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Report on the conversation between Marko Nikezic and Dean Rusk at the State Department.

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Summary:

Memorandum of conversation between Yugoslav Foreign Minister Marko Nikezic and Secretary of State Dean Rusk at the State Department. The discussion is a continuation of earlier talks between U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson and Yugoslav president Josef Tito. Rusk and Nikezic clarify the mutual positions of their countries on the crisis in the Middle East resulting from the recent Six-Day War. They also touch upon U.S.-Cuban relations, political developments in China, and tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union over plans for anti-missile systems.

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KABINET DRŽAVNOG SEKRETARA
ZA INOSTRANE POSLOVE
Pov. broj 42939o
Beograd, 5.IX-1967.

GENERALNI KOSMETIČKI I PARFUMSKI
POSLOVNI CENTAR
ODELJENJE ZA MEĐUNARODNE VEZE
Pol. Br. 013/III-427
24. 9. 1967. god.
BEOGRAD

Z A B E L E Š K A

o razgovoru državnog sekretara M. Nikezića sa D. Rask-om u
Stejt Departmentu, 31.VIII-1967.

Prisutni:

Sa američke strane: Din Rask, ministar inostranih
poslova, Nikolas ~~Kacembah~~, zamenik ministra inostranih po-
slova, Džon Ledi, pomoćnik ministra za Evropu, Džozef Sisko,
pomoćnik ministra za međunarodne organizacije, Iusius Batl,
pomoćnik ministra za BI, Berk Elbrik, ambasador u SFRJ.

Sa naše strane: državni sekretar Marko Nikezić,
ambasador Bogdan Crnobrnja, ambasador A. Vratuša, ministar
savetnik M. Bruner, I sekretar ambasade Z. Knežević, referent
u Odseku za SAD S. Pobulić.

Rask napominje da naravno još nisu imali vremena da
detaljno prouče poruku te zbog toga njegova sadašnja izlaga-
nja ne treba shvatiti kao odgovor. Medjutim, pažljivo su je
pročitali i imaju utisak da su neki stavovi bliski njihovima,
dok u pogledu nekih imaju rezervi.

Izlaže da je američki stav i dalje zasnovan na 5
tačaka iz Džonsonovog govora uoči zasedanja SGS.

Želeći da ovu priliku iskoristimo za otvorenu i
iskrenu razmenu mišljenja, pita da li DS ima još nešto da
doda poruci odnosno svom sinoćnjem izlaganju.

DS kaže da bi želeo da pismenom tekstu poruke doda
izvesne komentare o utiscima predsednika Tita iz nedavnih su-
sreta i naša razmišljanja o svemu tome, verujući da će to

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olakšati razumevanje stavova koji su izloženi u poruci. Napominje da je osnovne stvari dan ranije izneo prilikom susreta predsedniku Džonsonu, ali misli da je korisno da ih nešto opširnije kaže i američkom državnom sekretaru /Napomena: Rask nije prisustvovao sastanku kod predsednika Džonsona/.

DS govori o razlikama u prilazu pojedinih arapskih vlada problemima krize, što nije odraz samo različitih pogleda njihovih lidera, već u prvom redu različitog položaja tih zemalja uopšte, a posebno u sadašnjoj krizi.

Kao što je već rekao predsedniku Džonsonu, predsednik Tito nije tražio od arapskih lidera da usvoje njegovo gledište. Međutim, kod Nasera jemogao konstatovati najveće razumevanje i pristupačnost argumentima. Smatramo razumljivim što je UAR, koja je najviše pretrpela, najdalje otišla u realističnom gledanju na mogućnost izlaska iz krize. DS napominje da se vlada UAR nalazi pod pritiscima i sa leva i sa desna, i unutar zemlje i spolja. U ovom momentu nije čak bitno odakle dolaze pritisci sa radikalnim zahtevima za zauzimanje ekstremnih stavova - a dolaze od Alžira do S. Arabije - jer se po dejstvu svode na isto.

U vezi sa primedbom predsednika Džonsona o tome da je teško očekivati jednostavno povlačenje Izraela jer se ovaj s pravom može upitati da li bi posle toga njegovi susedi mogli pokušati da ga "uhvate za gušu", DS želi da izvesna objašnjenja o tome zašto su u tačkama našeg predloga razdvojena pitanja povlačenja izraelskih trupa od problema plovidbe i drugih. Ne radi se o stvaranju mogućnosti da se posle povlačenja izraelskih trupa sa strane Arapa dovede u pitanje izvršenje ostalih tačaka predviđenih sporazumom. Niti kod nas postoji takva ideja, niti smatramo da bi Arapi imali snage da tako postupe. Jasno je da bi sve tačke ovog rešenja morale biti izvršene, samo se postavlja pitanje faza i mogućeteta

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што bi trebalo da bude predmet diskusije. U tom istom smislu, a u vezi sa drugom primečkom predsednika Džonsona da plovidbu kroz Suec ne treba uslovljavati rešenjem drugih pitanja, DS ističe da je plovidba kroz Suec jedna od stvari koje bi morale dobiti svoje rešenje, ali da se predsednik Tito ponovo uverio prilikom posete da, uza sve razumevanje na realne odnose i potrebu političkog rešenja koje ima predsednik Naser, danas ni jedna vlada u UAR ne bi mogla prihvatiti prolaz izraelske zastave kroz Suec, a da se i dalje održi. To je razlog što mi smatramo da se realizacija pojedinih delova sporazuma mora rasporediti u vremenu tako da bude ostvariva.

