1988
Disarmament: The View from Moscow. Chemical Weapons

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Contents:

DISARMAMENT:

the view from Moscow

Gennadi Stashevsky

Chemical Weapons

DISARMAMENT

1988 - a year of chemical disarmament ?

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CONTENTS

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November 1984. The world learns the awful news of the accident that occurred in Bhopal, India at the plant owned by the US corporation Union Carbide. Over two thousand people are killed and tens of thousands suffer acute poisoning, when a highly toxic chemical is accidentally leaked into the atmosphere. The consequences of this poisoning will have adverse effects for generations to come.

The Bhopal tragedy serves as harsh and tangible evidence of the extremely harmful potential of modern-day chemistry running out of man's control. That accident, however, occurred at a plant producing highly toxic substances for non-military purposes. What then would be the consequences if chemicals were to be deliberately used for the extermination of people?

A Dreadful Reality of Our Day

The destructive and damaging effects of chemical weapons bring them, along with nuclear and biological weapons, under the category of means of mass destruction. But as opposed to nuclear weapons, they are primarily designed to disable and kill people while leaving property intact. They rank among the most barbarous and inhuman instruments of war.

Chemical weapons have been around for some time now, though they were first used on a large scale during the First World War. On April 22, 1915 Kaiser Germany's troops released a cloud of chlorine gas against the French forces holding the front sector running along the Ypres River. Fifteen thousand French soldiers were affected by that gas attack, five thousand of whom later suffered an agonizing death. All told, 1.3 million people were affected as a result of the employment of chemical warfare agents in the war. More than 100,000 died.

The chemical warfare agents used at the time were far less toxic than those now stored in the arsenals of modern armies. And they were employed in a relatively primitive way compared to the means of delivery now available (warplanes, missiles, long-range artillery, multiple rocket launchers). For example, as early as the 1960s the US toxic agent *VX* was 10,000 times more effective for killing people than *mustard gas*, the agent used most commonly in the First World War. And the toxicity of *Botulin*, which is now part of the US Army's arsenal, exceeds VX in effectiveness a further 1,000 times.

The modern arsenals of chemical weapons are very inclusive and diverse. In the effects they exert upon the human

organism they are divided into *nerve gases, blister gases, choking gases, blood gases, tear gases and psychochemical gases*. Especially pernicious and dangerous are the nerve gases, which penetrate the body through the skin and the respiratory system. They exert a toxic effect on the nervous system, impair the organism's vital functions and paralyze the entire muscular system. Normally, the cause of death is the paralysis of the respiratory system. Nerve gases kill almost instantly.

Modern chemical weapons pose a terrible threat for mankind. In his report on chemical and bacteriological weapons and the effects of their possible use issued way back in 1969, the UN Secretary-General of the day said that "the particular threat posed by chemical weapons today derives from the existence of new, and far more toxic, chemical compounds

EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS*
(15 tons of nerve gas)

Affected area	**up to 60 sq km**
Time before effect	**a few seconds**
Duration of effect	**contamination lasting from several days to several months due to the agent's long-term effect**
Possibility of normal use of the affected area after attack	**limited during the period of contamination**
Maximum effect on humans	**death for 50 per cent of the exposed population**

* May be delivered by one strategic bomber to attack unprotected administrative objectives.

that were known fifty years ago. ...The fear today is that the scientific and technological advances ... have increased the potential of chemical and bacteriological ... weapons to such an extent that one can conceive of their use causing casualties on a scale greater than one would associate with conventional warfare."

Chemical weapons are especially harmful to civilians who have no means of protection against them and no way of being warned about a gas danger. According to experts' estimates, chemical warfare would cause 20 to 30 times as many civilian deaths as military deaths. Therefore, chemical weapons present a special danger to the densely-populated regions of Europe and other continents. UN experts have calculated that in the event of nerve gases being used in a surprise attack on a city with a population of 80,000, forty thousand would be affected, half of them fatally.

The United States has the most diverse arsenal of chemical weapons. It is estimated by Western experts at 150,000-300,000 tons of chemical ammunition, including over 3 million artillery and mortar shells, aerial bombs, missile warheads, and land mines. The USA has more than ten chemical-weapon depots on its mainland. It also has depots on Johnstone Island in the Pacific and on the territory of the Federal Republic of

DEVELOPMENT AND USES OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS THROUGH THE YEARS

April 22, 1915	**The first large-scale use of chemical weapons (in a battle at Ypres, Belgium, German troops launch a gas attack by discharging chlorine from gas containers)**
September 25, 1915	**British troops launch their first gas attack by discharging chlorine from gas containers**
February 21, 1916	**French troops launch their first mass gas attack using phosgene at Verdun**
1935-1936	**Italian troops use Yperite and phosgene in Abyssinia**

Germany. Highly toxic nerve gases constitute the bulk of the US chemical-weapon arsenal. One of them is *Sarin*, the production of which the USA launched right after the Second World War on the basis of specifications captured in Germany. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the USA adopted and started serial production of a highly toxic chemical warfare agent known as *VX*, an organic ester of phosphorus. One kilogram of VX can kill almost 4 million people. In addition, US scientists have synthesized and adopted a psychochemical gas of the *BZ* type. According to estimates made by experts, the stocks of chemical weapons accumulated by the USA towards the close of the 1960s were already sufficient to exterminate mankind several times over.

France also has a significant chemical offensive capability. According to Western experts, the stockpiles of French chemical weapons comprise about 450 tons of highly toxic chemical warfare agents contained in more than 7,500 tons of ammunition for artillery systems.

Although **Great Britain** has never admitted having its own chemical weapons, it plays an important role in aiding US and NATO efforts in the planning of chemical war. Its contribution to the development of novel chemical warfare agents is well known. The British, for instance, were the first

1937	**Japanese troops use Yperite and lewisite in China**
1940	**The construction of a factory to manufacture Tabun is started in Dyhernfurth near Breslau in Germany**
1942	**The production of Tabun begins in Dyhernfurth**
1943	**A semi-commercial plant to synthesize Sarin is constructed in Falkenhagen, Germany**
1951	**Great Britain uses phytotoxic chemicals as warfare agents in Malaya**
1956-1958	**Dr. Lars Tammelin experiments with highly toxic derivatives of phosphoryl-choline and posphorylthiocholine, eventually producing V-gases and VX-gases**

to develop the above-mentioned highly toxic VX agent. They optimized its technology and turned it over to the USA for full-scale production.

The USA's large-scale production of highly toxic chemical warfare agents in the 1950s and 1960s, together with the large chemical-weapon arsenal stored in the zone of their possible employment—Europe—and the refusal of the USA, right up to 1975, to accede to the *Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare* compelled the USSR to build its own defensive chemical capability and to maintain it at a proper level.

In December 1987 **the Soviet Union** declared that its stock of chemical warfare agents did not exceed 50,000 tons. Before that, in April 1987, it had said it had stopped producing chemical arms and had begun eliminating their stockpiles. The Soviet Union is prepared to provide more details about



Chemical munitions used in Vietnam by US forces (1961-1971).

its chemical capability, as well as information about its storage and production locations, as will be discussed at the Disarmament Conference, as soon as the convention to ban and eliminate chemical arms which is being developed by the Conference goes into effect. Similar procedures have been adopted by other states possessing chemical arsenals. Neither the USA nor France publish official statistics on this question.

True, in July 1986 the USA circulated at the Disarmament Conference a document setting forth its plan for the destruction of its fixed chemical ammunition as a result of its changeover to the production of *binary chemical ammunition**—a new generation of "silent death" weapons. But it contained only general information about the chemical-

* In these weapons two precursors of a nerve gas are loaded into separate plastic canisters within a munition. The mixing of the contents of the two canisters occurs only after firing en route to the target.

A napalm bomb dropped on a South Vietnamese village in August 1966.



Lance tactical missile.



F-15 fighter.

