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Pakistani Ambassador Raza Pays Formal Visit to Chinese Premier Zhou

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Summary:

Zhou Enlai and Pakistani Ambassador Raza discuss Chinese and Pakistani relations with India, especially Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's positions on Kashmir, Sino-Indian border disputes, and Sino-Indian interactions on Taiwan and Tibet.

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Abstract of Conversation: Pakistani Ambassador Raza Pays Formal Visit to Premier Zhou

(Not yet examined by parties concerned)

--- Raza passes on letter from Pakistani foreign minister to Premier Zhou. He explains the reasons for Pakistan joining the military bloc; says Nehru has adopted two-faced tactics, playing underhanded tricks while claiming neutrality, always going back on his word and bullying the Pakistani side on Kashmir and other issues. ---

Time: 5 September 1962, 9:30-10:30 p.m.

Location: Zhongnanhai, Xihua Hall

Accompanying Attendees: Department Director Zhang Wenjin, Deputy Department Director Ge Buhai

Translator: Zhong Shukong

Stenographer: Ma Jiexian

Passes On Letter From Pakistani Foreign Minister to Premier Zhou

After an exchange of pleasantries, [N.M.] Raza conveyed Ayub [Khan]'s hopes for the further development of the Sino-Pakistani friendship, and passed on a letter from Pakistani Foreign Minister [Muhammad] Ali [Bogra] to Premier Zhou (already translated and printed). After reading it, the premier said thank you for the foreign minister's friendly letter with its expressions of goodwill and for the friendly wishes from the Pakistani president that the ambassador has conveyed. China has the same hopes; it is willing to advance Sino-Pakistani friendship, and solve the problems that need solving. At the same time, [Zhou] welcomed Raza back to the post of ambassador; [he] believed this would contribute to reaching an agreement on border issues.

Raza expressed [his opinion] that the border issues were easy to solve. He would give his all in an effort to advance the two countries' relations. Sino-Pakistani friendship was his wish. He was an army man, not a diplomat, so he could not play a diplomat's tricks; when handling issues, he was always willing to take a direct approach. He had spoken straightforwardly to the [Chinese side] about a variety of his own opinions, including dissenting views, with the result that his reputation was sometimes affected. But the three years he had spent in China in the past [had] made his country understand that he would not conceal his point of view, and was devoted to Sino-Pakistani cooperation. He was very happy that it was for this very reason that he had been sent to China as ambassador again.

The premier said that [we] believe that the three years the ambassador spent in China in the past had a positive impact on Sino-Pakistani relations. The ambassador often talked with us about the Pakistani situation, and conveyed the positions and policies of the New China to his own country's government; during the Bandung Conference, [he] carved out a way for the Chinese and Pakistani premiers to meet; although the two sides held differing opinions, through [their] contact during the Bandung Conference, they established a friendship and the beginnings of understanding. [We] welcome you taking the post of ambassador to China once again; the two countries' increased understanding and developing friendship will enable you to fulfill new tasks and make greater contributions. We welcome your direct manner; debate sometimes also has benefits, and will advance [our] understanding of each other.

Raza said, I have also frequently spoken with the Pakistani president and foreign minister, [of the fact that] in terms of understanding China and the Chinese people, I bear a heavy responsibility. China's leaders always listen very patiently to other people's ideas, even if they don't agree at all with these kinds of ideas. The premier said getting along with each other in this way is beneficial to [our] work and the two countries' relations, and should be kept up. Raza continued: While in France, I once got in a ferocious debate with [Charles] de Gaulle; de Gaulle was very angry, [so] I had to take my leave. The next day I received a letter from de Gaulle saying, "We two are both army men, and we are also both fools; let's dine together."

When speaking of [the fact that] the Pakistani president was also an army man, Raza said Ayub once worked under him for 15 years, and every time [Raza] was promoted, Ayub took his [old] place; later Ayub rose above him. But Ayub was very capable, and very determined. The premier said, The ambassador rose slowly because he joined the diplomatic ranks. Pakistan needs determined people [who] don't handle matters according to the old conventions. China and Pakistan discussing and negotiating border issues—this, as far as the nations of the military bloc were concerned, is not handling matters according to the old conventions.

