

**October 5, 1970**

**Note about the Talk with Henry Kissinger, held on  
Thursday, October 1st, 1970 on an Airplane en route  
from Zagreb**

**Citation:**

"Note about the Talk with Henry Kissinger, held on Thursday, October 1st, 1970 on an Airplane en route from Zagreb", October 5, 1970, Wilson Center Digital Archive, Josip Broz Tito Archives, KPR I-3-a USA. Visit of Richard Nixon 9.30-10.2.1970. Translated for CWIHP by Lana Obradovic

<https://wilson-center-digital-archive.dvincitest.com/document/110827>

**Summary:**

Report on the conversation between Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, United States, and Mirko Tepavac, Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, SFRY. Topics of the conversation, held on an airplane en route from Zagreb, include U.S. development policies in Africa, the war in Vietnam, the crisis in the Middle East, and the Yugoslav position in Soviet-U.S. relations.

**Original Language:**

Serbo-Croatian

**Contents:**

Original Scan

Translation - English

KABINET DRŽAVNOG SEKRETARA  
ZA INOSTRANE POSLOVE  
Beograd, 5.X.1970.

Z A B E L E Š K A

o razgovoru sa Henri KISINGER-om, vodjenim u četvrtak,  
1. oktobra 1970., u avionu na povratku iz Zagreba

1. Kisinger je zamolio da objasnim predsedniku Titu da njegova obaveštenja da Amerika ne daje pomoć afričkim zemljama nisu tačna. Oni daju velika sredstva čitavom nizu afričkih zemalja i ne vezuju ih za političke uslove.

Rekao sam da predsednik Tito nije mislio pre svega na pomoć pojedinim zemljama, nego na potrebu punog učešća Amerike /1%/ u programu II dekade razvoja gde Amerika nije još dala pozitivan odgovor iako su to učinile već mnoge zapadnoevropske zemlje.

2. Vratio se na temu Vijetnama. Rekao da treba shvatiti da njima nije lako, da ne mogu prosto "odstupiti", da su to nasledili od prethodne Administracije i da ne može biti rešenja ako Privremena vlada J.V. nastavi da postavlja neprihvatljive zahteve. Pitaju da li mi možemo uticati da Privremena vlada bude realnija, jer rat ne može dobiti. Amerika ne može pristati na poraz.

Konstatovao sam da se iz prepodnevnih razgovora jasno videlo da iz osnova drugačije gledano na tu stvar. Dodao sam da mi nismo jedini koji ne odobravamo njihovu indokinesku politiku. Nešto mora da im znači činjenica da danas imaju veće ratište a manje podrške u svetu nego što je bio slučaj pre dve godine od kada su oni došli na vlast. Moraju priznati da

- 2 -

je Privremena vlada učinila već jedan korak ka omogućavanju nastavka razgovora sa nedavnih 8 tačaka. Znam da misle da je taj korak mali, ali zašto oni ne načine jedan veći. Mi imamo kontakte sa Privremenom vladom. Međutim, ništa ne možemo činiti ako oni /Amerikanci/ ne uzvrate pozitivnim kontrapredlogom. Kada bi se to dogodilo uveren sam da bi pregovori u Parizu imali makar nekakvu perspektivu. Iz konteksta koje imamo sa nizom zemalja vidimo da svi misle da je nemoguća šira svetska uloga Amerike uz postojanje takvih hipoteka kao što su Indokina, Bliski istok i slične.

3. Razgovor se prenosi na Bliski istok. Ne zna da li smo videli da oni /Amerikanci/ zaista žele tamo mir. Oni žele da se Izraelci povuku ali je neosnovana iluzija Arapa, a možda i naša, da oni mogu prosto narediti Izraelu da se povuče. Video je da situacija na Bliskom istoku i nas brine i očekuju da ćemo umirivati arapski ekstremizam, jer situacija može postati krajnje opasna ako obe strane ostanu nepopustljive. Tu ne dobijaju Arapi nego samo Rusi koji žele da zadrže stanje "stalnog malog rata."

Rekao sam mu da možda neko i precenjuje njihov uticaj na Izrael ili da ga ni mi ne podcenjujemo. Ko drugi može naterati Izrael na povlačenje ako ne oni! Svaka se politika meri po njenim stvarnim efektima. Dosadašnji efekat je da oni tamo sve više gube a Sovjeti sve više dobijaju. Rusima nije ni potrebno da se nameću Arapima jer bi bili sasvim bespomoćni bez sovjetske podrške i pomoći.

- 3 -

Nas ta situacija veoma brine i zbog našeg položaja. Vojnopolitički prostor Bliskog istoka se proširuje već danas na ceo Mediteran i deo Evrope u kojem se i mi nalazimo. Još danas je moguć izlaz ako se postigne povlačenje Izraela, dakle striktno sprovođenje rezolucije Saveta bezbednosti. Sutra već ona može biti neprihvatljiva i za one arapske zemlje koje danas još prihvataju rezoluciju SB. Arapi će biti u međuvremenu sve jači a sovjetsko prisustvo sve veće. Iako podržavamo sovjetsku politiku pomoći Arapima, mi takodje ne želimo da zaoštavanje situacije poveća značaj jugosloveskog geografskog prostora /jedino vanblokorskog u tom delu/ za bliskoistočnu strategiju velikih sila.

