

## November 8, 1978

## 'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' US Embassy West Germany cable 20685 to State Department

#### Citation:

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### **Summary:**

West German response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate and expressing surprise that Pakistan was attempting to complete the reprocessing plant.

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## **Original Language:**

English

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E. O. 11652:

関TAGS: MNUC, TECH, PK

SUBJECT: US DEMARCHE ON PAKISTANI REPROCESSING PLANT

REF: STATE 281962

WE MADE DEMARCHE REQUESTED IN REFTEL TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY LAUTENSCHLAGER, HIGHEST POLICY LEVEL OFFICIAL IN FONOFF WITH RESPONSIBILITIES IN THIS FIELD IMMEDIATELY MANAILABLE TO US. WE MADE POINTS PARA 2 REFTEL AND LEFT NON-PAPER.

2. LAUTENSCHLAGER SAID AT OUTSET THAT HE WOULD MAKE CERTAIN THAT USG REQUEST WAS REPORTED IMMEDIATELY TO CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE, ECONOMICS MINISTRY AND POSSIBLY SCIENCE MINISTRY, AT A LEVEL AND IN A FASHION THAT HOULD PRESPECT CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION. HE MADE POINT AND REPEATED IT LATER THAT IT COULD DO SERIOUS DAMAGE TO WEST'S RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN, WERE NEWS OF USG APPROACH TO LEAK. HEADLINE "US AND FRG IN NUCLEAR BOYCOTT OF PAKISTAN" WAS LAST THING HE WANTED TO SEE AT THIS JUNC-MENTURE IN RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND ITS NEIGHBORS. MHEARTILY CONCURRED.

LAUTENSCHLAGER WENT ON TO EXPRESS SECRET .

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USG CONVICTION THAT PAKISTAN SEKING TO MOVE TOWARDS COM-PLETION OF REPROCESSING FACILITY. HE STATED, AND ROUGET (FONOFF) CONFIRMED, THAT MOST RECENT REPORTING FROM ERG EMBASSY IN PAKISTAN TENDED TO DISCOUNT THIS POSSIBILITY.

- 4. NONETHELESS, IN A PRELIMINARY WAY, HE COULD ASSURE US THAT FRG WOULD TAKE OUR APPROACH FULLY INTO ACCOUNT SHOULD THERE BE ANY ATTEMPT BY PAKISTAN TO ACCOUNT CESSING TECHNOLOGY. OR EQUIPMENT IN FRG. IN THIS CONNECTION HE RECALLED FRG'S OWN PLEDGE IN JUNE, 1977, NOT TO PERMIT FURTHER EXPORT OF SUCH SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY OR EQUIPMENT. THIS, ALONG WITH IAEA AND SUPPLIER'S CLUB RULES, AND US APPROACH, WOULD BE PRINCIPAL CRITERIA AGAINST WHICH ANY PAKISTAN REQUEST FOR EXPORT LICENSE WOULD BE JUDGED.
- THAN ADEQUATE CONTRUL OVER EXPORTS. HE STATED AND POUGET CONFIRMED THAT FRG EXPORTS. HE STATED AND ALL NUCLEAR SENSITIVE ITEMS. ANY APPLICATION FOR SUCH EQUIPMENT REQUIRED SPECIFIC LICENSE FROM ECONOMICS MINISTRY. ALL SUCH LICENSES WERE COPIED TO FOREIGN MINISTRY WHICH SCREENED THEM PRIOR TO LICENSE ISSUANCE. HE, THEREFORE, DOUBTED IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR SUCH AN ITEM TO BE LICENSED INADVERTENTLY.
- TO. ROUGET ASKED FOR LATEST US READOUT ON HOW MUCH IN WAY OF REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGY FRENCH MAY HAVE ALREADY SUPPLIED PAKISTANIS, AND WHETHER ANY EQUIPMENT FOR REPROCESSING PLANT MAY HAVE ALREADY BEEN EXPORTED BY FRENCH. WE SAID WE WERE NOT CERTAIN, BUT WOULD RAISE THIS WITH WASHINGTON.

ACTION REQUESTED: ANY INFORMATION BEARING ON THIS POINT.
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7. FINALLY LAUTENSCHLAGER PROMISED KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US SINCE, AS HE INDICATED, FRG SHARED USG NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES AND WOULD BE CONCERNED OVER POSSIBLE ACQUISITION BY PAKISTAN OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY.

B. EMBASSY COMMENT: LAUTENSCHLAGER'S VIEWS WERE OF COURSE PRELIMINARY AND LABELED AS SUCH. MIGHT BE USEFUL, IF WE HAVE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE BEARING DIRECTLY ON PAKISTANS ATTEMPT TO COMPLETE CHASMA PLANT AND BUILD PINSTECH FACILITY, TO SUPPLY THAT TO FRG. THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL IN DISPELLING ANY LINGERING DOUBTS FRG MIGHT HARBOR OVER SERIOUSNESS OF PAKISTANI INTENTIONS, STOESSEL

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