Explains the Reasons for Pakistan Joining the Military Bloc, Says Nehru Has Adopted Two-Faced Tactics, Plays Underhanded Tricks While Claiming Neutrality

When The premier mentioned the military bloc, Raza said that was a defensive treaty, and was not aimed at China. The premier said I agree that this is your country's view, but as far as the United States is concerned, that's not the way it is at all. Raza said that [we] do not take aim at China; this is Pakistan's policy. For example, the United States wanted Pakistan to dispatch troops to Thailand, and Pakistan refused. The premier continued [to say] but the United States sent troops. Raza explained, Pakistan's main difficulty is that India wants to make Pakistan suffer, cut off Pakistan's water sources, occupy Kashmir, and try all it can to do away with Pakistan. Thus, we have to look for some friends so as not to be in an isolated position. These are just background circumstances provided for the premier's reference. If Pakistan had no dispute with India, Pakistan would not form an alliance, wouldn't join anything. India is dealing in underhanded tricks, instigating Side A to oppose Side B, bullying Ceylon, Burma, Pakistan, Nepal, the Bhutan, Malaysia and other countries. It doesn't dare bully China, because China is a major power. The premier said India has already made incursions into China. He continued, "You have the ability to fight [India] out [of there]; we can't." When Kuwait declared independence, Menon said that Britain's territorial possessions all belonged to India. The premier said Nehru has revealed this kind of thinking in his past writings, so India sees China's Tibet, Xinjiang and Aksai Chin as its own. Nehru has always wanted to inherit the British imperial legacy. Our People's Daily wrote an article about Nehru's philosophy. [We] can provide the ambassador with a copy.

Raza said Nehru is playing a two-faced game; a few years ago, India was always saying to China that India's arms weren't aimed at anybody; it was that [they] feared Pakistan attacking India. Pakistan has 100 million people, India has 400 million people—how can Pakistan attack India? But India said to the United States and Britain that India did not fear Pakistan and India's arms were aimed at Communist China.

The premier said I did take in your analysis of Nehru at that time. Nehru's claims of peaceful neutrality and peaceful coexistence are influential across the world, and also, at that time his plot concerning Tibet had not yet been revealed; thus, there was no reason to oppose him. But we do not condone his lack of fair play. During the Bandung Conference, we advocated bringing all sides together, but Nehru wanted to argue with everybody. Raza said my appraisal of the Bandung Conference is, Nehru wanted to be the leader, [but] the result was that China became the leader. You [all]

were very calm and didn't talk much, but Nehru was very nervous, and as a result he lost everything. Those are the facts.

The premier said your criticism of Nehru is right. We never wanted to be the leaders or anything of the sort; we went to join in the conference and learn how to interact with each country as equals. At that time, The premiers of five sponsor nations including Pakistan and Ceylon stated that they did not understand Sino-American relations or the Taiwan issue. We expressed a willingness to talk about it, but Nehru was opposed. The result of our talk was very good; it made clear that the tense situation of China and the United States in the Taiwan region could be resolved through peaceful negotiations, but that Taiwan is absolutely a Chinese province, the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair and outside interference would not be tolerated; this led to ambassador-level Sino-American talks in Geneva. Nehru wanted to monopolize [the conference] and keep us from raising this issue. At the time, the premiers of Pakistan and Ceylon also asked me, if Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] were willing to return to the Mainland, would he be given any [position of] status? I said that [this] would surely be no problem.

The Premier Explicitly States [China's] Attitude Toward Kashmir; Raza Says Nehru Went Back on His Word on the Kashmir Issue and Other Issues

The premier said that another matter is [our] attitude toward Kashmir. We have repeatedly demonstrated that China holds a neutral stance: [we] have not stated that Kashmir belongs to [this or] that side, but have advocated seeking a resolution for this issue through peaceful negotiation. We also listened to India's opinion, but did not express any preferences. We respect the two sides' resolution reached through negotiation. We do value the ambassador's explanations on this issue and the many Pakistani leaders continuously talking to me about it. This has all had an effect. We are not biased in favor of any one side on the issue of the Kashmir state, and India is displeased with me. During my second visit to India, Nehru repeatedly hinted about this issue. He deliberately invited a Kashmiri prince to a banquet; I did not take any notice of it. We adopted an extremely objective attitude, but he just had to interfere in China's internal affairs and engineer the Tibet incident. During my second visit to India, he received the Dalai Lama, [so] it was absolutely clear that he wanted to get involved in subversive activities. At that time the seeds for the Tibetan revolt were sown, and in the end the 1959 revolt happened. Then I understood that Nehru had inherited the British imperial legacy's ideology in a profound way. A government friend from a friendly Southeast Asian nation said to me, Nehru's ideology is the British ideology. I said these words were right.