-----

4. Razgovor se preneo na položaj Jugoslavije. Kisinger se raspitivao da li nas Rusi ugrožavaju. Da li predviđamo da bi mogli da zažele izlaz na Mediteran preko Jugoslavije? Šta bismo u tom slučaju radili?

Rekao sam da se mi ne osećamo ugroženi, ali da logika mogućeg proširenja sukoba može dovesti do zahteva za naše veće razumevanje prema sovjetskim potrebama u Mediteranu gde Sovjetski Savez sada nema odgovarajućih uporišta i komunikacija. Ta potreba bi prestala ili bi se bitno smanjila ako bi se kriza na Bliskom istoku okončala. A za to oni /Amerikanci/ imaju daleko najveće mogućnosti. Inače, što se nas tiče, mi nikvoj i ničijoj strategiji nismo spremni da žrtvujemo našu nezavisnost i teritorijalni integritet.

- 4 -

5. U vezi sa položajem Jugoslavije i američkim odnosima i dijalozima sa Sovjetskim Savezom, zapitao sam Kisigera kako treba tumačiti Rodžersovu izjavu od pre nekoliko meseci da "SAD veruju da će Sovjetski Savez biti obazriviji u primeni Brežnjevljeve doktrine na Jugoslaviju." Konstatovao sam da ta izjava sugerira mnogo manji stepen zainteresovanosti za jugoslovensku bezbednost nego što su je ranije pokazivali. Mi ne očekujemo da nas oni brane niti se osećamo nesigurnim. Pitanje sam, dodajem, postavio ne zbog nesigurnosti jugoslovenskog položaja nego zbog nejasnoća u američkom gledanju na tu stvar. Daju li možda interno takve izjave i Rusima?

Kisinger izjavljuje da je poznato da oni ne bi ravnodušno posmatrali bilo kakav sovjetski vojni potez prema Jugoslaviji.

Pitam ga šta to znači "ne bi ravnodušno posmatrali". Da li to znači da bi se "ljutili" ili da bi se suprotstavili?

Kisinger precizira da bi nam oni pružili "svaku moguću pomoć" ako bismo se i mi sami borili.

Odgovaram mu da bismo se mi bezuslovno borili protiv svakog ko nas ugrozi, bez obzira da li bi nas neko drugi pri tome pomagao, da se uzdamo pre svega u svoje odbrambene sposobnosti. Međutim, ne radi se o tome da se mi borimo nego da ne budemo ni ugrožavani. Jaka i stabilna Jugoslavija je najponздanija garantija da se niko ne upusti u bilo kakve kombinacije protiv nje. U tom pogledu nismo uvek nailazili na dovoljno razumevanja onih koji inače ističu zainteresovanost za našu nezavisnost i vanblokovski položaj. I Sovjetski Savez

- 5 -

takodje nam tvrdi da je zainteresovan za našu bezbednost. Jednostavno ne želimo da budemo predmet ni nadmetanja ni popustljivosti u odnosima izmedju velikih sila i njihovih paktova.

Kisinger ističe da bi, bez obzira kako je formulisana Rodžersova izjava, Rusi morali znati da bez teških posledica ne bi smeli nešto preduzeti protiv Jugoslavije.

Završavam time da bi to morali znati svi. Ni od koga ne tražimo da nas brani, ali ne želimo ni da nejasnoće takve vrste pobude bilo sa koje strane nerealne nade da se po cenu našeg integriteta mogu pomerati odnosi snaga izmedju velikih sila u Evropi i na Mediteranu.

Kisinger ističe tvrdnju da je nezavisna Jugoslavija njihov /američki/ interes, da ne žele da nas menjaju i kad bi mogli. Oni nas ne ugrožavaju ali će - dodaje - verovatno morati jasnije dati na znanje da ni drugi ne smeju to da čine. Nixonova poseta, zaključuje, ima takodje za cilj da i to učini jasnijim. Ne bi im bilo nimalo svejedno ako bi se Jugoslavija, na račun žrtvovanja svoje nezavisnosti, približavala Sovjetskom Savezu iako, inače, u tu mogućnost ne veruju.

-----  
M. Tjavarac

Cabinet of State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Belgrade, 10.5.1970

NOTE: About the talk with Henry Kissinger, held on Thursday, October 1st, 1970 on an airplane en route from Zagreb.

1. Kissinger politely asked me to explain to President Tito that his information about America not giving help to African countries is not correct. They are giving large means to a lot of African countries and they are not connecting them to any political conditions. I told him that President Tito was not referring to the help given to individual countries, but to the need for the full participation of America in (1%) the program of the Second Decade of Development because America has not given positive answer as of yet, even though many Western European countries have done so.

