレタリアート独裁③共産党の指導
④マルクス・レーニン主義と毛沢東思想

2. 現状の評価

4日未明の軍による武力鎮圧以来党・政府の指導者がほとんど姿を見せず、指導部内での対立・攻めぎ合いも伝えられたが、9日に至り鄧小平がその健在振りを示すとともに李鵬・楊尚昆・喬石及び党長老が一斉に登場したことは、鄧の下に趙紫陽らを除く党・軍の強硬派が指導権を握ったことを意味するものであり、事態はこのラインで一応収束の方向へ向かうものと見られる。（趙紫陽及び胡啓立は姿を現さず、失脚が確定的。内部で意見の不一致も報じられた軍部も鄧の下で一本化の様様。）

3. 今後の見通し

(1) 内政上の問題点

(イ) 中国はここ1カ月以来の混乱を取束させ、表面上の安定を取り戻しつつある。今後は「安定團結」を謳う上からも正式な手続きによって今次事態の決着を付ける必要があり、その意味で党中央委員会総会（4中全会）が如何なる形で開催され、趙紫陽らの処分の内容（罪状）及びその範囲がどのようなものとなるかが注目される。現指導部としては、当面、「安定團結」を確保する見地から、指導部内の人事異動は小規模にとどめるよう努めるとともに、他方で民主化運動の芽を摘むべく学生・知識人ら反政府グループの摘発等引き締め強化の方向で全力を挙げるものと思われる。

(ロ) しかし、今回の一連の動きで明らかとなった一般大衆（学生、市民）の民主化、自由化への強い要求と経済状態の悪化や官僚の不正・腐敗への憤り、そしてこれらを力で抑えつけた現指導部への反発は大きく、大都市を中心に党の威信は決定的に低下したと言えよう。また、今回の事態收拾を通じて「軍に支えられた共産党一党独裁」の色彩が濃く出たが、今後軍の発言力が強まるとともに、党の大衆からの遊離は決定的。武力鎮圧により「一党独裁」を守りはしたが、その代償は大きく、近代化達成の諸条件は悪化し、経済面を中心とする政策運営は一層困難となり、今後国内情勢が再び不安定な局面に陥る可能性も排除されない。

(2) 改革・開放政策の推進と民主化の問題

(イ) 78年以来鄧小平のリーダーシップの下経済面で改革・開放の政策が積極的に進められてきたが、政治体制改革については一定の進展を見つつも、共産党一党独裁を揺るがすような民主化要求には一貫して厳しい態度がとられてきた。（胡耀邦の解任、反ブルジョワ自由化キャンペーン等による引き締め、今次デモを「動乱」、「反革命暴乱」と決め付け、武力鎮圧）。今後、改革・開放を推進することは必然的に民主化・自由化の動き（一党独裁を揺るがす恐れ）を招来することが明確となった現在、鄧ら指導部は、如何にし

て一党独裁を保持しつつ近代化を図るかという相矛盾する命題に真剣に立ち向かわねばならない時代を迎えたとも言えよう。

(ロ) 鄧小平は9日の重要講話でも改革・開放路線堅持に変わりはない旨強調しているが、今回の事態により中国の党・政府部内で改革開放を推進してきたグループが大きな打撃を受けることは避けられず、西側からの資金・技術の導入に依存した近代化は足踏みする可能性大。具体的には、経済面では調整が継続され、昨年来のインフレ・幹部の腐敗等により事実上頓挫していた価格改革などこれ以上の改革は当面棚上げされることになるう。

(ハ) 当局の強硬姿勢により民主化運動は当面押し留められることとなろうが、今次学生の運動が、中国指導部にとって予想し得なかった程の広範な盛り上がりを見せたことは、中国においても民主化運動が一つの大きな流れとなってきたと言え、今後何らかのキッカケ（例えば鄧小平の死等）により再び大きな盛り上がりを見せる可能性も排除し得ない。他方、指導部としては、共産党の一党独裁を守るべく全ゆる手段を講じてかかる動きを封じていくものと思われる、また、政治問題にはほとんど関心がない8億の農民が政治的安定と経済的繁栄のみを追及する保守的な基盤として存在し続ける限り、中国の民主化実現は容易ではない。

