

June 4, 1989

China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan], 'The Chinese Student Demonstrations (Part 2)'

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Summary:

The document, written on June 4, 1989 and submitted by the China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau of Japan, lists the facts surrounding Beijing's use of martial law authorities and military force during the Tiananmen Square incident on June 3, 1989. It details the background leading up to the imposition of the martial law, power struggles within the Chinese Communist Party, lateness in bringing the situation under control, and struggle for democratization and liberalization. It also indicates the impact of the Tiananmen Square incident and the CCP's response as it pertains to the Party's prestige and international image.

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中国の学生デモ。(軍の実力行使)

平元. 6. 4.

中 国 課

1. 事実認識

- (1) 3日深夜、北京の戒厳当局は戦車を含む大規模な武装部隊を出動させて、実力行使による学生の強制排除に乗り出した。これに対し、学生・市民はその進軍を阻止すべく懸命の抵抗(無防備)を続けたが、多数の死傷者を出す中で、4日午前2時前には軍が天安門前広場に突入し、3時頃には広場は軍によりほぼ制圧された。
- (2) 軍事力による制圧で事態は表面上収拾されたが、軍による無差別発砲により無辜の一般市民をも巻き込み多数の死傷者を出したことは学生・市民と党・政府・軍との亀裂を深め、国際的にもそのイメージを大きく傷つけることとなった。

2. 今次事態に至った背景等

(1) 指導部内の勢力争い

李鵬は民主化要求に一貫して厳しい態度をとってきた鄧小平、^{Deng Xiaoping} 楊尚昆等^{Yang Shang Kun}の支持を得て主導権を握ったものと見られ、その意味でも学生運動を早期に鎮圧する責務を負わされていたと言えよう。また、趙紫陽等の処分を巡って党内工作が思うように進んでいないとの情報もあり、このまま学生デモ収拾が長引く場合には趙を支持する勢力が勢いを盛り返す可能性も排除されず、李鵬グループとしては、開催が噂されている党中央委員会総会を始め指導部内の権力闘争の状況をもにらみ、早急に学生等を抑え込み事態に決着を付ける必要があったものと思われる。

(2) 事態収拾の遅れと軍の動向

李鵬らは学生との「対話」という趙の柔軟路線を退け、戒厳令の公布による強硬策を打ち出したものの、一部の学生はあくまで座り込みを続けるとの姿勢を崩さず、軍の強制排除に踏み切れないまま実態の伴わない戒厳状態が半月も続くという李鵬等の指導

方自体が問われかねない事態ともなったと言える。この背景には、軍の一部に武力鎮圧に対する消極的意見があった模様であり（当初、軍は進出しては引返した）、李鵬等の強硬ラインで簡単には軍内がまとまらなかったとの事情があったであろうことが推測される。その意味で、軍の容赦のない鎮圧振りから3日夜には軍内が強行策実施のラインで一応固まったことが窺われる。

（注）趙を支持したとして一時失脚説も伝えられた秦基偉国防部長は3日夜中央テレビで戒厳部隊を見舞ったことが報じられたが、これも軍が武力鎮圧に出ることでまとまったことを示唆するものと言い得よう。

（3）民主化・自由化の問題

党内の保守長老グループは、民主化を要求して「動乱」を引き起こした学生らを放置しておくことは、共産党の一党独裁を揺るがし、ひいては現体制の崩壊にも繋がりがねないとの強い危機感を抱いていたものと見られる。市民との分断や厳しい締め付けにも拘らず、一部の学生があくまで「李鵬打倒」（現指導部、ひいては共産党批判にもつながる恐れ）を掲げて世界の耳目の集まる天安門前広場に座り込むことは現指導部にとってみればまさに「反革命の暴乱」として「断固として鎮圧すべき」ものとみなされたことは想像に難くない。

3. 今次事態の評価及び影響

（1）党の威信の低下

学生達の民主化要求は、市民の支持と参加も得た広範な大衆運動にまで発展したが、これに対し、現指導部は最終的に武力弾圧という形で大衆と言わば敵対関係に立つこととなった。これによって、党は大衆を抑圧する独裁的集団として人民の怒りと失望の対象とさえなつたと言え、党の威信は今後回復困難な程低下したと言っても過言ではない。従って、短期的には事態を收拾し、現指導部の権力を維持し得たとしても、中長期的には党の基盤は極めて不安定なものとなることは避けられない。

(2) 国際的イメージの低下

(イ) 世界の注視する中で中国の現指導部が戒厳令を発動し、軍の武力行使により多数の無防備の学生・市民に発砲し、多くの犠牲者を出したことは中国の国際的イメージを悪化させ、10年間の改革・開放の努力によって高まった国際的評価を一気に落としてしまったとも言えよう。中国の独裁政治の陰湿さと不安定性は国際社会における中国に対する信頼と各国の対中関係促進の意欲を著しく削ぐことにつながる可能性あり。特に投資等の経済交流が大きな影響を受けることは避けられないであろう。

(ロ) また、鄧の「一国二制度」に対する疑念等97年の大陸復帰を控えた香港には大きな心理的影響を及ぼさざるを得ず、更には台湾との交流促進に向けての動きにもマイナスの作用をもたらすものと思われる。