Multiple launch rocket system (MLRS).

weapon depots on US territory and about the proportion of particular types of chemical warfare agents kept in those depots. On the other hand, the document contains no data on what represents the main characteristic of the US chemical capability—the total volume of chemical-weapon stocks and their make-up according to particular categories of chemical warfare agents and types of chemical ammunition.

When Washington launched on December 16, 1987 the production of a new variety of chemical weapons—binary munitions containing nerve gases, it tried to justify its move by claiming a need to "modernize" its stockpile so as to maintain its reliability as a deterrent.

In fiscal year 1988 the Pentagon intends to spend 124 million dollars on binary weapons, and 87 million dollars on the destruction of the obsolete chemical weapons. The Pentagon's appropriations for chemical-warfare means for the 1983-1988 five-year period will total 4,600 million dollars.

France is following suit. In 1987 Paris adopted legislation on military programmes envisaging the appropriation of 700 million francs for an accelerated production of war gases and, first of all, for the development of binary weapons.

1960	**The United States starts developing binary weapons for its Navy and Army**
1961	**A plant in the US town of Newport, Indiana starts producing VX**
1961	**The United States starts using phytotoxic agents (herbicides) and tear gas in the Vietnam war**
1962	**A plant in the US town of Pine Bluff, Arkansas starts producing BZ**
1965	**The United States starts work on the development of the Bigeye bomb, a binary munition containing nerve gas**
1966	**BZ is used for the first time in Vietnam**
1968	**The United States patents and starts manufacturing binary cluster bombs**

Obviously, the development of binaries can serve as an impetus for another round of the chemical weapons build-up. The adoption by the USA and France of chemical rearmament programmes puts up additional obstacles in the way of reaching international accords on the elimination of chemical weapons. Such a course also undermines trust among states, and trust is so essential to the solution of this major international problem.

The very existence of large arsenals of chemical weapons breeds mistrust and suspicion in interstate relations, especially between the USSR and the USA, and the countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. A whole range of states have been seeking to acquire chemical weapons for fear that their potential adversaries might get hold of them.

Chemical weapons also pose another danger. Because of certain military and technological specifics their manufacture could be started by many countries that have attained the requisite level in the development of their chemical industries, relevant technologies and engineering personnel. According to experts' estimates, some 16 states today have all the prerequisites for the production of chemical weapons.

1969	**Field tests of XM 687 binary howitzer shells are conducted in the US town of Dugway**
1969	**The United States extends its use of chemical warfare agents in Southeast Asia to Cambodia**
1973-1974	**The United States starts work on the development of the XM 736 binary shell for the 8-in howitzer**
February 8, 1982	**President Reagan endorses a binary-weapon production and chemical rearmament programme for the US Army**
March 8, 1982	**The South African Air Force uses a plant killer known as Agent Orange against SWAPO troops in Namibia**
September 5, 1983	**NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Bernard W. Rogers,**

Therefore, any delay in concluding a convention on their elimination seriously heightens the danger of the proliferation of this means of mass destruction throughout the world with all the negative implications that would have.

The specific features of chemical weapons (compactness, the possibility of producing them at relatively small enterprises and of storing them secretly, etc.) make them an ideal weapon for all sorts of terrorist groups and dictatorial regimes having a complete disregard for the rules of international law, morality and ethics.

All this goes to show that the chemical threat is not a problem for the remote future but a dreadful reality of our day.

	speaks in favour of producing new types of chemical weapons
November 8, 1983	**The US Senate votes in favour of chemical-weapon production**
1987	**The Pentagon requests for fiscal year 1988: 943 million dollars for anti-gas protection, 124 million dollars for binary weapons, and 87 million dollars for the destruction of obsolete chemical weapons**
1987	**France passes a law on military programmes, with approval for a 700-million-franc five-year programme intended to speed up the production of chemical weapons, including binary weapons**
December 16, 1987	**The United States starts the production of binary chemical weapons**

Binary Threat

The mounting chemical threat is nowadays most of all linked with the initiation by the USA of a large-scale chemical rearmament programme. The decision to begin implementing that programme was announced by President Ronald Reagan in February 1982. Its total cost, according to US estimates, is in the neighbourhood of 10,000 to 20,000 million dollars.

Once the binary weapons programme is implemented the stocks of live chemical ammunition will have been increased from 3 to 5 million units (with the elimination of no longer usable and obsolete units). A new plant for the production of chemical ammunition with an annual output capacity of 700,000 munitions has been built in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. The initial stage of the programme for the full-scale commercial production of binary weapons in the USA provides for the production of 155-mm artillery shells and "Bigeye" aerial bombs, the development of new methods for employing binary weapons, the construction of major chemical-ammunition depots outside the USA (mainly in Western Europe), and the development of new systems for chemical warfare. Later, the USA intends to manufacture binary ammunition for all the principal artillery systems and for tactical missiles and cruise missiles, along with new aerial spray-tanks and cluster bombs.

The implementation of the Reagan administration's binary chemical programme, however, met with stiff resistance in Congress, which for a long time refused to approve funding for its realization. It was only in December 1985 that the administration was able to secure congressional approval for appropriations for the production of binary weapons. The

Binary Munitions



actual spending of these appropriations, however, was made conditional on the consent of the US NATO allies to a "modernization" of US chemical weapons and the adoption by the NATO military leadership of a plan for their deployment in European countries.

Despite the objections raised by the "junior" NATO partners (Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Greece), the USA secured the formal consent of its allies to its binary programme in the summer of 1986, including to the possibility of the deployment of US binary weapons in the West European NATO countries "in an emergency". An agreement was reached between the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany (the only country in which US chemical weapons have been deployed) that the USA would withdraw the weapons currently stationed there and introduce binary weapons instead only with the consent of the West German government. Thus the realization of one of the most dangerous of Washington's militarist programmes to European peace and security was brought one step closer. In the

A depot for storing binary nerve gas components in the Federal Republic of Germany.



Nerve gas plant in Pine Bluff, Arkansas.

Newport (Ind.)

Edgewood (Md.)

Lexington (Ky.)

Anniston (Ala.)

F.R.G.

Hanau

Mannheim

Massweiler

Viernheim

present-day international situation this represents a further heightening of the danger of war.

The Reagan administration has been invoking a variety of "reasons" and "arguments" to rationalize and substantiate its binary programme. It has been claimed that the USA "needs the means of chemical deterrence" in order to counter a continuing "Soviet chemical threat" that has allegedly been growing for some time.

This argument is disproved by reality. It stands to reason that the US administration is well aware that there is no danger of a Soviet chemical attack upon either the USA or any of its European allies. The USSR was among the first major states to accede to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which it did back in 1928. It strictly and meticulously abides by its commitments under this international agreement, just as it does by its other international commitments and pledges.

As was mentioned earlier, the USSR was forced to develop and maintain its own limited defensive chemical capability in the face of the US build-up of the deadliest chemical warfare agents, the deployment of US chemical weapons in Europe in close proximity to Soviet territory and the continuing development and preparation for the full-scale production in the US of binary weapons.

According to leading Soviet military experts, the claim, current in some Western countries, that the Soviet stock of chemical weapons will be several times that of the United States does not hold water. In reality there is an approximate parity in chemical arms between the two countries.

In determining the magnitude of its own arsenal of chemical weapons the USSR has been guided by the concept of a sufficiency suitable for the purposes of defence. The defensive character of the Soviet chemical capability is attested to by the fact that the USSR does not maintain chemical weapons anywhere outside of its territory. Therefore, the use of chemical weapons by the Soviet Union is only possible in reply to a chemical attack. This was stipulated, incidentally, in a statement made by the Soviet representative on the occasion of the ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The Soviet Union firmly stands for an early conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. And it has been due to a series of major steps

undertaken by the Soviet side, especially over the last two years, that the negotiations on the preparation of a corresponding international convention at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva have entered a final stage.

As for "chemical deterrence", this US doctrine has just one purpose: to preserve and build up an offensive chemical capability and to make possible a first-strike chemical-weapon attack.

