

November 8, 1978

**'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' US
Embassy West Germany cable 20685 to State
Department**

Citation:

"'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' US Embassy West Germany cable 20685 to State Department", November 8, 1978, Wilson Center Digital Archive, Mandatory Declassification Review request. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #3.

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Summary:

West German response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate and expressing surprise that Pakistan was attempting to complete the reprocessing plant.

Credits:

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English

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E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MNUC, TECH, PK

SUBJECT: US DEMARCHE ON PAKISTANI REPROCESSING PLANT

REF: STATE 281962

1. WE MADE DEMARCHE REQUESTED IN REFTEL TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY LAUTENSCHLAGER, HIGHEST POLICY LEVEL OFFICIAL IN FONOFF WITH RESPONSIBILITIES IN THIS FIELD IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO US. WE MADE POINTS PARA 2 REFTEL AND LEFT NON-PAPER.

2. LAUTENSCHLAGER SAID AT OUTSET THAT HE WOULD MAKE CERTAIN THAT USG REQUEST WAS REPORTED IMMEDIATELY TO CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE, ECONOMICS MINISTRY AND POSSIBLY SCIENCE MINISTRY, AT A LEVEL AND IN A FASHION THAT WOULD RESPECT CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION. HE MADE POINT AND REPEATED IT LATER THAT IT COULD DO SERIOUS DAMAGE TO WEST'S RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN, WERE NEWS OF USG APPROACH TO LEAK. HEADLINE "US AND FRG IN NUCLEAR BOYCOTT OF PAKISTAN" WAS LAST THING HE WANTED TO SEE AT THIS JUNCTURE IN RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND ITS NEIGHBORS. WE HEARTILY CONCURRED.

3. LAUTENSCHLAGER WENT ON TO EXPRESS SOME SURPRISE AT

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USG CONVICTION THAT PAKISTAN SEEKING TO MOVE TOWARDS COM-
PLETION OF REPROCESSING FACILITY. HE STATED, AND ROUGET
(FONOFF) CONFIRMED, THAT MOST RECENT REPORTING FROM FRG
EMBASSY IN PAKISTAN TENDED TO DISCOUNT THIS POSSIBILITY.

4. NONETHELESS, IN A PRELIMINARY WAY, HE COULD ASSURE US
THAT FRG WOULD TAKE OUR APPROACH FULLY INTO ACCOUNT
SHOULD THERE BE ANY ATTEMPT BY PAKISTAN TO ACQUIRE REPRO-
CESSING TECHNOLOGY, OR EQUIPMENT IN FRG. IN THIS CONNec-
TION HE RECALLED FRG'S OWN PLEDGE IN JUNE, 1977, NOT TO
PERMIT FURTHER EXPORT OF SUCH SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY OR
EQUIPMENT. THIS, ALONG WITH IAEA AND SUPPLIER'S CLUB
RULES, AND US APPROACH, WOULD BE PRINCIPAL CRITERIA
AGAINST WHICH ANY PAKISTAN REQUEST FOR EXPORT LICENSE
WOULD BE JUDGED.

5. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, HE BELIEVED THAT FRG HAD MORE
THAN ADEQUATE CONTROL OVER EXPORTS. HE STATED AND
ROUGET CONFIRMED THAT FRG EXPORT CONTROL LIST COVERED
ALL NUCLEAR SENSITIVE ITEMS. ANY APPLICATION FOR SUCH
EQUIPMENT REQUIRED SPECIFIC LICENSE FROM ECONOMICS
MINISTRY. ALL SUCH LICENSES WERE COPIED TO FOREIGN
MINISTRY WHICH SCREENED THEM PRIOR TO LICENSE ISSUANCE.
HE, THEREFORE, DOUBTED IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR SUCH
AN ITEM TO BE LICENSED INADVERTENTLY.

6. ROUGET ASKED FOR LATEST US READOUT ON HOW MUCH IN WAY
OF REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGY FRENCH MAY HAVE ALREADY
SUPPLIED PAKISTANIS, AND WHETHER ANY EQUIPMENT FOR REPRO-
CESSING PLANT MAY HAVE ALREADY BEEN EXPORTED BY FRENCH.
HE SAID WE WERE NOT CERTAIN, BUT WOULD RAISE THIS WITH
WASHINGTON.

ACTION REQUESTED: ANY INFORMATION BEARING ON THIS POINT.
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7. FINALLY LAUTENSCHLAGER PROMISED KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US SINCE, AS HE INDICATED, FRG SHARED USG NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES AND WOULD BE CONCERNED OVER POSSIBLE ACQUISITION BY PAKISTAN OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY.

8. EMBASSY COMMENT: LAUTENSCHLAGER'S VIEWS WERE OF COURSE PRELIMINARY AND LABELED AS SUCH. MIGHT BE USEFUL, IF WE HAVE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE BEARING DIRECTLY ON PAKISTANS ATTEMPT TO COMPLETE CHASMA PLANT AND BUILD PINSTECH FACILITY, TO SUPPLY THAT TO FRG. THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL IN DISPELLING ANY LINGERING DOUBTS FRG MIGHT HARBOR OVER SERIOUSNESS OF PAKISTANI INTENTIONS.
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