

May 6, 1968
The KGB's 1967 Annual Report

Citation:

"The KGB's 1967 Annual Report", May 6, 1968, Wilson Center Digital Archive, TsKhSD f. 89, op. 5, d. 3, ll. 1-14. Translated for CWIHP by Vladislav Zubok.
<https://wilson-center-digital-archive.dvincitest.com/document/110403>

Summary:

Yearly report by KGB Chief Andropov to the CPSU leadership on the actions taken by the KGB in the field of espionage, counter-espionage, and counter-propaganda.

Original Language:

Russian

Contents:

Translation - English

[The State Seal] Top Secret. Extremely Sensitive Committee of State Security [KGB] of the Council of Ministers of the USSR TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF CC CPSU6 May 1968 Comrade L.I. BREZHNEV.no. 1025-A/ovMoscowOn the results of the work of the Committee of State Security of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and its local branches during 1967.[For information-P.B. Ulanov][Signatures: L. Brezhnev, A. Kosygin, D. Polianskii, A. Pel'she, K. Mazurov, Podgornyi, Suslov, Kuusinen]Guided by the decisions of the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] and by the instructions of the CC CPSU, the Committee of State Security and its local branches took measures during the year [covered in this] report to raise Chekist work to a level adequate for the needs flowing from the present international situation and the interests of communist construction in our country. [Ed. Note: The original KGB founded in 1917 was known as the Chrezvychainyi komitet or Extraordinary Committee, from which comes the acronym ChK. One who worked for the ChK was known as a "Chekist."]In accordance with the tasks set by the June (1967) CC CPSU plenum, the main attention of the KGB has been devoted first and foremost to strengthening foreign intelligence, so that it could actively contribute to the successful implementation of Soviet foreign policy and could reliably ensure the timely discovery, foiling and unmasking of subversive plans of imperialist countries and their intelligence services. One of the first-priority measures in this regard was the reinforcement of the intelligence services by experienced KGB professionals in the central apparat, as well as in the KGB stations abroad.In the period under review, special attention was given to the organization of active countermeasures against the enemy's ideological diversions. Following the decree of the CC CPSU on this issue, passed on 17 June 1967, a Fifth Directorate was created in the Committee of State Security and fifth bureaus, divisions and departments in territorial branches of the KGB.In the interests of increasing the level of agent work [agenturno-operativnoi raboty] in the local branches of the KGB, Chekist organs were created in regions and cities that in recent years have grown economically or acquired important military significance and have therefore now become objects of intelligence interest for the enemy. The local party organizations gave positive marks to the intensification of the Chekist work in those regions. At the present time, the Committee is examining a number of proposals from the CCs of Communist Parties of the Union Republics, area [krai] and regional [oblast'] party committees forwarded during 1967 to create KGB offices in other cities and districts where this is dictated by interests of state security. Implementing the instructions of the CC CPSU, the Committee of State Security carried out a set of measures aimed at increasing the struggle with the anti-Soviet activities of the Chinese splitters [raskolniki] and at ensuring the reliable protection of the borders of the USSR with the PRC. To this end, we set up a Trans-Baikal border district, organized new detachments, maritime units, checkpoints of the border troops and battalions of government communications troops. In the KGB branches of the [Union] republics, areas and regions bordering on the PRC, we organized intelligence subdivisions, and in the frontier areas we created several new city and regional offices of the KGB. The improvement of the operational and service activities of the KGB branches and troops has also been ensured through administrative measures aimed at further perfection of their structure and personnel. In particular, to achieve more efficient use of operative equipment we transformed the second department of the Operational-Technical Directorate into a separate department of the Committee. We carried out some required structural changes in the subdivisions of the KGB in charge of engineering, cryptography and the development of new special devices. We set up several special departments in the KGB in connection with the establishment of new and the deployment of existing large formations and large units [ob'edineniia i soedineniia] of the Soviet Army. We set up an Inspectorate under the Chairman of the KGB with the purpose of improving the system of control and inspection of activities of the Chekist offices and units of the KGB troops.In the period under review the branches of State Security had to fulfill their prescribed tasks in an aggravated operational situation. The governments and intelligence services of the USA and other imperialist states have intensified their aggressive policies and subversive activities with respect to the socialist countries. They made intense efforts to take advantage of this jubilee year in the life of the Soviet people [Ed. Note: 50th anniversary of the 1917 Revolution] to carry out ideological operations and to organize large-scale anti-Soviet propaganda.In view of the developing situation, the intelligence service of the KGB carried out a number of measures to help promotion of foreign policy and other initiatives of the Soviet Union, to unmask aggressive plans of imperialist states,