(3) 対外関係への影響

(イ) 中国の現指導部が戒厳令の下、世界の注視する中で軍の武力行使により多数の無防備の学生・市民に発砲し、多くの犠牲者を出したことは中国独裁政治の陰湿さと不安定性を印象づけ、国際的イメージを悪化させ、10年間の改革・開放の努力によって高まった中国の国際的信用を一気に落としてしまったとも言えよう。特に投資等の対外経済関係が大きな影響を受けることは避けられないであろう。

(ロ) 鄧の「一国二制度」に対する疑念等97年の大陸復帰を控えた香港には大きな心理的影響を及ぼさざるを得ず、更には台湾との交流促進に向けての動きにもマイナスの作用をもたらすものと思われる。

る。

(ハ) 民主化や人権問題に敏感な国内世論を無視できない米国との関係は、今後中国における学生・知識人らに対する締め付けが厳しくなる中で、種々摩擦の多いものになりかねない可能性がある（特に、米大使館に庇護されている方勵之の処遇は米中間の大きな問題となり得る）。

(ニ) 他方、日・米・欧が中国との関係に消極的となる場合には、中国がソ連との関係強化に動く可能性も排除されず、混乱を収拾した後の中ソ関係は注視する必要があろう。

（注）ソ連は論評を加えず、「鄧氏登場」の事実のみ簡単に報道。

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Deputy Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs 000 000 000

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Ambassador in Charge of International Economy 000 000 000

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Assistant Vice Minister 000 000 000

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Director, Management and Coordination Division 000 000 000

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Director-General for Press and Public Relations 000 000 000

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The Situation in China (Moves to Bring the Situation Under Control)

June 11, 1989

China Division

1. The Facts

(1) Since his meeting with Gorbachev on his visit to China on May 16, there had been no reports of Deng Xiaoping's movements. But on June 9, he was shown on television giving an important speech in a meeting with military cadres. Present were Yang Shangkun, Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Yao Yilin, Wan Li, Li Xiannian, Peng Zhen, Wang Zhen, and Bo Yibo (Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili did not appear. Chen Yun appeared in a message expressing respect to the military).

(2) Deng Xiaoping in that major speech was severely critical of the recent activities and justified the armed suppression by the military in saying, "A small number of people caused turmoil, which they later turned into a counterrevolutionary riot. Their goal was to bring down the Communist Party, overthrow the socialist system, overthrow the People's Republic of China, and establish a bourgeois republic."

(3) On the other hand, he stated that it was correct to adhere to the Four Cardinal Principles (see note below), which have been basic policy since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to promote reform and opening and that they would carry through without change.

(Note): (1) the socialist road; (2) dictatorship of the proletariat; (3) leadership of the Communist Party; (4) Marxism-Leninism-Mao-Zedong Thought

2. Evaluation of the Current Situation

Party and government leaders made almost no appearances following the armed suppression by the military before dawn on the morning of June 4, and there was reporting of conflict and quarrels within the leadership. However, the showing on June 9 that Deng Xiaoping was in good health and the appearance together of Li Peng, Yang Shangkun, Qiao Shi, and the Party elders means that the hardline faction in the Party and military under Deng have removed Zhao Ziyang and others. They will likely move to bring the situation under control for the time being along this line. (It is certain that Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili have lost their positions. Even the military, which was reported to have had internal disagreements, appears to have united under Deng.)

