

**October 1, 1981**  
**Information on the Position of the CPSU Regarding  
the Polish Situation**

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**Summary:**

ND -- Information on the Position of the CPSU Regarding the Polish Situation and criticism of the actions of Polish party leadership. This document was not dated.

**Original Language:**

Czech

**Contents:**

Translation - English

Regarding the Polish crisis and our viewpoint  
(Information)

For a long time developments in Poland have caused anxiety and concern in our country and in other countries of the socialist community.

The evaluation of events in Poland was presented by L.I. Brezhnev, at the 26th Congress of the CPSU.

The CPSU CC has always kept the party and its friends informed of the situation in Poland, of our steps and of help in stabilizing the situation.

In October and November this year the situation heated up further. The "Solidarity" congress revealed counterrevolutionary intentions to seize power to change the basis of socialism in Poland by:

- transforming socialist public ownership into group and gradually private ownership;
- gaining political power by taking over the Sejm;
- weakening Poland's ties to the countries of the socialist community with an appeal to the peoples of Eastern European countries.

In reality, "Solidarity" has been changing into a political party.

In Poland:

- 1) The leading role of the party has been weakened.
- 2) Deformation of economic and political life is continuing.
- 3) The take-over of plants and distribution of production by "Solidarity" is continuing.

In fact, two actual governments exist. The disruption of the economy is evident in the reduction of the volume of industrial production by 15%, of coal output by 40 million tons and in great inflation.

4) Continuing attacks on the PUWP and as a result of that the disintegration and gradual extinction of the party.

The causes of the crisis have their roots in the past:

- long-standing disquiet in the country, created by the strong position of the Church, where more than 85 % are believers.
- the reality of 74% of agricultural land in individual ownership;
- the influence of petit-bourgeois ideology through the opening of opportunities for the infliction of all contagions of petit-bourgeois ideology;
- voluntarism in economic policy—efforts to achieve a "great leap" in the economy of the country at the price of Western loans;
- in these circumstances a stream of bourgeois ideology arose, especially from the 12 million Poles living in Western countries;
- underestimation of the growth of consumer petit-bourgeois views among the people and members of the PUWP;
- severing of the party from the masses:
- violation of Lenin's principles of building the party. Quick acceptance [of new members] into the party in an effort to reach 3 million party members—they drew in everyone;
- we drew all these facts to the attention of the Polish leadership and many times made them aware of them, including at the 7th Congress of the PUWP.

But the Polish comrades failed to take measures.

Nationalist smugness predominated. Many things were kept from us, particularly the economic relations with the West.

Nationalist forces joined with internal reaction— resulting in "Solidarity."

The leadership of the party and state showed itself to be unprepared and unresponsive. Regarding the international situation, great circumspection is necessary.

After Kania took office we advised him (in September 1980) and emphasized that, with the legalization of the counterrevolutionary forces, it was necessary under the circumstances:

- to strengthen the party and its connection to the masses;
- to strengthen the army and security organs;
- to launch an open and decisive attack on counter-revolution.

Kania agreed with our recommendations but [only] in words, but pursued a policy of compromise with counter-revolution. This occurred out of unwillingness or disinterest. Instead of an attack—defensive tactics and retreat.

30 October 1980 meeting with Kania in Moscow. He agreed with our recommendations and criticisms, made promises but his deeds didn't follow.

5 December 1980 meeting with the representatives of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Moscow, where all participants made the Polish leaders aware of their responsibilities. They also agreed and made promises, but in reality they made concessions.

4 March 1981 meeting with a PUWP delegation after the 26th Congress of the CPSU.

April 1981 Comrades Andropov and Ustinov hold discussions in Warsaw.

May 1981 meeting between Comrades Suslov and Rusakov and Polish representatives.

June 1981 meeting between Comrades Gromyko and Kania.

5 June 1981 letter from the CC CPSU to Polish Communists, which caused a clear delineation between the compromisers and the healthy forces in the CC of the PUWP and in the party.

Telephone conversation between L.I. Brezhnev and Kania before the congress, informing [the latter] of the necessity to defend the healthy forces and revolutionary line, the work of comrades [Politburo member Victor Vasil'evich] Grishin and [Politburo member Arvid Yanovich] Pel'she during the congress.

The letter prevented the destruction of the party, but the leadership continued on its original path.

At the meeting in Crimea in August L.I. Brezhnev again underscored that the PUWP

was continuing to make concessions. But even despite this, further concessions were made to "Solidarity." The path of "renewal" through compromise: "We Poles will come to an understanding."

During that time 37 of 49 county council secretaries had to give up their leadership positions. Kania was the main hindrance in the struggle for socialism. The question arose of restoring the leadership to a sound footing. The Poles put forward Jaruzelski. The army and security forces stand behind him. The healthy forces supported this. Change in the leadership is a positive fact, assuming that the results of the 4th plenum of the PUWP CC 61 are followed up on.

The difficulties in the PUWP as well as in the country remain, the situation is difficult.

Further developments will depend on how consistently the new leadership will work and struggle against Kania's course without Kania.

A conversation took place between Jaruzelski and L.I. Brezhnev<sup>62</sup> in which it was stressed that:

- choosing reliable co-workers was the most important thing;
- it was time to take decisive measures against counter-revolution.

The PUWP CC, the Sejm and the PPR government are taking some measures, but so far the outcome of this has somehow not been clearly apparent. So far they are relying on discussions. They are considering solving [the situation] by means of a National Unity Front.

We are pointing out the possibility that the party may lose its leading role in a coalition with "Solidarity" and the church.

We are securing the supplies of goods in their original volumes and also in the future. But hereafter everything will depend on the character of the internal political situation in Poland. The support of the healthy forces—one of our tasks.

Overall our course lies in:

- preserving the PUWP as the leading force;
- preserving the Polish People's Republic as an ally;
- saving socialism in the PPR.

The danger has not been eliminated, the struggle will continue.

Lessons from the crisis in Poland.

1. The successful building of socialism is [only] possible under conditions when general principles are consistently implemented in the building of a new society. Deviation from these [principles] leads to crises.

2. Maintaining high political vigilance. To see not only successes, but also errors and failures in time to analyze and eliminate [them].

3. We attach great importance to strengthening the party's leading role and of the party's connection to the masses, to the strengthening and development of socialist democracy, to internationalist education in the socialist spirit, to intensifying of the ideological struggle against bourgeois ideology.

4. The present international situation has become worse and the enemies would like to "feather their own nest" provoking us to become involved in Polish affairs, hoping that our nerves will fail.

In this situation a special vigilance and self-control is essential so it will not lead to their [the enemies'] coming in the other countries, to the isolation of the socialist community and to an increasing danger of military conflict.

5. We are looking for ways to find a political solution. There is still a possibility to prevent disaster. The PUWP must find ways to alter developments.

The tasks facing our party:

- 1) To strengthen the connection with the working class, to lead a decisive struggle against failures.
- 2) To increase awareness, not to permit deviations from the policy of the party.
- 3) Our line towards Poland is correct. The support of the healthy forces and working with the leadership of the PUWP and the country.
- 4) The USSR will make use of its influence in the international arena so as not to allow an escalation of Polish events in other countries.

The plenary session of the CC fully approved the political line and the practical action of the Politburo of the CC CPSU relating to the crisis situation in Poland.