According to the US and NATO concepts, chemical weapons, including binary munitions, are part and parcel of the Western bloc's offensive capability. Specifically, this is stated in the US field manual FM 100-5 which provides for the delivery of an attack by a whole complex of nuclear-, chemical- and conventional-warfare means all along the depth of the defences of the Warsaw Treaty member states. It should be noted that chemical weapons are assigned an essential role. The Pentagon's manuals and regulations require the employment of chemical weapons at a very early stage of a conflict.

The Reagan administration alleges that the USA has fallen behind the Soviet Union in chemical weapons, that the US chemical-weapons arsenal has been growing obsolescent and losing its effectiveness inasmuch as the USA has since 1969 essentially maintained a unilateral moratorium on the production of chemical weapons and has not field-tested the available ammunition, etc.

But these allegations also do not square with the facts. As was shown earlier, the USA possessed in the past and still possesses the most diverse, most modern and deadliest arsenal of chemical mass-extermination weapons. As for the US "chemical moratorium", the USA did not cease its research and development work towards the production of new toxic agents or their testing after 1969. By the time of the cessation of the production of chemical weapons in 1969 the USA had created such vast chemical-weapon stockpiles that there was no sense in their further production. Along with the "crisis of overproduction" of chemical-warfare means, emphasis in US military planning and in the US military strategy was being laid upon a massive build-up of nuclear weapons. In the struggle that developed in the US ruling circles over the question of military priorities the upper hand was gained by

The US Armed Forces have been intensively training their personnel in chemical warfare.

the forces which deemed it possible to temporarily stave off the production of fixed chemical ammunition with the prospect of passing over to the production of new binary weapons either in the early 1970s or no later than the middle of the 1970s. It is beside the point that, what with technological complexities, the development of a new generation of chemical ammunition was delayed somewhat.

Aside from purely military considerations, the decision by the administration then in power to stop the production of chemical weapons had another aspect. Washington had to reckon in its policy with the mass movement of protest against chemical weapons which was growing in the USA in connection with the large-scale use of chemical warfare agents by the US Army in Vietnam and a series of grave accidents in the USA linked with the storage, transportation and testing of

The gear of the infantryman of the 21st century enabling him to fight in conditions of chemical warfare.

chemical weapons. In that atmosphere the US Congress adopted in 1968 a law prohibiting open-air tests of chemical ammunition and limiting their transportation, deployment and burial. But even in those conditions the USA retained and maintained an immense capability for priming chemical ammunition in a state of constant readiness for a start-up of production.

Simultaneously, the USA launched preparations for waging a major chemical war in Europe. In the 1970s and 1980s the methods for the use of chemical weapons were tried out in Europe in the course of large-scale NATO war games. At the same time an intensive training programme of chemical-service specialists was conducted in the USA and in other NATO countries.

It should be stressed here that the US binary programme will have especially harmful consequences for the peoples of Europe in particular. That continent is already oversaturated with deadly weapons of all types, including chemical warfare agents. As is known, the US arms depots in the Federal Republic of Germany contain thousands of tons of chemical ammunition (shells, aerial bombs, missile warheads and land mines) filled with over 4 million litres of lethal war gases, such as Sarin and VX.

In my view, arguments that invoke the provisions that the NATO countries have given assent to the production of binary weapons in the USA on condition that they would first be stored on US territory and would be shipped to Europe only in an emergency and with the consent of the governments concerned are indefensible. The Pentagon does not plan using the new binary ammunition on US territory. In terms of their performance, binary weapons are viewed as an ideal and effective means for use in Europe. Therefore, Washington intends to deploy its new chemical weapons in Europe at the earliest opportunity, and such an opportunity—a "crisis situation"—can be contrived by the US generals whenever they want.

Washington makes no secret of its plans to deploy binary weapons first of all in the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain and Italy. Europe is being prepared for conversion into a vast "gas chamber" in which, needless to say, the civilians will be the first casualties. US and other Western

experts believe that if just the US arsenals of these weapons of "silent death" now located on West German territory were to be employed in combat operations, no fewer than 100 million people would be affected in Western Europe. And Washington plans to add to its lethal arsenals in West Germany, although the formal "condition" for that country's approval of the start of binary-weapon production was the US pledge to withdraw its fixed chemical ammunition already stored there. Washington, however, is conveniently trying to "forget" this.

The Federal Republic of Germany is assigned a special role in the Pentagon's plans. At least five more depots for binary weapons are to be set up there in addition to the existing ones.

Binary weapons also create a grave threat to states and peoples in other regions of the world. As is known, the Pentagon plans to deploy binary ammunition not only in Europe, but also at its bases scattered all across Asia, Africa and Latin America, as well as aboard the ships patrolling different parts of the world's oceans off the coasts of developing countries. The US military views chemical weapons as an effective means for the realization of Washington's global strategy in "Third World" countries. It is no accident, therefore, that plans are afoot to equip the special Rapid Deployment Force designed for US intervention in different parts of the world with binary ammunition.

In justification of the US binary programme, Washington argues that the "chemical modernization" will allegedly act as an "incentive" for the USSR when it comes to the elaboration of a convention banning chemical weapons. This kind of reasoning is designed to make it appear that the USSR has to be forced into this, although it is precisely the recently made Soviet proposals (to be discussed further on) that have given a fresh impetus to the Geneva talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The USSR has shown much restraint, as is testified to by the cessation of chemical-weapon production in the USSR.

But what grounds has Washington given Moscow for trusting it? After all, it was exactly at the decisive stage of the talks, when the preparation of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons was nearing completion and when the USSR had stopped manufacturing all types of

chemical weapons, that the USA launched its full-scale production of a new generation of those weapons. It has now become exceedingly important that the necessary level of trust for reaching accords on the cardinal problem of chemical disarmament not be undermined. On the contrary, it should be preserved and enhanced.

Another question arises. Can it be that Washington, in its eagerness to see the realization of its binary programme. intends to raise additional difficulties at the negotiations in Geneva, to drag them out so as to substantiate the "unfeasibility" of an early conclusion of the convention and the "inevitability" of the large-scale production of binary weapons? According to the observations of various experts, evidence of such an intention is the passive and non-constructive position of the US delegation at the Disarmament Conference, especially since the summer of 1986 when the US administration finally got congressional approval to finance the binary programme.

The started production of binaries has the potential to greatly increase the danger of chemical arms being proliferated since it is planned to give contracts to a large number of private firms and transnational corporations for their production. Thus the already complicated problems of verifying compliance with the international agreement on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons will be further compounded.

The preparations for the full-scale production of binary weapons have caused grave concern among most of the UN member states participating in the work of the Disarmament Conference. In Western Europe the plans for binary rearmament have triggered a sharp debate. More and more politicians, public personalities and even whole political parties have been making statements demanding the renunciation of the chemical arms build-up, of the development of their new types, and their deployment in Western Europe, and the protest actions of mass organizations have been gaining in scope. Expressing the sentiments of a large number of UN member states, Sweden's Minister of Foreign Affairs Lennart Bodström stated in his address to the 40th session of the UN General Assembly in 1985 that the "plans for the manufacture of binary chemical weapons are a cause of grave

concern". Many states voice their fears that the production of binary weapons will raise additional difficulties to hinder the conclusion of the international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The Soviet Union is firmly against the binary rearmament programme. It has never carried out research into such weapons and has no intention of manufacturing them in the future.

From the Geneva Protocol to the Convention on Chemical Disarmament

Since the Second World War the struggle to ban and eliminate chemical weapons has become an important part of the struggle to curb the arms race and secure disarmament. Although in the first postwar years the threat posed to the world by the advent of nuclear weapons overshadowed, as it were, the danger of chemical weapons, they have always represented, and still do, one of the most acute and pressing problems of international life. In the complicated international situation of the first postwar decades, and despite the "cold war" and the arms race launched by the forces of imperialism, the USSR and other socialist countries, supported by all peace-loving nations, worked hard at the UN to increase the number of states belonging to the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

This document expresses the world's profound concern as regards the consequences of the use of chemical weapons of mass destruction. Being an important international instrument presenting a significant barrier to the use of chemical warfare agents, the Protocol still did not prohibit, and consequently, did not preclude the development, production, accumulation and technical advancement of chemical-weapon arsenals. But the very fact of the existence of the Protocol furnished a strong political and legal foundation for launching a struggle against the growth of the chemical threat.

