

**September 15, 1978**

**'Congressional Consultations on Pakistan,' State  
Department cable 235372 to US Embassy Vienna**

**Citation:**

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**Summary:**

Plans for meetings with Congress members to discuss resuming aid to Pakistan. Talking points include the cancellation of the French reprocessing plant deal and the importance of Pakistan's position in the Middle East. Also includes discussion of Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, technical capabilities, and the United States' efforts to block their nuclear development.

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JOE NYE AND I PLAN TO MEET WITH GLENN AND ZABLOCKI EARLY NEXT WEEK. AFTER THESE MEETINGS WE WILL HOPEFULLY BE IN A POSITION TO SCHEDULE FURTHER MEETINGS ON THE HILL.

2. THURSDAY MORNING (SEPT 14) I MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM ALL THE CONCERNED OFFICES TO REVIEW TALKING POINTS FOR THE GLENN/ZABLOCKI MEETINGS. ALL PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS COULD BE USED FOR THE GLENN/ZABLOCKI MEETINGS. A MODIFIED VERSION OF THESE TALKING POINTS WOULD BE USED FOR MEETINGS WITH OTHER SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN. PLEASE REVIEW THESE POINTS AND LET ME HAVE YOUR COMMENTS BY OPENING OF BUSINESS MONDAY (SEPT 18). *(Comments attached.)*

TALKING POINTS FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH GLENN AND ZABLOCKI

-- WE'VE BEEN WORKING INTENSIVELY FOR WELL OVER A YEAR WITH BOTH THE FRENCH AND PAKISTANIS ON THE PROBLEM OF THE REPROCESSING PLANT.

-- I AM NOW HAPPY TO REPORT ON A SUBSTANTIAL STEP FORWARD TOWARD OUR OBJECTIVE OF PREVENTING PAKISTAN FROM ACQUIRING A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY. WE ARE NOW SATISFIED THAT THE FRENCH WILL NOT GO FORWARD WITH THEIR CONTRACT AND THAT NO SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT FOR THE PLANT HAS BEEN OR WILL BE TRANSFERRED.

-- WE BELIEVE OUR LOW-PROFILE IN WASHINGTON ON THIS SUBJECT (DURING THE LAST SEVERAL WEEKS) HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY HELPFUL IN TERMS OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH AND WILL CONTRIBUTE TO OUR ABILITY TO COOPERATE WITH THEM ON OTHER IMPORTANT NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES. IT COULD SEVERELY EMBARRASS THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IF WE WERE SEEN

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*see Smith's  
Comment,  
attached*

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TO BE TAKING CREDIT FOR WHAT IS THEIR DECISION.

-- (IF ASKED ABOUT ASSURANCES: FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS NEITHER THE FRENCH NOR PAKISTANI GOVERNMENTS WISH TO MAKE PUBLIC THE FACT OF CANCELLATION, AND WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE IN TERMS OF OUR RELATIONS WITH BOTH COUNTRIES TO TRY TO HAVE THEM DO SO.)

-- WE HAVE COME TO DISCUSS WITH YOU HOW WE CAN NOW GO FORWARD TO RESTORE A NORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT PAKISTAN IS AN IMPORTANT COUNTRY AND THAT WE HAVE IMPORTANT INTERESTS IN THE REGION. THE SITUATION IN IRAN IS WORRISOME AND AFGHANISTAN CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS DESTABILIZING FACTOR. INTERNALLY PAKISTAN IS A DEEPLY TROUBLED LAND. THE BHUTTO PROBLEM HANGS LIKE A SHADOW OVER THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE. PAKISTAN FEELS THREATENED BOTH FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT. A DISINTEGRATING OR RADICALIZED PAKISTAN COULD DIRECTLY THREATEN OUR MAJOR INTERESTS IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.

-- PAKISTAN SEES HERSELF SURROUNDED BY UNFRIENDLY OR UNSTABLE STATES, AND IS LOSING CONFIDENCE IN THE WILL AND ABILITY OF THE US, OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES AND CENTO TO PROVIDE SECURITY DURING THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD.

-- TAKING INTO ACCOUNT BOTH OUR NON-PROLIFERATION INTERESTS AND OUR BROADER REGIONAL CONCERNS, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO MOVE FORWARD TO RESTORE MORE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN NOW THAT THE SPECIFIC ISSUE OF THE FRENCH REPROCESSING PLANT IS BEHIND US. WE BELIEVE

THAT A RESUMPTION OF AID AND LIMITED MILITARY SALES COULD GIVE US SOME INFLUENCE ON GDP POLICIES AND PERHAPS RELIEVE SOME OF THE TENSION AND SENSE OF

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ISOLATION WHICH GIVE PAKISTAN GREATER INCENTIVE TO MOVE COVERTLY IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD.