to compromise policies of the American government and the most dangerous enemies of the Soviet state as well as to foil subversive ideological operations targeted by the enemy at the 50th anniversary of Soviet power. The intelligence service of the KGB attributed primary significance to the timely acquisition of secret information on subversive plots of the enemy and took measures to develop agents' access, primarily in the USA and other countries of the main enemy, but also took measures to create intelligence potential for operations against the Chinese splitters. During 1967 [the KGB] recruited 218 foreigners, among whom 64 possess operational capacities for work against the USA. Reinforcement of agent networks of the intelligence service contributed to obtaining important information on political, military and scientific-technological problems. During 1967 the KGB stations abroad received and acted on a total of 25,645 informational materials. Beside that, the intelligence services of socialist countries sent 7,290 materials in the course of informational exchange. During 1967 the KGB carried out operations of clandestine pilfering of secret documents from intelligence services of the enemy. These and other measures resulted in obtaining the codes of seven capitalist countries and in implanting eavesdropping radio-devices at 36 installations of interest for Soviet intelligence. On the basis of the data obtained by the intelligence services, there were prepared and sent to the CC CPSU 4,260 informational reports, to the CC CPSU departments-4,728, to the Foreign Ministry of the USSR-4,832, to the Ministry of Defense and the GRU [Military Intelligence] of the General Staff of the Soviet Army-4,639. The Politburo CC CPSU members received 42 bulletins of foreign intelligence information. At the same time we sent to various ministries and agencies of the USSR 1,495 informational reports, as well as 9,910 materials and 1,403 samples of foreign technology. This year, at the request of the Military-Industrial Commission, we obtained 1,376 works on 210 subjects and over 330 most recent samples of foreign technology. In carrying out measures of counterintelligence, KGB stations prevented the compromise of 22 officers and agents of the KGB and GRU and 8 officers and agents of the intelligence services of socialist countries. They also uncovered 42 double agents planted by the enemy. The main attention in improvement of counterintelligence work inside the country was focused on its further perfection so as to ensure more efficient struggle with military, economic and political espionage. Fulfilling this task in practical terms, the counterintelligence branches directed their efforts at carrying out measures to gain agents' access to intelligence and other special services of imperialist states. During 1967 to this end the KGB arranged the planting of 31 agents in the enemy's intelligence; of them 12 were located by the enemy's special services and subjected to their intense scrutiny, which creates preconditions for the accomplishment of these "plants" in the future. Measures were also carried out to ensure agents' access to foreign centers that plan and implement ideological diversions, and also to anti-Soviet nationalist and religious organizations. Seven agents were planted into their leadership structures. In order to intercept and control channels of penetration by the enemy into our country, [the KGB] continued working on successful accomplishment of operational games. Currently, 9 such games are being conducted, including 4 games with the intelligence of the USA, 8 games with the center of the [Russian emigre organization] NTS and 2 games with the centers of Ukrainian nationalists abroad. As a result of these measures we succeeded in uncovering the encroachments of the enemy intelligence services in some regions of the Soviet Union, particular in the Far East, the Baltic, frontier areas of Ukraine, as well as at a number of enterprises and scientific research institutes. We also succeeded in obtaining data on some modes of communication between the enemy's intelligence and agent networks in spotting specific intelligence officers engaged in enemy activities against the USSR, and in passing to the enemy advantageous information and disinformation, [even] regarding operational activities. More successful fulfilment of the task of penetrating the enemy's special services has been facilitated also by measures of recruiting foreigners. During 1967, 42 agents were recruited, among them 8 diplomats. The counterintelligence service carried out special measures which resulted in photocopying 54 documents of ambassadors from member countries of NATO, annual reports of some embassies, reports of military attachés, and other classified materials on political, military-economic, operational and other matters. In addition, we worked out ciphers and codes in 11 embassies of capitalist countries, which will allow us to decode their correspondence. Among the