There are now 103 states that have signed the Geneva Protocol. The USSR, which was one of the first states to accede to the Geneva Protocol, makes strenuous efforts to increase this number. The USA, for one, evaded signing the Protocol for fifty years. It only found it necessary to do this in

1975 after repeated calls from the UN and under pressure from the world public once the facts of the US Army's large-scale use of toxic agents during the war of aggression against Vietnam and other countries of Indochina became known. And even so the USA sought to have a free hand in questions of using particular types of chemical weapons. In the provisos made in connection with its ratification of the Geneva Protocol, the USA reserved the right to use chemical herbicides for the destruction of vegetation at US military bases and facilities or along their defence perimeters, and also to use riot control means for defensive military purposes. It is relevant to note here that US bases are scattered all over the world and the decision as to when toxic agents need to be used for "defensive" purposes is to be made by the US generals themselves.

In 1969 the USSR and other socialist countries submitted a proposal to the UN on radical and simultaneous solutions to the problems of chemical and bacteriological weapons by stopping their production and then eliminating all existing stockpiles. A concrete draft international convention on this question was put forward for UN consideration. The USA and some of its NATO allies, however, proposed first coming to an agreement on bacteriological weapons. Considering that these Western countries were not ready to ban chemical weapons and wishing to hasten at least a partial solution of this all-important problem, the USSR and other socialist countries consented to the conclusion of the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.**

In 1972 the USSR and its allies submitted to the Geneva Committee on Disarmament** a draft *Convention on the*

* This Convention, which entered into force in 1975, became the first measure of real disarmament in postwar history which eventuated in a whole range of dangerous weapons of mass destruction being removed from states' arsenals and destroyed and thus eliminated the possibility of unleashing a war with the use of such weapons. After the ratification of the Convention the governments of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain stated that they no longer had any stocks of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins, or equipment or delivery vehicles. It should be noted that the 1975 Convention also covered toxins which, as is known, can be synthesized not only biologically but also chemically.

** The name of the Disarmament Conference prior to 1984.

The area surrounding a Vietnamese village sprayed with Agent Orange.

In the course of its chemical warfare in Vietnam the United States widely used defoliants containing chemicals extremely harmful to humans. Over two million Vietnamese were directly affected. The long-term genetic effects of toxic agents are especially dangerous.

The chemical warfare caused irreparable damage to Vietnam's environment, reducing 150,000 hectares of tropical forest and ten per cent of the country's farmland to wasteland.

Over 60,000 American and several thousand Australian, Canadian and New Zealand servicemen were also affected by the chemical warfare in Vietnam.

Victims of the chemical warfare in Vietnam.

Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. The draft also included reliable verification measures.

But the USA, which back then was widely using toxic agents in the Vietnam war, took steps to block any such accords. It tried to prevent the prohibition of certain types of chemical weapons, specifically, incapacitating agents. This being the case, the Soviet Union consented as a first step to the prohibition of the more dangerous and lethal types of chemical weapons. Agreement on a joint initiative on this score was set forth in the communique on the results of the Soviet-US summit meeting held in July 1974.

Following the US defeat in the war in Indochina, Washington was compelled to demonstrate a more constructive approach to this problem. From 1976 to 1980 the USSR and the USA held negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The sides reached an understanding on the need for a total prohibition of chemical weapons and their positions drew closer on a range of important questions connected with the formulation of the proposed convention.

But in 1980 the USA broke off those negotiations, as well as talks on a number of other topics having to do with curbing the arms race. It was then that the USA started the implementation of a whole range of programmes for a build-up of its military might. An important role in those militaristic plans was allotted to chemical weapons and preparations for starting the production of the new, binary chemical weapons.

As one of the more topical issues of disarmament, the question of prohibiting and eliminating chemical weapons has been regularly discussed at the sessions of the UN General Assembly over all these years. In its resolutions on this question the Assembly has invariably stressed the need to accelerate the elaboration of the convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and has persistently urged the Geneva Disarmament Conference to do this.

In recent years the Geneva Disarmament Conference has been the main venue at which the questions of banning chemical weapons have been debated. Forty states representing all the principal groups of countries in today's world have

been active in its work: the USSR and other socialist states belonging to the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the Mongolian People's Republic, Cuba and China, the USA and other NATO countries, as well as Japan, Australia and a group of neutral and non-aligned states known as the Group of 21, which includes Argentina, Brazil, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, etc.

The Conference has proven to be the most suitable international mechanism for holding negotiations on chemical weapons. Both the states possessing chemical arsenals and those having the requisite industrial base and advanced chemical industries take part in its work. Since most participants in the Geneva Conference are concerned about an early elimination of chemical weapons, this question has from the very first been accorded priority in its deliberations. The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons was set up at the Conference for the formulation of a draft international convention on chemical weapons.

In 1982 the USSR submitted to the Disarmament Conference a detailed document entitled *Basic Provisions of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction* (it was originally submitted at the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament).

The Soviet-proposed document envisages the pledge of signatories not to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or transfer chemical weapons under any circumstances, and to either destroy the existing stockpiles of such weapons or convert them for authorized purposes and to shut down or dismantle facilities used for the production of chemical weapons.

The *Basic Provisions* also furnished a solid and reliable mechanism for verifying compliance with the Convention based on a suitable combination of national means of verification and international procedures, including regular on-site inspections.

The comprehensive Soviet initiative embodies everything of positive value from the achievements of Soviet-US talks and the proposals of other states. The Soviet draft furnishes a strong foundation for an early reaching of accords on all

aspects of the problem, including verification. The question of verification, by the way, has been used by the USA and some other Western countries as an artificial impediment to the elaboration of the Convention in order to justify their reluctance to go along with a ban on chemical weapons.

For the purpose of making headway at the negotiations and hastening agreement on the draft Convention, the USSR came up with a series of additional constructive proposals, including on the question of verification, at the 1983-85 sessions of the Conference.

In order to enhance the effectiveness of the international regime established by the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the USSR proposed that a ban on the use of chemical weapons together with the corresponding verification procedures be included in the contemplated Convention as well in a special proviso.

Eventually, despite continued existence of considerable differences on a number of questions, the participants in the Disarmament Conference got down to the formulation of the convention's concrete provisions. Much was done along this line from 1982 to 1985. Thanks to the strenuous efforts of the USSR and other socialist and non-aligned countries and the uncreased contribution made by the NATO countries participating in the work of the Conference, the parties managed to make some progress towards coming to terms on a number of important questions. The socialist and non-aligned countries sought to accelerate the elaboration of the convention. If the USA and the NATO countries supporting it were to have shown the necessary political will, there was every possibility for a speedier advance towards agreement on the basic provisions of the Convention. But because of Washington's wanting to have a free hand for the implementation of a large-scale programme for the production of binary chemical weapons this did not happen.

Intent on the development of a new binary arsenal as an instrument for the achievement of military superiority over the USSR, the US administration not only did not show any readiness to adopt a serious approach to the preparation of the Convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, but, moreover, took steps to obstruct this. With exactly this end in view, the USA submitted to the Disarmament Conference its own draft convention in April

1984 containing a number of provisions known to be unacceptable to other partners in the negotiations, discriminatory in their character and envisaging unjustified interference in the civilian activities of the chemical facilities of other countries. The US draft set forth an overly involved system of verification at enterprises of the chemical industry concerned with civilian production. This immediately brought forth objections and doubts as to its feasibility on the part of delegations of many Western countries having advanced chemical industries.