DS se vraća ponovo na razgovor sa Džonsonom, njegovu izjavu o vitalnim interesima SAD na SI i o potrebi SAD da saradjuje sa Arapima, kao i na ranije izjave predsednika Džonsona, koje je Tito izneo Arapima, o tome da on /Džonson/ ne želi da se učini išta u pravcu ponižavanja Arapa. U vezi s tim DS kaže da u celini predsednik Tito smatra da na bazi dosadašnjih realističnih stavova Nasera situacija može da evoluirati, pod uslovom da pritiscima i preteranim zahtevima sa strane to ne bude onemogućeno. Od predsednika Nasera situacija zahteva hrabrost u preuzimanju odgovornosti u tom pravcu - on je i sam toga svestan, a moram reći da mu je i predsednik Tito u tom pogledu izrazio svoje mišljenje. Međutim, da bi se omogućila kretanja u tom smislu neophodna je dobra volja i spremnost za realno rešenje i sa druge strane, tako da korak s jedne strane bude praćen korakom s druge strane. SAD kao najveća zapadna sila posebno mogu da imaju velik uticaj na držanje Izraela i na razvoj događaja uopšte.

DS je dalje rekao, pozivajući se i na svoj razgovor sa Raskom u junu mesecu, da smo sad još više uvereni da je Naser jedini sa kojim bi se mogao postići sporazum o trajnom miru, jer ima razumevanje za potrebu takvog rešenja, a ima i podršku u zemlji. U vezi s tim napomenuo je da je, razume se, moguće misliti i o rušenju Nasera i da ima ekstremista kod Arapa koji bi mogli želeti da ga zamene. Međutim, oni

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bi se, i kad bi uspeali, sutradan sreli sa istim problemima, našli u istim dilemama, a rešenje bi bilo još dalje, jer u medjuvremenu bi situacija mogla samo da se pogorša. Kao što smo se složili kod predsednika Džonsona, stvari, ukoliko bi bile prepuštene da samo idu svojim tokom, mogu imati samo tendenciju pogoršanja.

Uzimajući reč Rask govori o "faktorima mira na BI" koji su po američkom gledanju sledeći:

1. Odnosi Arapi - Izrael /iznosi istorijat konflikta/;

2. Nesigurnost u odnosima izmedju samih a.z. U tom domenu SAD su zadovoljne što je, kako su obavešteni, u Kartumu postignut sporazum UAR - S. Arabija o Jemenu;

3. Opasnost da SSSR i SAD budu uvučeni u konflikt na BI. Govori optimistički i upadno pozitivno o zajedničkom nastojanju SAD - SSSR da se izbegne njihova konfrontacija. Poziva se i na Glasboro:

4. Ne tako bitna, ali za njih ipak važna okolnost je i to što američko javno mnjenje veoma negoduje zbog prekidanja od strane nekih arapskih zemalja diplomatskih odnosa sa SAD na bazi potpuno neosnovane arapske optužbe o učešću SAD u vojnom sukobu; ovo Administraciji u znatnoj meri vezuje ruke u elastičnijem prilazu UAR i drugim nekim arapskim zemljama /Kongres/. SAD ne plediraju za uspostavu odnosa, ali treba shvatiti "da su i velike sile osetljive".

Prema njihovom gledištu ključno pitanje je zaračeanost. Rask ^upovlači da on nije siguran da se ovo pitanje može rešiti na de facto bazi. Argumentiše da ako a.z. sebi prisvajaju pravo održanja ratnog stanja ne može se to pravo osporiti ni Izraelu. Ovo nije stvar a.z. ili Izraela, nego i drugih. Tako, na primer, kada je Naser pozivajući se na ratno stanje zatvorio Tiranski moreuz, on to nije učinio samo pre-

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ma I. nego i prema drugima, konkretno time je i SAD "uhvatio za gušu".

SAD bi želele da se u pitanju okončanja ratnog stanja postignu potpuno jasna rešenja, jer je to uslov za dugoročan mir u toj oblasti. Oni /SAD/ veruju da će ako to pitanje - ratnog stanja, - bude moguće rešiti, i ostali problemi dobiti druge dimenzije /Kacembah ovde spominje kao primer pravne implikacije i za Suec, ako bi to pitanje došlo pred Medjunarodni sud pravde/.