personnel of diplomatic missions as well as tourists, businessmen and members of various delegations arriving in the USSR (in 1967 their numbers came up to more than 250 thousand), we spotted over 270 foreigners suspected of links to the enemy's special services. On the charges of intelligence activities, participation in acts of ideological diversion, smuggling, illegal currency operations and violations of the norms of behavior, [the KGB] deported from the USSR 108 foreigners and brought 11 foreigners to justice. The organs of military counterintelligence of the KGB, jointly with the organs of security of the GDR, unmasked 17 agents of Western intelligence services who conducted espionage work against the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. In the course of counterintelligence countermeasures with regard to enemy intelligence officers under diplomatic cover and other foreigners under suspicion of being affiliated to the enemy's special services, a number of Soviet citizens who established contact with the aim of passing secret information were discovered and unmasked. Among those persons brought to justice were a senior economist of the scientific research institute of the MVT [Foreign Trade Ministry] of the USSR Salov, a senior engineer of the all-union association "Stankoimport" of the MVT of the USSR Seregin, and a technician from an installation of special significance of the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building [cover for the Atomic Energy Program] Malyshev. While organizing ever more effective struggle with military and economic espionage, the counterintelligence branches of the KGB took measures to reinforce the regime of secrecy, to bring to further perfection the protection of state secrets from the radio-technical and aerial-space means of reconnaissance of the enemy and to foil the enemy's attempts to use for reconnaissance purposes the expansion of the scientific-technical exchange between the USSR and capitalist countries. The organs of military counterintelligence of the KGB did significant work on camouflaging rocket launching pads, depots of nuclear weapons and other objects from the enemy's space reconnaissance. They worked hard on spotting and prevention of violations in concealed control and command of troops and operating means of communication, as well as on the counterintelligence support of military exercises and maneuvers, and transfers of military equipment. A place of high visibility in counterintelligence activity went to the measures taken along the lines of trips of Soviet citizens abroad, with the purposes of their protection from machinations of the enemy's intelligence services and for the solution of other operative tasks. As part of delegations, tourist groups and exhibition participants in 1967 the KGB sent 378 operatives to the capitalist countries, and also over 2,200 agents and 4,400 persons-in-confidence [doverennykh lits]. With their help we spotted 192 foreigners affiliated or suspected of being affiliated with special services of the enemy, thwarted 60 attempts to work on Soviet citizens [to persuade them] not to return to the Motherland; disclosed 230 persons who compromised themselves through incorrect behavior (18 of whom were recalled early to the USSR). The establishment of subdivisions of the so-called fifth line in the structure of the KGB branches allowed us to concentrate the needed efforts and means on the countermeasures to fight ideological diversions from outside and anti-Soviet manifestations inside the country. The measures taken in this regard succeeded in general in paralyzing the attempts of enemy special services and propaganda centers to carry out in the Soviet Union a series of ideological diversions, time-linked with the half-century anniversary of Great October. Along with unmasking a number of foreigners who arrived in the USSR with assignments of a subversive character, materials were published in the Soviet and foreign press disclosing subversive activities of the enemy's special services, and over 114 thousand letters and banderoles containing anti-Soviet and politically harmful printed materials were confiscated in the international mail. Since the enemy, in its calculations to unsettle socialism from inside, places its stake mainly on nationalistic propaganda, the KGB branches carried out a number of measures to disrupt attempts to conduct organized nationalist activities in a number of areas of the country (Ukraine, the Baltics, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, Armenia, Kabardino-Balkar, Chechen-Ingush, Tatar and Abkhaz Autonomous SSRs). The measures to spot and undercut the hostile activity of anti-Soviet elements, including church officials and sectarians, were carried out with consideration of the existing data on the growth of hostile and ideologically harmful activity by religious and Zionist centers. To uncover their plots and to foil their subversive actions under preparation, and serve other counterintelligence tasks, the KGB dispatched 122 agents abroad. We also managed to suppress and disrupt hostile