The USA proposed holding obligatory on-site inspections according to a permanently valid invitation whereby foreign inspectors should be given access within 24 hours to any place and any enterprise, depots and other facilities, even those unrelated to chemical production. In proposing such stringent measures of control, not to mention obligatory inspections at short notice, Washington was counting on their being unacceptable to the USSR so that responsibility for a lack of agreement on the accords relating to the convention could be shifted onto the Soviet side. At the same time, the US proposal stipulated that the holding of inspections on request would apply only to government-owned or -controlled enterprises. Thus the US verification scheme envisaged control over all of the enterprises of the socialist countries (since they are all state-owned) while ruling out such control over privately-owned industrial firms and transnational corporations of the USA and its allies.

The very fact that such proposals were submitted, proposals that would quite obviously put the USSR and other socialist countries at a disadvantage, showed that Washington was deliberately advancing unacceptable conditions. On the other hand, the US draft also contained a number of positive proposals that had been put forward by socialist and other countries participating in the Conference. And then during the negotiations themselves the US delegation did its utmost, even within the purview of the convention, to make it so it would be able to retain its industrial base for the production of chemical weapons, especially the latest types. As a result, the American side refused for a long time to accept the Soviet proposal on the concentration of the production of the more dangerous super-toxic chemicals, which were to be permitted

by the Convention in limited quantities, at one specialized facility that would be subject to systematic international inspections. The USA sought to retain the possibility of producing such chemicals in any amounts and wherever and whenever it wanted to.

This position of the US delegation at the negotiations was assessed by many experts at the Geneva Conference as chicanery designed to push the negotiations farther into a quagmire and, by pointing to the lack of progress, be able to justify and start a rapid implementation of the programme for the chemical rearmament of the USA.

For all the complexity of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons at the sessions of the Geneva Conference from 1982 to 1985, the extremely slow advance in the formulation of the Convention was not caused by the impossibility of overcoming difficulties in the dovetailing of technical questions, least of all those connected with verification. The blame for this must be laid on Washington's policy, which threatened mankind with a new spiral in the chemical arms race.

Developments in Individual Sectors of the Struggle

As it presses for a global ban on and the complete elimination of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union, together with other socialist states, also makes efforts to have those weapons barred from individual regions, above all from Europe.

A call **for ridding Europe of chemical weapons** was contained in the Political Declaration adopted in Prague in January 1983 by the Warsaw Treaty Organization's Political Consultative Committee. That call drew a positive response from the European and world public.

In January 1984 the countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization proposed to NATO that they discuss practical aspects of negotiations on the problem of chemical disarmament in Europe. Such talks could involve other European states besides those of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. NATO, however, has not responded to the proposal.

In May 1984 at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe the USSR proposed that chemical disarmament in Europe be discussed as a major confidence- and security-building measure. That proposal was met by the flat refusal of the NATO states to even discuss it.

The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization reiterated its offer to NATO to hold direct talks on chemical disarmament in Europe in its statement issued in Sofia in October 1985. And again NATO refused.

The USSR has supported a number of other measures

aimed at eliminating chemical weapons on a regional scale. Following a series of consultative meetings between the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the West German Social Democratic Party in 1984-1985, the governments of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia proposed on September 13, 1985 to the government of the Federal Republic of Germany that they begin negotiations **on making Central Europe chemical-weapon-free.** They proposed that the sides reach agreement on permanently removing all chemical weapons from Central Europe (i.e., the Federal Republic of Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic).

This peace initiative of two socialist nations aroused a great deal of interest among the European public and in political circles. Quite clearly, such a development would be very important for European peace and security, because it is in Central Europe where the two military and political alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, meet, and the concentration of arms and troops is very high there. The removal of chemical weapons from that zone would considerably lower the level of military confrontation and would be a big step towards eliminating the danger of chemical war, whose effects for densely-populated Europe would be disastrous.

The Soviet Union, for its part, has expressed its readiness to respect such a status of that zone if it were to be established, provided the United States agreed to do the same. When Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev met with French parliamentarians in Paris in October 1985 he said that the USSR was prepared to do all it could to remove chemical weapons from Central Europe.

In December 1985 the leaders of Bulgaria and Romania, in a move that elicited a positive response from the Balkan and European public, called upon the Balkan states **to make the Balkan Peninsula free of chemical weapons.**

The Soviet Union and other socialist states have given their strong support to the efforts of the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania to eliminate chemical weapons from Central Europe and the Balkan Peninsula.

The United States and other NATO countries, however,

refuse to treat the socialist nations' initiatives in a constructive manner, and claim that negotiating a ban on chemical weapons for a limited zone "would undermine international efforts" to prohibit them world-wide.

Naturally, prohibiting chemical weapons and eliminating them everywhere would be the ideal solution. But meanwhile, before a comprehensive treaty banning and eliminating them can be worked out and concluded, it is important to take interim steps leading to that goal. NATO's allegation that it would be difficult to verify observance of a chemical-weapon ban in a limited region does not hold water, for the socialist countries are prepared to introduce provisions that would absolutely ensure verification. All that is needed is the political will, for it has now become obvious that all the difficulties involved in verification in the zones in question can be overcome.

The US arguments that the removal of its chemical weapons from Central Europe would weaken NATO's "deterrence" potential and would even increase the risk of a nuclear war cannot be taken seriously. The fact is that the US chemical weapons deployed in West Germany are not intended for deterrence or for defence against a Soviet chemical attack, for the latter danger has never existed. As with their nuclear weapons, the chemical ones of the United States and NATO are part of an offensive potential; they are first-strike weapons targeted on the Soviet Union and the East European socialist states. One fact to make this point: unlike the United States, the USSR keeps no chemical weapons in the territories of its European allies.

The ultimate goal—universal and complete elimination of chemical weapons—could be brought closer by preventing their proliferation in any form. This is a task that all states could be involved in, both domestically and internationally. That is the position of the Soviet Union and other socialist nations. Some Western states also speak in favour of chemical-weapon non-proliferation. The problem is indeed a very serious one: there are no internationally accepted norms regulating the transfer or acquisition of chemical weapons or the industrial methods and equipment for making them. Needless to say, the unrestrained proliferation of chemical

weapons augments the danger of their being used in a regional conflict.

Mikhail Gorbachev spoke in favour of an international agreement **on the non-proliferation of chemical weapons** along the lines of the one on nuclear non-proliferation during his visit to France in October 1985.

This was reiterated by Mikhail Gorbachev in his statement of January 15, 1986, in which he outlined the Soviet Union's programme for universal nuclear and chemical disarmament by the end of this century. According to that programme, a multilateral agreement banning the transfer of chemical weapons would be an interim step towards the ultimate solution—banning such weapons altogether.

During the Soviet-American summit in Geneva in November 1985, the parties agreed to start discussing the issue of the non-proliferation of chemical weapons. As a follow-up to that agreement, Soviet and American experts met several times in the Swiss capital of Bern in 1986 and 1987 and exchanged information about the two countries' unilateral restrictions in the export of dual-purpose chemicals (those are chemicals that can be used both for peaceful purposes and for the production of chemical weapons). Both sides once again agreed that it was necessary to take effective measures against proliferation of chemical weapons and to continue exchanging information and coordinating international efforts to that end.

Simultaneously with that, the USSR adopted its own measures to contribute to the international effort against the spread of chemical weapons. In January 1986 the Soviet government approved a set of rules regulating the export of chemicals that are used for peaceful purposes but could also be used in the production of chemical weapons. Those chemicals can now be bought from the USSR only by countries that provide guarantees that they will not be used, directly or indirectly, for military purposes, or that they will not be reexported or transferred to third countries without the Soviet Union's consent. A specific list of those chemicals has been made.

Exports of dual-purpose chemicals are regulated in a number of Western countries with advanced chemical industries. Several Western countries, on Australia's initiative, have

been coordinating their national regulations; the Australian Club meets regularly for consultations.