Rask nastavlja da bez okončanja ratnog stanja ne bi bilo kvalitativne razlike ni kad bi se I. povukao iza linije pre 5. juna. Ako bi SAD tražile od I. da se povuče u sadašnjim uslovima, ovaj bi to odbio pozivajući se na ranije iskustvo, na činjenicu da su se SAD i 1957. angažovale za povlačenje s tim da će mu /Izraelu/ biti garantovana sloboda plovidbe kroz Tiran. Jednostranom akcijom zatvaranja Tiranskog moreuza Naser je u velikoj meri oštetiо i verodostojnost /credibility/ SAD. Podseća da ni tada /1957/ Naser nije bio spreman da sporazum o povlačenju potpiše, ali da ga je, isto tako kao što se i sada predlaže, prećutno prihvatio, ubirajući plodove tog sporazuma.

Zatim Rask opširno govori o sporazumu SAD - SSSR o nacrtu rezolucije pred kraj SGS. Podvlači da su se dve sile bile sporazumele o važnim pitanjima kao što su: postojanje Izraela, okončanje ratnog stanja /uz formulaciju koja bi mogla biti prihvatljiva i za arapske zemlje - ne traži, na primer, formalno priznanje, diplomatske odnose, itd./, rešenje problema izbeglica, slobodna medjunarodna plovidba /pri tome podvlači da je taj sporazum obuhvatao sve vodene puteve - "waterways"-u u množini"/. Po njihovim informacijama, tako su ih i Rusi obavestili, UAR je bio spreman da prihvati to kao bazu, ali su se Alžir i Sirija usprotivili. Na

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nesreću, kaže, u formulisanju arapskih stavova do sada je uvek preovladavala najradikalnija struja. Naglašava da on ni u buduće ne vidi rešenje ako će, na primer, Alžir određivati arapsku politiku. Međutim, ako su Arapi odbili nacrt rezolucije SAD - SSSR, to je učinio i Izrael. Ipak, i sama činjenica da obe strane odbijaju istu stvar, već nešto znači. Ako se već ne može sagledati neka formulacija koju bi i jedni i drugi podržavali, protivljenje suprotne strane može da omogući drugoj strani da to toleriše. Oni /SAD/ bi želeli da se podje od nacрта rezolucije SAD - SSSR koja bi se u odgovarajućoj fazi mogla izneti pred SB. SAD se lažu da vreme ne radi u interesu mira. Možda je bilo potrebno izvesti vreme da se duhovi smire, ali u buduće situacija bi vremenom mogla postati teža.

Rask zatim izlaže gledište da se mora naći put miru u kome neće biti zaraćenih strana, pa će se iz nosnova izmeniti čitava situacija. Kaže da za SAD formule, forumi /koji bi to diskutovali/ i modaliteti nisu bitni i da su oni spremni da saslušaju svaku sugestiju u pravcu osnovnog cilja - trajnog mira.

Rask ističe da je predsednik ^{II}Tito u pravu kada pripisuje velik značaj pitanju izbeglica. Po njihovom /SAD/ gledištu za ovo postoji rešenje, ako se problem oslobodi političkih okvira. Ako bi se, recimo, izbeglicama pojedinačno dalo pravo da se slobodno i tajno izjasne gde žele da žive, oni /SAD/ su uvereni da bi se samo neznatan postotak /10-15%/ izjasnio za povratak u Izrael, a u tom slučaju bi to i Izrael mogao da prihvati. Međutim, sve dok se insistira da sve izbeglice moraju da se vrate, Izrael će biti prinudjen da odbija. Problem nije lak, on se akumulirao i zaoštravao kroz 20 godina; radi konačnog rešavanja treba mu prilaziti kroz "sporedna vrata", distancirajući ga od političke pozadine.

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D.S. kaže da ne bi želeo da bude nekih nesporazuma u pogledu naših /jugoslovenskih/ krajnjih ciljeva. Jugoslavija je kao zemlja istočnog Sredozemlja i neposredno zainteresovana za učvršćenje mira i stabilnosti u ovom regionu i njen interes je i da rešenje krize na BI donese trajan mir. Mi takodje smatramo da primirje nije odgovor na probleme ove oblasti i da bi definitivan i stabilan mir bio u interesu kako Izraela, tako i arapskih zemalja. Na kraju krajeva, arapske zemlje su te koje su stalno pod vojnim pritiskom jačeg protivnika, one od čije se teritorije stalno otkidaju delovi, te bi i njihov vitalni interes bio da se fiksiraju granice i da se one zaštite od takvih akcija.

Medjutim, upravo da bi se postiglo takvo rešenje treba voditi računa o političkom stanju u arapskim zemljama, o tome da predstoji jedan dug put dok se u arapskim masama dodje do razumevanja situacije i da u mnogim stvarima Arapi u ovom momentu ne mogu ići na javne deklaracije. Rešenje bi sigurno bilo u utvrđivanju i poštovanju granica od strane svih država u tom regionu i davanju garancija velikih sila ili UN. Kako bi to bilo formulisano zavisi od toga kako bi tekli razgovori, kojim redom bi se stvari rešavale i u koje vreme, jer, naravno, mnoge stvari koje nije moguće rešiti u toku sledeća dva ili tri meseca, mogle bi se reći i utvrditi u toku jedne ili dve godine. Bitno je da postoji čvrst sporazum svih zainteresovanih o tome da se prihvataju mir i garancije, a treba imati razumevanja za činjenicu da te stvari moraju da idu po etapama.