2. I returned to the question of Vietnam. I said that it is necessary to understand that it is not easy for them, and that they cannot simply "walk away", that they inherited it from the previous administration and that there can be no solution if the provisional government of South Vietnam continues with unacceptable demands. They asked if we could influence the provisional government to make it more realistic, because the war cannot be won. America is not going to accept defeat. I said that it was clear from the morning talks that from the beginning things were viewed differently. I added that we are not the only ones who disapprove of their politics in Indochina. The fact that today they have a bigger battlefield and less support in the world than they had two years ago, when they came to power, must mean something to them. They have to recognize that the provisional government already took a step toward continuing talks with the eight points. I know they think that step was small, but why are they not making a bigger one? We have contacts with the provisional government. However, we cannot do anything if they (Americans) are not countering this with a positive suggestion. If that happened, then I am convinced that the negotiations in Paris have some future. From our contacts with various countries, we see that they all think that America cannot have a wider world role as long as situations such as Indochina, Middle East and others exist.

3. Next, the talks went on about the Middle East. He does not know if we have seen that they (Americans) really want peace there. They would like for the Israelis to withdraw, but it is a baseless illusion of the Arabs, and perhaps us, to think that they can just order Israel to withdraw. He realized that the situation in the Middle East worries us and they expect that we will calm Arab extremism, because the situation can ultimately become very dangerous if both sides remain adamant. That is the situation in which the Arabs are not gaining anything, but rather the Russians are the ones who are because they would like to keep the state of a "constant little war". I told him that perhaps some overestimate their influence on Israel, but we are not underestimating it. Who else can make Israel withdraw if not them! All the politics are measured by the real effects of it. The effect so far is that they are losing ever more, and that the Russians are gaining ever more. It is not necessary for the Russians to force themselves on the Arabs, because the Arabs are completely helpless without Soviet support and help. The situation there also worries us because of our position. The military-political space of the Middle East is expanding today to encompass the whole Mediterranean and the part of Europe where we are located. It is still possible to exit such a situation today if we can achieve Israeli withdrawal, therefore strictly implement the Security Council resolution. Tomorrow the resolution might already be unacceptable even for some of the Arab states that are accepting this SC resolution today. In the meantime, the Arabs are getting stronger, and the Soviet presence larger. Even though we support the Soviet policy of helping the Arabs, we also do not wish for the deterioration of the situation to increase the importance of the Yugoslav geographical space (the only space outside of the two blocks in that region) for the strategies of the two great powers in the Middle East.

-----

4. The discussion continued on the position of Yugoslavia. Kissinger was asking if we are threatened by the Russians. Do we think they will want to get access to the Mediterranean via Yugoslavia? What would we do in that case? I told him that we do not feel threatened, but that the logic of the possible expansion of the conflict can lead them to demand a bigger understanding on our part toward Soviet needs in the Mediterranean, where the Soviet Union does not have adequate bases and communications. These needs no longer exist or would be significantly reduced if the crisis in the Middle East ended. They (Americans) are the most capable of helping us achieve that. In any case, as far as we are concerned, we are not ready to sacrifice our independence and territorial integrity for any or anybody's strategy.

5. In terms of the Yugoslav position and American relations and dialogues with the Soviet Union, I asked Kissinger how should the statement that Rogers made a few months ago about

how "the USA believes that the Soviet Union will be more careful about its implementation of the Brezhnev doctrine to Yugoslavia" be interpreted. I said that such a statement suggests a smaller degree of interest for Yugoslav security than those expressed earlier. We are not expecting them to be protecting us nor do we feel insecure. I asked the question not because of the insecurity of the Yugoslav position, but because of the ambiguity of the American views on that. Are they, perhaps, giving such statements to the Russians in private? Kissinger said that it is known that they would not view indifferently any type of a Soviet military move toward Yugoslavia. I asked him what he meant by "would not view indifferently"? Does that mean that they would be "angered" or that they would confront them? Kissinger was trying to be more precise and said that they would give "all necessary help" so that we could fight on our own. I told him that we would fight unconditionally against anyone who tries to hurt us regardless of who will be helping us do that and that, most importantly, we trust our own defensive capabilities. However, it is not even about us fighting, but about us not being threatened to begin with. A strong and stable Yugoslavia is the best guarantee that nobody will even try to do anything against it. But it seems that this has not always been understood well by those who try to underscore their interest in our independence and outside-of-the-blocks position. The Soviet Union also tells us that they are interested in our security. We simply desire not to be the subject of any rivalry or any relaxation in the relations of the two great powers and their pacts. Kissinger said that, regardless of how Rogers's statements were formulated, the Russians ought to know that they could not do anything against Yugoslavia without difficult consequences. I ended by saying that everybody needs to know that. We are not asking anybody to protect us, but we do not want the ambiguities of such a thing to raise unrealistic hopes on either side, that the relations of the great powers in Europe and in the Mediterranean can be changed at the expense of our integrity. Kissinger underscored the claim that the independent Yugoslavia is in their (America's) interest, and that they do not want to change us even if they could. They are not being a threat to us, but - he added - they will have to make it clear that others cannot do that either. He concluded by saying that it is also a goal of Nixon's visit to make that clearer. We would not be indifferent if Yugoslavia was to become closer to the Soviet Union at the expense of sacrificing its independence, even though we do not believe in that possibility. M. Tepavac