At the same time, a number of developing nations have expressed concern at the Conference on Disarmament that international provisions on chemical-weapon non-proliferation may be used by industrialized Western countries and their major chemical firms to promote their self-interested aims to the detriment of the economic interests of developing countries by impeding the development of their peacefully oriented chemical industries. While this complicates the elaboration of an international agreement on the problem, the USSR and other socialist states understand and sympathize with the developing nations' concern.

The danger of chemical weapons proliferating, however, remains, and this fact requires all states who really want to see the problem resolved to search for ways to deal with the problem, to exchange information and to coordinate their efforts.

At the Turning Point

The Soviet Union advanced a number of major initiatives in 1986-1987 that gave real substance to the talks on a convention banning chemical weapons at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. And so the final goal appeared in sight.

In April 1986 the USSR came out with a complex of provisions for eliminating the industrial base of chemical-weapon production under strict and systematic international supervision. It was proposed that the location of chemical-weapon factories should be disclosed and their production stopped within 30 days of the convention's enactment, that procedures should be worked out for eliminating the industrial base of chemical-weapon production, and that within six months of the convention's enactment the destruction of chemical stockpiles should be started. The elimination of chemical-weapon factories was to begin no later than one year after the convention's coming into force. Among the provisions is one for regular international on-site inspections to be conducted at all stages of the elimination of chemical-weapon factories. It was also proposed that international inspectors be present during all the major dismantling and destroying operations and that a final international on-site inspection be conducted after those operations were completed.

In November 1986 the USSR put forward proposals that opened prospects for agreement on a verifiable ban on the production of chemical weapons at non-military facilities of the chemical industry—a very complex problem that had for a long time been a major stumbling block at the talks. It is planned to establish four regimes of control over the produc-

tion of chemicals falling into different categories according to their toxicity and the hazards they pose.

Category I comprises supertoxic lethal chemicals used exclusively as weapons (Yperite, Sarin, Soman and VX; chemicals that are essential components of binary chemical weapons; and some others). All these chemicals should be withdrawn from serial production. Each signatory to the convention should be permitted to produce a limited quantity of those chemicals (keeping for this purpose one small factory with an annual production capacity of not more than one ton of chemicals whose operation would be under strict international supervision) and to use them for permitted purposes.

Strict control is also envisaged for chemicals of **category II** (these are supertoxic lethal chemicals used for non-military purposes only—in pharmaceutics, scientific research, etc.). Control and supervision could be exercised by the international Consultative Committee currently being established to verify observance of the convention (with each signatory providing it with up-to-date information) and by regular on-site inspections. Thirty days after the convention becomes effective, the signatories should make declarations regarding all of their facilities manufacturing category II chemicals.

Category III covers the key precursors of supertoxic lethal chemicals used for permitted purposes. To ensure that chemical weapons are not manufactured at commercial factories, permanent international supervision should be maintained at factories whose capacity exceeds an internationally set and accepted threshold,

A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS FOR CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT

1874	**A conference on the laws and customs of war is held in Brussels**
1899	**The First Hague Peace Conference on the limitation and humanization of war on land adopted a declaration urging its signatories to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole purpose of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases**
1907	**The Hague Conventions are signed. Article 23 prohibits: a) the use of poisons or poisoned weapons; b) the use of arms causing unnecessary suffering**

and international on-site inspections should be conducted at those facilities having annual capacities under that threshold.

As for **category IV** chemicals (chemicals manufactured in large quantities for permitted purposes that can also be used in chemical-weapon production), it is proposed that all the facilities manufacturing and processing those agents be declared. The signatories to the convention should send regular reports about the operation of those facilities to the Consultative Committee, and international on-site inspections should be conducted where necessary.

The USSR also proposed that immediately upon the convention's coming into force the signatories open all their laboratories and research centres involved in the development of chemical weapons for inspection, and that a regime be established for those facilities to preclude chemical-weapon research and development for as long as the convention is effective.

The Soviet Union proposed in February 1987 that within thirty days of the convention's enactment each signatory declare and specify the location of all of its chemical-weapon depots and the munitions stored in them (both within the country and abroad) and then close them down. This initiative, which includes provisions for international on-site inspections on a regular basis and for permanent monitoring with

1918	**The International Red Cross issues an appeal against the use of chemical warfare agents**
1921-1922	**A conference in Washington reaffirms the declaration on the use of chemical weapons as being in violation of international law**
1925	**The Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare is opened for signature**
1926-1930	**The League of Nations' Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference discusses the prohibition of chemical warfare**

the use of remote sensing and other devices, was helpful in dealing with this complex problem.

A major problem blocking the finalization of the convention—the issue of conducting on-site inspections by request in the event of suspected violations—was brought closer to solution by another Soviet proposal made on August 6, 1987. Addressing the Conference on Disarmament, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said that the Soviet delegation to the talks would proceed from the need to legalize the following provision: requests for on-site inspections must always be honored. Since inspections should be conducted within the shortest time possible, the USSR proposed that inspection groups be allowed to arrive at the installation in question within 48 hours of a request.

These steps, taken by the USSR in accordance with a new way of political thinking, ensured radical solutions to many key problems at the talks. The Soviet proposals took into account the valid considerations and constructive views of the other negotiators. During the discussion of the issue of compulsory inspections on request, for instance, the USSR was accommodating to the position of the United States. Fresh proof of the USSR's sincere desire to reach a mutually acceptable solution to this problem was the Soviet

1932	**The League of Nations Conference on Disarmament adopts a resolution banning chemical and bacteriological warfare**
1969	**A report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations is published on chemical and bacteriological weapons and the effects of their possible use**
1969	**The United Nations adopts Resolution 2603 on the prohibition of chemical warfare**
1972	**A Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction is submitted to the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva by a group of socialist nations (Document CCD/361)**

delegation's agreeing to accept Great Britain's 1986 proposal on "alternative arrangements" as a basis for the ultimate accord.*

In its efforts to bring about the quickest possible completion of the convention, the USSR has also unilaterally taken a number of constructive steps intended to create a better political climate and an atmosphere of confidence at the talks.

In April 1987 the Soviet Union announced that it was stopping the production of chemical weapons and starting to build a facility for destroying them.

Speaking at the Disarmament Conference on August 6,

* The "alternative arrangements" proposal allows a state suspected of violating the convention to offer alternatives to an inspection that would disprove the allegations. Those alternatives may include: observation of the sites of suspected violations, air sampling near those sites, etc. If the state making charges of violations expresses dissatisfaction with the alternatives offered, an inspection is compulsory.



Foreign experts and newsmen being shown standard Soviet chemical munitions in Shikhany in October 1987.

1987, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze invited all the negotiators to visit a Soviet military installation in Shikhany in the Saratov Region to see what types of chemical weapons the USSR had, as well as the mobile units being used to destroy them. The USSR at that time also said that it would accept a US invitation to visit a facility for destroying chemical weapons in Tooele, Utah in November 1987.

On October 3-4, 1987 the delegations of 45 nations, along with experts, diplomats, United Nations representatives, and journalists from many countries, visited a testing ground in Shikhany. They were shown **all** the chemical-weapon delivery systems (19 types) currently existing in the Soviet Union (tube artillery systems and rocket launchers, tactical missiles, aircraft, and close-combat arms), **all** the toxic agents which are currently standard issue of the USSR's Armed Forces, and **all**

A rabbit injected with a chemical warfare agent after it was rendered harmless shows no signs of poisoning.

the types of chemical munitions. The international experts saw a 250-kilogram Sarin aerial bomb turned into harmless scrap metal and by-products by a mobile disposal unit.

According to Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, head of the Swedish delegation and chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the demonstration was important for two reasons: it made it possible to get a deeper insight into the problem and was evidence of the Soviet Union's trust of its partners. He said that what he had seen surpassed his greatest expectations.