Rask podvlači da su ovo vrlo poverljivi, otvoreni razgovori izmedju nas. Kaže da je tragično što Arapi imaju osećaj nepravde, da moraju plaćati za grehove Hitlera. Da je on /Rask/ Arapin, verovatno bi i on tako gledao na stvari. Medjutim, on nije Arapin i ne gleda tako na stvari. Njemu se čini da su Arapi svojom nerealnošću više puta "zakašnjavali" u zaštiti vlastitih interesa. Tako je bilo pre isteka mandata 1948, kada je on /Rask/ pregovarao i s predstavnicima Arapa, i s predstavnicima cionističkih organizacija. U ono vreme je, na primer, Feisal bio protiv predloga da se odobri skromna kvota za useljavanje Jevreja od 2500 osoba mesečno, argumentišući da bi Jevreji mogli slati 2500 trudnih žena, što bi stvarno značilo 5000 lica; kasnije, Arapi su odbili rezoluciju UN od 1948, d

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bi to docnije samo zažalili. Pa i nedavno, posle izbijanja neprijateljstava početkom juna, kada su SAD zatražile hitno obustavljanje vatre, Arapi su uz pomoć SSSR odugovlačili sa usvajanjem te rezolucije, što im je samo nanelo znatne štete. Da je ta rezolucija odmah prošla, možda bi se stvari i drukčije razvijale. On /Rask/ se nada da Arapi sada neće ponovo zakasniti.

Zatim izlaže da su Arapi pojedinačno razumni ljudi, ali kada istupaju javno, onda se sasvim drukčije postavljaju. On smatra da je sada neophodno da se sazna šta su Arapi zapravo spremni da prihvate a da ne budu poniženi.

Rask kaže da je do sada govorio o arapskoj strani, sada bi nešto rekao i u vezi sa Izraelom. Važno je, kaže, da razmisle o tome kakva je perspektiva nacije od 3 miliona u moru od 100 miliona Arapa, kojih će uskoro biti 2000 miliona. On je uveren da i mnogi Izraelci o tome razmišljaju i traže puteve pomirenja. Oni /SAD/ ih u tome ankuražiraju.

D.S. kaže da je veoma važno da oni /SAD/ tako misle i da, i oni i druge zapadne zemlje, utiču na Izrael. Bilo bi potrebno, kao što je rekao i Rask, da Izrael vodi računa o budućnosti, uključujući i to da će kroz 30 godina velike zemlje - SAD, SSSR, Kina - možda biti zauzete na drugim stranama, i neće moći posvetiti toliku pažnju BI kao danas, a tada bi odnos snaga između Izraela i Arapa mogao biti bitno drugačiji.

D.S. nastavlja da je to najmanje što se može tražiti od Izraela, jer se od Arapa traže veoma velike žrtve. Mi /Rask i on/ možemo kao posmatrači da hladno rezonujemo o tome šta je neizbežno sada u traženju rešenja, ali treba imati u vidu da su Arapi duboko uvereni u opravdanost svojih žalbi kad govore o proterivanju jednog miliona Palestinaca. Nesumnjivo da je tačno da je Izrael veštač-katvorevina, i to najkasnijeg datuma, država stvorena jednom organizovanom akcijom u XX veku na račun stalnog oduzimanja arapskih teritorija i proterivanja arapskog stanovništva. Mi, Jugosloveni, smo bili sa drugo rešenje, smatrajući mogućim da Arapi i Jevreji žive u jednoj državi, kao što su živeli Jevreji sa muslimanima stotinama godina.

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Do toga nije došlo i Izrael je danas fakat kojimi smatramo da treba prihvatiti. Medjutim, neophodno je da oni pokažu više mudrosti ako žele da budu prihvaćeni za budućnost od svojih suseda, jer uspesi izraelskih generala nisu nikakva garancija za život njihove dece i unuka: oni su samo dokazali da Jevreji mogu biti talentovani i za ratni zanat kao i za druge, kad na njega prionu. Medjutim, to nije najveća mudrost i nije nikakva garancija za budućnost.

Time je razgovor o BI praktično završen.

Nadovezujući na perspektive za budućnost Rask izražava zabrinutost za LA, gde Kastro predstavlja za njih "ozbiljan problem". Kaže da će prisustvovati konferenciji ministara OAD, sredinom septembra, koja razmatra problem Kube i zbog toga neće ići na zasedanje GS sve do 26.IX.