(ハ) なお、民主化や人権問題に敏感な国内世論を無視できない米国との関係は、今後中国の保守的思想傾向が強まると思われる中で、反体制知識人の処分等をめぐり種々摩擦の多いものになりかねない可能性がある。

(ニ) ソ連は論評を加えていないが、「当局は再三学生側に交渉を提案した」旨報道して、中国側に理解を示した。

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The Chinese Student Demonstrations (Military's Use of Force)

June 4, 1989

China Division

1. Recognition of the Facts

(1) Late on the night of June 3, Beijing martial law authorities dispatched large-scale armed forces, including tanks, and set out to remove the students by use of force. Students and civilians responded to this by continuing to put up strenuous resistance (they were defenseless). At 2 o'clock in the morning of June 4, the military thrusted into Tiananmen Square, resulting in many deaths and wounded. By around 3 o'clock, the Square was largely brought under control by the military.

(2) With control by military force, the situation on the surface is one that has been brought under control, but the many deaths and injuries of innocent civilians caught in the military's indiscriminate shooting has deepened the rift between students and civilians on the one hand and the government and military on the other. It has also greatly damaged the image of the government and military internationally.

2. Background to the Current Situation

(1) Power Struggle within the Leadership

Li Peng is seen as having taken the initiative in obtaining the support of Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun, and others who have consistently taken a harsh attitude toward demands for democratization. One could say, in that sense, that he was early given the responsibility for the early suppression of the student movement. There is also information that work within the party on how to handle Zhao Ziyang and others is not moving forward as expected. At this rate, in the event that bringing the student demonstrations under control drags out, the possibility of forces in support of Zhao regaining its strength cannot be excluded. As for the Li Peng group, with an eye on the state of the power struggle within the leadership and starting with a rumored full meeting of the Party's Central Committee, it was necessary to suppress the students as soon as possible to settle the situation.

(2) Lateness in Bringing the Situation under Control and Military Moves

Li Peng and others rejected Zhao's flexible line of "dialogue" with the students and launched a hard-line policy through the imposition of martial law. Even so, some of the students stuck to continuing their sit-in. One could say that the leadership of Li Peng and the others, unable to commit to forcible removal by the military and with the state of the martial law without substance having continued for half a month, could be called into question. There seems to be a reluctance among some in the military regarding armed suppression in the background to this (initially, the military advanced and then turned back). One could speculate that it was probably a situation where the hard-line of Li Peng and others did not simply bring the military together. In that sense, given the military's relentless suppression, it can be inferred that by the night of June 3, the military settled on carrying out the policy of force.

(Note) It was reported the night of June 3 on Central Television that Defense Minister Qin Jiwei, who was reportedly disgraced at one point for having supported Zhao, paid a visit to martial law units. One could say that this would also suggest the military's coming to an agreement on going ahead with armed suppression.

(3) The Problem of Democratization and Liberalization

It seems that a group of conservative elders within the Party had a strong sense of crisis that leaving alone the students who had caused "turmoil" in demanding democratization would shake the one-party dictatorship of the Communist Party and, in turn, could quite possibly lead to the present system's collapse. It is not difficult to

imagine that some of the students continuing, despite their separation from residents and the harsh clampdown, to raise the banner of "Down with Li Peng" (with the fear of this leading to criticism of the present leadership and, in turn, the Communist Party) and stage a sit-down in the square in front of Tiananmen, which had the world's attention, was seen by the present leadership as truly "counter-revolutionary riot" and something "to be decisively suppressed."

3. The Current Situation: Evaluation and Impact

(1) Decline in the Party's Prestige

The demands of the students for democratization developed into a broad mass movement that obtained civilian support and participation. Against this, the present leadership in the end turned against the masses, so to speak, in the form of armed suppression. One can say that the Party thereby became the object of the people's anger and disappointment as a dictatorial group oppressing the masses and that it is no exaggeration to say that the Party's prestige has declined to such a point that recovery will be difficult. Therefore, even if the Party was able for the short term to bring the situation under control and maintain the present leadership's power, it is inevitable that the Party's base in the medium to long term will be very unstable.

(2) Decline in International Image

(a) One can say that China's present leadership's imposition of the martial law while the world was watching, producing many victims due to the military's firing on many defenseless students and civilians, has worsened China's international image and that it has lost the international reputation that had risen due to 10 years of efforts in reform and opening with the incident. There is the possibility that the darkness and instability of China's dictatorial politics will lead to a substantial reduction of the international society's confidence in China and its desire to advance relations with China. It is probably inevitable that economic exchanges in particular, such as investment, will be greatly affected.

(b) In addition, it is conceivable that it will have a major psychological effect on Hong Kong's return to Mainland China in 1997, such as doubts concerning Deng's "One Country, Two Systems" and, furthermore, have a negative effect on the movement toward promoting exchanges with Taiwan.

(c) In addition, there is the possibility that relations with the United States - which cannot ignore domestic opinion that is sensitive to issues of democratization and human rights - will experience, with the likely future strengthening of conservative thinking in China, much friction of various types around the handling of dissident intellectuals and such.

(d) The Soviet Union has not commented but reported that "the authorities repeatedly proposed negotiations with the student side," expressing their understanding of the Chinese side.

(End)