activities by the emissaries of foreign religious centers who were sent to the USSR, and to unmask and bring to justice for illegal activity a number of active sectarians. In 1967 the distribution of 11,856 leaflets and other anti-Soviet anonymous documents on the territory of the USSR was registered. In addition, in the Armenian SSR we confiscated and prevented distribution of another 6,255 leaflets. During the year the KGB established the identity of 1,198 anonymous authors. The majority among them did this because of their political immaturity, and also because of shortcomings in required educational work at the collectives where they work or study. At the same time some select hostile elements chose this way to struggle against Soviet power. Because the number of anonymous authors who distributed malicious anti-Soviet documents owing to hostile convictions increased, there was an increase of those convicted for this type of crime: in 1966 there were 41 of them, and in 1967-114. An integral part of the activities of KGB military counterintelligence in maintaining combat readiness of Soviet Armed Forces is the prevention of ideological diversions in smaller and larger units of the Army and Navy, to sever in a timely manner the penetration channels of bourgeois ideology. During 1967 we aborted 456 attempts at distribution among military personnel of manuscripts, foreign magazines and other publications with anti-Soviet and politically harmful content, as well as 80 attempts to set up among the troops various groups of a hostile character. In the system of measures undertaken to better resolve counterintelligence tasks there were important initiatives aimed at reinforcing agent networks. During 1967 the branches of the KGB recruited 24,952 agents, i.e. a figure constituting 15% of the total network personnel, the overall size of which did not change substantially during the year owing to the dropping of others. At the same time forms and methods of "shadowing" [naruzhnoe nabludenie] and operations equipment were improved. Special attention was paid to the development of state-of-the-art special devices and their supply to the units of intelligence and counterintelligence. Work in this direction is being conducted keeping in mind that the intensification of struggle with an enemy who is equipped with state-of-the-art science and technology requires a wider employment in Chekist work of modern technological devices and therefore a drastic improvement of technological level in the KGB branches which, in turn, leads to a considerable increase in material expenditures for this purpose. In assessment of the state of operational cases [operativnikh uchetov] of the KGB, one should note that they continued to decrease quantitatively, although only to a small degree. According to the statistics on January 1 of this year, counterintelligence offices of the KGB are working on 1,068 persons, searching for 2,293 persons, and shadowing 6,747 persons. In 1967 the KGB branches brought to justice 738 persons, 263 for particularly dangerous, and 475 persons for other state crimes. Among those who were convicted for criminal offenses, 3 carried out diversion operations, 121 are traitors and war criminals from the German-Fascist occupation, 34 were indicted for treason to the Motherland and for treasonous plotting, 96 persons-for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, 221 persons-for illegal crossing of state borders, 100 persons-for embezzlement of state and public property in large amounts and for corruption; 148-for illegal smuggling of goods and for violations of currency operations rules; and one foreigner and one Soviet citizen have been arrested for espionage. During this year the Committee of State Security took a number of effective measures to strengthen legality in the work of the state security organs. Investigation of criminal cases was conducted according to the norms of legal procedures. The cases prepared by the KGB organs in 1967 led to 13 court trials with wide public participation. KGB investigators, acting upon citizen appeals, reviewed 6,732 criminal cases involving 12,376 persons; in 3,783 cases the conclusion was reached to close them. Great importance was attached to measures of a prophylactic character aimed at prevention of state crimes. In 1967 the KGB branches subjected to prophylactic treatment 12,115 persons, most of whom revealed manifestations of an anti-Soviet and politically harmful character without hostile intent. Great importance was attached to further improvement of the protection of the state borders. As before, the borders with Turkey, Iran and Norway were guarded with high-density concentrations of forces and measures. The concentration of forces guarding the borders with the PRC has been almost tripled. To ensure border control along the seacoasts of the Arctic Ocean, a separate Arctic borderguards detachment and a separate air wing were formed. The borderguard troops in 1967 processed through the borders more