D.S. izražava nadu da će oni /OAD-SAD/ u svojim zaključcima ostati u okvirima političke debate. Rask odgovara da, medjutim, Kuba predstavlja ozbiljan i praktičan problem svojim mešanjem. D.S. kaže da i mi poneki put izvučemo sa Kubancima deblji kraj, npr., u onome što su rekli o nama prilikom zasedanja OLAS-a, ali da ipak smatramo da na reči treba odgovarati samo rečima.

Rask zatim posebno spominje Kinu, da ne razumeju stvarnu pozadinu sadašnjih događaja i da su zabrinuti.

Kao svetlu tačku spominje sporazum sa SSSR o neširenju nuklearnog oružja. Podvlači da je to prvi, a ne zaključni korak. DS odgovara da je veoma važno da to bude samo prvi korak, jer inače bi za nuklearne zemlje predstavljalo jednostranu diskriminaciju, osudu na tehnološko zaostajanje, itd.

Rask govori i o problemu antiraketnih balističkih sistema naglašavajući da bi u nedostatku sporazuma SAD-SSSR o tom pitanju, obe strane morale da besciljno troše desetine milijardi dolara i da bi trka u naoružanju dosegla astronomske cifre, stvarajući ogromne nove opasnosti. Na pitanje D.S. da li o tome već pregovaraju s Rusima, odgovara evanzivno, da nisu još počeli, ali da su spremni na to,

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nastavljajući da je Kosigin došao u Glasboro sa "neosnovanom" pretpostavkom da su SAD zainteresovane samo za ograničenje odbrambenih raketnih sistema, no da su SAD spremne da pregovaraju i o ograničenju ofanzivnih.

Na kraju Rask odaje priznanje naporima predsednika Tita da doprinese stvaranju čvrstog mira na BI, u čemu je njegova uloga posebno značajna s obzirom na odnose sa a.n. Oni /SAD/ žele da nastave sa dosadašnjim razgovorima sa nama na poverljivoj osnovi. Rask će o poruci i razgovorima detaljno obavestiti i Goldberga. Interesuje se kada će D.S. doći na GS, da bi se ponovo sastali.

Prema beleškama ministra
savetnika Dr. Mirka Brunera
odobrio
Marko Nikezić

DOSTAVLJENO:

Kabinetu Predsednika Republike
Kabinetu Predsednika Savezne skupštine
Kabinetu Predsednika SIV-a
Drugu Mijalku Todoroviću
" Edvardu Kardelju
" Koči Popoviću
" Petru Stamboliću
" Ivanu Gošnjaku
" Veljku Vlahoviću
" Nikoli Ljubičiću
" Veljku Mićunoviću
" Nijazu Dizdareviću

u DSIP:

M.Pavićeviću, D.Belovskom, M.Pešiću,
I.Njegovanu, M.Vošnjaku, R.Čačinoviću, R.Uvaliću,
R.Radoviću, D.Petroviću, A.Božoviću, D.Bernardiću,
Ambasadi - Vašington, Političkoj arhivi.

THE CABINET OF THE STATE SECRETARY
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS Confidential Number 429390
Belgrade, 5. IX - 1967.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
THE YUGOSLAV LEAGUE OF
COMMUNISTS
THE OFFICE FOR INTERNATIONAL
CONNECTIONS
Pol. Number. 013/III - 727
24.V 1968
BELGRADE

N O T E S

on the discussions of State Secretary M. Nikezic with D. Rusk in the State Department, 31. VIII - 1967.

Those present:

From the American side: Dean Rusk, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nicholas Katzenbach, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Ledi, Assistant to the Minister for Europe, Joseph Sisko, Assistant to the Minister for International Organization, Lucious Battle, Assistant to the Minister for the Near East, and C. Burke Elbrick, Ambassador to the SFRY.

On our side: State Secretary Marko Nikezic, Ambassador Bogdan Crnobrnja, Ambassador A. Vratusa, Minister Counselor M. Bruner, the Secretary of the Embassy Z. Knezevic, and referent for the Department on the USA, S. Pobulic.

Rusk mentions that of course they have not had enough time to study the message and because of this his current statements should not be seen as an answer. However, they have carefully read it and they have the impression that some of the positions are very close to their own, and they have some reservation concerning others.

He stated that the American condition continues to be based on 5 points from Johnson's speech on the eve of the meeting of the UN General Assembly.

We wanted to use this occasion for an open and honest exchange of views, and asked does the State Secretary have anything else to say concerning last night's presentation.

The State Secretary said that he wanted to add some commentary to the written text of the message concerning the ideas of President Tito from recent meetings and our thoughts about all of this, believing that this will ease understanding of our position which has been stated in the message. He notes that the basics were brought to light one day earlier during the meeting with President Johnson, but he thinks that it is useful to say something in a wider context to the American State Secretary /Note: Rusk was not present at the meeting with President Johnson/.

The State Secretary speaks about the differences and approaches of individual Arab governments to the problems of the crisis, which has not only in expression of different views of their leaders, but firstly it is because of the different positions in general of these countries, especially with the current crisis.