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze also said in his speech at the Geneva Disarmament Conference on August 6, 1987 that some time later the USSR would invite experts of the negotiating states to visit a facility for destroying chemical weapons that was then under construction near the town of Chapayevsk.

A chemical arms disposal plant is being built here in the town of Chapayevsk on the eastern bank of the Volga River.

That facility is intended only for destruction, not manufacturing, and will scrap lethal chemical munitions by turning them into non-toxic compounds that can never be made into toxic agents again. Solid and liquid by-products will be incinerated, leaving very little if any waste. The designed facilities and developed processes will destroy all the Soviet stockpiles of chemical weapons within a time-frame specified by the future convention.

Experts from the nations taking part in the talks were able to visit a Soviet military facility at Shikhany. This was a sign of Soviet openness in matters pertaining to chemical weapons and provided a powerful impetus to the further strengthening of confidence-building measures in this field. On November 16-17, 1987 a group of Soviet experts visited a chemical weapons disposal facility of the Bundeswehr at Munster, in the Federal Republic of Germany. On November 18-21, 1987 Soviet specialists also visited a chemical weapons disposal facility in Tooele (Utah), in the United States. We believe that



The plant is to be provided with a purification system that will eliminate the possibility of environmental damage.

reciprocal visits to chemical weapons installations in the states participating in the talks constitute an important confidence-building measure which will become particularly necessary in the concluding stage of the negotiations.

By Joint Efforts

By the end of 1987, as a result of the increased activity of most of the negotiating states and their constructive cooperation in the development of mutually acceptable solutions, the talks on a convention to ban chemical weapons were entering their final phase.

Under the influence of the Soviet Union's constructive stand in matters related to the prohibition of chemical weapons, the United States delegation had to give up a number of discriminatory provisions in its 1984 draft convention and take into account proposals from other negotiating parties, the United States' allies in NATO, and other Western countries. Yet, the American delegation assumed a passive position since official Washington had decided to launch the production of binary chemical weapons. The United States, however, had to consider the views of other negotiation partners, especially those from among the Western countries. This explains the dual and contradictory nature of the American draft.

Along with the negotiations held at the Disarmament Conference, there have been several rounds of bilateral consultations between the Soviet Union and the United States on the drafting of the convention.

Great Britain made a major contribution to the development of the convention banning chemical weapons with its compromise proposal on "alternative arrangements". Another British proposal made in July 1987 to discuss in advance the operation of the verification mechanism provided for by the convention also was responded to positively by the delegations at the talks.

In 1984 China proposed its own "basic elements" of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The delegations of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and Canada submitted working papers with specifications on verification and control, non-production of chemical weapons by commercial industries, and other major provisions of the future convention.

The Group of 21, which comprises neutral and non-aligned nations, has been working to find compromises on outstanding issues. Sweden has been especially active in that work. As Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament that country played an important role in 1987. Pakistan and Indonesia, which have also been actively contributing to the effort, have put forward their own proposal concerning inspections on request. Brazil has proposed that the future convention include provisions that would enable the signatories to develop chemical industries and technology for peaceful uses "without any discrimination", such as on the exchange of chemicals, equipment, and industrial research information for non-military purposes, and on the promotion of peaceful international cooperation in the sphere of the chemical industry.

1973	**A working paper (Document CCD/400) on the prohibition of chemical weapons is submitted to the Geneva Committee on Disarmament by ten non-aligned states**
August 7, 1979	**The Soviet Union and the United States submit to the Geneva Committee on Disarmament their first joint report on the progress made in bilateral negotiations on a joint initiative on the prohibition of chemical weapons (Document CD/48)**
1980	**A working group on chemical weapons is established in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament**

Important contributions to the development of the convention have also been made by other socialist states participating in the talks aside from the USSR—Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Mongolia, and Cuba. Those nations have submitted a number of working papers on all the major sections of the convention.

As most of the negotiating states intensified their efforts, making practical contributions to the development of the convention, by the end of 1987 generally acceptable decisions had been found on just about all the major provisions and the overall structure of the convention, and its preamble and major articles had been fully or partly formulated.

Article I outlines the scope of the ban. The signatories undertake not to develop, manufacture, accumulate, stockpile, or acquire chemical weapons, not to encourage anyone to engage in activities prohibited by the convention, not to use chemical weapons, and also to scrap the existing stockpiles of chemical weapons and dismantle the factories manufacturing them.

Article II gives a number of definitions.

Article III stipulates that the signatories to the convention shall declare their chemical-weapon stockpiles and factories

July 7, 1980	The Soviet Union and the United States submit to the Geneva Committee on Disarmament their second joint report on progress in their negotiations (Document CD/112)
June 16, 1982	At the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Soviet Union submits a draft entitled Basic Provisions of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction
January 1984	The Warsaw Treaty countries make a proposal to the NATO states on the question of freeing Europe of chemical weapons

and submit plans for their elimination, etc. within 30 days of the convention's enactment.

Article IV formulates the procedure for eliminating chemical weapons, which is to start 12 months after the convention comes into effect and end not later than nine years after that. In addition, the signatories are to submit annual reports on the implementation of elimination plans and international on-site inspections are to be conducted regularly, with the installations in question controlled by permanently-stationed inspectors or by technical means.

Article V specifies measures to be taken with respect to chemical-weapon factories. Those facilities are to be declared, equipment transfers and factory closures are to be reported, and general elimination plans are to be submitted. Regular international inspections are to be given access to those facilities to verify their closure and elimination.

Article VI outlines the regime of production and transfers of chemicals for permitted purposes. The signatories to the convention are permitted to develop and manufacture toxic chemicals for purposes not prohibited by the convention (non-military chemical production, pharmaceutics, and so on).

Agreement has been reached to classify toxic chemicals by

April 1984	**The United States submits a draft convention on chemical weapons to the Conference on Disarmament**
June 19, 1985	**The Socialist Unity Party of the German Democratic Republic and the West German Social Democratic Party come out with a joint policy initiative concerning the establishment of a European zone free of chemical weapons**
August 1985	**Representatives of the Socialist Left Party of Norway, the Socialist People's Party of Denmark, the Pacifist Socialist Party of the Netherlands, and the Green Party of the Federal Republic of Germany call on the US administration to renounce the development, production, and deployment of new types of chemical weapons, above all binary munitions**

toxicity, with production and control regimes varying from one category to another, which will ensure that commercial chemical industries are not able to manufacture chemical warfare agents. Categorized lists of chemicals are contained in an annex to Article VI. It is also pointed out that these restrictions should not affect the economic or technological development of non-military chemical industries in any of the signatory states or impede international cooperation in that field.

Article VII deals with the measures to be taken by each signatory state: each one should establish a national body to ensure observance of the convention and to preclude any actions violating it.

Article VIII institutes bodies to enforce and verify the convention's implementation. *A Consultative Committee* comprising all the signatories shall examine all scientific and technological achievements that may affect the convention's implementation; it shall work to promote international cooperation in chemical research and development for peaceful purposes.

The Committee shall be in charge of all verification, elaboration of the procedure for conducting regular international on-site inspections and fact-finding missions in re-

September 10, 1985	**In a conversation with Johannes Rau, Deputy Chairman of the West German Social Democratic Party and Minister-President of North Rhine-Westphalia, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev says the Soviet Union is prepared to respect the status of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe if the United States also does so**
September 13, 1985	**The governments of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia jointly address the government of the Federal Republic of Germany proposing that Central Europe be declared a chemical-weapon-free zone**

lation to the convention's implementation.

An Executive Council made up of representatives of signatory states is to fulfil any function related to the convention's implementation that may be assigned to it by the Consultative Committee.

A Technical Secretariat is to be established to assist the Consultative Committee and the Executive Council in their functions, including provision of technical assistance to signatory states. *An International Inspectorate* will be part of the Technical Secretariat; its task will be to carry out international verification.

Article IX deals with consultations, cooperation, and fact-finding missions, including on-site inspections. Signatory states shall hold consultations, exchange information and cooperate with each other either directly, through the Consultative Committee or other international channels, including the United Nations.