than 7.8 million persons, including over 3.5 million foreigners; they did paperwork on and searched 815,564 vehicles; detained 2,026 violators of state borders, among whom they discovered 2 enemy agents and 3 traitors to the Motherland. In 1967 the border-guard troops at frontier check-points and the investigative personnel of the KGB confiscated from smugglers and currency-traders about 30 kilograms of gold bullion and coins, artifacts in precious metals and stones, foreign and Soviet currency and other goods totaling 2,645,000 rubles. A special service of the KGB carried on interception of encoded communication from 2,002 active radio stations of 115 countries of the world. The units of radio counterintelligence of the service worked on 24 radio-centers of intelligence services of capitalist countries which maintained communications to 108 agent points. 3 new agents' radio-transmitters were detected in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. No agent radio-transmissions were found on the territory of the Soviet Union. The search squads established the addresses of 500 owners of unregistered radio-transmitters in the USSR. As a result of decoding and deciphering work we read communications in 152 cipher-systems of 72 capitalist countries; in 1967 we broke 11 cipher-systems, and decoded 188,400 telegrams overall. For the needs of ministries and agencies of the USSR, [the KGB] created 217 codes and other means of hand-ciphering, prepared 1,241,113 key- and recyclable cipher pads, 29,908 copies of codes and code tables, and 305,182 copies of other special documents. All current requests from ministries and agencies of the USSR have been entirely fulfilled. Industry supplied to the lines of communications 8,785 sets of cipher-making and scrambling equipment, which accounted for 100.6% of the planned amount. Tests of operational quality in 217 ciphering bodies and the departments of classified communications of ministries and agencies of the USSR were carried out, and also in 190 ciphering units in Soviet institutions abroad. Random radio-surveillance of 200 radio-networks of public communications and of 102 secret lines of communications of ministries and agencies of the USSR was carried out. Cooperation of the organs of the KGB with the security organs of socialist countries developed successfully. The mutual exchange of intelligence data increased considerably. In bilateral consultations, prospective plans for intelligence work were periodically shared, joint measures to study enemy intelligence officers for recruitment purposes and to work on and check on those who were suspected of espionage and other hostile activity, were carried out. The security organs of Poland and Hungary gave us assistance in maintaining security of Soviet troops abroad. There was interaction in counterintelligence protection for training exercises of the armies of the Warsaw Pact. Cooperation with the organs of security of Romania was limited to the minor exchange of information. The restored contacts with the MOB [Ministry of Security] of the KNDR [North Korea] have received some further development. In the last year [the KGB] guaranteed security for leaders of the Communist Party and Soviet government during their 134 trips on the territory of the USSR and abroad. Special measures of a protective nature were also carried out for more than 70 events of the party and the state and during the most important visits by foreign delegations. Measures were also carried out to raise the quality and reliability of the national system of [internal] government communication, to ensure its further development and automatization, and also to keep it equipped with secure equipment; a new communication network linking government objects was put into effect that increases the combat-ready qualities of the whole communication system. For the purposes of increasing mobilization readiness, a set of measures to create the conditions propitious for organization of intelligence and counterintelligence work was carried out, and also for timely deployment of organs and troops of the Committee in a special [wartime] period. As far as decisions related to financial and economic activities of the organs and forces of the KGB were concerned, special importance was attached to further reinforcement of the regime of savings of material and financial resources, as well as to strict observation of state and accounting discipline. Last year more systematic efforts were made to exercise control over the activities of local branches of the KGB and to provide them with assistance in implementing decisions and instructions of the party, state, and KGB. Improvements were made in the way collegiums of the committees of state security and councils advising the heads of KGB directorates worked in that field. Higher quality of operative-service activities has been achieved in the period under question due to measures to upgrade selection, appointment and education of the Chekist cadres. In 1967 the

organs and forces of the KGB enrolled 11,103 new employees, including 4,502 to positions requiring officer ranks. Simultaneously, the KGB laid off 6,582 persons, including 2,102 officers. The new recruits to the KGB included 470 employees who were recruited from positions in Party, Komsomol [communist youth movement] and soviet organizations. Six hundred one persons were selected and appointed to positions of nomenklatura leadership in the CC CPSU and KGB. All organizational and educational work with KGB cadres during the last year has been aimed at paying homage to the half-century anniversary of the Great October socialist revolution as well as all-sided improvement of the operative-service activities of the branches of the central apparatus, organs and forces of the Committee of State Security. To commemorate successes in fulfilling the tasks set by the Party and government, 10 military units received awards-memorial banners of the CC CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Seven military units and three educational institutions have been decorated. For exemplary results in work and achievements in building Soviet state security, 5,665 servicemen, workers and employees of the organs and forces of the KGB have been decorated with orders and medals of the USSR; 24 [KGB] officers and generals have been promoted to the ranks of major general, lieutenant-general, colonel general and general by Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The measures adopted in accordance with the resolutions of the CC CPSU June (1967) plenum increased the role of the party organizations of the central apparatus, organs and forces of the KGB in the area of more successful implementation of Chekist tasks, in their greater impact on the improvement of work with cadres, in reinforcement of military discipline, and in the growth of political vigilance over personnel. In their constant building and expanding of their ties with the Soviet people, the organs and forces of the KGB in all their practical activities rely on the assistance and care of the CC CPSU, the CC of the Communist Parties of Union republics, area and regional party committees. Receiving with enthusiasm the congratulation of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the 50th anniversary of the VChK-KGB and [gratified] by the high evaluation of the work of the Chekist organs, the personnel of the organs and forces of the KGB continues to toil selflessly in fulfillment of the decisions of the Twenty-Third Party Congress, considering as their main task a further improvement of work to ensure state security. One of the conditions for a successful resolution of this task is removal of important weaknesses in intelligence and counterintelligence work, as well as in other activities of the Committee of State Security and its local branches. First of all, one should mention that the intelligence service of the KGB has not yet established the necessary agent access to governmental, military, intelligence and ideological centers of the enemy. Therefore it is not possible to obtain information on the enemy's plans and designs, to inform in a timely manner the CC CPSU and Soviet government about the most important actions of imperialist states along the major lines of their foreign and domestic policies. For the same reason the intelligence service of the KGB exercises, as yet, only weak influence on the development of political events in crisis situations in the direction advantageous for the Soviet Union, and it is not always able to exploit weaknesses in the imperialist camp and contradictions among capitalist countries. The counterintelligence service of the KGB, possessing data on the presence of an enemy agent network [agentura] inside the USSR, failed to achieve during the period under review any substantial results in unmasking these agents, in revealing and plugging all possible channels for leaks of state secrets. One still has to work out a system of effective countermeasures to thwart the enemy, who is using illegal means to penetrate our country. The organization of the work of the counterintelligence service needs further improvement, including broader use of active measures to spot and foil subversive plans and designs of the enemy. The struggle with the enemy's ideological subversion is still not sufficiently capable and effective. Chekist work along these lines could not as yet be unfolded in full because of weak development of agent networks of the KGB organs in those layers of the population which might provide a good breeding ground for the acts of ideological subversion. This in part can explain the fact that the KGB organs failed to prevent in a timely manner individual anti-Soviet and anti-public manifestations, including mass disorders that took place in several cities. One should also note that, because of insufficient quality and the not always timely manner of