As he already said to President Johnson, President Tito did not ask of any of the Arab leaders that they accept his point of view. However, with Nasser he was able to determine the greatest understanding and the acceptance of his arguments. We view as understandable that the [UAR], which has suffered the most, has gone the greatest distance in terms of a realistic view as to the possible exits from this crisis. The State Secretary warns that the government of the [UAR] finds itself under pressure both from the left and the right, and within its country as well as from the outside. At this moment it is not even important from where these pressures are coming for the radical requests to assume extreme positions - but they are coming from Alzire to Saudi Arabia - because in action they are the same.

In relation to the objection of President Johnson that it is difficult to expect a one sided withdrawal of Israel because it is right to ask that if following this its neighbors would try to "grab it by the throat," the State Secretary desires to explain in detail why in our points of our suggestion the questioning of the withdrawal of Israeli troops was separate from problem of free sailing and others. It is not so that it creates the possibility that following the withdrawal of Israeli troops on the Arab side then it would be brought into question the implementation of the remaining points envisioned by the agreement. Neither do we have such an idea nor do we believe that the Arabs would have the strength to behave in this fashion. It is clear that all of the points of this settlement would have to be implemented, the only question is of phases and the modality as to what should be the subject of discussions. In the same view, and in connecting with the other objection of President Johnson that free sailing through the Suez should not be conditioned to the solving of other questions, the State Secretary states that the sailing through the Suez is one of the issues that needs to receive its own solution, but that President Tito once again was convinced during this visit, that along with all of his understanding for realistic relations and the need for political solution which President Nasser has, that today not a single government in the [UAR] would not be able to accept the passage of the Israeli flag though the Suez, and still remain in power. This is the reason that we believe that the realization of individual parts of the agreement has to be divided in time in order to be achieved.

The State Secretary returns again to the conversation with Johnson, and his statement concerning the vital interests of the USA in the Middle East and of the needs of the USA to cooperate with the Arabs, as well as the earlier statements of President Johnson, which Tito conveyed to the Arabs, concerning those where /Johnson/ does not wish to do anything in the direction of humiliating the Arabs. In relation to this the State Secretary says that as a whole President Tito believes that on the basis of the up to now realistic positions of Nasser the situation can evolve, under the condition that pressure and overboard request from the side does not prevent this. From President Nasser the situation demands courage in his assuming responsibility in this direction - he himself is aware of this, and I must say that President Tito in this view also expressed to him his thoughts. However, so that movement can be allowed in this direction it is necessary that good will and a readiness for a realistic solution be shown from the other side as well, so that a step from one side is followed by a step from the other side. The USA as the largest Western power can especially have a big influence on the position of Israel and on the development of the situation as a whole.

The State Secretary further said, referring to his conversation with Rusk in June, that we are now even more convinced that Nasser is the only one with whom an agreement can be reached for a durable peace, because he has an understanding for the necessity of this type of solution, and he has the support within the country for

this. In relation to this he noted that, it is understood, there can be consideration to the toppling of Nasser and there are some extremists among the Arabs who would perhaps like to replace him. However, they, even if they succeeded, would have to the next day deal with the same problems, and find themselves with the same dilemmas, but a solution would be further away, because in the meantime the situation could only worsen. As we had agreed upon with President Johnson, things, if we were to allow them to follow their own course would only have the tendency to worsen.

Taking into consideration Rusk's words in his speech about "factors of peace in the Near East" which according to the American viewpoint are the following:

1. The Relations of the Arabs - Israel / he went into the history of the conflict/;
2. The insecurity in the relations between the Arab countries themselves. In this domain, the USA is satisfied that, how they were informed, in Cartoum and agreement was reached between the [UAR] - S. Arabia about Yemen;
3. The danger that the USSR and the USA would be pulled into a conflict in the Near East. He speaks optimistically and noticeably positively about the joint policy of the USA and the USSR that they avoid confrontation. He refers to Glassboro as well:
4. Not that importantly, but for them an important development nonetheless is that American public opinion is not very ideal because of the breaking of diplomatic relations with the USA by some Arab countries on the basis of totally unfounded Arab accusations concerning the involvement of the USA in the military conflict; to this Administration to a large extent has its hands tied with an elastic approach to the [UAR] and some other Arab countries / Congress/. The USA is not pleading for the resumption of relations, but it is necessary to understand "that even great powers are sensitive."

According to their point of view the key question is the conflict. Rusk underlined that he was not certain that this question could be solved on a de facto basis. Arguing that if the Arab countries allow themselves the right to maintain the war status then you cannot object to Israel doing this as well. This is not a subject for the Arab countries or for Israel but for others as well. So, for example, when Nasser refers to the state of war and he closes the Tiran moreuz, he did not do this only against Israel but also against others, concretely with this he "grabbed (the USA) by the throat."