3. Future Prospects

(1) Problems in Domestic Affairs

(a) China for the past month has been bringing the disorder under control and regaining surface stability. It will now be necessary to settle the recent situation through formal procedures in calling for "stability and unity." In that sense, attention will be paid to the form in which the full meeting of the Party Central Committee (the Fourth Plenary Session) is held, the details of the handling of Zhao Ziyang and others (the charges against them), and its scope. As for the present leadership, the thinking is that, for now, from the viewpoint of preserving "stability and unity," they will work to keep to a minimum personnel movement within the leadership and, on the other hand, devote their energies in the direction of such tightening of control as exposing students, intellectuals, and other anti-government groups to nip in the bud the movement for democratization

(b) However, one can say that what is great are the strong demands for democratization and liberalization of the masses (students, civilians), which became clear in this series of events, the indignation over the worsening of economic conditions and the injustice and corruption of bureaucrats, and the reaction against the present leadership, which suppressed this with force. It can also be said that the Party's prestige has decisively declined, especially in the big cities. In addition, the "Communist Party one-party dictatorship, supported by the military," came sharply into view through the bringing of this situation under control. Together with the future strengthening of the military's voice, the Party's separation from the masses will be decisive. They did protect "one-party dictatorship" by armed suppression, but at great cost. The possibility cannot be excluded that, when the conditions for achieving modernization worsen and policy management focusing on the economy becomes more difficult, the domestic situation will once become unstable.

(2) Problems in Promotion of Reform and Opening, Democratization

(a) A policy of reform and opening in the economy has been actively promoted under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping since 1978 but, in regard to reform of the political system, despite some measure of progress seen, a consistently harsh stance (the tightening of control by such means as the dismissal of Hu Yaobang from his position and the campaign against bourgeois liberalism, the defining of the recent demonstrations as "turmoil" and "counterrevolutionary riot," and the armed suppression) has been taken against demands for democratization that would shake the one-party dictatorship of the Communist Party. At present, when it has become clear that promoting reform and opening will inevitably give rise to movements for democratization and liberalization (concern over the shaking of one-party dictatorship), one could say that Deng and others in the leadership must seriously face the mutually contradictory proposition of how to modernize while maintaining a one-party dictatorship.

(b) Deng Xiaoping stressed in his important speech of June 9 that there would be no change in adhering to the line of reform and opening, but it is inevitable that the group within China's party and government that has promoted reform and opening has suffered a major blow on account of the situation. There is a great possibility of modernization, which has depended on the introduction of funds and technology from the West, coming to a standstill. Specifically, there will likely be continuing adjustments in the economy. Further reform, such as that for prices, which have been effectively held up on account of such reasons as the inflation since last year and cadre corruption, will likely be shelved for the time being.

(c) The democracy movement has probably been stopped for the time being by the hardline stance of the authorities, but with the student movement showing such a widespread rise, which the Chinese leadership was unable to predict, one can say that the movement for democracy has become a major trend in China. One cannot exclude the possibility of it showing again a great rise on some future occasion (such as the death of Deng Xiaoping, for example). On the other hand, the leadership will be expected to take all possible means to block such a movement in order to protect the Communist Party's one-party dictatorship. In addition, so long as the 800 million peasants - who have almost no interest in political issues -- continue to exist as a conservative base pursuing only political stability and economic prosperity, the realization of democracy in China will not be easy.

(3) Effect on External Relations

(a) One can say that the military's use of force and firing upon many defenseless students and civilians, incurring many casualties, under the martial law of China's present leadership while the world was watching gave off dark and unstable impression of China's dictatorial politics, worsened the country's international image, and lost the international trust in China that had grown due to 10 years of efforts in reform and opening in a moment. It is probably inevitable that economic exchanges in particular, such as investment, will be greatly affected.

(b) It is conceivable that it will have a major psychological effect on Hong Kong's return to Mainland China in 1997, such as doubts concerning Deng's "One Country, Two Systems" and, furthermore, have a negative effect on the movement toward promoting exchanges with Taiwan.

(c) There is the possibility that relations with the United States - which cannot ignore domestic opinion that is sensitive to issues of democratization and human rights - will experience much friction of various types with the increasingly harsh controls on students and intellectuals in China (In particular, the treatment of Fang Lizhi, who is under the protection of the US Embassy, could become a major problem between the United States and China).

(d) On the other hand, in the event that relations of Japan, the United States, and Europe with China become negative, the possibility of China moving to strengthen relations with the Soviet Union cannot be excluded. It will probably be necessary to watch relations between China and the Soviet Union after order is restored.

(Note) The Soviet Union has not commented but reported only that "Deng has made an appearance."