

April 20, 1964

National Security Action Memorandum, NSAM 294, McGeorge Bundy to Secretary of State, 'US Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System Assistance to France'

Citation:

"National Security Action Memorandum, NSAM 294, McGeorge Bundy to Secretary of State, 'US Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System Assistance to France'", April 20, 1964, Wilson Center Digital Archive, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Security Council Files (NSCF), box 676, France vol. V 01 Feb 70-Apr 70. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #2. https://wilson-center-digital-archive.dvincitest.com/document/110246

Summary:

Bundy explains that, according to policy, the U.S. is opposed to the development of nuclear forces by other states except those approved by NATO. Thus, the U.S. is not to aid French nuclear development, and this document calls for specific technical guidelines to be developed for the agencies in the government to prevent France from receiving any such aid.

Original Language:

English

Contents:

Original Scan

THE WHITE HOUSE

April 20, 1964

TOP SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM 294

TO:

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Administrator, National Aeronautics and


Space Administration

The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director, Office of Science and Technology

SUBJECT: U.S. Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System
Assistance to France

It is the policy of this government to oppose the development of nuclear forces by additional states, other than those whose forces would be assigned as part of a NATO nuclear force, targeted in accordance with NATO plans and, except when supreme national interests were at stake, used only for the defense purposes of the Alliance.

Given current French policy, it continues to be in this government's interest not to contribute to or assist in the development of a French nuclear warhead capability or a French national strategic nuclear delivery capacity. This includes exchanges of information and technology between the governments, sale of equipment, joint research and development activities, and exchanges between industrial and commercial organizations, either directly or through third parties, which would be reasonably likely to facilitate these efforts by significantly affecting timing, quality or costs or would identify the U.S. as a major supplier or collaborator. However, this directive is not intended to restrict unduly full and useful cooperation in non-strategic programs and activities.



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Therefore, the President has directed that effective controls be established immediately to assure that, to the extent feasible, the assistance referred to above is not extended either intentionally or unintentionally.

To this end, specific technical guidance is to be developed and issued at the earliest possible time for the use of the agencies that control the export of equipment and technology, including data exchange arrangements. Responsibility for the development of such guidance, and when necessary the revision of these guidances, will be vested in the Departments of State and Defense, in consultation as appropriate with the Department of Commerce, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Office of Science and Technology, and under the leadership of the Department of State. The approved guidance documents will be cleared at the White House and issued as technical appendices to this National Security Action Memorandum. Necessary guidance will be requested before specific commitments are made by any agency.

McGeorge Bundy

cc:

Mr. Bundy

Mr. Klein

Col. Smith

Mr. Johnson

NSC Files