The USA would like that the question of ending the war status be resolved through specific solutions, because this is a condition for long term peace in this region. They /USA/ believe that if this question - war status - is possible to solve, then the other problems would gain a new dimension / Katzenbach mentions here as an example the legal implications for Suez, if that question were to appear before the international court of justices/.

Rusk continues that without the ending of the war status there would be no qualitative difference even if Israel were to withdraw to the lines before the 5th of June. If the USA asked of Israel that it withdraw under the current conditions, they would refuse referring to earlier experiences, to the fact that the USA in 1957 also worked for withdrawal but with this that it would be guaranteed /to Israel/ the free sailing through Tiran. The one sided action of closing the Tiran moreuz Nasser has in great measure damaged the /credibility/ of the USA. He reminds us that even then / in 1957/ Nasser was not ready to sign the agreement on withdrawal, but that he, as it is now again suggested, accepted it through silence, harvesting the fruit of this agreement.

Following this Rusk spoke more generally about the agreement of the USA - USSR concerning the draft resolution before the end of the General Assembly. He underlined that the two powers had come to an agreement concerning important questions such as: the existence of Israel, ending the war status/with the formulation which could be accepted also by the Arab countries - it does not demand, for example, a formal recognition, diplomatic relations, and so forth/, the solution of the refugee problem, free international sailing/along with this he underlines that this agreement encompasses all "waterways."/ According to their information, and that is also as they were informed by the Russians, the [UAR] was ready to accept this as a basis, but that Alzir and Syria objected. Unfortunately, he said, in formulating the Arab positions up until now the most radical elements always prevailed. He stresses that he does not see in the future a solution if, for example, Alzir is going to set Arab politics. However, if the Arabs refuse the draft resolution of the USA - USSR, Israel will do the same. Even the fact that both sides reject the same thing, already in itself means something. If it is impossible to already find some formulation to which both one or the other would support, then the objection of the opposing side can allow the other side to tolerate this. They /the USA/ wish to begin from the draft resolution of the USA - USSR which in a responsible phase could be brought before the Security Council. The USA is lying to itself that time is not working in the interest of peace. Maybe it was necessary through some time that the spirits be pacified, but in the future the situation with time may become even more difficult.

Following this Rusk puts out the view that a path to peace has to be found in which there will be no worrying parties, so that the entire situation can be totally renewed. He said that from the USA the formulas, forums/which would be the ones discussed/ and the modality are unimportant and that they were ready to listen to all suggestions in the direction of a common goal - durable peace.

Rusk stressed that President Tito was correct when he placed great importance on the question of the refugees. According to their /the USA/ viewpoint is that a solution exists, if the problem frees itself from its political framework. If, let's say, the refugees were given the individual right to freely and secretly express where they would like to live, they /the USA/ are convinced that only an unimportant percentage /10-15%/ would express their wish to return to Israel, and in this situation Israel would be able to accept this. However, as long as there is insistence that all refugees must return, Israel will be forced to reject this. The problem is not easy, it has accumulated and sharpened through 20 years; because of the final solution it is important to approach it through the "back door," distancing it from its political background.

The State Secretary says that he would not like to have any mist understandings in regards to our /Yugoslav/ end goals. Yugoslavia as a country of the eastern Middle Lands is directly interested in strengthening peace and stability in this region and its interest is that a solution of the crisis in the Near East bring about a lasting peace. We also consider that the ceasefire is not an answer to the problems in this region and that a definite and stable peace would be in the interests of Israel, as well as the Arab countries. In the end, the Arab countries are those that are under a constant military pressure of a stronger opponent, and from which pieces of their territory are constantly taken, so that it would be in their vital interest to affix borders and that they be protected from these actions.

In the meantime, so that this type of solution can be obtained it is necessary to take stock of the current political situation in the Arab countries, that is that it will take a long road until the Arab masses come to an understanding of the situation and that in many things the Arabs in this moment cannot go in the direction of public declarations. A solution would for sure have to include the definition and respect for borders on the part of all states in this region and in giving guarantees on the part of the great powers or the UN. How this would be formulated would depend on how the negotiations went, in which order things would be solved and in what time, because, of course, many things that cannot be solved in the next 2 or 3 months could be

stated and confirmed in the course of one or two years. It is important that a firm agreement of all interested parties exists and that include the acceptance of peace and guarantees, and there should be an understanding for the fact that these things need to occur in a certain order.

Rusk underlines that this is a very confidential, open conversation between us. He says that it is tragic that the Arabs have a sense of injustice, that they have to pay for the sins of Hitler. If he were /Rusk/ an Arab, he would also likely see things this way. However, he is not an Arab and he does not see things in this way. To him it seems that the Arabs with their unrealistic (view) had many times "arrived late" to protect their own interests. That is how it was before the end of the Mandate in 1948 when he (Rusk) negotiated with the representatives of the Arabs and with the representatives of Zionist organizations. At that time, for example, Feisal was against the suggestion that a modest quota for settling Jews be approved of 2500 individuals monthly, he argued that the Jews could send 2500 pregnant women, which would in fact mean 5000 people; later, the Arabs rejected UN resolution from 1948, so that they could only later be sorry for doing so. And not too long ago, after the initiation of the conflict in the beginning of June, when the USA asked for an immediate ceasefire, the Arabs with the help of the USSR delayed the adoption of this resolution, which brought significant detriment to them. If that resolution had passed immediately, maybe things would have developed differently. He /Rusk/ hopes that the Arabs will not now be late again.