initial investigations and because of weaknesses in the operative-investigative work in local branches of the KGB, it failed to uncover over 50 crimes, on which the preliminary investigation had to be suspended and the culprits were not found. In the practical work of some of the KGB organs there were examples of superficial study of persons suspected of committing state crimes. This resulted in three arrests of people without sufficiently checked materials, who then were released in the course of investigation. The potential of counterintelligence for acting against the enemy's attempts to carry out acts of ideological subversion by encouraging politically and morally unstable persons to defect [while abroad], was weakly employed. This factor largely explains the fact that in 1967 seventeen persons stayed abroad; it also failed to prevent 3 cases of betrayal of the Motherland by servicemen of the Soviet Army. There are a number of shortcomings in the practice of selection, appointment and education of cadres. Of special importance is the problem of preparation of officer cadres for the organs and troops of the KGB. For years there was no well-organized practical system in this field. As a result officer personnel fell short of the required number by 7% (about 4,000), and perhaps will do so even more, when one considers increasing demand in cadres and expected retirement of officers in view of the new law of universal military conscription. Meanwhile, the existing sources of replenishment of officer cadres do not meet current demand and will not do so in the future. To this effect testifies the relative decrease, for various reasons, of the number of graduates of the educational institutions of the KGB in the new cohorts of officers (from 75% in 1966 to 51% in 1967). The task of persuading young officers to remain on service in the organs and forces of the KGB still remains problematic: recently, on the average, about 140 of them submitted resignations annually, and moreover half of this number are graduates of the educational institutions of the KGB. The Committee of State Security and its local branches suffer from visible lack of other cadres: a certain delay in wage increases for a number of categories of the personnel of state security, particularly technical personnel, not only creates certain difficulties in their recruitment, but also affects negatively the maintenance of security in certain aspects of operational work, and also the attitude of this part of the personnel to their fulfillment of service duties. In taking measures to remove the above-mentioned and other shortcomings, the Committee of State Security attaches particular importance to the practical solution of tasks related to reinforcement of the Chekist cadres, improvement of their selection, appointment and increasing qualification to meet the present-day requirements. The Committee deems necessary first of all to attract the most promising workers from the periphery to the central apparatus of the KGB and the apparatus of the republican committees of state security, as part of the process of retraining and promotion. It is advisable also to send to the peripheral organs some experienced officers of the central apparatus of the KGB and the republican committees of state security, as part of the process of promotion to command positions, and to make them aware of the local working conditions. In order to increase the quality of selection and training of national (natsional'nye) cadres, there are plans to expand the practice of promotion of Chekists from the major national [Union] republics to positions in the central apparatus of the KGB, having in mind their preparation for subsequent employment as leading cadres in the organs of the KGB in those republics. In resolving the tasks of qualitative improvement of cadres, particularly the directorates of intelligence, counterintelligence and investigation, the Committee of State Security acts on the assumption that these cadres should by their qualifications and Chekist acumen be able to ensure under modern conditions further upgrading of methods and means of struggle with the enemy on the basis of the newest achievements in the social science and scientific-technological spheres. This report has been discussed and approved at a meeting of the Collegium of the Committee of State Security of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE OF STATE SECURITY ANDROPOV