The article will also outline procedures for inspections by request.

Consensus has been reached that **Articles X through XVI** will cover assistance, economic and technological development, the convention's relation to other international agreements, adoption of amendments to the convention, its period

November 21, 1985	**Following the Soviet-American summit in Geneva, the Soviet Union and the United States issue a joint statement reiterating their attitudes in favour of universal and complete chemical disarmament and abolition of chemical stockpiles, and expressing their agreement to start discussing measures to preclude proliferation of chemical weapons**
January 15, 1986	**Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev makes a statement advancing a complex of proposals concerning the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons and the abolition of the industrial base for their production under strict international control**

of validity, enactment and withdrawal procedures, and what languages the document should be written in. Those articles have not yet been worked out in detail, but no major difficulties are expected.

We can say today that generally acceptable solutions have been found to all the basic issues, and no conceivable obstacles exist to impede the convention's finalization.

This is not to say that there are not still a number of technical issues of varying complexity to be settled: the stages of the elimination of chemical stockpiles are to be specified, lists of chemicals for various permitted production regimes and procedure for amending them have to be coordinated, and procedures have to be worked out for compulsory inspections by request, adoption of decisions by the Consultative Committee, and so on.

One major factor creating an atmosphere of uncertainty at the talks and undermining confidence in declarations of readiness to start chemical disarmament is Washington's strategy aimed at producing binary weapons on a large scale.

Several Western states with advanced chemical industries—like the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands—have been working to minimize control over commercial chemical facilities, maintaining that other-

April 1986	**The USSR submits to the Conference on Disarmament a set of proposals concerning the abolition of the industrial base for the production of chemical weapons**
July 1986	**The United States submits a document to the Conference on Disarmament outlining plans to abolish fixed chemical ammunition in connection with its binary weapons programme**
October 1986	**The USSR advances proposals at the Conference on Disarmament concerning the establishment of guarantees that chemical weapons not be manufactured at non-military chemical-industry facilities**

wise "technological secrets" will be endangered and it is important to follow the rule of "non-interference" in non-military chemical production.

Considerable difficulties have been created by France, which insisted that some of the signatory states be permitted to retain a certain amount of "safety-margin" weapons (1,000-2,000 tons of chemical munitions containing nerve gas) till the end of the decade in which chemical weapons are to be eliminated. This proposal, though in line with the programme recently proclaimed in France to develop its chemical "deterrence potential", is at variance with the positions of most other negotiators, who say the production of chemical weapons should be stopped as soon as the convention comes into effect. Therefore, the French proposal concerning "a safety margin" has been strongly criticized by many at the Disarmament Conference.

Experts believe that the convention can be finalized and made ready for signing in 1988. This calls for the political will to reach accord on the outstanding issues and eliminate the existing difficulties, and for active cooperation and interaction among all the negotiators. Now that the development of the convention has entered its final and most important phase, it is essential to avoid steps that could slow down the

1986	**Great Britain submits a proposal on "alternative arrangements" concerning verification to the Conference on Disarmament**
February 1987	**The USSR submits proposals to the Conference on Disarmament concerning the declaration and elimination of chemical stockpiles and appropriate verification measures**
April 1987	**Mikhail Gorbachev announces that the USSR has stopped the production of chemical weapons and started building a facility to destroy chemical stockpiles**
May 1987	**The USSR provides guarantees against the deployment or use of chemical weapons in the Balkan Peninsula**

negotiations and complicate agreement.

The finalization and conclusion of the convention would be promoted if every state without exception were to stop the production of all chemical weapons, refrain from manufacturing binary and other new chemical warfare agents, remove their chemical weapons from foreign territories, and pledge not to deploy those weapons outside their own territories.

When the convention will actually be concluded largely depends on the Soviet Union and the United States, their positions at the talks and their foreign policies in general, since, in the opinion of experts, it is these two powers that have the largest chemical warfare potentials in the world.

When they met in Geneva in November 1985, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan stated their commitment to the idea of a universal and complete ban on chemical weapons and the elimination of all chemical stockpiles; they also agreed to intensify efforts for an effective and verifiable international convention outlawing these weapons. That policy commitment of the two powers remains in effect. The Soviet Union has been honoring it and expects the United States to do the same.

A session of the NATO Council held in Reykjavik in June 1987 gave assurances that the member countries of the North

July 1987	**Great Britain proposes that the verification procedures for a chemical weapons ban be discussed in advance**
August 6, 1987	**The USSR advances an initiative at the Conference on Disarmament concerning on-site inspections in the event of suspected violations of the convention**
October 3-4, 1987	**Diplomatic representatives and experts of 45 states and the United Nations visit a testing ground in Shikhany in the Saratov Region of the USSR and are shown all the existing types of Soviet chemical weapons**

Atlantic bloc were determined to reach an early agreement on a comprehensive, global and verifiable convention to destroy all existing arsenals and prevent any further production of chemical weapons. It is now time to act upon these political statements.

A serious discussion about ways of expediting the drafting of the convention was held at a meeting between the USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and the US Secretary of State George Shultz in Washington in mid-September and then in Moscow in late October 1987. The Soviet side said that it was still determined to work for an early completion of the draft work and signing of the convention. It also suggested additional efforts the Soviet Union and the United States could make to promote this process.

The Soviet side made further steps to meet the United States' position on matters to which the American side has attached special significance, including the American proposal that the Soviet Union and the United States exchange information about their chemical weapons and manufacturing facilities even before the signing of the convention. The Soviet side suggested that the first stage of this exchange begin when the negotiations are still in their concluding stage. The two sides would provide each other with information about the existing arsenals and the number and location of manufacturing and storage facilities for chemical weapons. The next stage of the exchange, involving more detailed information, would also take place prior to the signing of the convention. Each side would be entitled to inspect three declared facilities, according to its choice, and also to carry out three inspections of three unspecified locations arousing suspicions.

The Soviet side proposed exchanging visits of military facilities linked with chemical weapons. It renewed the invitation to American experts to visit a chemical weapons disposal facility under construction near the town of Chapayevsk after the project is completed in 1988.

Serious attention was paid to the problem of eliminating chemical weapons at the Washington summit in December 1987. In a joint top-level statement on the results of the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and President Reagan, both

leaders expressed their commitment to work out a verifiable, comprehensive and effective international convention on banning and destroying chemical weapons. They welcomed the progress achieved so far and reaffirmed the need for more intensive negotiations aimed at concluding a genuinely global convention covering all states capable of producing chemical weapons. The USSR and the USA agreed to continue periodic discussions at the level of experts on the problem of the spread and use of such weapons.

To ensure an early finalization of the convention, it is now necessary to speed up and intensify the talks. A more active interaction and cooperation is needed among all the negotiators and all states wishing to make a practical contribution to the promotion of chemical disarmament.

The struggle to remove the horrible threat posed by chemical weapons continues to need the fresh efforts of anti-war movements, public organizations, and all the forces around the world opposed to the militarists' attempts to impede the solution of this all-important task—the complete elimination of what is one of the most barbarous types of weapons of mass destruction.

1988 CAN AND SHOULD SEE THE START OF UNIVERSAL AND COMPLETE CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT.

Геннадий Степанович Сташевский

ХИМИЧЕСКОЕ ОРУЖИЕ

Станет ли 1988-й годом химического разоружения?

на английском языке

Цена 25 к.

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

Gennadi Stashevsky was born in 1931. He graduated from the Moscow Institute of International Relations. In the sixties and early seventies he worked as a diplomat at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in New York. In the seventies he was deputy head of the Department of International Organizations at the USSR Foreign Ministry. Now he is deputy head of the Office for Arms Limitation and Disarmament of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

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Gennadi Stashevsky is the author of a series of books and many articles in Soviet periodicals on the United Nations' activities, the banning of chemical weapons, and other aspects of arms limitation and disarmament.

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