-- AS I SAID AT THE OUTSET, CANCELLATION OF THE REPROCESSING CONTRACT IS AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD. NEVERTHELESS, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE ON THE REPROCESSING PLANT DOES NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF PAKISTAN AS A POTENTIAL PROLIFERATOR. I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU OUR THINKING AS WE LOOK BEYOND THIS IMPORTANT MILESTONE.

-- THE MOTIVATING FORCE FOR A NUCLEAR OPTION REMAINS UNDIMINISHED -- NAMELY THE FEAR OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN'S DESIRE TO COMPENSATE FOR A PERCEIVED INDIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. IN RECENT MONTHS, PAKISTAN'S SECURITY CONCERNS HAVE BEEN HEIGHTENED BY THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION WHICH HAS LED TO INCREASED SOVIET INFLUENCE IN KABUL. PAKISTAN IS ALSO DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT ANY INSTABILITY IN IRAN.

-- AWARE OF PAKISTAN'S STRONG MOTIVATION, WE HAVE BEEN MONITORING THE SITUATION VERY CAREFULLY AND, I MIGHT ADD, WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. THIS WILL FOCUS NOT ONLY ON ANY INDIGENOUS EFFORT AT REPROCESSING, BUT ON OTHER AREAS AS WELL.

-- WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT PAKISTAN CAN OBTAIN SENSITIVE ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES FOR THE FRENCH REPROCESSING PLANT. YOU MAY HAVE SEEN PRESS REPORTS ABOUT POSSIBLE CHINESE ASSISTANCE BUT WE HAVE BEEN ASSURED BY THE CHINESE THAT THEY HAVE NO INTENTION TO DO SO. WE HAVE ALSO UNDERTAKEN A STUDY OURSELVES OF PAKISTANI CAPABILITY TO PROCEED WITH THE PLANT ON ITS OWN, AND

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WE DO NOT THINK THEY HAVE THE TECHNICAL SKILLS AND INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY TO COMPLETE THE FRENCH PROJECT IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

-- WE RECENTLY OBTAINED SOME EVIDENCE THAT PAKISTAN IS LOOKING INTO THE GAS CENTRIFUGE PROCESS WHICH COULD, OF COURSE, PERMIT THEM TO PRODUCE HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM. THE PAKISTANIS HAVE BEEN SHOPPING AROUND FOR SOME EQUIPMENT WHICH MIGHT BE USED IN THE CENTRIFUGE PROCESS.

-- WE ARE STILL ANALYZING THE AVAILABLE INFORMATION, BUT THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS IN ANY CENTRIFUGE EFFORT

ARE ENORMOUS AND WE BELIEVE WE CAN CONTROL THIS THROUGH NUCLEAR SUPPLIER CONSULTATIONS. WE ARE WORKING WITH OTHER SUPPLIERS TO RESTRICT PAKISTANI PURCHASES OF ITEMS WHICH MIGHT BE USED IN A CENTRIFUGE OR OTHER PROGRAMS.

-- IT IS CLEAR THAT PAKISTAN'S INTENTIONS IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD BEAR CLOSE WATCHING AND WE NEED TO PURSUE POLICIES WHICH DEAL BOTH WITH PAKISTAN'S MOTIVATION AND WITH ITS CAPABILITIES TO PURSUE THE NUCLEAR OPTION IF IT SO CHOOSES.

-- WE WILL MAKE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THAT OUR SUPPORT -- ECONOMIC, MILITARY OR OTHERWISE -- IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT PAKISTAN WILL NOT ACQUIRE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY. WE WILL, OF COURSE, EXPLAIN TO THEM ALL RELEVANT LEGISLATION. WE WILL ALSO SEEK TO AT LEAST MITIGATE PAKISTANI MOTIVATION BY ATTEMPTING TO MOVE INDIA TO ACCEPTING FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AND BY SUPPORTING A SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE.

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-- IN SUM, WE THINK IT IS IN US NATIONAL INTEREST TO RESTORE OUR RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN, A CRITICAL COUNTRY IN AN UNSTABLE REGION. THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS SHARE THE COMMON OBJECTIVE OF LIMITING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. WE THINK WE HAVE A GREATER CHANCE OF DEALING EFFECTIVELY WITH THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM IN THE LONG RUN IF WE REKNIT OUR TIES WITH PAKISTAN. AS WE KNOW, IN THE CASE OF OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE MOTIVATION TOWARD A NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION, SUCH AS SOUTH AFRICA, TAIWAN, SOUTH KOREA, WE HAVE TO CONSTINUOUSLY WORK ON THE PROBLEM IN A VARIETY OF WAYS AND THIS WE FULLY INTEND TO DO.

-- WE THINK THAT ANY ALTERNATIVE COURSE WOULD HEIGHTEN PAK INSECURITY, GIVE THEM GREATER MOTIVATION TO GO IT ALONE IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD AND WOULD NOT SERVE OUR GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS IN THE REGION. CHRISTOPHER

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