Following this he set forth that the Arabs individually are reasonable people, but when they act publicly, then they represent themselves completely differently. He thinks that it is now necessary to find out what the Arabs in fact are prepared to accept and at the same time not be insulted.

Rusk says that he until now spoke about the Arab side, and that now he wanted to say something with regard to Israel. It is important, he says, to think about what kind of perspective a nation of 3 million has in the sea of over 100 million Arabs, which will soon grow to 2000 million. He is convinced that many Israelis also think about this and are trying to find the roads to peace. They /the USA/ are encouraging them in this.

The State Secretary says that it is extremely important that they /the USA/ think like this and that they and other Western countries, influence Israel. It would be necessary, as Rusk even said, that Israel is taking stock of its future, including that through 30 years time the great countries - USA, USSR, China - maybe will be busy in other areas, and they would not be able to devote that much attention to the Near East like today, and then the balance of power between Israel and the Arabs maybe will be significantly different.

The State Secretary continues that this is the minimum that can be asked of Israel, because Arabs are being asked for very significant sacrifices. We /Rusk and he/ can as observers coldly rashen about what is unavoidable now in finding a solution, but you have to keep in mind that the Arabs are deeply convinced in the correctness of their grievances when they talk about the expulsion of 1 million Palestinians. It is undoubtable that it is correct that Israel is an artificial creation, and that in the most recent dates, a state created by a single organized action in the 20th century at the expense of constantly taking Arab territory and expelling the Arab inhabitants. We, Yugoslavs, were for a different solution, believing that it is possible for Arabs and Jews to live together in a single state, like the Jews had lived with the Muslims for hundreds of years.

It did not come to this and Israel is now a fact which we consider that it is necessary to accept. However, it is necessary that they show greater wisdom if they wish to be accepted for the future by their neighbors, because the successes of the Israeli

generals are not any kind of guarantee for the lives of their children and grandchildren: they have only proved that Jews can be talented also for the business of war as for other things as well, when they focus on this. However, that is not the greatest wisdom and it is no kind of guarantee for the future.

With this the discussion concerning the near east was practically concluded.

Tying his comments to the perspective for the future Rusk expressed concern for Latin America, where Castro represents for them "a serious problem." He said that they will attend the conference of ministers of the OAS, in mid September, which will consider the problem of Cuba and because of this he will not be going to the General Assembly all the way until 26th of September.

The State Secretary expresses his hope that they /OAS - USA/ in their conclusions remain in the framework of the political debate. Rusk responds that, in the meantime, Cuba represents a serious and practical problem through its interference. The State Secretary says that even we sometimes end up with the short end of the stick with the Cubans, for example, what they said about us during the meeting of OLAS, but we still believe that nonetheless one should respond to words only with words.

Rusk following this specifically mentions China, that they do not understand the real background of the current developments and that they are concerned.

As a bright spot he mentions the agreement with the USSR of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. He underlines that this is the first and not the final step. The State Secretary responds that it is very important that this be only the first step, because for non-nuclear countries this would represent a one sided discrimination, in which they would be sentenced to technological backwardness, and so forth.

Rusk speaks about the problem of the anti-rocket ballistic systems stating with the absence of an agreement between the USA - USSR about this question, both sides would have to spend without real goals tens of millions of dollars and that this would be an arms race that would reach astronomical figures, creating great new dangers. To the question of the State Secretary if they were already negotiating about this with the Russians, he responds evasively, that they had not yet begun, but they were prepared for this, continuing that Kosigin had come to Glassboro with "an unfounded" assumption that the USA was interested only for the organization of defense rocket systems, but that the USA was prepared to negotiate a limit to the offensive (systems).

In the end Rusk gives recognition to the efforts of President Tito to help build a firm peace in the Near East, in which his role is especially important considering the relations with the Arab nations. They /the USA/ wish to continue with the current discussions with us on a confidential basis. Rusk will in detail inform Goldberg of the message and our discussions. He is interested (to learn) when the State Secretary will come to the General Assembly so that they can meet again.

According to the notes of Minister
Counselor Dr. Mirko Bruner
Approved by
Marko Nikezic

DISSIMINATED TO:

The Cabinet of the President of the Republic
The Cabinet of the President of the Federal Parliament
The Cabinet of the President of the FEC

Comrade Mijalk Todorovic

" Edward Kardelj

" Koca Popovic

" Petar Stambolic

" Ivan Gosnjak

" Veljko Vlahovic

" Nikola Ljubicic

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