

**December 18, 1949**  
**Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 18 December  
1949**

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毛泽东就同斯大林第一次会谈情况致刘少奇的电报  
(1949年12月18日)

少奇同志：

十二月十三日四时 - 电悉。(一)我们一行于十六日上午十二时到莫斯科，住斯大林别墅。下午十时谒见斯大林元帅，情意恳切，谈两小时。谈了和平可能性、大条约、借款、台湾及毛选出版等问题。我方为一人。苏方有莫洛托夫、马林科夫、布尔加宁及维辛斯基等四人参加，是一小型会谈。师哲、费德林二人当翻译。(二)斯大林说：美国人很怕打仗，美国人叫别人打，别人也怕打。看他这种说法，仗是很难打起来的，和我们的估计一样。(三)关于条约问题，斯大林说：因为雅尔塔协议的原故，目前不宜改变原有中苏条约的合法性。如果改变原有的，重订新的，就会牵连到千岛群岛的问题，美国人就有理由要拿走千岛群岛。因此，旅顺为苏联租借二十年一点，目前在形式上不要改变，但在实质上苏联实行撤兵，由中国军队进驻。我说撤得太早也不利。他说可想办法使苏联撤兵不成为袖子，不管让中国同志独当其冲。他的意见是，签订一个声明，照上述内容解决大问题，如此即可使中共取得政治资本。我说，照顾雅尔塔协议的合法性是必要的。惟中国社会舆论有一种感想，认为原条约是和国民党订的，国民党既然倒了，原条约就似乎失了存在的意义。他说，原条约总是要修改的，大约在两年后可以修改。(四)关于是否要中国外长来此的问题，他说签订一个声明似乎外长不来也可以。我说，待我考虑一下是否连借款、民航、通商等事一起同时签订协定，如果同时签订协定，则外长似宜来此。(五)请你和恩来商量并召集政治局诸同志加以讨论，目前是否有签订一个简单通商协定(包括新疆在内)规定每年交换货物的品种及总数量之可能，以便决定恩来是否来此。同时对上述条约问题提出意见，速告为盼。

毛泽东  
十二月十八日

中国中央档案馆1949年1—1: 672/696

Cable, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, on the First Meeting with Stalin<sup>[1]</sup>  
(18 December 1949)

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

The cable sent at 4:00am on 13 December was received.

(1) [We] arrived in Moscow on the 16th at 12 o'clock in the morning and are staying in Stalin's villa. [I] met with Marshal Stalin for two hours at 10 p.m. [Beijing time]. His attitude was really sincere. The questions involved included the possibility of peace, the treaty, loan, Taiwan, and the publication of my selected works. There was only myself on our side. On the Soviet side, Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, and Vyshinsky participated. It was a small discussion. Shi Zhe and Fedorenko served as translators.

(2) Stalin said that the Americans are afraid of war. The Americans ask other countries to fight the war [for them], but other countries are also afraid to fight a war. According to him, it is unlikely that a war will break out, and we agree with his opinions.

(3) With regard to the question of the treaty, Stalin said that because of the Yalta Agreement, it is improper for us to overturn the legitimacy of the old Sino-Soviet treaty. If we abolish the old treaty and sign a new one, the status of the Kurile Islands will be changed and the United States will have an excuse to take them away. Therefore, on the question of the Soviet Union's 30 year lease of Lushun [Port Arthur], we should not change it in format; however, in reality, the Soviet Union will withdraw its troops from Lushun and will let Chinese troops occupy it. I expressed that too early a withdrawal [of the Soviet troop from Lushun] will create unfavorable conditions for us. He replied that the Soviet withdrawal of troops [from Lushun] does not mean that the Soviet Union will stand by with folded arms [in a crisis]; rather, it is possible to find ways through which China will not become the first to bear the brunt. His opinion is that we may sign a statement, which will solve the Lushun problem in accordance with the above-mentioned ideas, and that by doing so, China will also gain political capital [zhengzhi ziben]. I said that it is necessary for us to maintain the legitimacy of the Yalta agreement. However, public opinion in China believes that since the old treaty was signed by the GMD [Guomindang; Kuomintang, KMT], it has lost its ground with the GMD's downfall. He replied that the old treaty needs to be revised and that the revision is necessarily substantial, but it will not come until two years from now.

(4) Stalin said that it is unnecessary for the Foreign Minister [Zhou Enlai; Chou En-Lai] to fly here just for signing a statement. I told him that I would like to consider whether the loan, aviation, and trade agreements will be signed at the same time, and if so, the Premier [Zhou Enlai] should come [to Moscow].

(5) In order to decide whether or not [Zhou] Enlai should come, [I] ask that you and Zhou Enlai talk over, and convene with the comrades in the Politburo for additional discussions, the possibility and necessity of entering into a simple trade agreement (which would include Xinjiang) that stipulates the quantity and type of goods to be exchanged each year. At the same time, [I] hope you will offer comments on the abovementioned treaty as soon as possible.

Mao Zedong  
18 December [1949]

[\[1\]](#) After leaving Beijing by train on 6 December 1949, Mao Zedong arrived in Moscow on 16 December and stayed in the Soviet Union until 17 February 1950. Liu Shaoqi was put in charge during Mao's absence. When Mao was in Moscow, he maintained daily telegraphic communications with his colleagues in Beijing, and all important affairs were reported to and decided by him.