Raza said that this is quite correct. Nehru claims to be neutral, but the more one researches [the matter] the clearer it becomes that Nehru is not neutral; [he] is, with the name of neutrality, carrying out underhanded tricks and two-faced cheating, fleecing both sides.

The premier said, objectively speaking, Nehru did make a definite impact at that time. If he had opposed holding the Bandung Conference, the conference could not have been held. Sukarno, the Pakistani president and we all favor holding a second Bandung Conference. Now there are already 23 countries that support holding the conference, but it could not be held if Nehru opposed it. The Pakistani ambassador said, "It is said that Nehru is now also willing to hold the conference." The premier went on to say, "he has to participate, but also says there's no need to hold the conference—it's still two-faced tactics. In fact, he wants to hold a conference in Belgrade with non-aligned nations. We have no share in it, and neither do you. We are both aligned nations."

Raza said one can understand a person being neutral, but being neutral doesn't mean adhering to one kind of policy today and another kind tomorrow. For example, the

incident that occurred in Jakarta. In the past, Nehru always said that Jiang Jieshi was a puppet, but today he's gotten together with Jiang. We are not neutral at all; we did not curse Jiang, but we do not stand together with him either. With Nehru, it's, today call a certain person a rascal, tomorrow love him, and the day after tomorrow assassinate him; this is what we cannot understand. When Nehru visited Pakistan in 1960, he said let us forget the Kashmir dispute, and in a spirit of mutual concession, the three sides together [can] discuss the issue and make a decision outside of the United Nations. In the end, the two sides issued a joint communiqué signed by Nehru and Ayub, agreeing to resolve the Kashmir state issue through negotiation. Three days later, Nehru went to New York; at just that time, the United Nations General Assembly was being held, and a reporter asked him, "Have you resolved the Kashmir issue?" He said Kashmir is a part of India, there is no such thing as the Kashmir issue. The reporter said this is what the communiqué you signed said. Nehru answered: I don't remember signing any communiqué. When somebody does something, there must be lines they do not cross; they [cannot] claim to be neutral, and yet keep doing whatever they please.

The premier said, Nehru does not now say he is neutral, he says he is non-aligned, and is cheating [people] out of [their] money everywhere. We must respect those who truly advocate neutrality; this can advance world peace. Raza said anyone would respect [this], [I] completely agree. But Nehru has never been neutral. Four days ago, India's government newspaper also mentioned that Nehru goes back on what he says. The premier said Nehru's reputation has declined not only in India, but across the world. Raza also mentioned that in the news he had provided [to Zhou] two days ago it was said that Ceylon's Senanayake stated in Parliament that if Ceylon trusted Nehru, Kashmir's misfortune would fall on Ceylon's head, and Ceylon would thus be lost. The premier said, finally, that the Pakistani ambassador is now more qualified to speak when it comes to talking about India. There is, indeed, in Nehru's thinking, the ambition to inherit the great British Empire. That article we wrote touched on this issue in a preliminary way. We have spoken quite enough about Nehru; let's talk about it again later.

Copied and sent to:

[Zhou] Enlai, [Deng] Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, Yang Shangkun, Luo Ruiqing, Kong Yuan, [Party] Central Confidential Office, Foreign Affairs Office (4), Investigation (4), Military Intelligence [Bureau] (2), Public Security Bureau, General Staff Department
Chen, Zhang, Ji, Geng, Huang, Qiao, Han, General Office (3), Research Office, Asian Affairs Department Number One (2), Information Department, Department of Consular Affairs, Department of Treaty [and Law], [Chinese] embassy in Pakistan, Ambassador, 3 copies to place on file. Total of 40 copies printed

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